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Abstract 
 
Over recent times there has been significant interest in corporate governance by 
the popular press, regulators and academics after strings of spectacular corporate 
failures. Governance research, however, appears to have been contextually-bound, 
focussing mainly on organisations with freely traded shares. The governance of 
co-operatives, despite their significance to the world and New Zealand economies, 
has received scant research focus. The New Zealand dairy industry, which is 
dominated by co-operatives, contributes 25 percent of exports and ten percent of 
GDP to the local economy, yet there appears little understanding and empirical 
research of co-operative governance. Reviews of the managerial corporate 
governance and co-operative literatures also suggest there is currently no all-
encompassing theory of the governance of co-operatives. Given these gaps in the 
literature, the aim of this research is to inductively develop a theory of the roles of 
governing boards of New Zealand and Australian co-operative dairy companies 
from the perspective of the participants.  
 
In order to achieve this aim, a case study method inspired by Eisenhardt (1989a) is 
selected to guide the research. Fieldwork utilising semi-structured interviews with 
governance participants from six co-operative cases is used to gather a broad and 
deep picture of co-operative board roles. By analysing data within case and 
comparing across cases, the understandings from the empirical data provide the 
basis to develop the theoretical model. 
 
Drawing from these understandings, this study will look at board member roles in 
terms of their activities and the process in which they engage. This research results 
in a theoretical model deeply informed from practitioners’ views to provide a 
unified theory of governance. Upon theoretical saturation five unique theoretical 
concepts and relationships between them emerge from the analysis with an 
intimate link to the empirical data: Exogenous-Issues, Supplier-Shareholder-
Needs/Benefits, Supplier-Shareholder-Controls, Board Architecture and Board 
Roles. Subconcepts within the Board Architecture concept are: Individual-
Distinctions, Engagement-Forums, and Dynamics. Four Board Role concepts 
emerge Unite, Strategic-Involvement, Control and Serve. The resultant model of 
co-operative board roles presents new insights, is logically coherent, has a good fit 
with the data and is reasonably parsimonious.  
 
A contribution to knowledge of corporate governance and agricultural co-
operatives is achieved through an integrative and nuanced understanding of co-
operative board roles. The findings also highlight individual director contributions 
to the role; a unique addition to governance studies. The model also begins to 
highlight the relationships between key actors and the processes used in decision 
making. The theoretical model’s similarities to and divergences from existing 
theories of corporate governance are drawn to illustrate the contribution of the 
model. 
 
This thesis provides researchers, practitioners, educators, regulators and policy 
makers in the corporate governance and agricultural co-operative fields, insights 
into the current and ongoing roles of co-operative boards. The theoretical model 
establishes foundations for further study into how directors can more effectively 
govern their co-operatives. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the thesis. The aim of the research is 
clarified followed by an indication of the significance of the study. This is 
followed by a statement of the research problem and the research question. The 
research methodology and method chosen are introduced along with role 
theory. This is followed by a section discussing the scope and limitations of the 
thesis. A summary is then given.  
1.2 The Research Aim 
 
The aim of this research is to inductively develop a theory of the roles of 
governing boards of New Zealand and Australian co-operative dairy 
companies from the perspective of participants. That is, the purpose is to gain 
an insight into the “black box” (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007) of co-operative 
governance1 and understand from those involved what boards of directors 
actually do; their relationships and the processes they go through in making 
board decisions.  
 
In inductively developing a theory, the research: 
 
• Critiques the literature on corporate governance to gain an 
understanding of the current knowledge and theories driving corporate 
governance research.  
• Contextualises the study from an analysis of agricultural co-operative 
structures and practices worldwide, with a particular focus on 
Australasian agricultural co-operatives. 
• Evaluates prior studies. 
• Selects and justifies an appropriate methodology and methods for the 
study. 
                                                 
1 A term used in this thesis to distinguish the governance of co-operatives from corporate 
governance, a term often associated with the governing of publicly listed companies with 
freely tradable shares. 
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• Acquires knowledge and documents the internal workings of governing 
boards of dairy co-operatives in New Zealand and Australia to evaluate 
current role practices and expectations of role practices of dairy co-
operative governing boards. By obtaining empirical data from key 
participants in governance relationships, practices and aspirations of 
actors are evaluated. 
• Conducts within-case and cross-case analysis to compare and contrast 
board roles, processes, relationships and decision making.  
• From this empirical data inductively develops a theory of the roles of 
governing boards within the context of New Zealand and Australian co-
operative dairy companies. 
• Concludes on the implications and opportunities for future research. 
1.3 The Research’s Significance 
 
The significance of the subject area can be seen at different levels. Corporate 
governance is of importance to society in general, and business in particular, 
nationally and internationally. Yet little seems to be known about how boards 
of directors (boards) work in practice (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007; Pye & 
Pettigrew, 2005). The co-operative sector, and the dairy industry in particular, 
are also very important.  
1.3.1 Corporate Governance 
 
Much of the world’s economic activity is undertaken under the guidance and 
supervision of governing boards. The activities of companies affect almost 
every citizen (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005) and the “health of our organisations, 
economies and society rely on us understanding how boards can influence firm 
performance” (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004b, p. 442). Boards have legal 
responsibility for the activities of companies and all critical decisions 
regarding companies are made by boards (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005). Boards are 
the organisation’s ultimate corporate decision makers (Nicholson & Kiel, 
2004b) and have been described as the "apex of the firm's decision control 
system" (Fama & Jensen, 1983b, p. 311). Boards are considered vital to 
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organisations (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005) and collectively determine the 
organisation’s fate, both positively and negatively (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005).  
 
Internationally, corporate governance issues have increasingly been in the 
spotlight over the past few years after a “spectacular sequence of US corporate 
crises” with the collapses, among others, of Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and 
Arthur Anderson (Clarke, 2005, p. 598). Huse (2003) sees governance as being 
of overriding importance as these scandals are “essentially about corporate 
power and the lack of ability to control this power” (p. 212). Corporate 
governance issues are also regularly in the mainstream media in New Zealand 
(e.g., Bradley, 2008) and of interest to policy makers worldwide (Ingley & van 
der Walt, 2005; Vinten, 2002). 
1.3.2 Co-operatives 
 
In the broad context of this research, co-operatives are significant as they 
represent a substantial share of most developed market economies (Hansmann, 
1999). Co-operatives are estimated to be responsible for one-third of the 
world’s agricultural food supply (Pattison, 2000; Skurnik, 2002). Ranked by 
revenue, a dairy co-operative is by far New Zealand’s largest company and 
there are five co-operatives in the top 15 New Zealand companies (Deloitte, 
2008).  In New Zealand, four of the five largest food and beverage companies 
are operated under the co-operative model and account for over half of the 
sector’s total revenues (Nowell, 2006). The more specific context of this 
research, dairy co-operatives, is particularly significant to New Zealand. 
Fonterra Co-operative Group Limited (Fonterra), New Zealand’s largest dairy 
co-operative, is the world’s largest exporter of dairy products, with revenues of 
over NZ$19.5 billion accounting for 25 percent of New Zealand’s exports in 
the year ended 2008 (Fonterra, 2008), and over 10 percent of New Zealand’s 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
 
The governance of co-operatives goes to the heart of the structure that makes 
co-operatives unique from other organisational forms (Barton, 1989b). Dunn et 
al., (2002) suggest that user-control is the most critical of the co-operative 
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principles when operating in a co-operative manner. They believe that it is 
through user-control that “members ensure business outcomes are consistent 
with their goals for their cooperatives” (Dunn et al., 2002, p. 34).  At the core 
of the user-control principle is the board and its composition. So much so that 
Dunn et al., (2002) see the single most critical factor to co-operative success in 
the 21st century as being co-operatives having “highly competent directors who 
understand how to exercise effective control over their cooperatives and do so 
in a manner that promotes the best interests of the member-users” (p. 35). 
 
Despite co-operatives’ undoubted success internationally, there has been doubt 
about the ability of directors on the governance boards of agricultural co-
operatives. The criticisms include being too old, ill informed, unimaginative, 
lacking the necessary skills, being production rather than market-led and 
staying on the board too long unchallenged (Anderson & Henehan, 2003). 
New Zealand economist Gareth Morgan (2000) scathingly referred to farmer-
politicians as “simpleton peasant politicians who would better serve making 
the tea” (p. 18).  
 
Despite the importance of the co-operative model to New Zealand, there 
appears to be little understanding and empirical research of its governance. 
Beginning to understand co-operative governance may assist in understanding 
the spectacular success of the co-operative business form. 
1.3.3 Practitioners and Policy Makers 
 
This research may be significant to practitioners and policy makers. The 
importance of governance and the disillusionment of various stakeholders with 
current governance arrangements lead to a pressing need to understand how 
boards actually work. As Leblanc (2004) suggests, “uncovering how boards 
work has tremendous practical significance” (p. 440). The principal aim of this 
research is to conceptualise board roles from evidence obtained about dairy co-
operative board practice within the New Zealand and Australian dairy industry. 
As such, this research may be of value to practising directors, particularly in 
the field of co-operative governance. It may also be of use to regulators as this 
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research provides evidence of the utility of existing theories upon which many 
of the laws, regulations and codes of practice are based.  
1.3.4 Theory Precedent 
 
The study of co-operative governance is significant theoretically, empirically 
and contextually. However, it is a complex area. There does not appear to be 
an all encompassing theory of corporate governance (Carver, 2007; Lockhart, 
2006). Existing theories are said to be inadequate for their purpose (Leblanc & 
Gillies, 2005; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Zona & Zattoni, 
2007). These inadequacies may be even more pronounced in the specific 
context of co-operatives (Cornforth, 2002; Jussila & Goel, 2006). This 
research contributes to knowledge by providing an empirically-informed 
theory of corporate governance contextualised to the agricultural co-operative 
sector. 
 
The disappointment with current governance practices and its theories has led 
to a need for research on how boards behave (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; Ruigrok 
et al., 2006). Boards are small decision-making groups who tend to meet 
infrequently and are secretive (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005). Even though their 
decision-making tasks are complex and multifaceted (Forbes & Milliken, 
1999), little is known about what they do and how they do it. This research 
will add to the small but growing pool of qualitative research looking at 
understanding the processes of corporate governance (Finkelstein & Mooney, 
2003; Pettigrew, 1992, 1997). 
 
The study of corporate governance has traditionally been contextually bound 
and has concentrated on US corporations with freely tradable shares (Deutsch, 
2005). Despite this concentration of research, other organisational forms carry 
out a vast range of the world’s economic activities but may or may not require 
similar governance structures (Pye & Pettigrew, 2005; van der Walt et al., 
2002).  Co-operatives offer a significantly different ownership structure from 
which to study governance (Jussila et al., 2005). Cornforth (2004) sees the 
governance of co-operatives as an area that requires in-depth case studies 
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which “examine the dynamics of relationship between boards and managers 
and how they attempt to tackle the problems and dilemmas they face” (p. 27). 
 
In summary, given the importance of corporate governance, the background of 
disappointment by stakeholders, the absence of co-operative-based governance 
development, and the lack of descriptive empirical data, it is believed that this 
study is significant as it makes an important contribution to the knowledge of 
the governance of co-operative businesses. The understandings to be 
developed may not only be of value to the dairy industry but also to the 
governance of all co-operative and mutual organisations. A theory on the roles 
of governing boards of New Zealand and Australian dairy co-operatives also 
potentially establishes a foundation for further theorisation into how directors 
can more effectively govern their organisations. This research may assist in 
closing what Brennan (2006) refers to as the “expectation gap” between “what 
stakeholders ... expect and what boards of directors can reasonably contribute” 
(p. 577). 
1.4 Problem Statement  
 
Little appears to be known about how boards of directors actually work in 
practice and how they make decisions (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005). Much of the 
existing literature is survey-based, looking at governing boards from the 
outside (Parker, 2007). Over a decade ago, Fox (1996) observed that empirical 
research on boards appears “more-or-less non-existent” and “the most 
promising area for international governance research” (p. 19). Ten years on, 
despite some tentative breakthroughs (see for example, Huse, 2007; Leblanc & 
Gillies, 2005; Stiles & Taylor, 2001), similar needs are still being expressed 
for in-depth qualitative research into governance (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007; 
Levrau & Van den Berghe, 2007b; Parker, 2007). One of the reasons cited for 
this lack of progress is the difficulty in getting inside the “black box” of 
governance (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005; Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007; Levrau & 
Van den Berghe, 2007b; Lockhart, 2006; Long et al., 2005; Pettigrew, 1992; 
Rindova, 1999). As Leblanc & Schwartz (2007) note, “gaining access to 
corporate boardrooms is extremely difficult if not virtually impossible for most 
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researchers” (p. 846). The dearth of knowledge is even more pronounced in the 
co-operative sector despite their economic contribution. 
1.5 Methodology and Method 
 
Cognisant with the recognised gap in the literature and given the need for 
qualitative research in this area, this thesis uses a method inspired by 
Eisenhardt’s (1989a) multi-case approach (outlined in chapter 6). Fieldwork 
utilises semi-structured interviews with participants and archival data to 
document the roles and relationships of co-operative boards. The empirical 
data is used to inductively drive the construction of a theoretical model of the 
roles of governing boards of New Zealand and Australian co-operative dairy 
companies. 
1.6 Role Theory 
 
As the aim is to develop a theory of the roles of governing boards of co-
operatives, an understanding of the concept of role and role theory (Biddle, 
1979; Biddle & Thomas, 1966) is helpful. In this section, the concept of role is 
defined, role theory is discussed with an emphasis on organisational roles and 
its applicability to this research is highlighted. Although the term ‘role’ is 
widely used in the corporate governance literature, it is seldom defined there 
(see for example, Hung, 1998; Mintzberg, 1983; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Role 
theory was developed in, and restricted to, 1970’s literature, with the notable 
exceptions of Stewart (1991) and Roberts and Stiles (1999). This study uses 
role theory to describe the essence on which this theory is being developed. 
 
Role theory has its roots in social psychology, sociology, and anthropology 
(Biddle, 1979, p. ix). Biddle (1979) simply defines a role as “those behaviours 
characteristic of one or more persons in a context” (p. 58), or more 
comprehensively, as “a behavioural repertoire characteristic of a person or a 
position; a set of standards, descriptions, norms, or concepts held for the 
behaviours of a person or social position; or (less often) a position itself” (p. 
9). O’Sullivan, et al., (1994) define roles as “socially defined positions and 
patterns of behaviour which are characterized by specific sets of rules, norms 
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and expectations which serve to orientate and regulate the interaction, conduct 
and practices of individuals in social situations” (pp. 270-271). Both Biddle 
(1979) and O’Sullivan et. al., (1994) highlight some essential features of roles 
as the behaviours of people, social positions, norms, and social situations 
(contexts).  
 
Roles are also described by listing their characteristics (Biddle, 1979, p. 59). 
There are several criteria that can be used (often simultaneously) to identify 
roles: person-associated, contextual, functional roles and task analysis, 
complexity, expected roles and authority structures (Biddle, 1979). O’Sullivan 
et al., (1994) define role-players and roles in terms of their expected 
behaviours:  
... individuals occupying certain positions or roles within society are 
expected to ‘act’ and behave in certain predictable ways, to follow  and 
conform to certain rules and  norms that may exist  independently of 
the particular individual involved. (p. 271; their emphasis) 
 
Roles are often associated with norms of behaviour. This study adopts this 
perspective on ‘role’ and is concerned with the norms of behaviour of dairy co-
operative boards and their members. As a person’s total set of behaviours 
would be difficult (and probably not useful) to describe, role descriptions are 
usually limited by context in some way. This study limits the context to 
describing the behaviours characteristic of persons in their roles as governing 
directors of New Zealand and Australian co-operative dairy companies.  
 
Within an organisational context Katz and Kahn (1978) also take a 
behaviouralist view:  
 specific forms of behaviour associated with given positions; they 
 develop originally from task requirements. In their pure or 
 organizational form, roles are standardized  patterns of behaviour 
 required of all persons playing a part in a given functional 
 relationship, regardless of personal wishes or interpersonal obligations 
 irrelevant to the functional relationship. (p. 43) 
 
The emphasis again is on persons, behaviours, processes and contexts. This 
definition is useful for this study as it emphasises how behaviours are attached 
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to organisational ‘roles’. Expanding on this theme, Biddle (1979) states that 
(behavioural-based) role theory is based on five underlying propositions: 
1. Some behaviors are patterned and are characteristic of persons within 
contexts.  
2. Roles are often associated with sets of persons who share a common 
identity (i.e., who constitute social positions). 
3. Persons are often aware of roles, and to some extent roles are governed 
by the fact of their awareness (i.e., by expectations). 
4. Roles persist, in part, because of their consequences (functions) and 
because they are often imbedded within larger social systems.  
5. Persons must be taught roles. (p. 8) 
 
Role theory generally views organisations as complex social systems set up to 
achieve tasks. Katz and Kahn (1978) link, for example, ‘behaviour’, ‘activities’ 
and ‘systems’ into their comprehensive view of ‘roles’.  
 
Katz and Kahn (1978) define human organisations as “open systems of roles” 
(p. 178) using the term “office” to describe an organisational position. Each 
office has relationships with other offices and to the whole system. Katz and 
Kahn (1978) believe that “associated with each office is a set of activities or 
expected behaviours. These activities constitute the role to be performed, at 
least approximately, by any person who occupies that office” (pp. 188-189). It 
is these “activities” within the context of dairy co-operatives in New Zealand 
and Australia that is of interest to this research.  
 
Organisations usually have “partially shared norms, a task structure, an 
authority structure, and written documents that support the enterprise” (Biddle, 
1979, p. 266). These notions are useful in defining the scope of what a study 
into ‘roles’ might involve. In particular, this study draws from those concepts 
of ‘persons’, ‘activities’ and the ‘processes’ in which they engage to 
understand role behaviour.  
 
The concept of role is also helpful in defining context and motivation. The co-
operative boards have powers under various acts of Parliament and from the 
supplier-shareholders under written documents, such as company constitutions 
and codes of practice that help define the roles of directors. Directors’ 
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positions are largely thought to be “achieved positions” in role theory terms, 
attained through the endeavours of the persons as opposed to “ascribed 
positions” attained through “accidents of birth”. These achieved positions will 
have “entry, maintenance and exit conditions” attached to them (Biddle, 1979, 
p. 103). Roles are dynamic, they can change as circumstances change, they can 
be renegotiated, additional behaviours can be added, and the time allocated 
varied (Major, 2003, p. 48). 
 
Each of the case study co-operatives have certain norms associated with 
governing positions. Biddle (1979) sees directors as having positional roles, 
which he defines as “behaviours characteristic of those sharing a commonly 
recognized identity or social position” (pp. 65-66). ‘Norms’ can be driven by 
regulation or corporate documents, or by shareholder voice and publicly 
expressed views. 
 
The aim of this research is to describe and theorise on the roles of directors of 
dairy co-operatives. This study looks at what Katz and Kahn (1978) describe 
as role behaviour, which they define as “the recurring actions of an individual, 
appropriately interrelated with the repetitive activities of others so as to yield a 
predictable outcome” (p. 189). Utilising the concept of role and of role theory 
thus helps define the boundaries of the object of this investigation. 
1.7 Scope and Limitations 
 
Three issues are highlighted under the scope and limitations of this research; 
the generalisability of this study, its descriptive and theoretical nature, and the 
researcher’s interests.  
 
This thesis focuses on the governance of New Zealand and Australian co-
operative dairy companies. This method claims theoretic generalisation as 
opposed to statistical generalisation. Generalisations of these findings to other 
countries, organisational forms, ownership structures, or industries, must be 
done with caution. Indeed, it is the special context of the co-operative 
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ownership structure and the dairy industry that has given rise to the need for 
this research.  
 
This research attempts to gain a deeper understanding of what the boards of co-
operative dairy companies actually do. No attempt has been made to link these 
findings, and the corresponding theorising, to board or co-operative 
performance. Also, it is from the perspective of those who govern, or who have 
governed. Future studies may test the resultant theory.  
 
The researcher is a dairy farmer, a supplier-shareholder and, at the time of data 
collection and writing, a director of the governing board of one of the cases 
that form part of this study. It is this interest that initially sparked the research. 
This may have had an effect on respondents’ willingness to be open and candid 
(Perry, 1998; Pettigrew, 1997). Every attempt is made during the research 
process to limit the (negative) impact of this interest on the research findings2, 
the interest needs to be acknowledged.  
1.8 Thesis Outline 
 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 2 looks at the context of this 
research, agricultural co-operatives, while chapter 3 reviews and critiques the 
corporate governance literature. The next chapter (4) identifies the gap in the 
literature that this thesis will begin to address. Chapter 5 discusses the chosen 
methodology for this research. Chapter 6 outlines the method used. Chapters 7 
and 8 reveal the theoretical model constructed. Chapter 9 elaborates on the 
model formed, implications and suggests further research. 
                                                 
2 These steps are outlined in Chapter 6, Research Methods, below. 
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CHAPTER 2 AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE CONTEXT 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In developing a theory of the roles of governing boards of New Zealand and 
Australian co-operative dairy companies, an understanding of agricultural co-
operatives and their context in New Zealand and Australia is important to this 
thesis. The dairy industry and its co-operative processors are hugely important 
to the New Zealand economy. Dairy co-operatives historically have been a 
driver of export growth and in 2009 account for over 25 percent of total 
merchandise export value and 10 percent of GDP. Decisions made by dairy co-
operative boards clearly have implications for the wider economy. This section 
considers the literature on agricultural co-operatives in analysing their role and 
place in New Zealand and Australian society. The section concludes with the 
implications of this content in expressing the need for study into New Zealand-
Australia agricultural co-operative governance. 
2.2 Scope and Limitations 
 
Co-operatives take many different forms. This analysis is limited to 
agricultural co-operatives and will concentrate on those from developed 
countries, which both manufacture and market products, often internationally. 
Much of the agricultural co-operative literature is based in the field of 
economics3 and elements from that literature will be drawn upon as appropriate 
to convey the context of New Zealand-Australian agricultural co-operatives.  
2.3 Co-operatives Defined 
 
There is no consensus for the definition of a co-operative (Cotterill, 1987; 
Evans & Meade, 2005; Hind, 1997). Defining co-operatives is a difficult task 
as they vary widely, particularly in relation to their objectives. Evans and 
Meade’s (2005) New Zealand definition of a co-operative is used in this thesis: 
A cooperative is an organisation in which those who transact with (i.e. 
“patronise”) the organisation also own and formally control the 
organisation, and derive significant benefits from those transactions 
over and above any financial returns they derive from their investment 
in the organisation. (p. 1) 
  
                                                 
3 For a review see Cook, Chaddad and Iliopoulos (2004).  
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This definition is useful as it covers all types of co-operatives. The definition 
highlights that patrons4 own, control and benefit from their use of the co-
operative. The definition notes that patrons benefit by transacting with the co-
operative and that the patronage relationship of users overwhelms the 
ownership relationship. Similarly, the New Zealand Co-operatives Association 
Inc. define a co-operative as “an organisation owned by and operated for the 
benefit of those using its services” (NZCA, 2000) and the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) in 1987 defines an agricultural co-
operative as “a user-owned, user-controlled, user-benefited agricultural 
producer organization”. Essentially, these definitions share an understanding 
that the owners have multiple and transaction-related relationships with the 
business. This is distinct from other types of businesses where a distance exists 
between ‘consumer’, ‘supplier’ and ‘owner.’ 
 
Co-operatives exist to benefit their owners by providing a vehicle for collective 
action (Katz & Boland, 2002; Skurnik, 2002). The most common justification 
for co-operatives is to correct market failures by avoiding being exploited by 
unscrupulous middlemen (Cook & Iliopoulos, 1999; Schrader, 1989; van Dijk, 
1997). Most co-operatives try to capture the benefits of collective action 
through vertical integration by acquiring the assets of a purchaser for the 
purpose of control (Grossman & Hart, 1986, p. 716). Vertical integration is 
optimal when one firm’s investment is particularly important to the other firms 
(Grossman & Hart, 1986, p. 717). This is often the case in agriculture where 
there are significant “disparities between the minimum efficient scale of 
operation in farming in relation to the upstream and downstream industries” 
(Torgerson et al., 1998, p. 11). Agricultural co-operatives may also help 
producers with: access to capital and technology; economies of scale in 
                                                 
4 The terms patron, user, member, farmer, producer, owner, shareholder, member-owner, 
member-shareholder and combinations of these appear to be used interchangeably in the 
literature. While they differ, they all refer to those who patronise, own and control the co-
operative firm. The term supplier-shareholder is utilised later in this thesis, as it more 
accurately reflects the patron’s relationship with a dairy co-operative. That is, they are first and 
foremost a supplier to the co-operative, but they also have a (less important) shareholding 
relationship with the co-operative. 
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production; coordinating production; processing and marketing; and capturing 
profits further up the value chain (Royer, 1995, p. 474). 
 
The most important relationship in a co-operative is between the co-operative 
and its members, which creates the co-operative difference (Fairbairn, 2003, p. 
5). Members of a co-operative are simultaneously patrons, owners, controllers 
and beneficiaries of the organisation (Nilsson, 1996, p. 635). As the customers 
are the owners, a higher standard of customer service is required of the co-
operative than that of an investor-owned firm (IOF) (Rhodes, 1987, p. 168). 
2.4 Co-operative Principles 
 
The co-operative definition leads to a number of co-operative principles that 
are utilised in the running of co-operatives. As with co-operative definitions, 
there are no universally accepted principles of co-operation (Barton, 1989a; 
Hind, 1997). The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) adopts a set of 
seven reasonably widely accepted co-operative principles: voluntary and open 
membership; democratic member control; member economic participation; 
autonomy and independence; education, training and information; co-operation 
among co-operatives; and concern for community (ICA, 2007). Many modern 
agricultural co-operatives, including New Zealand and Australian dairy co-
operatives, conform to some but not all of these principles.  
 
In the agriculture co-operative literature there is some consensus around three 
underpinning co-operative principles: user-owned, user-controlled, and user-
benefitted (Barton, 1989b; Katz, 1997; Kyriakopoulos et al., 2004; Nilsson, 
1996). That is, firstly, those who own the co-operative are those who use it. 
Secondly, those who use the co-operative are those who control it and finally, 
the benefits from the use of the co-operative are distributed to the users on the 
basis of their use (Chaddad et al., 2005; Cook, 1994). These three co-operative 
principles have a substantial effect on the way the co-operative is organised, its 
objectives, culture, and its governance (Barton, 1989a; Dunn et al., 2002).  
 
15 
 
Co-operatives also share a set of social values: “co-operatives are based on the 
values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity, and 
solidarity. In the tradition of their founders, co-operative members believe in 
the ethical values of honesty, openness, social responsibility and caring for 
others” (ICA, 2007, p. 1). 
 
The co-operative principles and values tend to translate into the processes by 
which the owners (Evans & Meade, 2005; Kyriakopoulos et al., 2004), control 
(Albaek & Schultz, 1997; Hansmann, 1996; Hart & Moore, 1996) and benefit 
from (Nilsson, 1996) membership. History informs why and how these 
practices came about. 
2.5 History, Concepts and Context of Co-operatives 
 
In 1844, in the town of Rochdale, England a group of pioneers, unhappy with 
unscrupulous merchants, established a business trading in basic food 
commodities that emphasised fair and accurate measure and good quality 
produce. The principles enunciated by these pioneers became known as the 
Rochdale principles and laid the foundations for not only consumer co-
operatives, but for all sorts of co-operative forms around the world (Mercer, 
1931). The industrial revolution is credited with the growth of the modern 
form of co-operative with its objectives as a self-help vehicle to promote the 
interests of the less powerful in society. This form of collective action has 
obvious appeal to farmers. Co-operative businesses began forming in the 
1800s in Europe (Ortmann & King, 2007). According to  Rhodes (1987), in the 
United States of America co-operation came naturally on the American frontier 
as it was a short step from the shared labour and machinery used in say, barn 
raising, to shared enterprises to serve essential needs (p. 155). Co-operatives 
began forming in New Zealand in the 1880s (NZCA, 2000). 
 
Co-operatives now represent a substantial share of most developed economies 
and have a greater share in developed than developing countries (Hansmann, 
1999, p. 387). Co-operatives are particularly strong in agriculture in 
industrialised countries in Europe, Japan and the United States. It is now 
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estimated co-operatives are responsible for a third of the world’s agricultural 
production and marketing (Pattison, 2000; Skurnik, 2002). Co-operatives today 
are a very important part of the New Zealand and Australian economies and 
are involved in businesses ranging from small consumer retailing groups to 
large financial, processor and marketing co-operatives. New Zealand’s largest 
corporation is a co-operative (Maher & Emanuel, 2005). Agricultural co-
operatives make up five of the top twenty, and eight of the top thirty 
companies in New Zealand by turnover (Deloitte, 2008). Within the New 
Zealand and Australian dairy industry co-operatives are the dominant 
organisational structure.  
2.6 Agricultural and Co-operative Theory 
 
According to Laidlaw (1974) there are four distinct schools of co-operative 
theory that have developed over time: 
• The co-operative commonwealth school: This school of thought 
envisaged by the Rochdale pioneers saw no limits to co-operation and 
thought that the movement would embrace all fields of social and 
economic organisation. As such, this school saw the possibility of an 
all-inclusive ‘totally co-operative social order’.  
• The school of modified capitalism: This school of thought holds that 
co-operatives are used to mainly curb the excesses of capitalism or to 
correct market failures. This school of thought accepts capitalism as the 
model for business and views co-operatives as a special form of 
business working within this system.  
• The socialist school: Dominant in the old Eastern European countries, 
this school of thought sees co-operatives as an integral part of the 
State’s control over all economic activity.  
• The co-operative sector school: The final school of thought proposes 
co-operation as a ‘middle way’, an economic sector distinct from both 
the public and private sectors. It foresees all three sectors ‘co-existing’ 
and ‘complementing’ one another. 
It is from the modified capitalism school of co-operative thought that this 
thesis is based. This is because New Zealand and Australian dairy co-
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operatives, the context of this research, operate in an environment where 
capitalism is accepted as the business model and the co-operative form of 
organisation is one that is utilised by dairy farmers to curb the excesses of 
capitalism or to correct market failures. 
 
According to Torgerson et al., (1998) agricultural marketing co-operatives 
emerged during the nineteenth century with the advent of commercial 
agriculture. Two schools of thought emerge from these developments. The 
American schools of thought, based on pragmatism, and the European schools 
which appear to be more influenced by social reforms (Torgerson et al., 1998, 
p. 1). Within the United States, two branches of thought developed during the 
1920s: the Californian and the Co-operative Yardstick schools. The 
Californian school, begun by Aaron Sapiro5 in the early 1920s, sought to 
“correct imbalances in grower treatment and to improve marketing 
coordination by using cooperatives organized along commodity lines to 
achieve more orderly marketing” (Torgerson et al., 1998, p. 2). Major points 
advocated by Sapiro are that co-operatives should be organised around a single 
commodity and that membership should be restricted to agricultural producers 
(Ingalsbe & Groves, 1989, p. 116). Sapiro maintains that by controlling 
commodities, co-operatives can exert influence on the market and extract 
higher prices for their members. In response Nourse (1922) developed the 
competitive yardstick school of thought in 1922. This emphasises local co-
operatives organised to meet producers’ needs in a local community 
(Torgerson et al., 1998). These smaller local co-operatives are then able to act 
as a ‘competitive yardstick’ to other firms operating in the market. The major 
points advocated by Nourse (1922) are more market- and democratically-
driven. In essence Sapiro believes that co-operatives should dominate markets 
along product lines where Nourse (1922) believes co-operatives only need to 
exist to ensure that other players in the market aren’t acting opportunistically at 
producers’ expense. New Zealand and Australia adopted practices from both 
these traditions.  
 
                                                 
5 Unpublished 
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The other major school of thought, the European model, is also employed to 
some extent in New Zealand and Australia. Social objectives, such as  
employment in, and reinvigoration of, rural communities are often cited as 
reasons for co-operation (Normark, 1996; Richards et al., 1998). The effect on 
communities of the closure of plants (Vilstrup & Groves, 1989) in rural New 
Zealand are often greeted with a great deal of angst within local communities. 
The effect of these upheavals is probably greater on the user-owners of a co-
operative firm because of their geographic location.  
 
Utilising the United States (US) schools of thought, Cook (1997, pp. 80-82) 
articulates a simple taxonomy of seven different “types” of US agricultural co-
operatives existing currently, most of which are reflected in New Zealand and 
Australian practices: 
1. Farm Credit. 
2. Rural Utilities. To provide a missing service such as electricity or 
telephone. 
3. Sapiro I Co-operatives: Bargaining co-operatives. Their main functions 
are to enhance margins and guarantee a market. 
4. Sapiro II Co-operatives: Marketing co-operatives. These are a form of 
vertical integration and are designed to increase margins and to avoid 
market power. 
5. Nourse I Co-operatives: Local associations. These are established to 
provide a missing service(s), to avoid monopoly power, reduce risk or 
achieve economies of scale. 
6. Nourse II Co-operatives: Multi-functional regional co-operatives. As 
with Nourse I type co-operatives, Nourse II co-operatives are driven by 
Nourse’s ‘competitive yardstick’ objective. But the type II variant 
integrates forward or backward along the value chain. 
7. New Generation Co-operatives (NGCs): NGCs address market failure 
situations, excess supply price depression; traditional co-operative 
property rights, structural weaknesses and free rider issues.  
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While elements of all these can be found in New Zealand and Australian 
agricultural co-operatives, the dairy co-operatives that are the subject of this 
study lie toward layers 4 and 7 of the classification. New Zealand and 
Australian dairy co-operatives are designed to combat market power, reduce 
risks and achieve economies of scale. They all vertically integrate along the 
supply chain to try to extract market rents. New Zealand and Australia have 
thus taken on the commodity dominance advocated by Sapiro and also operate 
to some extent in the competitive environment discussed by Nourse (1922) as 
well as trying to extract market rents.   
 
Co-operatives undertake many functions in New Zealand and Australia (Evans 
& Meade, 2005; Lang, 1995). Agricultural co-operatives in New Zealand and 
Australia combine some or all of the following activities: 1) handling, such as 
warehousing grain and wool, or coolstores for perishables, such as horticultural 
products; 2) processing, particularly where this requires large amounts of 
capital and the produce is perishable, which exposes producers to unequal 
market power; 3) marketing, including negotiating prices, pooling, staged 
selling, and economies of scale in marketing and branding; 4) farm requisites, 
where suppliers have market dominance (e.g., fertiliser), where quality is 
critical (e.g., genetics), or have specific farm attributes (e.g., insurance and 
lending); 5) property right development (e.g., irrigation schemes); 6) advocacy, 
between farmers and regulators (e.g., in negotiating market access); 7) the 
delivery of social services, and 8) industry good activities (Evans & Meade, 
2005, pp. 27-28).  
2.7 Co-operative Board Roles  
 
While the roles of co-operative boards in governing their organisation can be 
assumed to encompass many of the aspects outlined in the corporate 
governance literature (see Chapter 3, section 3.2) the special nature of co-
operatives suggests an effect on the composition and roles of co-operative 
governing boards. Co-operative governance lies at the heart of the user-control 
principle. As such, the governing board is elected from and by the membership 
to express the members’ interests (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999, p. 349). Co-
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operative boards are expected to represent co-operative members, to 
understand their needs and ensure resources are employed to meet those needs 
(Baarda, 2002, p. 4). The democratic governance structure can be fundamental 
to the members’ relationship with the co-operative. The relationship is 
different from investor relations, as members are a source of capital and 
control as well as sales and use of the co-operative (Fairbairn, 2003, p. 7). 
According to Cornforth and Edwards (1999), co-operative boards have a 
“political model of the role of boards as a means of resolving or choosing 
between the interests of different stakeholders, setting the overall policy of the 
organisation, holding staff to account for implementation, and being publicly 
accountable for the organisation as a whole” (pp. 349-350). The co-operative 
board may also have a task in preserving the co-operative character of the firm 
and keeping members informed about the co-operative (Baarda, 2002). The 
user-control principle also suggests co-operative boards are made up of lay co-
operative members, not selected for their expertise in running businesses 
beyond farms. 
 
New Zealand and Australian dairy co-operative boards may have roughly the 
same roles as expressed in the corporate governance literature and suggested 
by co-operative writers, although the means by which they operate is 
unknown. Although the co-operative form is in extensive use in most market 
economies throughout the world, academic understanding of its governance 
appears limited (Jussila & Goel, 2006; Skurnik, 2002). For example, co-
operatives are assumed to have “severe agency problems” (Porter & Scully, 
1987) due to the lack of external controls and are seen to need countervailing 
and substituting measures by boards to overcome these problems (Deutsch, 
2005; Huse, 2007; Spear, 2004).  
 
This study begins to explore perceptions of what governing boards of New 
Zealand and Australian dairy co-operatives do: their behaviours, their 
relationships, dynamics and processes by which governance operates within 
this economically important context. As King (1995) argues, scholars “have 
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much to learn from simply observing and describing the formation, evolution, 
and operation of successful cooperatives” (p. 1161). 
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CHAPTER 3 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The literature on corporate governance is now reviewed and evaluated as to 
how it defines, classifies, distinguishes and understands the roles of boards of 
directors (boards). Three board roles are highlighted and discussed. Eight 
theories used in the corporate governance literature and there implications for 
board roles are explored. The literature review is used to discover gaps in the 
literature in order to identify the area of empirical study. This range of themes 
and rationales will be utilised as alternate lenses to make a theoretical 
contribution, based on observation, of the roles of governing boards of co-
operative dairy companies. Conclusions are then drawn. 
3.1.1 Corporate Governance Defined  
 
There have been many attempts at defining corporate governance in the 
literature but with little consensus. The definitions tend to vary depending on 
the objectives of the writer and the dominant theory the writer ascribes to (see 
section 3.3, below). As such, any definition will be biased (Huse, 2005b, p. 
42). Tricker (2000) suggests questions we should be asking when looking at 
corporate governance: 
How is oversight to be exercised over those delegated to the task of 
running the venture; how are the owners’ interests to be protected; who 
sets the direction of the enterprise and ensures its accountability; how is 
power over the enterprise legitimised; to whom is a company 
accountable and, ultimately responsible? …. Corporate governance is 
about the exercise of such power. (p. 289) 
 
Or, in a more nuanced sense, Huse et al., (2005) see the study of corporate 
governance as seeking to understand: 
who is making the most important decisions, why they are doing so, 
and how they are making them. It is thus concerned with the 
development of structures and norms that ensure that proper questions 
are being asked, and that necessary controls are in place to see that 
answers are provided that reflect what is best for long-term value 
creation in a company. (p. 285) 
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In this research, Aguilera’s (2005) definition of corporate governance is 
utilised:  
the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different actors 
involved in the corporate organization. (p. S41)  
3.1.2 History 
 
According to Ticker (2000), the practice of corporate governance is “ancient”, 
occurring whenever the management of an enterprise is separated from its 
owners (p. 289). Initially, it is of interest to note the origins of the name of 
“board” and “chairman”. In the nineteenth century, because of the expense of 
furniture, meetings were conducted by men sitting on stools, around a long 
board laid across two sawhorses. The group of men became known as the 
“board”. The board’s leader who was given a chair, instead of a stool, became 
known as the “chair-man” (Monks & Minnow, 1995, p. 180).  
 
Corporate governance as a field of academic study, especially its theoretical 
underpinnings, has, however, been more recent. In the early 1980s, the phrase 
‘corporate governance’ is rarely found in the literature (Pye, 2000; Tricker, 
1993a). The interest in corporate governance by academics and many other 
stakeholders such as practitioners, lawmakers and shareholders burgeoned in 
the late 1980s. In response to the 1987 share market crash, a plethora of  
reports were written resulting in the Cadbury and Greenbury codes, and the 
Hampel and Turnbull reports (Vinten, 2001a) in Great Britain. Malaysia (Ho et 
al., 2008), the US, Australia, Japan and Canada have all had similar reports 
(Vinten, 1998). More recently, high profile corporate collapses such as Enron 
(Vinten, 2002) and WorldCom led to further public and regulatory disapproval 
at the behaviour of corporate management and the quality of corporate 
governance. These concerns led to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the US and new 
governance rules around the world, including New Zealand where the 
Securities Commission and the New Zealand Stock Exchange have introduced 
codes of practice for corporate governance (Ingley & van der Walt, 2005). 
Company Annual Reports now report the governance practice of the 
companies’ boards.  
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3.2 Roles of the Board of Directors 
3.2.1 Introduction 
 
In developing a theory of the roles of boards of co-operatives, the existing 
knowledge needs to be explored. Three “generally agreed” roles of boards - 
strategy, control and service - are examined to understand the scope, functions 
and terms attributed to these roles. The sometimes overlapping and often 
ambiguous nature of these roles are also highlighted. 
 
Boards undertake a number of functions (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004a) or tasks 
(Huse, 2007; Ingley & van der Walt, 2005) which, when aggregated, are 
termed roles (van den Heuvel et al., 2006). Boards play multiple and critical 
roles in organisations (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003), yet the roles of boards 
are not well articulated, or in fact well known, and their definitions are 
“surrounded by ambiguity” (van den Heuvel et al., 2006, p. 470). The lack of 
an integrated approach has led to board roles being conceptualised in many 
different ways (e.g., Dixon et al., 2005; Hung, 1998; Huse, 2007; Johnson et 
al., 1996; Mintzberg, 1983). These roles often overlap, are contradictory 
(Dalton et al., 1999) and the activities attributed to each role are dependent on 
the authors’ theoretical persuasion and what they are trying to discover 
(Hendry & Kiel, 2004; van den Heuvel et al., 2006). While this ambiguity 
perseveres there is some broad agreement around three key roles boards 
undertake - strategy, control and service (Brennan, 2006; Levrau & Van den 
Berghe, 2007a; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004b; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Stiles & 
Taylor, 2001). In the following sections these “generally agreed” roles are used 
as headings to explore the corporate governance literature’s notion of board 
roles. 
3.2.2 Strategy Role 
 
There seems to be fairly clear consensus in the literature that boards have a 
role to play in an organisation’s strategy (e.g., Brennan, 2006; Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Molz, 1985; Rindova, 1999; 
Ruigrok et al., 2006; Scherrer, 2003; Schmidt & Brauer, 2006; Siciliano, 2005; 
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Toms & Filatotchev, 2004; Wadsworth, 2001). This expectation appears to 
cross theoretical and contextual boundaries; however the extent of a board’s 
involvement in strategy, what influences it and how the role is fulfilled is far 
from understood (Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Ingley & Van der Walt, 2001; Judge 
& Zeithaml, 1992). 
 
The range of tasks in the strategy role for the board vary but often include 
defining the organisation’s business, developing the vision and mission, 
aligning the organisation’s purpose with shareholders’ needs, scanning the 
environment, selecting and implementing a choice of strategies (Hendry & 
Kiel, 2004; Ingley & van der Walt, 2005; Ruigrok et al., 2006; Stiles & Taylor, 
2001). The chief executive has a large influence on an organisation’s strategy. 
As it is one of the boards’ tasks to appoint and dismiss the CEO, this gives the 
board a great deal of sway over the organisation’s strategic direction (Hendry 
& Kiel, 2004; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Stiles, 2001; Stiles & Taylor, 2001; 
Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001). 
 
Expectations of the boards’ tasks in strategy vary between rubber stamping 
(approving) management’s proposals (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971; 
Westphal & Fredrickson, 2001) to setting the tone and working with 
management to initiate, analyse, develop and implement strategies (Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992; O'Neal & Thomas, 1995; Siciliano, 2005; Stiles, 2001). Board 
involvement in strategy is characterised, usually as a continuum, from initiator 
to approver (Henke, 1986), minimalist and maximalist (Pettigrew & McNulty, 
1995), active to passive (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Stiles & Taylor, 2001) and 
watchdog, trustee, and pilot (Demb & Neubauer, 1992). These divided 
conceptualisations lead to “very different conclusions regarding both 
prescriptions and descriptions of board behaviour” (Golden & Zajac, 2001, p. 
1088). With a little more refinement, McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) identify 
three levels of board involvement in strategy; taking strategic decisions, 
shaping strategic decisions, and shaping the content, context and conduct of 
strategy” (p. 55). Boards are able to influence strategies through suggestions, 
advice, counsel (Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; Levrau & Van den Berghe, 
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2007a), establishing the context for the preparation and approval of strategies 
(Mizruchi, 1983; Schmidt & Brauer, 2006) and by executives self regulation 
through fear of rejection (Baysinger & Hoskinsson, 1990; McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999). Having set the corporate direction it needs to be maintained. 
Boards are able to do this by acting as a ‘gatekeeper’ by approving or refusing 
strategies (Stiles, 2001), monitoring the outcomes and allocating resources 
(Schmidt & Brauer, 2006). 
 
Much of the literature (e.g., Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Nicholson & Kiel, 
2004a) assumes strategic decision-making follows Fama and Jensen’s (1983b) 
four step process of: initiation, ratification, implementation and monitoring (p. 
303). They term initiation and implementation steps as “decision management” 
and term ratification and monitoring as “decision control” (Fama & Jensen, 
1983b). Boards are assumed to be charged with decision control. This 
sequential, formalised process has been challenged (Burgelman, 1983; 
Mintzberg, 1983; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985). Rindova (1999) believes 
strategies “evolve through complex, nonlinear and fragmented processes” that 
are “interactive and iterative” (p. 956). Moreover, Leblanc and Gillies (2005) 
find that strategies are constantly being developed. These strategies range from 
very complex, such as acquisitions and mergers (Lawler et al., 2002), to 
relatively simple and everything in between. This leads to a variety of possible 
participation modes by the board and directors (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999). 
3.2.3 Control Role 
 
The second of the broadly agreed roles of the board is ‘control’. It is this role 
that receives the most frequent attention from all sources; the popular and 
business press, shareholders, regulators and researchers. Corporate scandals 
(Clarke, 2005; Vinten, 2002) and the dominance of agency theory (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and their effect on governance codes 
and legislation lead to this being the most prominent of board roles (Dalton et 
al., 1999; Molz, 1985; Van den Berghe & Baelden, 2005). The control role is 
based around agency theory assumptions (Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003; Johnson et al., 1996; Keasey & Wright, 1993; Pearce & Zahra, 
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1991) in protecting shareholders’ interests from errant managers. Protecting 
shareholders interests refers to the board’s “wealth protection dimension” 
(Filatotchev et al., 2006, p. 259) to “safeguard the company’s assets and 
resources, to ensure survival, and to avoid corporate trauma or consistent poor 
performance” (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p. 27).  
 
The governing board is one of several controls by which a company is 
disciplined. There are a number of external controls, such as the independent 
audit of company accounts, the corporate laws policed by different regulators 
and the capital markets (Dalton et al., 1999), product and labour markets 
(Johnson et al., 1996), exit (Keasey & Wright, 1993), and voice (Hirschman, 
1970). The governing board is the key internal control mechanism. The board 
exercises this control largely through being the final arbiter on key decisions 
(Dixon et al., 2005; Forbes & Milliken, 1999). Through legislation, 
regulations, company constitutions and policies, the board has responsibility 
for managing the organisation. Boards delegate, as they are able, the day-to-
day running of the business to specialist managers, most notably the CEO, 
under a series of delegated authorities, while retaining some decisions for 
themselves and carrying on an oversight task for the remainder (Useem & 
Zelleke, 2006). The board has a task in defining, adopting and reviewing 
appropriate delegated authorities (Molz, 1985; Van den Berghe & Baelden, 
2005). This reserves a range of decisions to be made by the board, giving it 
“allocative control” and effective economic control (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p. 
121). 
 
One of the major control mechanisms of the board is the dismissal and hiring 
of the CEO. Although this seldom happens, this latent power is important in 
disciplining management and setting the boundaries of decision making 
(Mizruchi, 1983; Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Useem & Zelleke, 2006). The board 
also has a task in management succession (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). By 
designing and setting senior executive remuneration, the board can align 
management compensation to shareholders’ interests (Johnson et al., 1996; 
Stiles & Taylor, 2001). 
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Another control task of the board is monitoring and evaluating company senior 
executive performance (Brennan, 2006; Ruigrok et al., 2006) and strategy 
implementation (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). As well as monitoring compliance 
with laws and regulations, boards are expected to ensure risk management 
procedures and internal controls are in place and delegated authorities 
established (Ingley & van der Walt, 2005; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004a). The 
board also has a task in the evaluation of the board itself (Van den Berghe & 
Baelden, 2005). The board’s control task relies heavily upon financial 
accounting measures (Dalton et al., 1998) and monitoring is often done on an 
exception basis (Stiles & Taylor, 2001). 
 
Controls are conceptualised as operational and strategic (Stiles & Taylor, 
2001), or strategic and financial (Baysinger & Hoskinsson, 1990). Strategic 
control involves controlling the boundaries of strategic decision making, and 
monitoring and evaluating strategies and their implementation. Operational or 
financial control involves financial targets and budgets, delegated authorities 
and the audit committee. 
3.2.4 Service Role 
 
The third broad role identified is the ‘service’ role. The tasks seen as part of 
this role include providing the organisation, particularly top management, with 
advice, counsel and knowledge, and providing legitimacy and prestige, as well 
as access to resources by utilising networks of contacts to assist the firm. 
Bezemer et al., (2007) and Huse (2007) distinguish between internal 
(providing advice and counseling to management) and external service tasks 
(boundary spanning). The internal tasks have theoretical underpinning in a 
resource-based view (Barney, 1991; Barney et al., 2001) and, to a lesser extent, 
stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; Muth & Donaldson, 1998) and the 
external tasks are underpinned by resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, 1972; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan, 1980). 
 
In the internal tasks, the board is seen to act as a sounding board and a 
confidant, particularly for the CEO (Lawler et al., 2002; Westphal, 1999), and 
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as a key source of knowledge, advice and experience to the organisation 
(Bezemer et al., 2007; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004a). Tasks may include scanning 
the internal and external environment and providing timely advice to 
executives (Murphy & McIntyre, 2007). As part of the service role, the board 
may also be tasked with conflict resolution (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999; 
Dixon et al., 2005). 
 
As part of the external tasks, the board may provide access to scarce resources 
(Brennan, 2006; Johnson et al., 1996) such as information and physical 
resources, particularly capital (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004a; Stiles & Taylor, 
2001). The literature also sees a task for the board in enhancing the credibility, 
legitimacy, reputation and prestige of the firm (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; 
Mizruchi, 1996; Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). The board (or 
individual directors) may act as a figure head in performing ceremonial 
functions to enhance the firm’s legitimacy (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005; Ruigrok 
et al., 2006). The board has a task to interact with a broad array of the firm’s 
stakeholders, both internal and external to the organisation, such as, 
maintaining relations with influential bodies (e.g., government), staff, 
customers and owners through meetings, AGMs, financial and other reporting 
(Stiles & Taylor, 2001). The network of personal and professional contacts that 
are utilised by the board in introductions, lobbying and in accessing experience 
or expertise that may assist the firm, is seen as a service task (Borch & Huse, 
1993; Murphy & McIntyre, 2007). These tasks may assist in attracting 
resources to the firm. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) see the provision of 
resources as directly related to the performance of the firm as it reduces 
dependency, diminishes uncertainty, lowers transaction costs, and “ultimately 
aid in the survival of the firm” (p. 386). 
3.2.5 Role Ambiguity  
 
The tasks attributed to each role in the literature vary depending on the 
author’s definition and their theoretical persuasion, leading to ambiguity 
around board roles (van den Heuvel et al., 2006). Many of the roles identified 
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in the literature are overlapping, parts of the roles seem synergistic and some 
seem contradictory (Brennan, 2006; Short et al, 1999).  
 
‘Overlap’ presents itself in many forms. The board’s provision of advice and 
counsel around strategic issues (e.g., Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Rindova, 1999) 
and acting as “strategic consultants” (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001) to 
management can be seen as both service and strategy roles. Stiles and Taylor’s 
(2001) “setting strategic parameters” and Hendry and Kiel’s (2004) concept of 
“strategic control” are simultaneously strategic and control activities of the 
board. Baysinger and Hoskisson’s (1990) notion of utilising financial and 
strategic controls as ways the board influences strategic direction is another 
example. The appointment, removal and remuneration of the CEO could be 
seen simultaneously as part of control, strategy and service roles.  The notion 
of similar behaviour being determined as strategic, service, and control by 
various writers highlights the complexity, interdependence and interrelatedness 
of board roles.  
 
Some of the expectations around board roles appear contradictory. The most 
glaring is board independence from management. Independence is seen as very 
important by commentators, regulators and academics for board members to 
fulfil their control role (Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 2004a; Rindova, 1999). 
Others note the need for closeness and trust and deep involvement between 
board and management to fulfil their service and strategy tasks (Bezemer et al., 
2007; Leblanc, 2004). Daily et al., (2003a) question whether a director can 
simultaneously have the independence and distance required for control and 
the closeness required for service and strategy. These issues introduce the 
concept of ambiguity (Van Peursem, 2005) and role conflict (Katz & Kahn, 
1978). 
 
Some note the increasing emphasis on one role (usually control) 
overshadowing others (Dalton & Dalton, 2005; Ingley & van der Walt, 2005; 
Van den Berghe & Baelden, 2005), others see it as important for boards to get 
the balance right (Lawler et al., 2002). Agency theorists suggest roles other 
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than control are superfluous (Carver, 2007). Some believe these roles are not in 
conflict and there is a need for boards to embrace this paradox (Fields, 2007; 
Leblanc & Gillies, 2005; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Others believe the 
roles to be complementary.  
 
Close involvement is important as it is only through involvement in strategy 
and service that boards gain the knowledge to fulfill their control role 
(McNulty et al., 2005; Pye, 2002; Roberts et al., 2005). Early participation in 
the strategic decision making process enables boards to offer advice and exert 
a controlling influence (Fields, 2007; Huse & Rindova, 2001; Levrau & Van 
den Berghe, 2007b; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Rindova, 1999; Schmidt & 
Brauer, 2006; Westphal, 1999). 
 
The roles enacted by boards also vary according to context (Baysinger & 
Hoskinsson, 1990; Cornforth & Edwards, 1999; Goodstein & Boeker, 1991; 
Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Zona & Zattoni, 2007). Board roles may vary between 
companies (Nicholson & Kiel, 2004a) due to institutional environments 
(Aguilera, 2005; Jonsson, 2005), the existence of external monitoring (Dalton 
et al., 2003; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004b), firm lifecycle (Filatotchev et al., 2006; 
Lynall et al., 2003), firm size (van den Heuvel et al., 2006), ownership 
structure (Long et al., 2005, p. 668) and the composition and processes of the 
board (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Huse, 2007; Leblanc & Gillies, 2005). Board 
roles also change over time (Bezemer et al., 2007; Graebner & Eisenhardt, 
2004; Huse et al., 2005; Shen, 2003; van den Heuvel et al., 2006). For 
example, the emphasis and involvement of particular board roles may increase 
at times of poor performance, crisis and uncertainty (Mace, 1971; McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999; Radin & Stevenson, 2006; Rindova, 1999; Siciliano, 2005). 
 
An expectations gap between various stakeholders’ expectations of board roles 
and actual board roles is also evident (Brennan, 2006; Coulson-Thomas, 1991; 
Heracleous, 1999; Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 2004b; Mace, 1971). This gap 
is hardly surprising given the lack of consensus around what boards are 
supposed to do, and little understanding of what boards actually do. Differing 
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stakeholders (e.g., owners, the public, customers, regulators, researchers, the 
media) have differing expectations of board roles, some of which may be 
unrealistic (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Leblanc & Gillies, 2005). 
 
In summary, the range of themes and rationales relating to the possible roles of 
boards in the corporate governance literature are both complex and often 
contradictory. While three main roles are generally identified; strategy, service 
and control, this review indicates that the role processes of board members are 
not well articulated or commonly specified. This lack of cohesion may 
possibly be due to a lack of contextual understanding or conflicting theoretical 
perspectives. The literature highlights the need for further empirical research, 
drawn from case-based fieldwork experiences, to better understand processes 
relating to the actual roles of board members.  
3.3 Theories of Corporate Governance 
 
Although there is no integrated theory of corporate governance (Carver, 2007; 
Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Letza et al., 2004; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007; Pettigrew 
& McNulty, 1995; Tricker, 2000), there are many theories that are used to 
inform the field. These are essentially all ‘normative’ and the overwhelming 
majority of literature in corporate governance is based on the agency 
theoretical perspective (Daily et al., 2003a), however, an increasing portion of 
the literature is looking at corporate governance through different theoretical 
lenses. Stiles and Taylor (2001) identify six “major theoretical traditions” 
utilised in the corporate governance literature; agency theory and transaction 
cost economics (TCE) (which they group together), stewardship theory, 
resource dependency theory (RDT), class hegemony theory, and managerial 
hegemony theory (p. 10). The resource based view (RBV) also emerges from 
the literature (Huse, 2005b, 2007) summarised in Table 3-1. These theories, 
discussed below, allow insights into normative expectations of the composition 
and roles of boards. The implications of these theories to this research are 
highlighted. 
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Table 3-1 A Comparison of Theoretical Perspectives on Governance 
Theory Interests Board members Board role 
Agency theory ‘Owners/members’ and 
mangers have different 
interests 
‘Owner/members’ 
representatives 
Conformance: 
- safeguard ‘owners’ 
interests 
- oversee management 
- check compliance 
Transaction 
cost economic 
theory 
Transacting members 
have different interest   
Transacting members 
with transaction 
specific assets 
Economise transaction 
costs 
- ensure a market 
- safeguard transaction 
specific assets 
Managerial 
hegemony 
theory 
‘Owners/members’ 
and managers have 
different interests 
Owners/members’ 
Representatives 
Symbolic: 
- ratify decisions 
- give legitimacy 
(managers have real 
power) 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Stakeholders have 
different interests 
Stakeholder 
representatives 
Political: 
- balance stakeholder 
needs 
- make policy  
- control management 
Resource 
dependence 
theory 
Stakeholders and 
organisation  have 
different interests 
Chosen for influence 
with key stakeholders 
Boundary spanning: 
- secure resources 
- stakeholder relations 
- external perspective 
Resource 
based  
view 
‘Owners/members’ and 
managers share interests 
Chosen for specific 
competence knowledge 
and skills 
Provide advice, 
counselling and 
expertise to 
management 
Stewardship 
theory 
‘Owners/members’ and 
managers share interests 
‘Experts’ Improve performance:  
- add value to top 
decisions/strategy 
- partner/support 
management 
Class 
hegemony 
theory 
The ruling elite and the 
public have different 
interests 
Members of the ruling 
elite 
Serve as a function of 
the corporate elite 
Co-operative 
perspective 
Members/the public 
contain different 
interests 
‘Lay/member’ 
representatives 
Political: 
- represent member 
interests 
- make policy 
- control executive 
Revised and adapted from Cornforth  (2004),  p. 20. 
3.3.1 Agency Theory 
 
Since Berle and Means’ (1932) noting of the separation of ownership and 
control, the principal-agent problem has been debated. Agency theory has its 
theoretical origins in economics and finance and underlies organisational 
theory (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999). Agency theory is regarded as the “Bible” 
(Huse, 2007, p. 45) of corporate governance; it dominates the academic 
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literature (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004) and has a major influence on regulators 
in underpinning the majority of reform activity (Stiles & Taylor, 2001).  
 
An agency relationship exists where principal(s) engage an agent to perform a 
service on their behalf by delegating the agent some decision making authority 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308). Agency theory is based on the contract as a 
unit of analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989b) with the central contracts specifying the 
residual claims and the allocation of decision process steps amongst actors 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983b, p. 302). Investors exchange capital for control rights 
in the organisation (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). This decision control is further 
delegated to a board (thus creating a second agency relationship) (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983b, p. 309). Boards, while retaining ultimate control, then in turn, 
usually delegate most decision management and some decision control to 
professional managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983b, p. 313). Under agency theory, 
decision management should be separated from decision control, with the 
board charged with decision control.  
 
Agency theory holds that if the principal and agent have conflicting goals the 
agent(s) will opportunistically maximise their utility at the expense of the 
principal(s) (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Agency theory uses the notions of bounded 
rationality and opportunism leading to self-serving behaviour with guile 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b, p. 64). Examples of possible agency issues are “excessive 
perquisites, underinvestment, overinvestment, risk shifting, asymmetric 
information, bankruptcy and financial distress” (John & Senbet, 1998, p. 376). 
Principals bear a number of agency costs; made up of monitoring expenditures, 
bonding expenditures and residual losses (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308) 
and the costs of structuring, monitoring and enforcing contracts (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983b, p. 304). 
 
Information asymmetry occurs when one party in an exchange has information 
the other does not (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004, p. 889). Agency theory argues 
that professional managers are able, through access to such information and its 
flow, to impose a disproportionate amount of power over the board (Brennan, 
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2006; Ingley & van der Walt, 2005; Radin & Stevenson, 2006; Rutherford & 
Buchholtz, 2007). This makes the monitoring and assessment of management 
by the board difficult (Walsh & Seward, 1990). Much of the board’s 
information relies upon (easily manipulated) financial accounting measures put 
together by management, which are in turn is used to monitor and evaluate, 
and remunerate management (Dalton et al., 1998, p. 274). 
 
Agency theory proposes a number of internal and external controls to 
encourage management to act in the best interests of shareholders (Walsh & 
Seward, 1990, p. 421) such as decision hierarchies, boards of directors and 
incentive structures (Fama & Jensen, 1983a, pp. 331-332). Decision 
hierarchies involve separating decision management (management task) from 
decision control (board task) (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). The board is seen as an 
internal governance mechanism to monitor and, if needed, control management 
behaviour (Baysinger & Hoskinsson, 1990; John & Senbet, 1998). Incentive 
controls are executive remuneration packages designed to align management 
and shareholders’ interests. Agency theorists note a number of external 
controls for self-serving agents: the sale of stock (Baysinger & Hoskinsson, 
1990); the stock market itself acting as an “external monitoring device” (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983b, p. 313); the market for corporate control (the takeover 
market) (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Letza et al., 2004; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997); 
competitive labour and product markets (Stiles & Taylor, 2001); corner stone 
shareholders (Short et al., 1999); and external audits (Cohen et al, 2002). These 
external market-based controls are activated if internal controls fail (Walsh & 
Seward, 1990, p. 434). Internal controls are viewed as a cheaper option than 
external controls (Davis et al., 1997, p. 22).  
 
Control mechanisms (internal and external) may substitute for each other 
(Coles et al., 2001; Deutsch, 2005; Filatotchev, 2007; Huse, 2007; John & 
Senbet, 1998). If, for example, the takeover market is weak there may be need 
for stronger internal controls, such as more independent boards (John & 
Senbet, 1998, p. 391), high information disclosure and a rigorous system of 
auditing (Filatotchev, 2007, p. 1048). 
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Critics claim agency theory focuses on the board’s role in reducing agency 
costs, while ignoring the board’s other roles, particularly wealth creation 
(Daily et al., 2003a; Huse, 2005b). Agency theory ignores the complexity of 
organisations (Clarke, 2005; Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson, 2003; Eisenhardt, 
1989b), poorly conceptualises how boards make decisions (Pettigrew & 
McNulty, 1995; Rindova, 1999; Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), 
and fails to take into account organisational context (Aguilera & Jackson, 
2003; Short et al., 1999). Agency theory is also based on questionable 
assumptions about human values and motivations (Borgen, 2004; Letza et al., 
2004; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Agency theory formally discounts trusting 
relationships with management (Roberts et al., 2005; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 
2003; Tricker, 2000), though this lack of trust may not always be the case 
(Clarke, 2005; Eisenhardt, 1989b). Agency theorists believe that firm 
performance is enhanced by utilising agency theory prescriptions. Empirical 
results have been equivocal with some studies finding empirical support (e.g., 
Brickley et al., 1994; Core et al., 1999; Cosh & Hughes, 1997; Cotter et al., 
1997; Kosnik, 1987; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990) and others not (e.g., Conyon 
& Peck, 1998; Daily et al., 2003a; Dalton et al., 2003; Dalton et al., 1998; 
Deutsch, 2005; Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Farrer & Ramsay, 1998; Rhoades et 
al., 2000). 
 
Agency theory implies the composition and roles of boards should be to reduce 
the agency costs associated with self-interested management behaviour 
(Bezemer et al., 2007; John & Senbet, 1998; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Agency 
theory is seen as the basis for a control role of the board (Carver, 2007; 
Filatotchev et al., 2006; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Johnson et al., 1996; Pearce 
& Zahra, 1991; Stiles & Taylor, 2001).  
 
Under agency theory, the board has a task to ensure the survival and success of 
the organisation (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2005, p. 29). More specific tasks of the 
board are to: monitor managers on behalf of shareholders (Dalton et al., 1998; 
Filatotchev & Toms, 2003; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Huse, 2007; Nicholson & 
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Kiel, 2004b; Radin & Stevenson, 2006; Rhoades et al., 2000; Zahra & Pearce, 
1989); take critical decisions (Deutsch, 2005); ratify and monitor other 
decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983b, p. 311); ensure controls are in place to 
minimise the potential abuse of delegation (Davis et al., 1997); ensure funds 
are not expropriated or wasted (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997); evaluate the 
performance of the company and strategy (Huse & Rindova, 2001, p. 157); 
assess the ability and efforts of top managers (Walsh & Seward, 1990, p. 424); 
and, if necessary, control management behaviour (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999, 
p. 349). The assessment of management  may be difficult due to asymmetry of 
information, the complexity of top managers’ jobs, the time lag between 
managerial effort and outcomes (Walsh & Seward, 1990, p. 425) and the need 
to disentangle the person and the environment (Walsh & Seward, 1990, p. 
425). Formal monitoring of the board may be buttressed with informal 
monitoring (Fama & Jensen, 1983b, p. 323). 
 
Another of the board’s tasks under agency theory is to identify and hire 
management (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Walsh & Seward, 
1990). Boards must also remove poorly performing management (Carpenter & 
Westphal, 2001; Daily et al., 2003b; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Long et al., 2005; 
Walsh & Seward, 1990) and involve themselves in succession planning (Long 
et al., 2005, p. 674). Under agency theory prescriptions, a board task is to 
design and enforce compensation systems that align management incentives to 
shareholders’ objectives (Davis et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989b; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983b; Filatotchev, 2007; Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Radin & 
Stevenson, 2006; Walsh & Seward, 1990) to reduce the board’s need to 
monitor (Westphal, 1999, p. 10). Mechanisms used by the board for this 
purpose might include performance-based bonuses, salary revisions, stock 
options, performance-based dismissal, and stock ownership (Jensen & 
Murphy, 1990, p. 226).  
 
Under agency theory, director compensation should be aligned with 
shareholders’ interests to incentivise directors to monitor managers (Dalton et 
al., 2003; Jensen, 1994; Letza et al., 2004; Lynall et al., 2003; Zahra et al., 
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2000). Following this line of thought, the amounts of equity held by directors 
and management in the firm should not be trivial (Jensen & Murphy, 1990, p. 
225) to make them “think like shareholders” (Muth & Donaldson, 1998, p. 8). 
This is practised in dairy co-operative governance where board roles are 
carried out by directors who generally have large amounts of their income and 
equity tied to co-operative performance.  
 
Agency theory also sees a role for the board in strategy. Boards are expected to 
contribute to and shape the strategic direction of the organisation (Hendry & 
Kiel, 2004; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), to monitor 
strategies and overturn poor decisions (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001, p. 639)  
and ensure the strategies pursued are not at the expense of shareholders 
(Baysinger & Hoskinsson, 1990). Agency theory overall suggests an 
adversarial relationship between board and management (Stiles & Taylor, 
2001). 
 
As to the composition of the board, first and foremost, agency theorists seek a 
board that is independent from management to be effective in improving firm 
performance (Clarke, 1998; Dalton et al., 1998; Dalton & Dalton, 2005; 
Dulewicz & Herbert, 1999; Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1994; Hillman et al., 2000; 
John & Senbet, 1998; Leblanc & Gillies, 2005; Lynall et al., 2003; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003; Udueni, 1999; Van den Berghe & Levrau, 
2004). The board should consist of a majority of non-executive directors. 
Some executive directors are required due to information asymmetry, to make 
collusion more difficult, and as an internal monitoring function (Baysinger & 
Hoskinsson, 1990; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Johnson et al., 1996; Walsh & 
Seward, 1990). Social ties between the board and management would impair 
the board’s ability to effectively monitor (Westphal, 1999, p. 8). The need for 
independence raises the “independence  paradox” - by being independent of 
management, the board is more exposed to information asymmetry 
(Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 2004a, p. 314). Agency theorists also advocate 
the separation of the role of chief executive and chairman (Dalton et al., 1998; 
Muth & Donaldson, 1998; O'Connor & Peel, 1995; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 
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2003). Jensen (1994) argues that if it is the function of the chair to hire, fire, 
evaluate and compensate the CEO, this cannot be done when both roles are 
combined (p. 20). Following on from that, agency theory would look at having 
board members with expertise in monitoring (John & Senbet, 1998; Johnson et 
al., 1996). 
 
Agency theory appears to extend to co-operatives in the sense that boards 
should ensure that managers act in the interest of members (Cornforth, 2002, p. 
53). Co-operatives are assumed to have severe agency problems because of 
their special structures (Porter & Scully, 1987). Some of the usual monitoring 
or control mechanisms available to investor owned firms (IOFs) may not be so 
available to co-operatives. Co-operative members lack: easy exit, monitoring 
through a stock exchange (Baysinger & Hoskinsson, 1990), an effective 
takeover market (Fama & Jensen, 1983b, p. 319), and an ability to diversify 
their risk away (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). Co-operative members’ goal 
functions are usually multidimensional, and not primarily that of an investor 
(Borgen, 2004, p. 389) making it difficult to design incentive schemes for 
management. Co-operative board members may not normally be expert 
monitors. On the other hand, co-operative board members tend to be 
independent of management, and are highly incentivised by way of “wealth at 
risk” to monitor management. 
3.3.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Bainbridge, 2002; Williamson, 1971, 
1979, 1981, 1983, 1984) shares theoretical underpinnings with agency theory, 
in particular, assumptions around human behaviour, such as bounded 
rationality, opportunism, self-seeking behaviour (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Stiles & 
Taylor, 2001) and information asymmetry (Hennessy, 1996). TCE differs in its 
focus on transactions (as opposed to contracts) as the basic unit of analysis. 
TCE also focuses on market failure and has asset specificity, unequal 
bargaining power (Eisenhardt, 1989b; Huse, 2007) along with uncertainty, and 
frequency of transaction (Sykuta & Cook, 2001, p. 1275) as its driving forces. 
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Under TCE solutions, an organisation should arrange itself to economise on 
transaction costs over time to survive (Williamson, 1984). Under TCE, special 
governance structures may be required if parties must invest in transaction-
specific assets to ensure the relationship is not terminated or abused 
(Williamson, 1984, p. 1202). TCE focuses on the governance structure as a 
means of managing transaction costs (Huse, 2007, p. 52).  
 
TCE is mainly associated with the board’s control role (Stiles & Taylor, 2001; 
Williamson, 1984). The main task of the board, therefore is to define and 
safeguard property rights (Huse, 2007, p. 42), particularly the protection of 
specialised assets (Williamson, 1983). TCE has been criticised for giving little 
guidance beyond a strong control role as to how boards should be structured or 
organised, or how boards make decisions (Stiles & Taylor, 2001). Williamson 
(1984) identifies costs associated with TCE-inspired governance arrangements, 
such as supplying of information - “huge educational needs arise if specialized 
constituencies are to be informed participants on the board” (p. 1206). Other 
costs include the risk of “squandering valuable resource” by “deflecting 
strategic decisionmakers from their main purpose by forcing them to redress 
operating-level complaints” (Williamson, 1984, p. 1206). 
 
While TCE shares many of the governance tasks with agency theory 
expectations, TCE advocates see the need for a board dominated by those with 
relation-specific investments at risk to ensure reliable company behaviour 
(Huse & Rindova, 2001, p. 164). TCE proponents do not see the need for other 
stakeholder representation (Williamson, 1984, p. 1197) and only minimal 
management representation (Williamson, 1984, p. 1216).  
 
Within the (dairy) co-operative context, TCE may be able to explain some 
reasons for the composition and roles of boards as dairy farmers have highly 
transaction-specific investments combined with high degrees of uncertainty. 
Furthermore, the daily need for a market (perishability of milk) may expose 
members to opportunistic behaviour. Members, who are dairy farmers are said 
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to  dominate the governing board to reduce their transaction costs and protect 
themselves from transacting cost opportunism (Borgen, 2000, p. 20). 
3.3.3 Managerial Hegemony Theory 
 
Hegemony refers to the “pre-eminence of one group among other groups” 
(Donaldson, 2003, p. 37) while managerialism refers to self serving behaviour 
by managers (John & Senbet, 1998, p. 375). Managerial hegemony has its 
theoretical roots in institutional theory drawing on sociology and psychology 
(Huse, 2007, p. 45). Managerial hegemony theorists hold that boards are 
dominated by management and as such are not a useful mechanism for 
aligning management and shareholder interests (Brennan, 2006; Kosnik, 1987; 
Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Mace, 1971; Molz, 1985; Useem & Zelleke, 2006).  
 
Under managerial hegemony it is claimed that management have effective 
control of the board. Management, due to the intimate knowledge gained from 
the day-to-day running of the firm utilise information asymmetry (Brennan, 
2006; Ingley & van der Walt, 2005; Radin & Stevenson, 2006; Rutherford & 
Buchholtz, 2007), retained earnings (Mizruchi, 1983, p. 427) and the control of 
the selection and perquisites of directors to control the board (Hendry & Kiel, 
2004; Kosnik, 1987; Latham, 1999; Mizruchi, 1983). With power over the 
board, management will act in their own best interests and expropriate wealth 
from shareholders (Kosnik, 1987, p. 169). 
 
Empirical studies (e.g., Bosch, 1995; Coulson-Thomas, 1991; Demb & 
Neubauer, 1992; Ingley & van der Walt, 2005; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; 
Mace, 1971; Monks & Minnow, 1995; O'Neal & Thomas, 1995; Pettigrew & 
McNulty, 1995; Useem & Zelleke, 2006) lend some weight to managerial 
hegemony’s existence. However, it has been criticised for ignoring board 
processes, roles other than the board’s control role, and that it overemphasises 
the link between board structures and performance (Zahra & Pearce, 1989).  
 
Managerial hegemony theory proponents see the role of the board as passive, 
dominated by management with little input into firm decision making (Stiles & 
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Taylor, 2001, p. 19) or in directing the company (Hendry & Kiel, 2004, p. 
502). As such, the board is effectively a “rubber stamp” for management 
(Jonsson, 2005, p. 711) or empowers the board only in a stewardship role to 
manage corporate assets (Muth & Donaldson, 1998, p. 6) or to provide advice 
to management (Huse, 2005a; Huse & Rindova, 2001). Under this view, the 
board is selected by management (Mizruchi, 1983; Stiles & Taylor, 2001) and 
as such is made up of inside directors or directors beholden to management 
(Kosnik, 1987, p. 163). Their role is likely to be one that is distant, less likely 
to hold managers to account and may be less accountable to shareholders. 
3.3.4 Stakeholder Theory 
 
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) holds that the interests of other 
stakeholders associated with the business, not just shareholders, should be 
taken into account in corporate decision making. Stakeholder theory has its 
theoretical origin in politics, law and management theory and has been in 
ascendancy in the study of corporate governance in recent years (MacMillan & 
Downing, 1999) to some extent taking over from economic theories (Key, 
1999, p. 320). Stakeholder theory rejects shareholder wealth maximisation as 
morally untenable (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Jones & Wicks, 1999) and 
sees human behaviour as more complex than self-serving and opportunistic 
characteristics would suggest (Jones & Wicks, 1999, p. 212). Stakeholder 
theory asserts that those companies that look after stakeholders, act morally, 
and serve social purposes will be more successful (Jones & Wicks, 1999; Letza 
et al., 2004).  
 
Those who could be considered stakeholders, and for whom account should be 
rendered, appear virtually endless (see for example, Donaldson & Preston, 
1995; Freeman & Reed, 1983). According to Freeman (1984), a stakeholder is 
“any group or individual who can effect, or is affected by, the achievement of a 
corporation’s purpose” and includes “employees, customers, suppliers, 
stockholders, banks, environmentalists, government and other groups who can 
help or hurt the corporation” (p. vi). Stiles and Taylor (2001) distinguish 
between a weak and a strong version of the roles of stakeholders in 
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organisations where the stronger version shareholders are displaced from their 
primary position (p. 96). Consensus as to stakeholder theory’s value is absent. 
Sternberg (1998) describes stakeholder theory as “fundamentally misguided” 
and that requirements to account so widely “undermines both private property 
and accountability” (p. 93). Stakeholder theory is effectively seen as “very 
fuzzy” (Antonacopoulou & Meric, 2005, p. 22) offering no guidance to the 
board as to who are legitimate stakeholders (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Sternberg, 1998), being over-ideological (Antonacopoulou & Meric, 2005, p. 
24) and better seen as a “corporate governance philosophy” (Tricker, 2000, p. 
295).  
 
Under stakeholder theory, a role of the board may be to act as representatives 
of stakeholders in the corporation (Freeman & Reed, 1983; Letza et al., 2004). 
The board may have a task to explore, explicate, review, discuss, and compare 
stakeholder expectations of board roles (Huse & Rindova, 2001, p. 154) and to 
assess the importance and power of stakeholders (Freeman & Reed, 1983; 
Huse, 2007). As it is likely that the various stakeholders’ expectations as to 
board roles will diverge (Huse & Rindova, 2001, p. 174), a board task will be 
to maintain a suitable balance between various stakeholder demands (Vinten, 
2001b, p. 36), and to make tradeoffs between stakeholders (Key, 1999, p. 320). 
This may suggest a political role for the board in negotiating and resolving 
conflicts (Cornforth, 2002, p. 54) and advocating for stakeholders (Huse, 2007, 
p. 54). The board will need to be aware of the impact of decisions on 
stakeholder groups (Freeman, 1984, p. 196). The board will also require 
different measures to judge firm performance such as “the generation of 
goodwill” (MacMillan & Downing, 1999, p. 19) and “corporate social 
responsibility” (Jones & Wicks, 1999, p. 209). Stakeholder theory would see 
the right to seats on the board as owed to a wide range of stakeholder groups  
(Kochan, 2003; Rindova, 1999).  
3.3.5 Resource Dependence Theory 
 
Resource dependence theory (RDT) (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) has its roots in 
economics and sociology. Its users claim that organisations use governing 
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boards to try to exert control over their external environment by co-opting 
scarce resources and potentially hostile elements in the environment through 
directors’ external relationships or putting representatives of those institutions 
on the board (Muth & Donaldson, 1998; Pfeffer, 1972; Provan, 1980). RDT 
sees directors’ contribution as being “boundary spanning” agents between the 
company and its environment (Daily et al., 2003a, p. 372) that “act to buffer 
the organization from the uncertainties of its environment” (Provan, 1980, p. 
221).  
 
The four primary resources co-opted are said to be advice and counsel; 
communication channels to external firms; assistance in obtaining resources; 
and legitimacy (Hillman et al., 2000; Lynall et al., 2003). Through the 
provision of timely advice and counsel to management on the external 
environment, outside directors can reduce uncertainty (Hendry & Kiel, 2004; 
Hillman et al., 2000; Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) and aid 
firm survival by dealing with external threats (Dalton et al., 1998, p. 273).  
 
Related to RDT are directors’ networks6 of connections. Directors’ networks of 
connections can reduce firm dependence or increase performance (Heracleous 
& Murray, 2001; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Muth & Donaldson, 1998; O'Neal 
& Thomas, 1995). Networks may be wide ranging: from simply letting 
management know the correct people to contact or influence; involvement in 
industry associations (Heracleous & Murray, 2001, p. 142); or links to 
customers, suppliers, and expertise (Muth & Donaldson, 1998). Director 
networks can be used to increase innovation, access new markets, decrease 
transaction costs and manage uncertainty (Heracleous & Murray, 2001, p. 
137).  
 
More formalised than network connections are interlocking directorates 
(Battiston et al., 2003; Boyd, 1990; Harris & Shimizu, 2004; Heracleous & 
Murray, 2001; Mizruchi, 1996; O'Neal & Thomas, 1995). An interlocking 
                                                 
6 Networks are defined here as “long-term contacts between persons or organizations in order 
to obtain information and building resources” (Borch & Huse, 1993, p. 23) 
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directorate is where “a person affiliated with one organization sits on the board 
of directors of another organization” (Mizruchi, 1996, p. 271). Interlocking 
directors provide access to important resources, opportunities to co-operate 
with other firms, legitimacy and information on business practices (Harris & 
Shimizu, 2004, p. 778). Through their prestige, the directors’ role can enhance 
the firm’s legitimacy in society (Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer, 1973; Zahra & 
Pearce, 1989) in order to extract resources for the firm. 
 
RDT theorists argue that RDT will raise firm performance and increase returns 
to shareholders (Dalton et al., 1998; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). There appears to be empirical 
support for a link between the board’s boundary spanning activities and firm 
performance (Hillman, 2005; Hillman et al., 2000; Kula, 2005; Stiles & 
Taylor, 2001). RDT, however, largely ignores other roles of the board, the 
inner workings of the board (Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Zahra & Pearce, 1989), 
and resource use through focussing only on resource attainment (Provan, 1980, 
p. 224). It is not a theory that has been tested against board role processes 
therefore. 
 
RDT invokes an external focus for the board (Provan, 1980, p. 226). Much of 
the board’s service role is drawn heavily from RDT prescriptions (Gabrielsson 
& Winlund, 2000; Levrau & Van den Berghe, 2007a). RDT proponents also 
see boards as strategists in their role of providing advice to the CEO and in 
aiding strategy development (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
RDT does not envision boards as evaluators of management (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003, p. 386). 
 
Under RDT prescriptions, the board’s tasks may include: a ‘linking task’ to 
important external resources, particularly finance (Bezemer et al., 2007; 
Filatotchev & Toms, 2003) and influential groups (Borch & Huse, 1993; 
Hillman, 2005; Pfeffer, 1973; Rhoades et al., 2000); supplying information, 
knowledge, experience and skills to management (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Huse, 2007; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004); networking and door opening (Huse, 
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2005a, 2005b, 2007); maintaining good relations with external stakeholders 
(Cornforth & Edwards, 1999); enhancing legitimacy and prestige (Hillman et 
al., 2000; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Provan, 1980), and lobbying regulatory 
bodies (Bezemer et al., 2007; Heracleous & Murray, 2001; Huse & Rindova, 
2001). Overall, RDT proponents would expect a very collaborative 
relationship between the board and management.  
 
Under RDT, the composition of the board will reflect the demands and 
uncertainties of the firm’s external environment (Borch & Huse, 1993; Boyd, 
1990; Hillman, 2005; Pfeffer, 1972; Provan, 1980; Toms & Filatotchev, 2004). 
These demands will change over time (Heracleous & Murray, 2001; Hillman et 
al., 2000). For example, the requirements of an “entrepreneurial threshold 
firm” (Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004) will differ from those of a declining 
industry (Toms & Filatotchev, 2004). RDT requires well-connected and well-
networked directors with each director having differing networks (Huse, 2007; 
Lynall et al., 2003). The board will also consist of stakeholders (Huse & 
Rindova, 2001, p. 156) and community influential parties (Hillman, 2005; 
Hillman et al., 2000) that provide legitimacy and prestige (Filatotchev et al., 
2006; Provan, 1980) with experiences and skills aligned to environmental 
dependencies (Hillman, 2005; Westphal, 1999). A board driven by RDT 
principles will predominantly be composed of external directors with some 
executive directors for firm-specific information (Hillman et al., 2000). RDT 
may require larger boards with greater external linkages to resources and 
higher quality advice to improve firm performance (Dalton et al., 1999; 
Pfeffer, 1973; Provan, 1980) or smaller boards consisting of “resource rich 
individuals’ (Boyd, 1990, p. 428). For a co-operative, that may implicate 
members who are major suppliers.  
 
The strong link to one stakeholder group limits access to resources to the 
detriment of the organisation (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007, p. 601). The co-
operative board may have strong linkages with supplier-shareholders to reduce 
uncertainty of supply (milk and capital) (Muth & Donaldson, 1998; Nunez-
47 
 
Nickel & Moyano-Fuentes, 2004). This could isolate the co-operative from the 
environment and competition.  
 
For the supplier-shareholder’s firm, RDT board representation could limit 
external risk by ensuring a market for their highly perishable goods, protecting 
transaction specific investments (Nunez-Nickel & Moyano-Fuentes, 2004, p. 
1134), collectively achieving economies of scale in production, distribution 
and marketing (Katz & Boland, 2002), and by ensuring reliable behaviour of 
the company (Huse & Rindova, 2001, p. 164). This could secure favourable 
treatment for both sides of the transaction (Muth & Donaldson, 1998, p. 11).   
3.3.6 Resource Based View 
 
Closely aligned to RDT is the resource based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 
1991; Barney et al., 2001). Both theories relate to the board providing 
resources to the firm. The difference relates to the external focus of the RDT 
compared to the internal focus of the RBV (Huse, 2005b, 2007). RBV 
advocates the need for experienced outside directors with professional and 
personal qualifications to complement management skills or knowledge 
(Gabrielsson & Huse, 2005, p. 29). RBV non-executive directors may provide 
valuable advice and counselling during corporate decision-making processes 
(Bezemer et al., 2007; Johnson et al., 1996; Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995; 
Rindova, 1999; Stiles, 2001). This allows the firm access to valuable, rare and 
sustainable resources (Barney, 1991; Filatotchev et al., 2006), such as 
professional competencies (e.g., finance, legal), personal networks, 
employment, market and industry knowledge (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2005, p. 
35). Under the RBV, corporate governance is a source of competitive 
advantage (Barney et al., 2001, p. 632) and the board is envisaged as a 
sounding board for executives (Hillman et al., 2000, p. 241).  
 
From a co-operative perspective the domination of the board by members 
(Cornforth, 2002) with knowledge mainly in farm production could pose 
problems. They may not necessarily have the knowledge to provide the sort of 
advice and expertise management might need.  
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3.3.7 Stewardship Theory 
 
Stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1994; Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998) has its basis in organisational theory and sees managers as 
stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of shareholders (Davis 
et al., 1997). Stewardship theory differs from agency theory (Letza et al., 2004; 
Muth & Donaldson, 1998) in assuming managers are driven not solely by self 
interest but by motives such as “the need for achievement and recognition, the 
intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, respect for authority and the 
work ethic” (Muth & Donaldson, 1998, p. 6). Under stewardship theory the 
core concept is that managers can be trusted to act in the best interests of 
shareholders (Huse, 2007; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). In a less radical version 
of stewardship theory it is suggested that managers and shareholders’ interests 
often merge and that by serving shareholders interests management often serve 
their own interests; for example, to preserve their reputation as expert decision 
makers (Daily et al., 2003a; Davis et al., 1997). Under stewardship theory 
shareholders can maximise their returns by empowering management and 
allowing them effective control of the organisation. This indicates a limited 
role for the board in overseeing managers (Letza et al., 2004; Muth & 
Donaldson, 1998). 
 
Not surprisingly, given its contradictory assumptions to the dominant agency 
theory, not all writers are comfortable with stewardship theory. Stewardship 
theory does not take account of those times when managers do not act as good 
stewards (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007, p. 601). As Clarke (2005) succinctly notes, 
the “tenets of stewardship theory – the capacity and willingness of managers to 
balance different interests in the professional pursuit of company strategy – 
would appear to be more than a little challenged by the Enron events” (p. 604). 
Empirical support for stewardship theory predictions seem, at best, to be mixed 
(Davis et al., 1997; Muth & Donaldson, 1998; Stiles & Taylor, 2001). 
Stewardship theory also does not offer how boards might make decisions 
(Stiles & Taylor, 2001), though it does implicate a more hands-off role for the 
board with managers making most decisions. 
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Stewardship theory focuses on the boards’ strategic and service roles 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001; Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004a) 
through adding value to the organisations’ decisions by offering advice and 
expertise (Levrau & Van den Berghe, 2007a, p. 13), rather than monitoring and 
controlling (Davis et al., 1997, p. 26). Directors are stewards to shareholders’ 
interests (Tricker, 2000, p. 295) motivated by their reputational effects 
(Carpenter & Westphal, 2001, p. 639). Stewardship theory suggests equity 
ownership by directors as fostering firm identification (Sundaramurthy & 
Lewis, 2003, p. 399). Under stewardship theory the relationship between the 
board and management is characterised by trust, cohesiveness, partnership, and 
mentorship (Huse, 2007). 
 
Stewardship theory would suggest that firm control and hence board 
membership should be firmly in management’s hands (Dalton et al., 1998, pp. 
270-271). As such, stewardship theory favours chief executive duality and a 
dominance of management representation on boards (Davis et al., 1997; 
Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Muth & Donaldson, 1998). Board independence from 
management is seen as counterproductive (Muth & Donaldson, 1998) as 
executive dominated boards will have a depth of knowledge, expertise, ease of 
communication and commitment to improve firm performance (Hendry & 
Kiel, 2004, p. 503). Stewardship theorists believe that CEO duality “empowers 
the CEO and stimulates the motivation to achieve” (Muth & Donaldson, 1998, 
p. 9) and gives a unity of command, reduced role conflict and clear decisions 
making authority (Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). 
Directors are selected for their expertise and contacts and their ability to 
operate as a team with each other and managers (Cornforth & Edwards, 1999). 
 
In the co-operative context, the stewardship recommendations appear to run 
counter to the “user-control” co-operative principle in which members, not 
executives, are elected as directors to control the co-operative leaving minimal 
room for management representation on the board. 
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3.3.8 Class Hegemony Theory 
 
Class hegemony theory holds that boards serve as a function of the corporate 
and social elite to which they belong. With its roots in Marxist sociology there 
is a belief that corporate governance is a system to perpetuate the ruling elite 
(Kosnik, 1987; Useem, 1982). By having only members of one social group 
serving on boards, all other social groups are effectively excluded, thus 
protecting the “values and interests of the ruling capitalists” (Zahra & Pearce, 
1989, p. 293). This perpetuation is often achieved through interlocking 
directorates (Huse & Rindova, 2001; O'Neal & Thomas, 1995; Useem, 1982). 
Class hegemony theory “suffers from a general lack of detail on what it is that 
boards actually do and the characteristics of actual corporate governance 
practices” (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p. 21).  
 
Nonetheless, class hegemony theory holds that there are two broad roles for 
the board; service and control. The board will provide legitimation and support 
to the organisation (Huse & Rindova, 2001, p. 157). Tasks for the board may 
include reviewing the CEO’s initiatives to ensure consistency with the interests 
of the ruling elite and utilising networks to promote favourable legislation  
(Huse, 2007, p. 60). Class hegemonists would expect to see selective 
recruitment of directors in terms of social status and influence, with close 
connections to management  (Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p. 18). 
 
From a co-operative perspective, a broad view would see supplier-shareholder 
directors as maintaining and supporting existing power elites (Huse & 
Rindova, 2001, p. 156). This does seem to contradict a rationale for co-
operatives as they are self-help organisations designed to bring economic 
balance back into the hands of disempowered actors in the economy.  
3.3.9 Discussion 
 
Corporate governance does not have a single accepted theoretical base that 
fully explains the role of governing body members (Carver, 2007; Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003; Letza et al., 2004; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007; Pettigrew & 
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McNulty, 1995; Tricker, 2000). Furthermore, corporate governance researchers 
note the poor explanatory power of existing theories (Dalton et al., 1998; 
Dalton et al., 1999; Heracleous, 2001; Huse, 2005b; Letza et al., 2004; Lynall 
et al., 2003; Tricker, 2000). The different theoretical perspectives suggest 
different and sometimes conflicting rationales, expectations and emphasis on 
board roles (Cornforth, 2004; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2005; Huse, 2007; Huse & 
Rindova, 2001; Nicholson & Kiel, 2004a; Stiles & Taylor, 2001). Yet some 
theories concentrate on specific board roles while ignoring others (Clarke, 
2005; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007; Tricker, 2000). While 
all normative prescriptions can explain elements of board performance, each is 
limited in its scale and scope resulting in an incomplete understanding of board 
behaviour (Cornforth, 2002; Hung, 1998; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Levrau & 
Van den Berghe, 2007a; Tricker, 1993b). A more encompassing theory of 
board roles is needed (Nicholson & Kiel, 2007, p. 601). 
 
Furthermore, multiple theoretical foundations lead to often contradictory role 
explanations (Dalton et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 1996). These theories offer 
“competing perspectives and assumptions”, and this can make board task 
expectations “a struggle between ideologies” (Huse, 2007, p. 68). According to 
Huse (2007) all theories have “something right” in their understanding of 
board tasks. Many authors reject the notion of a universal governance theory. 
Some suggest a combination of theories to understand board behaviour (e.g., 
Clarke, 2005; Daily et al., 2003a; Davis et al., 1997; Eisenhardt, 1989b; 
Filatotchev et al., 2006; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2005; Golden & Zajac, 2001; 
Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Hung, 1998; Huse, 2005a, 
2007; Pye, 2000; Stiles, 2001; Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
This may be important to attempt, but it would seem to be sensible to begin 
such an effort in practice (as is done here), not in theory, so as to ensure that a 
real grounding and a practice foundation are the basis for theoretical induction.  
 
There is a degree of overlap between, and incompleteness of, each of the 
various theories. Agency, TCE, and managerial hegemony share assumptions 
about: the separation of ownership and control; goal conflict between 
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management and shareholders; self interested behaviours of managers; the 
need for oversight and the control of management; and the alignment of 
management and shareholder goals. These theories indicate a general distrust 
of management and emphasise the need for board independence, and skills in 
monitoring and control. In contrast, stewardship, class hegemony and the 
resource theories emphasise trust and collaboration between management and 
board and highlight service and strategy roles. Stewardship and class 
hegemony theories emphasise the need for management-dominated boards. 
Resource theories emphasise non-management directors. RDT looks to a board 
with external networks, and RBV seeks out internal support for management. 
Finally, stakeholder theory sees the boards’ task as representing constituent 
groups.   
 
Cornforth (2002) identifies four “key tensions” for co-operative boards, all of 
which are reflected in one or another of these normative theories: between the 
board as representative or experts; between conformance and performance 
roles; between control and support of management; and between multiple 
stakeholders and multiple and ambiguous accountabilities (p. 52). Some 
writers find that these seemingly contradictory theoretical prescriptions can co-
exist in a trust-based environment (Stiles & Taylor, 2001; Sundaramurthy & 
Lewis, 2003; Westphal, 1999). Others merely see the need to balance the 
various tasks (Huse, 2007; Spear, 2004). 
 
Other writers highlight the need to take into account the organisation’s context 
when applying these theories (e.g., Baker & Thompson, 2000; Filatotchev, 
2007; Filatotchev et al., 2006; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Provan, 1980; 
Turnbull, 1997). Issues such as board power, environmental uncertainty, 
information asymmetry (Hendry & Kiel, 2004, p. 500), firm ownership 
structure, industry (Taylor et al., 2008), firm complexity (Gabrielsson & Huse, 
2005), stage in a firm’s evolution (Lynall et al., 2003; Zahra & Filatotchev, 
2004), institutional background (Aguilera, 2005; Baker & Thompson, 2000), 
country (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Huse et al., 2005) and the executives’ 
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motivations (Davis et al., 1997, p. 25) may all influence the applicability of the 
various theories to specific situations. 
 
Normative in nature and specifying what roles the boards should perform, 
these theories could be enriched by taking into account what boards actually do 
(Huse & Rindova, 2001, p. 155). Normative theories may simplify rationales 
which can only be understood by documenting the inner workings of the board 
- how they make decisions, and how they work in practice (Stiles & Taylor, 
2001, p. 10). Fieldwork and theorising on board practices would enrich 
understanding of governance, while normative theories contribute to 
knowledge, they also may ignore the “black box” of practice. There is 
therefore a call for empirical research into actual board behaviour (Cornforth & 
Edwards, 1999; Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Huse, 2005b; Leblanc & Schwartz, 
2007; Letza et al., 2004; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007).  
 
In summary, eight theories utilised in the corporate governance literature are 
discussed to gain an insight into the possible roles of the governing boards of 
co-operative dairy companies. Findings are as to the knowledge they provide 
and gaps they leave and point to a need for inductively-developed theory on  
corporate governance practice.                            
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CHAPTER 4 GAP IN THE LITERATURE 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify prior and similar studies and to 
evaluate these studies. This purpose is to identify a gap in the literature in 
which to frame this study, allowing this thesis to make a contribution to the 
corporate governance literature. 
 
The prior studies selected are those that begin to explore inside the boardroom, 
that is, the study of board relationships, behaviours and/or processes. Outcome 
and effectiveness studies are only included if it is felt that a substantial portion 
of the study sheds light on the boards, relationships, behaviours and processes. 
Studies of governing boards in all types of contexts, particularly differing 
ownership structures, are included. The search began in the business 
management literature utilising the following databases: Google Scholar; 
ProQuest; ABI/INFORM Global; Emerald Management Xtra; Blackwell’s 
Synergy; and Elsevier Science direct. No publication date time limits were set 
on the search. The searches were limited to articles in the English language. 
The keywords used are: Corporate Governance; and combinations of the 
keywords (Agricultural) Co-operative (Cooperative) Governance. Careful 
scrutiny of references concluding journal articles also proved a rich source. 
The 53 prior studies that meet the criteria are in Table 4-1. 
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Table 4-1 Prior Studies in Governance Processes 
Author, Source Year Purpose of study Theoretical 
context 
Methods Used Context Results / Findings 
Mace, M. L. (1971)  Managerial 
hegemony 
Interviews 
(50 directors) 
US Boards are dominated by 
managers 
Pearce, J. A., & 
Zahra, S. A. 
(1991) Empirically validate a 
typology of CEO -board 
relative powers and their 
association with corporate 
performance 
Power perspective 
–Managerial 
hegemony? 
Survey US 
139 Fortune 500 
companies 
Significant difference in board 
types. Participative boards are 
associated with superior financial 
performance 
Stewart, R. (1991) Exploring the relationship 
between chairmen and chief 
executives 
Role theory Longitudinal study 
20 General Managers 
and their chairmen 
Action research 
UK  
National Health 
Service 
Not for profit 
The two roles are dependent with 
overlapping domains. The 
relationships varied. Five 
different chair roles identified 
Judge, W. Q., & 
Zeithaml, C. P. 
(1992) Measure the level of board 
involvement in strategic 
decisions 
Institutional 
Strategic choice 
Interviews (114) with 
board members and 
archival data. 
Quantitative 
US  
Four  industrial 
sectors 
Board size and levels of 
diversification and insiders are 
negatively related to board 
involvement in strategy. 
Board involvement positively 
related to firm performance 
O'Neal, D., & 
Thomas, H. 
(1995) Gain insights into the board’s 
strategic role 
 Interviews 
ethnography 
US 
for-profit; publicly 
listed and private 
Boards are selected and 
dominated by management 
Huse, M. (1998) Identify and understand the 
processes which influence the 
behaviour of boards 
Stakeholder Participant observation 
Chair of 3 small 
companies for 15 months 
Europe 
Norway – small 
companies at 
different stages of 
their lifecycle 
 
Board roles depend on 
relationships between the 
external and internal stakeholders 
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Author, Source Year Purpose of study Theoretical 
context 
Methods Used Context Results / Findings 
van Hamel, J. A., 
van Wijk, H. E., de 
Rooij, A. J. H., & 
Bruel, M. 
(1998) Gain a better understanding of 
how supervisory and advisory 
processes take place in Dutch 
boardrooms 
Qualitative 
Exploratory 
Interviews - 25 in-depth 
interviews with top 
executives and directors 
Europe  
Holland; large, often 
listed Dutch 
companies 
Descriptive findings 
Cornforth, C., & 
Edwards, C. 
(1999) Examine what boards do in 
practice 
Institutional 
theory 
Multiple case study – 
observations, interviews, 
board documents 
UK  
Not for profit 
Boards vary considerably in how 
they interpret their roles and 
contribution 
Maassen, G. F., & 
van den Bosch, F. 
A. J. 
(1999) Assess the independence of 
two tier boards in the 
Netherlands 
Agency Survey 
- Structured 
questionnaire 
Europe 
Netherlands 50 
largest companies 
listed on 
Amsterdam stock 
exchange 
Challenges the agency belief that 
two tier boards are independent 
from management 
McNulty, T., & 
Pettigrew, A. 
(1999) How Chair’s and NED7’s 
influence strategy 
Multiple Interviews 
 
UK 
publicly listed 
companies 
Part time board members 
influence strategy – Relevance to 
agency, RDT and strategic 
management scholars 
Roberts, J., & Stiles, 
P. 
(1999) Study the relationship 
between chairmen and chief 
executives 
Role, leadership, 
agency and 
negotiated order  
theories 
Theory 
development 
 
 
 
Interviews - semi-
structured in-depth with 
30 chair/CE dyads 
UK  
major corporations 
Dimensions of the relationship 
are multifaceted. The roles need 
to be complementary 
                                                 
7 Non-Executive Director 
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Author, Source Year Purpose of study Theoretical 
context 
Methods Used Context Results / Findings 
Westphal, J. D. (1999) Develop and test theoretical 
framework 
Examines how social ties 
between top managers and 
NEDs may facilitate board 
involvement by encouraging 
the provision of advice and 
counsel in the strategy making 
process 
Resource 
dependence theory 
 
Survey 
243 CEOs 
And 564 NEDs 
US 
600 companies 
Forbes 1000 index 
industrial and 
service firms 
Lack of social independence can 
increase board involvement and 
firm performance  by raising the 
frequency of advice and counsel 
interactions between CEOs and 
NEDs. Challenges agency theory 
Adrian, J. L., & 
Kiser, S. L. 
(2000) Provide information about 
directors’ attitudes and 
perceptions toward their roles 
as directors and their 
understanding of the co-
operative environment  
Unstated 
From the co-
operative 
literature 
Questionnaire 
Board survey - Mail and 
in person 
(79 respondents) 
US   
Alabama 48 
agricultural and 31 
rural electric co-
operative directors 
Provides indications of the 
strength and limitations of actual 
and perceived knowledge 
directors posses and use and 
presents opportunities to enhance 
director training   
Gabrielsson, J., & 
Winlund, H. 
(2000) Examine the importance of 
structures and process in the 
boardroom 
Unstated Mail Survey to CEOs 
Hypothesis testing 
Europe 
Sweden; small and 
medium sized 
industrial firms 
Board member involvement and 
formal structures are important 
for the board to perform 
effectively 
Hillman, A. J., 
Cannella, A. A., & 
Paetzold, R. L. 
(2000) Examines the resource 
dependence role of the 
directors 
To present a taxonomy of 
classifying directors that 
reflects the resource 
dependence role 
 
 
 
Resource 
dependence theory 
 
Secondary data US  
14 airline firms 
The board’s function as a link to 
the external environment is an 
important one, and that firms 
respond to significant changes in 
their external environment by 
altering board composition 
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Author, Source Year Purpose of study Theoretical 
context 
Methods Used Context Results / Findings 
Pye, A. (2000) Contribute to the descriptive 
data on corporate governance 
Descriptive Interviews Qualitative 
data  
Longitudinal (13 years) 
 
UK  
large organisations 
The Chair and CEO relationship 
provides a powerful axis around 
which boardroom (r)evolves and 
corporate governing takes place 
Carpenter, M. A., & 
Westphal, J. D. 
(2001) Examines how external 
network ties determines a 
board’s ability to contribute to 
the strategic decision making 
process 
A socio-cognitive 
perspective 
Survey US  
600 large and 
medium Forbes 
1000 NEDs and 
CEOs 
The monitoring and advising 
behaviour of directors depends 
on the strategic perspective and 
base of expertise provided by 
their appointments to other 
boards 
Cornforth, C.  (2001) Examines the relationship 
between board inputs, 
structures, processes and 
board effectiveness 
Unstated Survey 
Stepwise logistic 
regression 
UK 
England and Wales; 
Charity boards 
Not for profit 
Board inputs and process 
variables are important in 
explaining board effectiveness 
Golden, B. R., & 
Zajac, E. L. 
(2001) Analyses the influence of the 
board on strategic change. 
Test model whether boards 
are active or passive in 
strategy by demographic and 
processual features 
Multiple 
Demography 
Agency  
Power 
Quantitative 
Survey 
Archival data 
US  
3000 hospitals 
Not for profit 
Strategic change is significantly 
affected by board demography 
and board processes 
Huse, M., & 
Rindova, V. P. 
(2001) Explore different stakeholders 
expectations of board roles 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Case study – survey and 
interviews 
Europe 
Norway - subsidiary 
boards of a single 
bank 
Key stakeholder groups have 
different expectations of board 
roles 
Ingley, C. B., & 
Van der Walt, N. T. 
(2001) Examine issues relating to 
board capability, effectiveness 
and organisational 
performance 
 
Build and test 
model 
Interviews 
Survey 
Focus groups 
 
New Zealand  Need for strategic vision and 
leadership in director capability 
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Author, Source Year Purpose of study Theoretical 
context 
Methods Used Context Results / Findings 
Stiles, P. (2001) Gain directors’ perceptions of 
their role 
Multiple 
Grounded 
methodology 
Interviews; survey; 
multi-case; 
 
UK 
Public companies 
Support for a number of 
theoretical frameworks – need 
multiple perspectives 
Stiles, P., & Taylor, 
B. 
(2001) Present a detailed picture of 
how boards operate from 
directors perspective 
Grounded Theory 
building 
Multiple cases 
Interviews 
UK 
Large public 
companies 
A theoretical framework 
Highlights multi-functional 
nature of board activity 
van der Walt, N., & 
Ingley, C. 
(2001) Highlight aspects of board 
process that inform efforts to 
improve director performance 
Theory 
development 
Interviews 
Survey 
Focus groups 
 
New Zealand  
Broad range of 
companies 
An integrated model of board 
effectiveness. 
Not enough evaluation and 
review of boards 
Finkelstein, S., & 
Mooney, A. C. 
(2003) Develop ideas of board 
process – interactions among 
board members influences 
their effectiveness 
Theory building 32 structured interviews US 
Large companies 
Five interrelated process goals 
(e.g. engage, teamwork, avoid 
destructive conflict) 
Nowak, M. J., & 
McCabe, M. 
(2003) Examines perceptions of 
directors about their access to 
information for their role 
Grounded 
research 
Agency theory 
Stewardship 
theory 
Interviews  
45 semi-structured 
director interviews 
Australia 
Publicly listed 
companies 
Found demonstrable evidence of 
information asymmetry 
Executives have controlling 
power over information 
Graebner, M. E., & 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 
(2004) Explore acquisitions from the 
sellers perspective 
Theory building 
inductive 
Eisenhardt (1989) 
method 
Multiple case 
 
US  
12 successful 
technology 
companies that are 
acquired  
Reframe corporate governance as 
a syndicate (interdependent peer 
relationship between the board 
and managers) 
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Author, Source Year Purpose of study Theoretical 
context 
Methods Used Context Results / Findings 
Harris, I. C., & 
Shimizu, K. 
(2004) Examine the impact of 
‘overboarded’ directors upon 
key strategic decisions (such 
as acquisitions) 
Unspecified Quantitative 
Secondary data 
US 
Top 100 deals 
reported in Mergers 
& Acquisitions 
magazine – Market 
listed  
Overboarded directors are 
important sources of knowledge 
and enhance acquisition 
performance 
Hooghiemstra, R., 
& van Manen, J. 
(2004a) 
  
Examine NEDs’ opinion 
regarding their roles and 
limitations 
 
Agency Questionnaire 
Survey – 250 Dutch 
NEDs 
- telephone and mail 
Europe 
Holland 
Monitoring is the main board 
task but limited by information 
asymmetry. The ‘independence 
paradox’ 
Hooghiemstra, R., 
& van Manen, J. 
(2004b)  Examine whether NEDs face 
an expectations gap 
 
Agency Questionnaire  
Mail survey – (directors; 
works councils; 
institutional investors) 
Europe  
Holland 
Gaps are found in stakeholders  
expectations of NEDs 
functioning and whom they 
should serve 
Pye, A. (2004) Draw attention to context and 
time for understanding and 
theorising about actual board 
behaviour 
Social capital 
Grounded 
theorising 
Interviews Qualitative 
data  
Longitudinal (13 years) 
 
UK 
large organisations 
Boards are not static homogenous 
groups. External relations impact 
on the internal workings of 
boards 
Van den Berghe, L. 
A. A., & Levrau, A. 
(2004) Identify what constitutes a 
good board of directors 
Theory building 60 in-depth interviews Europe  
Belgium; listed 
companies 
Practitioners see “soft” elements 
(that are absent from  the 
literature and governance ratings 
agency) as important to good 
governance 
Huse, M., 
Minichilli, A., & 
Schoning, M. 
(2005) Develop ideas for effective 
functioning boards 
Unstated   
multiple - 
suggests 
stakeholder theory 
 
 
Single case 
Direct observation 
Europe 
Norway; dairy co-
operative 
Process orientation may be 
crucial to the boards contribution 
to strategy and value creation 
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Author, Source Year Purpose of study Theoretical 
context 
Methods Used Context Results / Findings 
Ingley, C., & van 
der Walt, N. 
(2005) Evaluates directors’ 
perceptions of fellow 
directors’ contribution as 
defined by the Companies Act 
1993 
Multiple 
 
Survey 
3000 directors 
Statistical analysis 
 
New Zealand Directors may not have the 
influence over outcomes that they 
need to deliver their duties 
Jonsson, E. I. (2005) Distinguish between different 
board roles  
Fit theoretical debate into a 
framework 
Multiple 
 
Qualitative 
Questionnaire and 
interviews 
Europe 
Iceland; 11 
companies 
Boards have various roles or 
patterns of roles that can change 
with circumstances 
Kula, V. (2005) Investigate the impact of 
board roles, structure and 
process on the performance of 
Turkish companies 
Multiple 
Agency focus 
Survey questionnaire 
Quantitative 
Europe 
Turkey; 386 small 
and non listed stock 
ownership 
companies 
Separation of chair and CEO and 
the resource acquisition role of 
the board  have a positive impact 
on firm performance 
Leblanc, R., & 
Gillies, J. 
(2005) Investigates how board 
decision making is conducted 
Grounded theory 
building 
Attendance and 
observation 
Interviews 
Qualitative 
US 
(North America) 
Broad range of 
ownership structures 
and sectors 
Decision making processes are 
greatly influenced by the 
characteristics of individual 
directors 
Long, T., Dulewicz, 
V., & Gay, K. 
(2005) Comparison of NEDs’ roles 
on listed and unlisted 
companies compared to 
Combined Code guidelines 
Interpretive Interviews  - 25 semi-
structured in-depth 
interviews with NEDs 
serving simultaneously 
on listed and unlisted 
boards 
UK  
listed and large 
unlisted companies 
There are differences in NED 
roles 
Roberts, J., 
McNulty, T., & 
Stiles, P. 
(2005) Examines board effectiveness 
through the work and 
relationships of NEDs 
Various 
Accountability 
40 in-depth interviews UK 
FTSE 350 
Actual conduct of NEDs vis-à-vis 
the executive, determines board 
effectiveness. 
Supports theoretical pluralism 
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Author, Source Year Purpose of study Theoretical 
context 
Methods Used Context Results / Findings 
Siciliano, J. I. (2005) Examines board participation 
relative to that of senior 
management in strategic 
decision-making and 
evaluation  
Unspecified Survey 
CEOs and board 
members 
US  
credit unions 
275 
Board involvement in strategic 
activities varies in relation to the 
organisation’s financial 
performance  
Van den Berghe, L. 
A. A., & Baelden, 
T. 
(2005) Present a framework to tailor 
the monitoring role of the 
board to the company’s 
situation and needs 
Agency Questionnaire 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Europe 
Belgium; 81 listed 
companies 
Two main monitoring decisions – 
which responsibilities are 
delegated to management and to 
whom 
Wan, D., & Ong, C. 
H. 
(2005) Investigate whether board 
process serves as an 
intervening variable between 
board structure and 
performance 
Multiple 
Agency; strategic 
choice and RDT 
Questionnaire Secondary 
data 
 
Singapore 
212 publicly listed 
companies 
Board structure does not affect 
board process, while board 
process is related to board 
performance 
Ravasi, D., & 
Zattoni, A. 
(2006) Increasing the visibility of 
social and political dynamics 
surrounding strategic issues 
Grounded theory 
building 
Multiple case (9) 
Comparative study 
Semi- structured 
interviews 
Europe 
Italy; large mixed 
ownership 
institutions (2 or 
more large 
shareholders) 
Boards may act as a negotiating 
forum in reconciling diverging 
shareholders’ interests 
Ruigrok, W., Peck, 
S. I., & Keller, H. 
(2006) Developing and testing the 
relationship between board 
characteristics and 
involvement in strategic 
decision making 
Agency theory 
Network 
perspectives 
Questionnaire 
Primary and secondary 
data 
Hypothesis testing 
Europe 
Switzerland; stock 
exchange listed 
(62 responses to 
questionnaire) 
 
 
 
 
Board involvement in strategy is 
lower when boards are highly 
interlocked 
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Author, Source Year Purpose of study Theoretical 
context 
Methods Used Context Results / Findings 
Useem, M., & 
Zelleke, A. 
(2006) Extract the major decision-
making process in board 
decisions on what they decide 
and what they delegate to 
management 
Grounded theory 
building 
Interviews 
Archival data 
 
US 
31 large financial 
services companies  
Executives set much of the 
board’s decision making agenda. 
Directors are reliant on executive 
judgement on what to bring to the 
board 
van den Heuvel, J., 
Van Gils, A., & 
Voordeckers, W. 
(2006) Empirically determine board 
roles in SME family 
businesses and CEOs 
importance of these roles 
Multiple Survey Europe  
Flemish (part of 
Belgium); small and 
medium sized 
family businesses 
Indispensible to differentiate 
between boards’ control and 
service roles. CEOs perceive the 
service role as most important 
Bezemer, P., 
Maassen, G. F., Van 
den Bosch, F. A. J., 
& Volderba, H. W. 
(2007) Investigate how NED’s 
service tasks have evolved 
between 1997 and 2005 
Multiple 
Agency, social 
network, RDT, 
RBV 
Published data – use of 
proxies 
Europe 
 Netherlands;  
top 100 listed 
companies – seven 
industries 
Service task has shifted from 
‘boundary spanners’ to providing 
advice and counsel to executives 
Huse, M. (2007) Combination of many 
research projects 
Theory building Various 
Mostly case studies 
Europe  
(largely) 
Theoretical framework 
Nicholson, G. J., & 
Kiel, G. C. 
(2007) Examine hypothesised links 
between board demography 
and firm performance 
predicted by agency 
stewardship and resource 
dependence theories 
Agency 
Stewardship 
RDT 
Multiple case study (7) 
Pattern matching 
explanatory 
Australia  
Broad range of 
organisations (1 co-
operative) 
Each theory can explain a 
particular case , no single theory 
explains the general pattern 
Parker, L. D. (2007) Inductively identify the key 
characteristics of nonprofit 
boardroom internal 
governance processes 
 
 
Inductive theory 
development 
Participant observation. 
Longitudinal 
Two case studies 
Australia 
Not for profit 
governance 
Boardroom culture is a potent 
ingredient in governance process 
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Author, Source Year Purpose of study Theoretical 
context 
Methods Used Context Results / Findings 
Rutherford, M. A., 
& Buchholtz, A. K. 
(2007) Examines the relationship 
between boards’ demographic 
characteristics and 
information gathering 
behaviour variables 
Agency Survey 
149 firms 
US  
Public firms 
An increase in NEDs is 
associated with increase in 
boards’ information quality 
Zona, F., & Zattoni, 
A. 
(2007) Develop and test a model 
relating group processes to 
three board tasks 
Multiple 
Group dynamics 
Questionnaire –  
targeting CEOs 
Europe  
Italy; 301 large 
manufacturing firms 
Process and demographic 
variables significantly influence 
board task performance; board 
task performance varies 
depending on the firm and 
industry 
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4.2 Findings 
 
Analysis of the 53 prior studies (Table 4-1) suggests that apart from the 
seminal Mace study in 1971, research into the internal workings of boards did 
not begin in earnest until the early 1990s. The studies have since gained pace 
with 41 of the studies (77%) published in the present decade and half of the 
studies in Table 4-1 only in print since 2004. Academic study of these issues is 
therefore relatively recent. 
 
The prior studies may also highlight the inadequacy of existing theories in 
explaining board roles with 11 of the studies choosing theoretical contexts 
broadly characterised as theory building, and a further 13 utilising multiple 
theoretical lenses in their studies. Nine studies are unspecified as to theoretical 
orientation and could broadly be characterised as descriptive. Seven studies are 
agency focused, three utilise managerial hegemony and two resource 
dependence theory. Five ‘other’ theoretical focuses are also used in the prior 
studies.  
 
Consistent with a lack of adequate theoretical context to explain board roles, 
the methods used in many of the prior studies aim to gain understanding of 
participants’ views, as 20 studies predominantly use interviews; six use 
multiple methods; one uses action research; two employ participant 
observation and only three use secondary data. Eight of the prior studies utilise 
case studies. Possibly highlighting access issues, 19 of the prior studies use 
questionnaires. 
 
These prior studies tend to focus on one specific board role. Ten studies 
focussed on the boards’ role in strategy, three on the boards’ service/resource 
dependence role, and one on the control role. Other prior studies focus on 
specific relationships such as the Chair/CEO relationship (3 studies) and 
stakeholder expectations (2) or on specific issues, such as; access to 
information (3), specific decisions (2), and context (1). Relatively few of the 
prior studies (17) look at governing boards’ role in a more holistic sense. Few 
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prior studies examine all board roles, relationships and processes within a 
particular context. 
 
In geographic terms, 16 are based in (continental) Europe with a further 11 
from the United Kingdom. Sixteen of the prior studies are from the United 
States of America, three from Australia, three from New Zealand (all from the 
same data / project) and another three from other parts of the world. As context 
may be important in understanding the roles of governing boards, the European 
and US dominance of the corporate governance literature suggests a gap in the 
literature that may be filled by the study of governance in geographically 
specific locations.  
 
When ownership type is analysed we see 33 of the prior studies examine the 
governance of large, predominantly publicly listed, companies, while four 
study small and medium enterprises. A further five do not distinguish between 
a broad range of ownership structures in their data. Five examine not-for-
profits while three look at other types of ownership structures.  
4.3 Conclusion 
 
There are only two prior studies examining co-operative governance and only 
one is a dairy co-operative (based in Europe). No prior studies combine all 
aspects of governance examined in this thesis. That is, utilising theory building 
to understand board roles within the context of co-operatives positioned in 
New Zealand and Australia. This suggests a gap in the literature and a need for 
an understanding of the roles of governing boards of co-operative dairy 
companies in New Zealand and Australia. The thesis now turns its attention to 
the methodology utilised to explore this gap in the literature. 
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CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The following chapter discusses the methodology used in this thesis. A 
discussion of various philosophical views of research is undertaken. The 
current methodologies used in corporate governance and co-operative research 
are covered. The selected methodology is then set out. A theory-building case 
study method is chosen based on Eisenhardt’s (1989a) multi-case framework 
as it is considered to be the most suitable method to achieve the aims of this 
thesis. A discussion of theory and the proposed outcomes of the research, 
along with ways this research could be evaluated, are noted before conclusions 
are drawn. 
5.2 Methodology Discussion 
 
The methodology, method and research question are inextricably linked. The 
research methodology chosen has a bearing on the methods and research tools 
used by the researcher. The discussion of methodology is important in research 
as it covers the assumptions researchers bring to their investigations (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979). These assumptions are “always present” even when they are 
unspecified (Lowe, 2001, p. 14). It is important that these assumptions are 
explicitly stated to allow readers to interpret the results of investigations. As 
Hines (1989) asserts:  
researchers generally are trained within a paradigm, unselfconsciously 
adopt the implicit assumptions of that paradigm, experience the 
worldview of that paradigm as “real”, and carry on their research in the 
company of others holding a similar view. (p. 57) 
        
Burrell and Morgan (1979) notably attempt to conceptualise social science 
theory “in terms of four sets of assumptions related to ontology, epistemology, 
human nature and methodology” (p. 1). Ontology refers to whether “reality” is 
“objective” and “external to the individual” or “subjective” and “the product of 
one’s mind” (p. 1). Epistemology relates to the assumptions about the 
“grounds of knowledge”, whether knowledge is “hard, real and capable of 
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being transmitted in tangible form” or “based on experience and insight of a 
unique and essentially personal nature” (p. 1). Assumptions about human 
nature relate to whether humans are the creators of their environment or the 
products of their environment. Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that different 
assumptions about ontologies, epistemologies and human nature lead to 
different methodologies (p. 2). Methodology is “the nature of ways of 
studying” phenomena (Parkhe, 1993, p. 235). Llewelyn (2003) notes 
“methodologies (and espoused theories) reflect the epistemological and 
ontological assumptions of researchers”  (p. 692).  
  
Burrell and Morgan (1979) go on to identify four separate, mutually exclusive 
paradigms reflecting different views of social reality based on assumptions 
about both the nature of science and society (p. 21). These paradigms are 
functionalist, interpretive, radical structuralist and radical humanist (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979, p. 22). According to Orlikowski and Baroudi (1991), 
functionalist studies tend to assume “a priori fixed relationships within 
phenomena”, while at the other end of the continuum, interpretive studies 
“attempt to understand phenomena through accessing the meanings that 
participants assign to them” and critical studies (the radical structuralist and 
humanist) “aim to critique the status quo, through the exposure of what are 
believed to be deep-seated, structural contradictions within social systems, and 
thereby to transform these alienating and restrictive social conditions” (p. 5). 
Quantitative research is usually associated with Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) 
functionalist paradigm while qualitative research is more closely related to the 
interpretive and other paradigms. 
 
While often cited and useful in identifying methodological alternatives, the 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) matrix has been extended and criticised since its 
publication (see for example, Deetz, 1996; Lowe, 2001; Morgan & Smircich, 
1980). Lowe (2001) states that the criticisms of Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
revolve around the “clear distinction between the methodologies and of an 
incommensurability between different paradigms” (pp. 7-8). Morgan and 
Smircich (1980) build on the work of Burrell and Morgan (1979) and argue 
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that “the dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative methods is a rough 
and oversimplified one” (p. 491). They go on to break down the functionalist 
and interpretive paradigms into a “rough typology” based on social scientists’ 
core ontological and human nature assumptions that underlie social scientists’ 
research. According to Morgan and Smircich (1980): 
Once one relaxes the ontological assumption that the world is a 
concrete structure, and admits that human beings, far from merely 
responding to the social world, may actively contribute to its creation, 
the dominant methods become increasingly unsatisfactory, and indeed, 
inappropriate. (p. 498) 
 
Morgan and Smircich (1980) somewhat relax the “mutually exclusive” nature 
of the four paradigms. 
  
A qualitative approach to research generally asserts that human behaviour is 
“best understood from the actor’s own perspective” as opposed to the 
quantitative perspective where human behaviour is viewed from outside 
(Atkinson & Shaffir, 1998, p. 43). Different methodologies lead to the use of 
different research methods. A quantitative approach will tend towards methods 
such as questionnaires that yield data that are amenable to statistical analysis 
and inference. Alternatively, a qualitative approach may use methods such as 
semi-structured interviews or observation, that try to capture an individual’s 
“process of interpretation” (Atkinson & Shaffir, 1998, p. 43).  
 
Debates about the relative merits and distinctions between quantitative and 
qualitative research methodologies have been vigorous since the publication of 
the Burrell and Morgan (1979) book (see for example, Aherns & Dent, 1998; 
Atkinson & Shaffir, 1998; Crotty, 1998; Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt, 
1991; Hines, 1989; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991; Parkhe, 1993). Lowe (2001) 
in discussing how field researchers in accounting select a method and 
methodology in order to frame a research question notes:  
Despite over two decades having passed since the appearance of the 
Burrell and Morgan matrix there still appears to be considerable 
confusion in the accounting literature over what role methodology 
plays in research and the related issue of what manner of rules might 
sensibly be applied to govern the conduct of field research. (p. 3) 
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The debate about the relative merits and usefulness of different methodological 
approaches looks set to rage and consume academic communities for some 
time to come.  
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) believe that the “quantitative-qualitative argument 
is essentially unproductive” (p. 41). In more pragmatic fashion, Eisenhardt and 
Graebner (2007) suggest the approach for coping with the varied meanings of 
‘qualitative research’ is to “avoid using the term” (p. 28). They suggest instead 
that researchers clarify their research strategy and be explicit about the theory 
building8 in order to avoid “confusion, philosophical pitfalls, and unrealistic 
reader expectations” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 28).  
 
The different methodologies chosen by researchers lead to different 
assumptions, methods and ways of viewing knowledge in research. Before 
returning to the implications of this debate on the selection of methodology 
and method for this research, it is useful to review the methodological 
approaches and methods commonly utilised by corporate governance and co-
operative researchers.  
5.3 Methodologies in Governance and Co-operative Research 
 
Most research in corporate governance and agricultural co-operatives research 
is functionalist. This is quantitative work often based on economic theory 
(Cook et al., 2004) or agency theoretical assumptions (Gabrielsson & Huse, 
2004) frequently utilising archival data from large US firms (Gabrielsson & 
Winlund, 2000).  
 
Functionalist assumptions about the nature of social science lead to research 
using a nomothetic methodology (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 2) placing 
emphasis on systematic measurement and identification in order to “search for 
universal laws which explain and govern the reality which is being observed” 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 3). Positivists seek to “predict what happens in 
                                                 
8 The type of research to be carried out in this thesis 
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the social world by searching for regularities and causal relationships between 
constituent elements” (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, p. 5). This predominantly 
positivist research tradition utilising existing theories may have led to 
inconclusive results in the theories explanatory and predictive power (for 
summaries see, Dalton et al., 1998; Deutsch, 2005), and to an incomplete 
understanding of the roles of governing boards (Stiles & Taylor, 2001).  
 
Most governance research attempts to link firm performance with a particular 
aspect of board composition of interest (Stiles & Taylor, 2001). Roberts et al., 
(2005) note that “whilst researchers remain wedded to the testing of theoretical 
models and assumptions against large quantitative data sets, they remain at 
considerable distance from the object of their inquiry, and as a result are 
inevitably obliged … to make huge inferential leaps” (p. S20). This has seen 
calls for board process studies (Huse, 2007; Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007; 
Lockhart, 2006) as these “can help to bring a measure of sophistication and 
balance to an area of corporate governance that is all too often fraught with 
contention and ideology” (Forbes & Milliken, 1999, p. 502).  
 
Daily et al., (2003a) believe much governance research is limited because of its 
“near universal focus on a direct relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm financial performance” (p. 376). Short et al., (1999), for 
similar reasons, believe that this type of research may be flawed (p. 346). The 
focus by researchers on simplistic, easily measurable structural dimensions of 
governance has shown no relationship to board or firm performance (Schmidt 
& Brauer, 2006). This may be due to what Huse (2000) refers to as the “lamp 
syndrome” where “those issues that are easiest to get access to are the most 
researched” (p. 282).  
 
This research aims to gain an understanding of the roles actually pursued by 
directors, their processes, relationships, and influences on the governing boards 
of dairy co-operatives in New Zealand and Australia. The usual approaches do 
not appear ideal for this understanding. As this field of research can be viewed 
as being in the early stages of development, there is a need for descriptive data 
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(Huse, 2000; Pettigrew, 1992; Stiles, 2001). There is a compelling need to get 
closer to the action, to gain insight into how boards actually work. Scholars 
have been calling for methodologies and methods that enable the research to be 
undertaken as close to the action and context as possible (Leblanc & Gillies, 
2005; Levrau & Van den Berghe, 2007a; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005) to understand 
how boards are run, their processes, directors’ behaviours, and how they 
interact with management (Schmidt & Brauer, 2006). To acquire such an 
insight, the perspectives and realities of those involved in the governance of 
dairy co-operatives are required to gain an in-depth understanding of board 
roles. Such an understanding places emphasis on inductive, qualitative 
research approaches (Roberts et al., 2005). 
 
A decade and half ago Pettigrew (1992) noted that in governance research 
there are “few theoretical, empirical, or methodological guideposts to assist the 
optimistic yet wary researcher through the prescriptive minefield” (p. 169). 
Brennan (2006) sees “a need for a different approach to researching 
governance, based on more qualitative approaches” (p. 587), as do others 
(Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007; Roberts et al., 2005) to study the dynamics of 
governance relationships (Huse, 2000).  
 
In order to answer the research question, qualitative research will be 
appropriate in gaining an understanding of the roles, processes, decision 
making and relationships of governing boards of dairy co-operatives from the 
participants’ perspective.  
 
Within the corporate governance literature there are existing theoretical models 
(see Chapter 3) that border the subject area relating to board roles (Hung, 
1998). Existing theories and research have had some disappointing results 
(Daily et al., 2003b; Dalton & Dalton, 2005) so it has been suggested that 
descriptive empirical research  may throw light on the topic (Gabrielsson & 
Huse, 2004; Leblanc & Gillies, 2005; Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007; Nicholson & 
Kiel, 2007). Parker and Roffey (1997) see the need to relate theories developed 
by grounded theory (or similar) methods to existing theories, thus “amplifying 
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and extending our current understandings of the phenomena in question” (p. 
241).  
5.4 Selected Methodology 
 
For research to be undertaken, at some point a researcher needs to make a 
choice of methodology and method that they feel is most appropriate to the 
research question. The clear articulation of the methodology and the method in 
the text answers calls by Pye and Pettigrew (2005) for “greater attention to the 
assumptions that underpin the researchers’ choice of methods, as well as 
greater clarity about techniques for analysing data and process of theorizing” 
(p. S36). This articulation should leave the reader in no doubt as to the 
orientation and bias of the researcher (Crotty, 1998; Ferreira & Merchant, 
1992). 
 
The methodology chosen for this research is Eisenhardt’s (1989a) theory 
building foundation. The methodology utilised for the research leads to the 
selection of the information to be collected and the research techniques used 
(Lowe, 2001). 
 
The single most important condition for selecting data collection methods is 
the research question asked (Lockhart, 2006; Yin, 1994). Field research would 
be particularly useful here because the “existing theory cannot explain 
phenomena” (Atkinson & Shaffir, 1998, p. 50) to do with corporate 
governance and co-operative structures. 
 
Lockhart (2006) suggests case research represents a “substantial shift in the 
lens through which we conduct governance research” (p. 40) which may be 
required to progress the field. Cornforth (2004) also sees the need for more in 
depth case study research into co-operatives (p. 27). Lockhart (2006) believes 
case studies are the “preferred technique when there is some focus on 
contemporary or current events. Board activities and subsequent performance 
is such an event” (pp. 33-34). In order, to gain insight and understanding of 
what actually happens inside the “black box” of co-operative board rooms the 
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perspectives of governance participants are required. This suggests that case 
study field research with qualitative research techniques is an appropriate 
methodological approach (Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991; Ferreira & Merchant, 1992; 
Parkhe, 1993; Yin, 1994, 1997). 
5.4.1 Case Studies 
 
A case study is an investigation of a “contemporary phenomenon” within a 
“real-life” context where the boundaries between the phenomenon and the 
context are not clear (Yin, 1994, p. 13). Case studies have a number of uses 
and advantages over other research methods. Case studies are useful in 
understanding complex social phenomena (Yin, 1994) around which there has 
been little academic research published (Perry, 1998, p. 785). Case studies are 
appropriate where behaviours cannot be manipulated (Yin, 1994, p. 8) and 
there is a need to emphasise the context in which the phenomena occur 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 25). Case research has a distinct advantage 
where research and theory are in their formative stages (Graebner & 
Eisenhardt, 2004) and where the actors and the context are critical (Benbasat et 
al., 1987). Eisenhardt (1989a) suggests theory-building case study research 
should be conducted when a fresh perspective is needed on a topic as existing 
theory, or “current perspectives seem inadequate because they have little 
empirical substantiation, or they conflict with each other or common sense” (p. 
548). Case research is well-suited to generating theories from practice, that is, 
capturing knowledge from practitioners in unexplored areas and developing 
theory from it (Benbasat et al., 1987; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). 
 
The case study method is particularly relevant in explaining how and why  
contemporary events occur over which the researcher has little control, such as 
co-operative governance. Lockhart (2006) goes further to suggest “only the 
case study method is appropriate to provide an in-depth understanding of why” 
(p. 34).  
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Another advantage of the case study is its ability to employ multiple methods 
of data collection to gather information (Benbasat et al., 1987) and a 
commensurate ability to cope with a variety of evidence such as documents 
artefacts, interviews and other observations (Yin, 1994, p. 8).   
 
Finally, the case study method is seen as producing robust findings. Eisenhardt 
and Graebner (2007) claim theory building from case studies is “an 
increasingly popular and relevant research strategy that forms the basis of a 
disproportionately large number of influential studies” (p. 30). Likewise, 
Sterns et al., (1998) suggest case study research is “capable of generating a 
robust, comprehensive array of “knowledge” about complex, highly 
interdependent and dynamic economic and social phenomena” in agribusiness 
research, particularly in firm decision making (p. 311). For these reasons, the 
method favoured for this research in order to develop a theory of the roles of 
governing boards of New Zealand and Australian dairy co-operatives, is the 
case study. 
 
There are four broad types of case studies: exploratory (or descriptive), theory 
building, exemplar, and hypothesis testing (Atkinson & Shaffir, 1998; Ferreira 
& Merchant, 1992; Stablein, 1996). Theory building cases are used in this 
thesis to fulfil the aim and are most appropriate for a theory of corporate 
governance contextualised in agricultural co-operatives. 
 
Doolin (1994) identifies three categories of case studies: single, multiple, and 
case survey (p. 13). The multiple-case design is utilised in this study as it is 
desirable when the intent of the research is description and theory building 
(Benbasat et al., 1987). A multiple case study design increases the 
generalisability of the findings and develops “more sophisticated descriptions 
and more powerful explanations” and deepens understanding (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994, pp. 172-173). Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest 
multiple-case studies typically generate theory that is “better grounded, more 
accurate, and more generalizable (all else being equal)” that yields more robust 
and testable theory than single-case research (p. 27). 
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5.4.2 The Eisenhardt (1989a) Method 
 
The research method chosen here is inspired by Eisenhardt’s (1989a) case 
study method. The Eisenhardt (1989a) multiple case study method is selected 
because it is designed to construct a “roadmap for building theories from case 
study research” (p. 534). It has been cited as authoritative and has the capacity 
to produce meaningful knowledge (see for example, Brown & Eisenhardt, 
1997; Eisenhardt & Bourgeios, 1988; Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004).  
5.4.3 Criticisms of Selected Method  
 
Case study research has been criticised on a number of a levels. It is important 
to understand these criticisms in order to a) be aware of them as a researcher 
and reader and b) to undertake ‘tactics’ to minimise these weaknesses. This 
section firstly explores general criticisms of the case study method and 
secondly, specific criticisms of the Eisenhardt (1989a) method. 
5.4.3.1 General Criticisms of Case Study 
 
Yin (1989) identifies a number of ‘prejudices’ against case studies; they take 
too long and are too difficult, they have poor quality findings resulting in a 
mass of documents, they lack rigour, and allow for little generalisation. Each 
of these points is discussed in turn. 
 
Case research can be resource consuming, particularly in terms of time 
(Lockhart, 2006; Yin, 1989). Case studies require research to be conducted 
within organisations (Lockhart, 2006) thus highlighting the difficulties of 
access to board information (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007; Pye & Pettigrew, 
2005; Wan & Ong, 2005). There also needs to be an empathy with the 
businesses being researched (Lockhart, 2006). Case study research is also 
criticised for the quality of its findings, in particular, overly complex theories 
at the cost of parsimony (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Parkhe, 1993) and “result in 
massive unreadable documents” (Yin, 1994, p. 11). Faced with “vivid, 
voluminous data”, researchers can be tempted to build theory which tries to 
capture everything (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 547). The complexity of social 
systems by their very nature almost defy modelling (Key, 1999).  
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Alternately, case study research can produce “narrow and idiosyncratic theory” 
with an inability to raise its “level of generality” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 547). 
There is “almost by necessity” a need to simplify what is being explained and 
“complexity may be lost in the trade off” (Key, 1999, p. 317).  
 
Finally, the method has the ability to merely replicate prior theory or produce 
“no clear patterns from the data” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 545) and can be 
ultimately “repetitive” (Lockhart, 2006, p. 40). Yin (1994) also cites “lack of 
rigour” by researchers who allow “equivocal evidence” and “biased views” to 
influence their findings (p. 9). Sample selection and data collection biases are 
also an issue. Sample selection bias can occur because those willing to be 
involved aren’t representative (Ferreira & Merchant, 1992). Interviewing is 
particularly prone to data collection biases, both response and interpretation 
biases (Atkinson & Shaffir, 1998; Ferreira & Merchant, 1992).  
 
Case studies, particularly single cases, have limitations as to the 
generalisability of their findings (Ferreira & Merchant, 1992; Golden & Zajac, 
2001). Yin (1997) however, highlights that generalisation from case study 
research is a matter of analytical generalisation, “using single or multiple cases 
to illustrate, represent, or generalize to a theory” as opposed to statistical 
generalisation, “generalizing from a sample to the universe” (p. 239). 
Analytical generalisation will be attempted here from the six cases used. 
 
Yin (1989) believes these prejudices can largely be overcome with good design 
(also see, Atkinson & Shaffir, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007; Yin, 1994; 1997). These design challenges and techniques to 
address them are discussed in Chapter 6 (see, section 6.2.3). 
 
The Eisenhardt (1989a) method specifically has not been without its critics in 
the literature. It is these criticisms (and defences) that will now be investigated. 
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5.4.3.2 Criticisms of the Eisenhardt (1989a) Method 
 
The Eisenhardt (1989a) method has been criticised in the literature (Aherns & 
Dent, 1998; Dyer & Wilkins, 1991; Parkhe, 1993). Dyer and Wilkins (1991) 
and Aherns and Dent (1998) have concerns around depth of understanding in 
multiple cases compared to single cases and the use of a priori constructs. 
Eisenhardt (1991), in a stinging rebuttal to Dyer and Wilkins (1991), argues 
that multiple cases are “a powerful means to create theory because they permit 
replication and extension” and for the need for “methodological rigour” (p. 
620). It seems likely that the two critiques, (Aherns & Dent, 1998; Dyer & 
Wilkins, 1991) and Eisenhardt’s (1991) response have to do with philosophical 
perspectives about how knowledge is acquired, and are thus not inhibitory to 
its use as long as the paradigm is acknowledged. Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007) themselves champion the need to make the method more explicit. 
 
Parkhe (1993) criticises Eisenhardt’s (1989a)  assertion that “theory-building 
research is begun as close as possible to the ideal of no theory under 
consideration and no hypotheses to test” (p. 536). Parkhe (1993) argues that 
this approach “may in many cases amount to ‘reinventing the wheel,’ and [fail] 
to exploit and build upon previous scientific achievements” (p. 253). This is 
probably true; nonetheless, given an absence of case-based theory for co-
operative governance, there is a need here for grounded development. 
5.4.3.3 Methodological Confusion 
 
Eisenhardt (1989a) sits on the edge of the functionalist paradigm and states 
“the process described here adopts a positivist view of research. That is, the 
process is directed toward the development of testable hypotheses and theory 
which are generalizable across settings” (p. 546). Eisenhardt (1989a), for her 
method draws heavily on the ideas associated with grounded theory (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967), case study design (Yin, 1984) and the analysis of qualitative 
data (Miles & Huberman, 1984) to develop her framework (pp. 546-547). 
Parker and Roffey (1997) interestingly draw upon the same five authors 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Miles & Huberman, 1984, 1994; Yin, 1989) as 
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offering a “potentially valuable part of the qualitative interpretive field 
research tradition” (p. 243). This thesis will do the same.  
 
Eisenhardt (1989a) envisages a great deal of flexibility in her method. For 
example, she uses the seemingly contradictory notions of “a priori 
specification of constructs” and that of “theory building is begun as close as 
possible to no theory under consideration” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 536). It is at 
the later end of this continuum that this research is undertaken. While still 
respecting Eisenhardt’s (1989a) insistence on a functionalist paradigm, this 
research focuses on the theory development aspect of it.   
 
In a later work Eisenhardt suggests building theory from case studies involves 
using case-based empirical evidence to inductively create theoretical constructs 
and that the resultant theory is ‘emergent’ (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 
25). This remains consistent with the direction of her previous work generally 
and remains relevant to the purpose of this study. 
 
In summary, a multiple-case study method based on the Eisenhardt (1989a) 
framework is adopted as the method to fulfil the aims of this thesis. The 
proposed outcomes of the research are now addressed. 
5.5 Research Outcomes 
 
The stated aim of this research is to develop a theory of the roles of governing 
boards of New Zealand and Australian dairy co-operatives. In this section, the 
concept of theory is discussed, what can be expected from theory-building case 
research and means of evaluation of case research are considered. 
5.5.1 Theoretical Outcome Expectations 
 
There are various types and levels of theories (Llewelyn, 2003). Of import here 
is the distinction between descriptive and normative theories (Zikmund, 2003). 
Theories representing phenomena as it exists are descriptive theories and those 
that describe the world as it ought to exist are seen generally to be normative 
theories.  This research develops a descriptive theory of the roles of governing 
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boards of New Zealand and Australian dairy co-operatives. Accordingly, Key’s 
(1999) simple definition of theory as a “systematic attempt to understand what 
is observable in the world” is utilised here (p. 317). 
 
Theories provide understanding and explanation by attempting to make 
complicated things understandable by showing how their components fit 
together (Miles & Huberman, 1994) thus creating order and logic (Key, 1999) 
and meaning and significance of social phenomena within context (Llewelyn, 
2003). Theories can also generate expectations about the world (Llewelyn, 
2003) and are therefore useful for prediction (Leblanc & Gillies, 2005) by 
generalising beyond individual situations (Zikmund, 2003). Normative theories 
allow predictive insights into general patterns of behaviour (Zikmund, 2003).   
 
Theory developed from case study research is likely to be novel, testable and 
empirically valid due to its “intimate linkage with empirical evidence” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 548). This is because the theory is emergent in the sense 
that “it is situated in and developed by recognizing patterns of relationships 
among constructs within and across cases and their underlying logical 
arguments” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 25). Case study research can 
result in “fresh theory that bridges well from rich qualitative evidence to 
mainstream deductive research” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 30). Theory 
founded on functional assumptions should be able to be scientifically verified 
and testable to allow it to either confirm or refute observations or discredit 
rival theories (Atkinson & Shaffir, 1998, p. 47), either by generating testable 
empirically established hypotheses (Key, 1999) or by matching predicted 
patterns against  empirical ones (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
 
Eisenhardt (1989a) suggests the final product of her method can be concepts, a 
conceptual framework, propositions or possibly a mid-range theory (p. 545). 
Models are used to represent complex empirical phenomena without losing 
their essential characteristics and to assist in the development of theory 
(Leblanc & Gillies, 2005) or in the representation of theory (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). A model can be described as “a set of integrated concepts 
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and principles that form a conceptually coherent whole” (Carver, 2007, p. 
1034). The resultant theory of this research emerges in this form (see Chapter 
7).   
5.5.2 Case Evaluation 
 
There does not appear to be any generally accepted guidelines for the 
evaluation of case study research, although many writers have offered pointers 
(see for example, Eisenhardt, 1989a; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Miles & 
Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994) around literature, significance, method and 
findings of the case research effort. 
 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) see the need for sound empirical research to 
begin with “strong grounding in related literature, identifies a research gap, and 
proposes research questions that address the gap” (p. 26). This is done here in 
chapters two, three and four.  
 
The research should also be assessed on the strength and documentation of the 
methodology and method (Yin, 1994). This is carried out by relying on 
Eisenhardt and her colleagues.  
 
Case studies must display sufficient evidence for the reader to have confidence 
that all cases are treated equally. Equality is addressed in the method (Chapter 
6) and the findings (Chapters 7 and 8). The researcher should know the 
subject. This is the case as the researcher is a member and director of a co-
operative board. Suggestions from Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) and others 
on the conduct and presentation of evidence are followed (see Chapter 6).  
 
Eisenhardt (1989a) suggests the outcome of good theory-building research is 
theory that is “parsimonious, testable, and logically coherent” (p. 548). Miles 
& Huberman (1994) suggest a good theory is one where “categories fit (or 
have come to fit) the data; that is relevant to the core of what is going on; that 
can be used to explain, predict, and interpret what is going on; AND that is 
modifiable” [their emphasis] (p. 144). A strong theory-building study may also 
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present “new, perhaps framebreaking insights” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 548). 
These characteristics will be used to assess the resulting framework (Chapter 
7). 
5.6 Conclusions  
 
In this chapter the methodology used is discussed. The methodologies used in 
current research in corporate governance and co-operatives are considered. It is 
posited that the research question to be answered and the current stage of 
development of the field of co-operative governance research is appropriate to 
the methodology and method chosen. A discussion of the research method 
utilising Eisenhardt’s (1989a) eight-step case study method follows (Chapter 
6). 
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CHAPTER 6 RESEARCH METHOD 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out the method and tools utilised in this research. As outlined, 
the Eisenhardt (1989a) multi-case study method is chosen for its ability to 
fulfil the aims of this thesis. Eisenhardt’s (1989a) method is broken down into 
each of its eight steps and the activities associated with each are discussed. The 
eight steps are: getting started, selecting cases, crafting instruments and 
protocols, entering the field, analysing data, shaping hypotheses, enfolding 
literature and reaching closure (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 533). The constant 
iteration between steps is highlighted. The chapter is rounded out by discussing 
the presentation of the thesis before conclusions are drawn. 
6.2 Eisenhardt (1989a) Method and Research Design 
 
Eisenhardt (1989a) provides a framework for a method of case study research, 
an overall direction. In the following chapter some of Eisenhardt’s (1989a) 
steps are necessarily fleshed out by reference to other writers (in particular 
Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Miles & Huberman, 1984; Yin, 1984) and their later 
works (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Yin, 1989, 1994, 
1997). Indeed, Eisenhardt (1989a) states that she draws ideas from these five 
authors and her intention is to “synthesize” and “extend” their work to 
construct a “roadmap for building theories from case study research” (pp. 532–
534). The method is further enhanced by reference to Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007), a follow up article to Eisenhardt’s (1989a) original piece. In this 
section, each of the eight steps of Eisenhardt’s (1989a) framework’s 
application to the research are discussed. An outline of the method is 
reproduced below in Table 6-1. 
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Table 6-1 Process of Building Theory from Case Study Research  
Step Activity  Reason      
Getting Started Definition of research 
question 
Possibly a priori 
constructs 
Neither theory nor 
hypotheses 
Focuses efforts 
Provides better grounding of construct 
measures 
Retains theoretical flexibility 
Selecting cases Specified population 
 
Theoretical, not random, 
sampling 
Constrains extraneous variation and sharpens 
external validity 
Focuses efforts on theoretically useful cases – 
i.e., those that replicate or extend theory by 
filling conceptual categories 
Constructing 
Instruments 
and Protocols 
Multiple data collection 
methods 
Qualitative and 
quantitative data 
combined 
Multiple investigators 
Strengthens grounding of theory by 
triangulation of evidence 
Synergistic view of evidence 
 
Foster divergent perspectives and strengthens 
groundings 
Entering the 
Field 
Overlap data collection 
and analysis, including 
field notes 
Flexible and opportunistic 
data collection methods 
Speeds analysis and reveals helpful 
adjustments to data collection  
Allows investigators to take advantage of 
emergent themes and unique case features 
Analyzing Data Within-case analysis 
 
Cross-case pattern search 
using divergent 
techniques 
Gains familiarity with data and preliminary 
theory generation 
Forces investigators to look beyond initial 
impressions and see evidence thru [sic] 
multiple lenses 
Shaping 
Hypotheses 
Iterative tabulation of 
evidence for each 
construct 
Replication, not sampling, 
logic across cases 
Search evidence for 
“why” behind 
relationships  
Sharpens construct definition, validity, and 
measurability 
 
Confirms, extends, and sharpens theory 
 
Builds internal validity 
Enfolding 
Literature 
Comparisons with 
conflicting literature 
Comparisons with similar 
literature 
Builds internal validity, raises theoretical 
level, and sharpens construct definitions 
Sharpens generalizability, improves construct 
definition, and raises theoretical level  
Reaching 
Closure 
Theoretical saturation 
when possible 
Ends process when marginal improvement 
becomes small 
Source: Eisenhardt (1989a, p. 533). 
 
The steps, one to eight, and the activities associated with each are as follows: 
 
 
 
85 
 
6.2.1 Getting Started 
 
The first step in Eisenhardt’s (1989a) framework is getting started. Eisenhardt 
(1989a) suggests in theory-building from case studies that it is initially 
important for the researcher to (at least broadly) define the research question 
(p. 536). Yin (1994) advances this, stating that “defining the research questions 
is probably the most important step to be taken in a research study” in that it 
helps identify the research strategy to be undertaken (p. 7). The aim of the 
research is to inductively develop a theory of the roles of governing boards of 
New Zealand and Australian co-operative dairy companies. The “tentative” 
research question in this research is therefore:  
What roles do the governing boards of dairy agricultural co-operatives 
in New Zealand and Australia pursue? 
 
Eisenhardt’s (1989a) method offers a range of starting positions for research 
between “a priori classification” of data gathering and “no theory under 
consideration” (p. 533). As the research on co-operative governance is an 
emerging field, and substantially normative, a priori classification of data 
gathering is limited. This research begins as close as possible to the “ideal of 
no theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test” end of the spectrum 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 536).  
 
Conceding that it is impossible to achieve this ideal, Eisenhardt (1989a) 
advises avoiding thinking about specific relationships between variables and 
theories at the outset of the research (p. 536). Pettigrew (1997) also suggests 
few researchers “enter the field with an empty head waiting to be filled with 
evidence” and that scholars carry “assumptions, values and frames of reference 
which guide what they are capable of seeing and not seeing” (p. 339). As Perry 
(1998, p. 788) muses “common prior knowledge gained through the process of 
socialization will inevitably influence the researcher … thus starting from 
scratch with an absolutely clean theoretical slate is neither practical or 
preferred” (p. 788). These notions are understood and highlighted, and as 
discussed, the topic is of immense interest to the researcher.  
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While no theory is under consideration initially, the literature reviews are still 
important at the getting-started stage of this research. The literature is used to 
identify the gap and the research question (see Chapter 4). Yin (1994) sees the 
literature review as useful in developing “sharper and more insightful 
questions about the topic” (p. 9). Eisenhardt (1989a) cautions, however, that 
the specification of a research question at the outset, while helpful, is only 
“tentative” and it may “shift during research” (p. 536). In this research, the 
emphasis shifts over the course of conducting the research as it becomes 
apparent that to understand board roles it is also necessary to understand board 
behaviour in a larger sense.  
 
The starting point also does not deny Parkhe’s (1993) notion of the “current 
stage of the evolution” of the research area of interest. Although there is no 
single integrative theory of the roles of governing boards of co-operatives, 
previous research and the researcher’s interests provide direction to some 
“potentially important variables”. For example, Hung (1998) believes any 
integrative theory of the roles of corporate governance should be able to 
integrate the six roles and theories highlighted in his typology (p. 109). This 
perception is also consistent with Miles and Huberman (1994) who state that 
“much qualitative research lies between these two extremes. Something is 
known conceptually about the phenomenon, but not enough to house a theory” 
(p. 17). 
 
In summary, this research begins with no a priori theoretical framework under 
consideration, nor does it force any particular a priori specification of 
constructs. This allows the constructs and their relationships to be induced 
from the empirical data. The second step of selecting cases follows. 
6.2.2 Selecting Cases 
 
The second of Eisenhardt’s (1989a) steps is selecting cases. This section 
covers the dairy co-operatives who participated and the underlying reasons for 
their selection. The unit of analysis is covered in section 6.2.2.1 below. Careful 
theoretical, not random, selection is required so that co-operatives and their 
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boards that contribute the most in terms of ‘information richness’ to the 
research, are selected.  
 
The method suggests that the cases be selected from a specified population 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 537), which in this instance is New Zealand and 
Australian dairy co-operatives. The selection is purposeful and strategic, 
allowing greater focus on the research question and answering calls for more 
focussed contextual research (Cornforth, 2004; van der Walt et al., 2002). By 
concentrating on New Zealand and Australia, co-operatives and the (bovine) 
dairy industry, the selection from the specified population helps control 
“extraneous variations” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 537). Golden and Zajac (2001) 
observe that a single industry study substantially minimises the “confounding 
effects of external contextual variables (e.g., industry life cycle, regulation)” 
(p. 1095). This is important as contextual and environmental variables may 
affect the various functions performed by the board of directors (Ravasi & 
Zattoni, 2006, p. 1699). By sampling from a specified population, the risk of 
creating overly complex theories at the cost of parsimony is reduced 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Parkhe, 1993). Doing so also “sharpens external validity” 
and “helps to define the limits for generalizing the findings” (Eisenhardt, 
1989a, p. 537). 
 
The cases represent theoretical not opportunistic, random or statistical 
sampling. This focuses the research effort on cases that are theoretically useful. 
As Eisenhardt (1989a) states, “the goal of theoretical sampling is to choose 
cases which are likely to replicate or extend the emergent theory” or to fill 
“theoretical categories” and provide “examples of polar types” (p. 537). 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) extend the understanding of theoretical 
sampling suggesting “cases are selected because they are particularly suitable 
for illuminating and extending relationships and logic among constructs … 
replication of findings from other cases, contrary replication, elimination of 
alternative explanations, and elaboration of the emergent theory” (p. 27). That 
is, cases within the scope of the investigation and which contribute the most in 
terms of “information richness” to the research, are selected.  
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The companies selected each represent co-operatives, in that they conform to 
USDA co-operative principles (i.e., they are user-owned, user-controlled and 
user-benefited (Barton, 1989a), as outlined in Chapter 2). All cases are in the 
dairy industry with each co-operative involved in the collection, (extensive) 
manufacture and marketing (internationally) of its supplier-shareholders’ milk 
and milk products. This vertical integration, being part of co-operative 
economic theory, also allows directors to display a variety of roles relating to 
the governance of their co-operative. The selection criteria and rationale are 
highlighted in Table 6-2. 
Table 6-2 Case Selection Criteria 
Criteria Measure Reason Distinctions 
Co-
operative 
User-owned 
User-controlled 
User-benefitted 
The focus of this 
study 
The context of this 
research 
Differences in levels of shareholding 
value ranging from ‘nominal value’ 
to ‘fair value’. Variations in the 
timing of withdrawal of capital from 
the co-ops.  Differences in voting 
ranging from ‘one-farm-one-vote’ to 
‘proportional-to-patronage’ 
Dairy Over 50% of 
income from 
dairy related 
products 
The context of this 
research 
To reduce 
extraneous 
variables 
Differing product ranges, markets 
and distribution channels 
User 
dominated 
board 
Supplier-
shareholders 
make up over 
50% of the board 
composition 
The focus of the 
study – user-
controlled 
Differences in percentages of users 
on the board. See section 7.6.1.1 
‘Composition’ , in particular, Table 
7.7 for details of distinctions 
Vertically 
integrated 
Markets a 
proportion of its 
own processed 
products 
To allow a range 
of governance  
roles  
For comparative 
purposes 
Differences in in-market 
infrastructure 
New 
Zealand  
and 
Australian 
Milk supply and 
main processing 
reside in New 
Zealand  or 
Australia 
Limit extraneous 
variations or non-
contextualised co-
operatives 
Three cases in each of New Zealand 
and Australia. Some offshore 
processing 
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All co-operatives selected meet the case selection criteria and provide a large 
sample of the population of concern. While these co-operatives are distinct in 
that they vary in size, geography, strategically, by product offerings and by 
distribution channels (e.g. with revenues from over $100 million to over $19 
billion (2007/2008 Annual reports)), they are all similar in that they 
concentrate on the collection, processing and marketing of milk products for 
the benefit of their supplier-shareholders. All cases fit within the scope of the 
study. 
 
The number of cases selected for this study is a mix of the need for 
“information richness” (Perry, 1998), “careful comparison” (Pettigrew, 1997), 
“theoretical saturation” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) and pragmatism. The need for 
pragmatism occurs at two levels; first, by the limited number of possible cases 
in the population and secondly, the need to avoid death by “data asphyxiation” 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). Various case study writers suggest differing 
numbers of cases in multi-case research. Perry (1998) suggests between four 
and ten cases, Pettigrew (1997) between six and ten, Yin (1994) four to six, 
and Eisenhardt (1989a) sees the need for between four and eight cases. For this 
research, six co-operative dairy companies are selected; there are three each 
from New Zealand and Australia. Initial cases are analysed and extra cases 
added in line with the criteria outlined by the Eisenhardt (1989a) method to 
“extend or replicate emergent theory”. Cases stop being added at the point 
where theoretical saturation is reached (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) (covered in 
section 6.2.8.1 below).  
 
While this study uses theoretical sampling, the research frame encompasses the 
entire population of New Zealand (bovine) dairy co-operatives. The inclusion 
of both New Zealand and Australian dairy co-operatives allows an adequate 
number and range of cases to be chosen. There are a limited number of dairy 
co-operatives from which to source cases. Continued amalgamations (driven 
largely by economies of scale) and industry dynamics have led to a reduction 
in the number of dairy co-operatives generally. 
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6.2.2.1 Unit of Analysis 
 
The unit of analysis relates to the “fundamental problem of defining what the 
‘case’ is” (Yin, 1994, p. 21). The most appropriate unit of analysis for research 
is often indicated by the research questions (Benbasat et al., 1987; Yin, 1994). 
Previous literature may also be an important guide (Yin, 1994, p. 25). Miles 
and Huberman (1994) define a case “as a phenomenon of some sort occurring 
in a bounded context. The case is, in effect, your unit of analysis” (p. 25). The 
unit of analysis selected in this research is the governing boards of directors of 
the dairy companies in the cases (co-operatives) outlined above. The persons 
included within the unit of analysis are the board of directors (as listed in 
annual reports). The boards comprise a variety of director “positions” 
including the chairperson (and possibly a deputy chairperson), supplier-
shareholder directors, outside non-executive non-supplying-shareholder 
directors bought on for their specialist skills, and any executive directors.   
 
In summary, theoretical sampling from a specified population is used to 
identify six cases for the development of a theory of the roles of governing 
boards of dairy co-operatives in New Zealand and Australia. The six cases are 
in the New Zealand and Australian dairy industry and, in line with 
Eisenhardt’s (1989a) framework, represent both theoretical and literal 
replication. The reasons for the cases selection are given. The unit of analysis 
for this research is described. The crafting of instruments and protocols is now 
addressed. 
6.2.3 Crafting Instruments and Protocols 
 
The third of Eisenhardt’s (1989a) steps is the crafting of instruments and 
protocols. This section covers the sources of evidence that constitute data in 
case studies and the combination of data used in this research. The data 
collection methods are then elucidated. The respondents targeted and the 
reasons for their selection are outlined along with ethical issues. The crafting 
of instruments and protocols is important to overcome the criticisms of the 
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method as outlined in section 5.5.3 (Yin, 1994). Tactics employed to ensure 
quality research are outlined in section 6.2.3.4. 
 
The data needs of research are dependent on the research questions and the unit 
of analysis  (Benbasat et al., 1987). The aim is to obtain rich data around the 
research topic and its context. The case study method allows multiple sources 
of data and collection techniques. A strength of case study research is its 
ability to cope with a variety of evidence to gain an understanding of the 
phenomena under investigation (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 1994). Yin (1994) 
identifies six sources of evidence that constitute data in case studies: 
“documents, archival records, interviews, direct observation, participant 
observation, and physical artefacts” (p. 79). Yin (1994) sees these six sources 
of evidence as complementary and believes that as many sources as possible 
should be used in case studies (p. 80). Eisenhardt’s (1989a) method suggests 
multiple data collection methods, combining qualitative and quantitative data 
and multiple investigators. These activities allow a synergistic view of 
evidence, fosters divergent perspectives and strengthens the grounding of 
theory (p. 533). As a doctoral thesis, this research has both resource and 
academic constraints that limit the ability to use multiple researchers, but other 
techniques are employed. 
 
Several data sources are utilised in this research. By far the largest is from 
semi-structured interviews and follow-up interaction with participants 
(outlined below, section 6.2.4). Documents, archival data and some 
observation also form an important element in this research. Documentation is 
likely to be applicable in all cases (Yin, 1994, p. 81) and is utilised in this 
research. Archival data systematically collected and found useful include co-
operative constitutions, annual reports, and variously; company websites, 
reports to shareholders, some internal documents sourced from respondents, 
newspaper articles, industry and business publications and other published 
articles. Archival data is utilised in a variety of ways; to influence collection 
methods, to focus on contemporary events (Lockhart, 2006), to “corroborate 
and augment evidence from other sources” (Yin, 1994, p. 82), to make 
92 
 
inferences and to triangulate with interview data to increase the reliability of 
the findings. Documentary evidence proves to be a rich source of data to 
supplement the chief source of data, semi-structured interviews to document 
the roles of governing boards of dairy co-operatives. 
 
Direct observation, both formal and casual, is used during these case studies as 
sites are visited.  Although there is no observation of board meetings (apart 
from the co-operative the researcher participates in9) direct observation is 
utilised before, during and after interviews. At least one of each case interview 
is undertaken in the co-operative’s offices and includes, in some cases, 
manufacturing plant tours. These observations are recorded in field notes as 
soon as practicable after the completion of interviews (Kvale, 1996). The types 
of data utilised in triangulating each resulting theoretical concept are displayed 
in Appendix C. 
6.2.3.1 Interviews  
 
Interviews are considered a highly efficient way to “gather rich, empirical 
data” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 28), to help explain “complex 
organizational processes” (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992, p. 786) and to understand 
how, when and why boards act or fail to do so (Leblanc, 2004, p. 437). 
Fontana and Frey (1994) identify three major types of interviewing – 
structured, group and unstructured (p. 361). A fourth type could easily be 
added to this group, semi-structured interviewing (Kvale, 1996). The lack of 
flexibility with structured interviews, lack of depth with group interviews, and 
the lack of a ‘framework’ with unstructured interviews, discounted these types 
for this study. Semi-structured interviews are used in this research. 
 
The interviews are to collect rich empirical evidence on board and director 
roles, processes and relationships based on participants’ own co-operative 
governance experience. As such, this research utilises semi-structured, in-depth 
                                                 
9 Due to the difficulties in gaining access to boardrooms and the need to treat cases 
consistently through a multi-case approach, these observations are not deliberately used by the 
researcher. 
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interviews with key governance participants as the primary data and collection 
method for this thesis. Consistent with the aims of the research, insights, 
understandings and perspectives of participants are required to gain an 
appreciation of a poorly researched phenomenon; the co-operative board’s 
processes and dynamics. According to Yin (1994), informants answering open-
ended questions are “often critical to the success of case studies” (p. 85). Semi-
structured interviews allow respondents to talk freely and candidly about their 
roles and relationships within the context of their co-operative positions (Long 
et al., 2005).  
 
The use of semi-structured, in-depth interviews also enables flexibility 
allowing the researcher to tailor interviews to interviewees, to explore themes 
raised by the interviewees, as well as themes highlighted in the literature and 
previous data collection. This is consistent with the Eisenhardt (1989a) method 
which sees the use of semi-structured interviews as important as they allow 
researchers to “probe emergent themes” and to “improve the resultant theory” 
(p. 539). The interviews with informants are also in line with the qualitative 
interpretive methodology outlined as researchers attempt to understand the 
informant’s world from their perspective. 
 
An interview guide (or schedule) is utilised in the field to guide the interviews 
(see Appendix A for an example interview guide). The semi-structured 
interview schedule is initially developed utilising the aims of the research, 
“suggestions” from the existing literature and archival research. All these 
notions are ‘held lightly’ by the researcher. A purely grounded theory approach 
to interviewing is rejected due to the methodological consistency (Eisenhardt 
& Graebner, 2007), and the interest in cross-case comparisons (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). The interview schedule is revised, amended and enhanced 
regularly, but not unsystematically, through the course of the study. This is 
done to tailor each interview to each respondent’s governance position. It is 
also updated for each subsequent case (and often interviewee) as theoretical 
issues or themes emerge. As the data collection progresses, the researcher is 
able to inform ongoing data collection and explore issues and “serendipitous 
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findings” that are raised in previous interviews and initial analysis (Eisenhardt, 
1989a). Further description of the interview process is covered in entering the 
field (section 6.2.4 below). 
6.2.3.2 Respondents 
 
As noted earlier with the selection of cases, the selection of respondents is not 
random, it is strategic and theoretical. The informants targeted to obtain 
empirical data are selected because: (a) they can reasonably be expected to 
contribute most in terms of “information richness” to the topic under research; 
(b) they are most likely to capture a range of views and special insights on the 
board’s roles, processes and relationships; and (c) they may shed light on the 
distinction between “board” and “individual” director’s roles. 
 
For each co-operative case at least three respondents are interviewed. In each 
case the chairperson (who is a supplier-shareholder director in all but one of 
the cases), a lead supplier-shareholder director (often the deputy chairman), an 
appointed10 director bought on for their specific skills (in all but one of the 
cases) and the incumbent CEO11 in the New Zealand cases, and MD12s (in one 
case the immediate past MD) in the case of the Australian co-operatives, are 
interviewed. Most, but not all, respondents come from the board. The CEO, in 
cases where they do not have a seat on the board, is interviewed as they have a 
key relationship with the board. The strategic targeting of respondents also 
allows insights into individual directors’ roles on the board as well as board 
roles per se. This utilises “within role categories”, a subject area the literature 
suggests is under-researched (Pettigrew, 1992; Pye, 2004). Theoretical 
selection also allows for a variety of views on board and director roles enabling 
the extension of the emergent theory. This also reduces the risk of a biased 
representation and permits respondent triangulation (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). The ‘quality’ of respondents leads to high ‘information richness’ of 
empirical data. Interviewing multiple directors from the same board also 
                                                 
10 The term “appointed” director is used here to describe directors that are both non-executive 
and non-supplier-shareholders directors. 
11 Chief Executive Officer 
12 Managing Director 
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enables a subtle view of board practices (Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2004) and 
a “richer more elaborate model” (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004, p. 371). 
6.2.3.3 Ethical Issues 
 
As the research involves human participants, approval is gained at each 
appropriate stage of the research from the Waikato Management School ethics 
committee to ensure that the research follows the nine primary principles of 
conducting research projects. Prior to each interview respondents are taken 
through an outline of the study and asked to sign a consent form outlining, 
among other things, the researcher’s position on a competitive dairy co-
operative, confidentiality, the ability of the interviewee to ask any questions, 
review the transcribed interviews and to withdraw at any time (see Appendix B 
for sample forms). Each interviewee is asked if the interview could be recorded 
and copies of transcribed interviews are returned to interviewees before 
analysis for any corrections, deletions or additions they may wish to make.  
6.2.3.4 Research Quality 
 
Yin (1994) identifies four “tests” that are commonly used to judge the quality 
of empirical case research: construct validity, internal validity, external validity 
and reliability (p. 32). “Case study tactics” can be employed at various stages 
of the study to enhance the quality of the research. In Table 6-3 below Yin’s 
(1994) tests, case study tactics and the phase of the research that the tactics are 
employed are displayed. 
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Table 6-3 Case Study Tactics 
Tests Case study tactic Phase of research in which tactic occurs 
Construct 
validity 
- use multiple sources of 
evidence 
- establish chain of 
evidence 
- have key informants 
review interviews
During data collection multiple sources of evidence 
is obtained 
- A chain of evidence was established 
- All interviewees were given transcripts of their 
interviews for comment and  correction 
Internal 
validity 
- do pattern-matching 
- do explanation-
building 
- do time-series analysis 
Pattern matching and explanation building formed 
an  important part of the analysis 
External 
validity 
- use replication logic in 
multiple-case studies 
The research design allows replication logic using 
six co-operative cases 
Reliability - use case study protocol 
- develop case study 
data base 
During data collection a case  study protocol is 
used along with a computer software package as a 
case study database  
Source: adapted from Yin (1994),  p. 33 
 
6.2.3.4.1 Construct validity. 
 
Construct validity refers to the establishment of “correct operational measures 
for the concepts being studied” (Yin, 1994, p. 33) and is considered one of the 
primary strengths of field research (Atkinson & Shaffir, 1998). To enhance 
construct validity, Eisenhardt (1989a) suggests the grounding, triangulation, 
and iterative tabulation of evidence, along with comparisons with the literature 
for each construct. This research is deeply grounded in the varied empirical 
evidence, most notably, the experience of co-operative governance 
participants. This, according to Eisenhardt (1989a), is likely to “result in a 
theory that is empirically valid because of its intimate tie with the evidence” 
(p. 547). The multi-case research design allows accurate definition and precise 
delineation of constructs (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 27). The utilisation 
of multiple sources of data and multiple collection methods facilitates firmer 
grounding of the emergent theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 538) and allows an in-
depth understanding of the research subject (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 3). 
 
Triangulation of data, or allowing different evidence to converge on the 
findings of the study, enhances construct validity (Benbasat et al., 1987; Yin, 
1994) by providing “stronger substantiation of constructs” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, 
p. 538). As outlined, this research uses data triangulation by collecting 
evidence from documentation (section 6.2.3), from interviewing (section 
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6.2.3.1) and from direct observation of directors’ place of work. The utilisation 
of a number of key informants from each case, as outlined in Table 6-4, also 
allows for triangulation (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Ferreira & Merchant, 
1992) as informants subtly differing perspectives triangulate into the emerging 
constructs.  
 
Yin (1994) suggests a chain of evidence to improve construct validity. This 
thesis acts as a chain of evidence. The tabulation of evidence helps to ensure 
that constructs fit with the data (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 542). Atkinson and 
Shaffir (1998) see having the people interviewed read and confirm what is 
observed as an important way of limiting possible bias of the researcher, 
possible misunderstanding interviewees’ perspectives and adding credibility to 
the findings (p. 60). These tactics are utilised in the data collection phase. 
6.2.3.4.2 Internal validity. 
 
The internal validity of this research is enhanced during the data analysis by 
the use of a number of tactics: first, by clearly documenting the philosophical 
foundations of this research and the research approach used (Sterns et al., 
1998, p. 314); secondly, by using the qualitative data “for understanding why 
or why not emergent relationships hold” and the “dynamics underlying the 
relationships” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 542); and finally by tying the emergent 
theory to the existing literature (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 545).  
6.2.3.4.3 External validity. 
 
External validity refers to “establishing the domain to which a study’s findings 
can be generalized” (Yin, 1994, p. 33). To establish whether the research 
findings can be generalised beyond the immediate case study, replication logic 
must be used (Yin, 1994, p. 35). Eisenhardt (1989a) pursues both literal and 
theoretical replication. Literal replications confirm the theoretical propositions 
from earlier case studies. If repeated cases confirm the emergent relationships, 
external validity is enhanced and creates “more robust theory” (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007, p. 27). Replication of the findings is achieved by using six 
cases from the specified population to replicate the emergent theory.  
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This research also attempts to maintain a chain of evidence, in the form of this 
thesis, from initial aims to conclusions with supporting empirical evidence to 
enhance the generalisation of these findings. The tying of evidence to the 
extant literature also enhances the generalisability of the findings (Eisenhardt, 
1989a, p. 545). 
6.2.3.4.4 Reliability. 
 
According to Yin (1994) the goal of reliability is to “minimize the errors and 
biases in a study” (p. 36). Yin’s (1994) main tactics to enhance reliability are 
to document procedures through the use of a case study protocol and the 
development of a case study database.  
 
Yin (1994) considers the case study protocol as essential in multiple-case 
studies. The protocol should contain the following in-depth sections: an 
overview of the case study project, the field procedures, the case study 
questions and a guide for the case study report (p. 64). This research utilises a 
case study protocol based on the Eisenhardt (1989a) framework. 
 
The reliability of this research is enhanced by a detailed description of the 
study, its philosophical underpinning, the basis of case and interviewee 
selection and the context for the gathering of data and the researcher’s role in 
that process. The techniques used in the analysis of data are clearly articulated 
inclusive of the use of computer software to provide a case study database. The 
reporting of findings and supporting evidence are all designed to enhance 
reliability. Supervisors (qualified researchers) provide input and review of each 
stage of the research process, and presentation of aspects of the research to 
academic audiences is undertaken. This “chain of evidence” (Yin, 1994) and 
the presentation of these issues here are designed to facilitate the readers’ 
judgement as to the reliability of these findings. 
 
The evidentiary case study database enhances the reliability of this thesis and 
is made up of “notes, documents, tabular materials, and narratives” (Yin, 1994, 
p. 95). Case study notes in this research include transcripts of interviews, 
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observational notes and documentary evidence. The computer software QSR 
NVivo version 2 (www.qsrinternational.com) is utilised to act as a case study 
database. 
 
A number of potential biases need to be kept in mind. First, sample selection 
bias can occur where organisations prepared to be involved are more likely to 
be proud of their achievements in the areas researched or are looking for help 
in a problem area (Ferreira & Merchant, 1992, p. 26). While most respondents 
are justifiably proud of their co-operatives achievements, given the coverage of 
the specified population, the availability of supporting (or refuting) 
documentation, and multi-respondents per co-operative, it is not believed that 
sample bias occurred in this research.  
 
Secondly, interview bias is a challenge to reliability. Yin (1994) cautions that 
interviews, the main source of data in this research, are “subject to the common 
problems of bias, poor recall, and poor or inaccurate articulation” (p. 85). 
Interview bias is minimised in this research by using other sources of evidence 
to corroborate the empirical data. Multiple respondents from the same case 
who view the phenomena from diverse perspectives also mitigate respondent 
biases (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004, p. 371). Amongst the multiple 
respondents from each case, no significant differences are found in their 
descriptions of board roles. All respondents are highly knowledgeable and 
influential members of their communities. Information bias is further 
decreased by ensuring confidentiality and by providing them with the 
opportunity to review the transcribed interviews. Some documentary evidence 
is also used with a degree of scepticism, understanding “that it was written for 
some specific purpose and some specific audience other than those of the case 
study being done” (Yin, 1994, p. 82). Finally, the researcher is aware of 
researcher bias and undertakes to minimise this by being open to contrary 
findings (Yin, 1994, p. 59). 
 
In summary, the third of Eisenhardt’s (1989a) steps, crafting instruments and 
protocols is discussed. Multiple data and collection techniques are used in the 
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data collection stages of this research to document and theorise on the roles of 
co-operative governing boards in the New Zealand and Australian dairy 
industry. Semi-structured interviews and document analysis are the main 
sources of evidence utilised in this research. Ethical issues are discussed as are 
applied tactics for producing quality case study research.  
6.2.4 Entering the Field 
 
The fourth of Eisenhardt’s (1989a) steps is entering the field. In this step 
Eisenhardt (1989a) foresees activities of overlapping data collection and 
analysis, including the use of field notes and flexible and opportunistic data 
collection methods (p. 533).  
 
The combination of data analysis and collection is important as it allows the 
researcher to speed analysis and also allows advantage to be taken of “special 
opportunities” and to “probe emergent themes” by adjusting the data collection 
instruments (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 539). This flexibility enhances the emerging 
theory (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). During the research 
themes emerging from early data collection and analysis are explored in later 
interviews. Examples in this research are the exploration of directors being 
“educated” by management, the “super” role of the chair and the conflicting 
nature of board roles in later interviews.  
 
Eisenhardt (1989a) sees field notes as an important means of achieving the 
overlap between data collection and analysis. Field notes are “an ongoing 
stream-of-consciousness commentary” of observation and analysis 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 539). Observations and reflections, in the form of field 
notes, are recorded as soon as practicable after the interviews and as memos 
during analysis. Analysis of the interviews begins immediately upon 
transcription and this, along with analysis of documents and field notes, is used 
to inform further data collection largely through the revision of the interview 
guide. Documentary evidence is systematically collected and analysed 
throughout the research process to corroborate evidence collected from other 
sources. 
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6.2.4.1 Gaining access 
 
One of the greatest problems in the study of governance can be gaining access 
to informants (Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007; Leblanc, 2004; Lockhart, 2006). 
Initial contacts are important as it is critical that the individuals approached 
have sufficient knowledge and authority to support the research. The 
chairperson of the governing board of each co-operative is approached. In most 
instances colleagues are utilised in assisting with initial introductions. This is 
followed by telephone contact with the chair outlining the research, followed 
by email correspondence including a more in-depth depiction of the study and 
the researcher’s requirements. This is generally followed by differing amounts 
of correspondence with executive personal assistants to make suitable 
arrangements to conduct the interviews. This approach allows the researcher 
deep access to the leaders in each of the co-operative cases, enabling 
theorisation from a significant base of cases from a large proportion of the 
population of interest. 
 
Benbasat et al., (1987) see two key points that need to be addressed to gain the 
co-operation of respondents: confidentiality and benefits (or lack of harm) to 
the organisation (p. 373). Confidentiality issues are addressed during the initial 
approach stage and prior to each interview. Although respondents revealed 
little concern for confidentiality each case and participant are assigned letters 
and numbers. Confidentiality may also encourage the expression of more 
candid views (Leblanc, 2004). Thus the findings of this study are focussed on 
“what was said” as opposed to the slightly more personalised notion of “who 
said what.”  
 
The researcher also provides assurances that the co-operative will not be 
harmed by its participation and that the researcher will not betray the 
interviewee’s confidence (Benbasat et al., 1987). In this research, the lack of 
empirical understanding of co-operative governance, particularly in New 
Zealand and Australia, and the benefit of a greater understanding of the actual 
roles of governing boards in dairy co-operatives, is highlighted. It is likely that 
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the co-operative nature of the industry and a very real willingness by 
respondents to discuss and explore issues of co-operative governance made 
access to such high quality respondents easier. 
6.2.4.2 The interviews  
 
The main source of empirical data for this research is 23 in-depth, semi-
structured interviews. Interviews are undertaken individually, face-to-face, 
between the interviewee and researcher. Each interview typically lasts between 
one and two hours, with 90 minutes the norm. After permission is granted all 
interviews are tape-recorded. In one interview the recorder malfunctioned, 
leaving the researcher to write notes from memory immediately after the 
interview concluded. Thus, 22 useful full interview transcripts are available for 
subsequent data analysis. See Table 6-4 for a summation of cases and 
informants. Following recommendations from Miles and Huberman (1994), 
field notes, including a contact summary sheet summarising reflections, key 
issues, and key themes requiring further investigation, are completed as soon 
as practicable after each interview.  
Table 6-4 Case Informants and Positions 
Informant Co-operative Total 
   A       B      C      D      E      F 6 
Chair 9  9  9 9 9  9  6 
Lead farmer  
director 
9  9  9 9 9  9  6 
Appointed  
director 
9  9  9 9  9  5 
CEO/MD 9  9  9 9 9  9  6 
Total      4       4       4     4       3      4 23 
 
 
As outlined, the interview guide is updated on reflection from earlier 
interviews, initial analysis, and tailored for the ‘type’ of director and the 
archival data accessed prior to each interview. This allows focused interview 
questions which can be important for corroborating or dismissing facts (Yin, 
1994), teasing out understanding and pursuing emergent themes (Eisenhardt, 
1989a). This flexibility is used for a number of emergent themes as data 
collection and analysis progresses.   
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Interviews are conducted in a variety of venues – from co-operative premises, 
respondents’ homes, hotel rooms, and on two occasions, restaurants. The 
majority of interviews, and at least one interview from each case, are 
conducted in the co-operative’s head offices allowing the researcher some 
direct observation of contextual data to record in field notes. In some cases, 
social interactions also occurred outside the interview which allowed themes to 
develop further. 
 
Interviews typically followed a pattern as outlined below (see Appendix A for 
a sample interview guide): Under the suggestions of Kvale (1996), 
interviewees are provided a context and purpose of the interview, asked if they 
can be tape recorded and if they have any concerns or questions before 
commencing the interviews (p. 128). Confidentiality and ethics issues are 
addressed (see Appendix B for an example copy). Rapport with the 
interviewee is established by showing understanding through being prepared, 
showing interest, and having respect for the interviewee’s views (Kvale, 1996, 
p. 128). The interview guide and researcher preparation is designed to allow 
participants to reveal their perceptions concerning their governance activities 
in a non-threatening, non-judgemental way. 
 
The interviews commenced with an initial question around the respondent’s 
governance experience designed for background information and to put the 
interviewee at ease (Kvale, 1996). The next open ended question is designed as 
much as possible to ignore the extant literature and the researcher’s views and 
invites respondents to tell of their own experiences with the research topic. The 
question in all interviews is:   
In your experience as a director13 at case x14 what does the governing 
 board do? 
 
This led to varying contributions. All the initial roles identified by the 
respondent are then explored in more depth with the use of follow up 
                                                 
13 Or whatever their position is. 
14 The actual name of the co-operative was used for each respondent. 
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questions. Where appropriate, in areas that are not commercially sensitive, 
interviewees are invited to use examples to explore a board’s role and trace the 
story of a decision or activity. Respondents are encouraged to talk, in as much 
depth as they like, around issues that are important to them, their companies, 
the industry, and governance as a whole, largely without interference from the 
interviewer. 
 
After initial comments are explored, the interview schedule is then utilised 
with a number of prompts to explore any areas not bought up by the 
respondents that the literature or previous respondents have identified. In doing 
so, the researcher endeavours not to lead the interviewee. Initial prompts cover 
areas such as the board’s role in strategy, monitoring, co-operative 
performance, accountability and relationships with supplier-shareholders and 
management. Terms used are easy to understand and devoid of academic 
language (see the Appendix A example).  
 
These prompts often lead to new avenues of insight. The researcher is sensitive 
to the need to be cognisant of “serendipitous findings”. Serendipitous findings, 
new ideas and areas of interest are explored with follow up “probing” 
questions to elicit deeper understandings. This requires some flexibility to 
allow new insights and contradictory evidence to emerge (Roberts & Stiles, 
1999); although this is not seen as a licence to be unsystematic (Eisenhardt, 
1989a).  
 
Toward the end of the interviews respondents are asked to reflect on the 
interview and rank the three most important things they thought their boards 
did. Finally, the respondents are given an opportunity to bring up any other 
issues that have not been raised but that may be of use to the researcher’s 
study. This often leads to more valuable data and follow up questions by the 
researcher. The result of this process is rich qualitative data upon which to 
interpret and theorise. 
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In summary, Eisenhardt’s (1989a) fourth step of entering the field is covered. 
The methods of gaining access and the conduct of the interviews are discussed. 
Interviews sought respondents’ descriptions of the roles, processes and 
relationships of dairy co-operative governing boards from the interviewee 
perspectives. The overlapping of data collection and analysis is highlighted to 
allow the researcher to take advantage of emergent themes and unique features 
of the cases. The thesis now turns to a discussion of analysis. 
6.2.5 Analysing the Data 
 
The fifth step of Eisenhardt’s (1989a) method is the analysis of data. 
Eisenhardt (1989a) breaks the analysis process into two parts; within-case 
analysis and cross-case pattern search. The within-case analysis gains 
familiarity with the data and allows preliminary theory generation. The cross-
case pattern search forces the researcher to look beyond initial impressions 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 533). Eisenhardt (1989a) sees analysing data as the 
“heart of building theory from case studies” but warns that it is also the “most 
difficult and least codified part of the process” (p. 539).  
 
The computer software package QSR NVivo version 2 
(www.qsrinternational.com) is utilised to assist in the analysis and data 
management of this research. The use of computer software in the analysis, 
particularly the coding, classification and pattern forming from large volumes 
of data is seen to have clear advantages over manual systems in terms of both 
speed and rigour. QSR NVivo also acts as a case study database, to underpin 
the reliability of the research.  
6.2.5.1 Grounded 
 
While this research begins as close as possible to ‘no theory under 
consideration’ specific grounded theory techniques (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; 
Strauss & Corbin, 1998) are not utilised in this analysis. In Eisenhardt’s later 
work in conjunction with Graebner (2007), she specifically distances herself 
from the grounded theory method. Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) see 
confusion around the multiple meanings of ‘grounded theory building’ and 
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view ‘grounding’ as the strength of the theory’s empirical grounding rather 
than the “specifics of the theory-building process” and suggest avoiding the 
use of the term “grounded theory building” (p. 30). As such, this analysis uses 
Eisenhardt and Graebner’s (2007) meaning of ‘grounded theory building’ as 
simply “creating theory by observing patterns within systematically collected 
empirical data … [including] some notion of recursively iterating between (and 
thus constantly comparing) theory and data during analysis, and theoretically 
sampling cases” (p. 30). This pattern of observation forms the basis for 
analysis (Chapters 7 and 8). 
6.2.5.2 Within-case Analysis 
 
Eisenhardt (1989a) does not suggest a standard format for within-case analysis, 
but encourages the researcher to allow “the unique patterns of each case to 
emerge” (p. 540). Within-case analysis focuses on developing constructs and 
relationships within the co-operative case, through case write-ups, coding and 
pattern coding to inductively allow constructs to emerge from the data 
(Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004).  
 
Within-case analysis, initially involving descriptive detailed case write-ups, is 
utilised to help the researcher deal with the volume of data and to “become 
intimately familiar” with each case (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 540). After “getting 
a feel” for the transcribed interviews15 initial case study write-ups are 
completed. These write-ups utilise many sources of data, including interviews 
and archival data, particularly annual reports, company constitutions and 
published company documentation. Case familiarity assists in later cross-case 
comparisons and encourages the resultant theory to be firmly grounded in the 
empirical data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
 
Deeper within-case analysis commences with the initial interview 
transcriptions coded sentence by sentence. Initial codes are sometimes 
                                                 
15 Analysis of interviews began after the return of transcribed interviews from participants and 
any corrections, deletions or additions are incorporated. 
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inductively derived from the respondent’s frame of reference and on occasion 
field notes, including contact summary sheets, are used to highlight initial 
codes. This again assists in grounding the resultant theory in the empirical 
data. Codes are assigned “clear operational definitions” (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). Codes, once created, are used in the coding of subsequent interviews. 
During analysis some codes prove superfluous and are dropped; others flourish 
in light of their fit and descriptive power as data collection and analysis 
progresses in tandem. As theory development is “a process of describing 
phenomena at increasingly higher levels of abstraction” (Zikmund, 2003, p. 
41) codes are then grouped together into common categories (or themes). To 
develop categories, memoing is used to question data and clarify ideas about 
the relationships between codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994). These categories 
are labelled and defined. The empirical data coded under a category is 
compared and contrasted with data previously coded under the category. In the 
iterative process entire interviews are regularly recoded as different thinking 
emerges. During the analysis, categories grew or dissipated and merged as 
evidence supported or challenged the categories to capture higher levels of 
abstraction. In this manner, initial descriptive codes became increasingly 
interpretive.  
 
In order to move to a more inferential and explanatory level the initial coding, 
memoing, categories and writing are employed to induce patterns of 
behaviours, or pattern codes and constructs (Miles & Huberman, 1984). 
Pattern codes revolve around “themes, causes/explanations, relationships 
among people, emerging constructs” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 70). 
Initially, the roles or what boards actually do is utilised in pattern recognition, 
however the importance of processes, relationship dynamics and decision 
making process became increasingly apparent in the understanding of co-
operative board roles. Once pattern codes are developed they are employed on 
the next lot of empirical data to test for fit and explanatory power. 
 
In line with the method, data collection and analysis are carried out 
simultaneously in an iterative way. New data is continually tested against the 
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emerging interpretations and explanations as they develop to enlighten and 
extend the emergent theory. “Serendipitous findings” and provisional analysis 
of the data inform further data collection, in particular, revisions to the 
interview schedule to fill in gaps and pursue new leads. As an example, the 
initial focus of the research is on board roles, but the analysis and subsequent 
data collection suggest that an understanding of relationships both within the 
board and between key stakeholders - the board, management and supplier-
shareholders - are an important aspect of understanding it. 
 
As data is continuously reduced, care is taken to return to the original 
transcripts and documents to ensure that theorising remains grounded in the 
empirical evidence. Initially, all explanations and conclusions emerging are 
held lightly “maintaining openness and scepticism” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, 
p. 11) until rival explanations are discounted and to prevent premature 
theoretical closure. Through the inductive process the categories are 
strengthened and reduced by seeking corroborating and disconfirming 
evidence until the weight of evidence supporting concepts16 emerge as an 
abstract of reality. Concepts are the primary building blocks of theory 
(Llewelyn, 2003; Zikmund, 2003). Concepts “subsume a mountain of 
particulars” and by determining the relationships between them lead to a 
conceptual framework (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 18). 
6.2.5.3 Conceptual Framework 
 
As patterns start to appear networks are formed to try to make the analytic 
progression to understand the explanations behind the particular patterns. From 
the “what” and “how” to the “why” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 90). 
Qualitative interview data is important in gaining an understanding of these 
emergent relationships. Diagrams, including boxes and arrows, are then used 
to try to establish relationships between variables of interest. The patterns are 
then compared against the transcripts to ensure they are not drifting from the 
                                                 
16 Zikmund (2003) defines a “concept (or construct) is a generalized idea about a class of 
objects, attributes, occurrences, or processes that has been given a name” (p. 41). The term 
concept is used in these findings. Eisenhardt (1989a) seems to use the terms concepts and 
constructs interchangeably. 
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empirical evidence. This leads to a conceptual framework (displayed in Figure 
7.1, Chapter 7) which is at the heart of building theory, showing “how the 
variables are connected, how they influence each other” (Miles & Huberman, 
1994, p. 91). Due to its inductive nature, the model emerges on a piecemeal 
basis with the initial version “amended and refined” as it is “tested against 
empirical events and characteristics” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 155).  
6.2.5.4 Cross-case Patterns 
 
The second step in analysing data in Eisenhardt’s (1989a) framework is 
searching for cross-case patterns. Tactics suggested for cross-case analysis can 
involve looking for and listing similarities or differences across categories, 
dimensions, between matched pairs or by data sources (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 
540). Cross-case analysis began at the conclusion of within-case analysis to 
begin to draw conclusions on the entire study (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Yin, 1994). 
Similarities and differences among cases are noted during data collection and 
within-case analysis, although further analysis is deferred until all cases have 
been analysed “in order to maintain the independence of the replication logic” 
(Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004, p. 373). 
 
Pattern matching across-cases is utilised. Parkhe (1993) sees pattern-matching 
as comparing an empirically based pattern induced from one case with other 
cases, so that they either match or are predictably different than the initial case 
patterns (pp. 249-250). In the analysis of qualitative data “gross matches or 
mismatches” are sought (Yin, 1994). Pettigrew (1997) also suggests cross-case 
pattern comparison to “find the underlying mechanisms which shape any 
patterning in the observed processes” and notes teasing out these mechanisms 
“represents one of the greatest inductive challenges for process scholars and an 
area of intellectual challenge which is as difficult to describe as it is to achieve 
and publically justify” (p. 339). The data are looked at in many divergent ways 
to force the researcher beyond his preliminary impressions (Eisenhardt, 
1989a). Rival explanations for patterns are tested within and across-cases to 
allow new insights and to “improve the likelihood of accurate and reliable 
theory” with a close fit to the empirical data (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 541). Rival 
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explanations are either countered, thus strengthening the developing model, or 
cause revision of the empirical model and thus firmer grounding of the 
findings. Eisenhardt’s (1989a) suggestions of cross-case searching for patterns 
of “within-group similarities and intergroup differences” from dimensions 
suggested by the “research question or by existing literature” are utilised to 
strengthen internal validity (p. 540).  
 
In summary, the empirical data is analysed both within-case and across-case to 
inductively develop a theory of the roles of New Zealand and Australian co-
operative boards grounded in the empirical data.  
6.2.6 Shaping Hypotheses 
 
Eisenhardt’s (1989a) sixth step is shaping hypotheses. Eisenhardt (1989a) 
suggests this step involves the iterative tabulation of evidence for each 
concept, replication logic across cases and the search for evidence for the 
‘why’ behind relationships. The reason for this is to sharpen concept 
definition, validity and measurability; confirm, extend, and sharpen theory and 
build internal validity (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 533). 
 
During the shaping hypothesis stage, the tentative concepts emerging from the 
data and analysis are sharpened so that the concepts are well defined. This 
involves refining the definition of the concepts and also building evidence 
which measures the concepts. This is achieved through “constant comparison 
between data and constructs so that accumulating evidence from diverse 
sources converges on a single well-defined construct” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 
541). The emerging concepts need to fit the evidence of each individual case. 
This is important as “cases which confirm emergent relationships enhance 
confidence in the validity of the relationships” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 542). In 
this highly iterative process, the relationships that emerge from the within-case 
and cross-case analysis are compared with the evidence of each case to iterate 
toward the theory refinement (chapters 7 and 8).  
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6.2.6.1 Replication Logic 
 
Emerging concepts and relationships are refined using replication logic. The 
multiple-case design allows replication logic where provisional explanations 
are checked across cases, thus using cases to confirm or disconfirm provisional 
inferences drawn from other cases (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004). Replication 
logic is central to case study theory-building as each case stands as its own 
analytic unit that serves to replicate, contrast and extend the emergent theory 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 25). Those cases that disconfirm the 
emerging relationships “can provide an opportunity to refine and extend the 
theory” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 542). According to Yin (1994), a “rich 
theoretical framework” needs to be developed so that the framework states “the 
conditions under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found (a literal 
replication) as well as the conditions when it is not likely to be found (a 
theoretical replication)” (p. 46). If the cases do not give predictable results the 
theory must be modified. When the theory does give predictable results it can 
then be used for generalising to new cases (Yin, 1994, p. 46). This replication 
is revealed using NVivo functions and classification comparison across cases. 
 
Eisenhardt (1989a) suggests replication logic develops confidence in the 
relationships validity. Tabulation and display of evidence underlying the 
concepts (see Chapter 7) is necessary to allow readers to form their own views 
on the strength of relationships. Eisenhardt (1989a) sees these processes as 
analogous to hypothesis testing, except that in theory-building researchers rely 
on the demonstration of evidence and procedures as opposed to the statistical 
tests used in hypothesis testing (pp. 542-544).  
6.2.7 Enfolding Literature 
 
Eisenhardt’s (1989a) seventh step, enfolding literature, entails comparisons 
with conflicting and similar literature to build internal validity, raise the 
theoretical level and sharpen concept definition and generalisability (p. 533). 
The literature from corporate governance has been reviewed (the agricultural 
co-operative literature has been considered, Chapter 2) and this forms an 
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important part of informing this process. Comparisons with conflicting and 
similar literatures throughout the research process are undertaken to gain 
deeper insights and to increase confidence in the findings. 
 
Although outlined as Eisenhardt’s (1989a) seventh step, enfolding the 
literature is carried out at many stages of the theory-building research. As we 
have seen in section 6.2.1 (above) it is important at the “getting started” stage. 
The literature is used to identify an area of study that is of interest to the 
researcher and the gap in the literature. It is then tentatively used as an 
indication to the sorts of questions that may have been of interest in the early 
stages of data collection although these notions are always “held loosely” by 
the researcher.  
 
During the analysis stage, concepts and relationships are thus initially induced 
from the empirical data to ensure the grounding of the resultant theory. This, 
however, does not deny the need to reference against current literature (Parkhe, 
1993) which is used more comprehensively later in the analysis stage. As 
Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) explain, the “theory-building process occurs 
via cycling among the case data, emerging theory, and later, extant literature” 
(p. 25). Yin (1997) requires the comparison of findings to “as much prior 
research as possible” (p. 255). Ferreira and Merchant (1992) also see the need 
to “explicitly link the observations to a pre-existing body of knowledge” (p. 6). 
Following Eisenhardt’s (1989a) indications, the emergent theory is compared 
with the corporate governance and co-operative literature to find similarities 
and contradictions. Contradictory literature occurs; for example in the 
assumption of distrust between the board and management seen in agency 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983a) and managerial hegemony (Kosnik, 1987) theories, 
neither of which is apparent in these findings. The use of literature in this 
research is described before reaching closure. 
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6.2.8 Reaching Closure 
 
Reaching closure is the eighth and final step in Eisenhardt’s (1989a) 
framework. Eisenhardt (1989a) seeks to achieve theoretical saturation17 and 
end the theory-building process when marginal improvement becomes small 
(p. 533). Eisenhardt (1989a) identifies two important issues in reaching 
closure; when to stop adding cases and when “iterating between theory and 
data” should cease (Eisenhardt, 1989a. p. 545).  
6.2.8.1 Cases 
 
According to Eisenhardt (1989a), no further cases should be added at the point 
of theoretical saturation, however, she does acknowledge time and money are 
limiting factors and suggests somewhere between four and ten cases work well 
in theory building (p. 545). Eisenhardt (1989a) believes that fewer than four 
cases leads to poorly empirically grounded theory that lacks complexity, and 
with more than ten cases it “quickly becomes difficult to cope with the 
complexity and volume of the data” (Eisenhardt, 1989a, p. 545). Yin (1997) 
more pragmatically suggests that the number of cases “depends upon the 
certainty you want to have about your multiple-case results” (p. 241). Yin 
(1994) believes the number of cases depends on the number of theoretical and 
literal replications you would like in your research (p. 50).  
 
In this research, following Eisenhardt’s (1989a) method, six cases are used, at 
which point theoretical saturation is reached. It is felt that any extra cases will 
not materially add any new information (Eisenhardt, 1991, p. 622). It is also 
likely that any new cases will considerably broaden the scope of the research 
beyond the governance of New Zealand and Australian co-operative (bovine) 
dairy companies. Likewise, after 23 interviews, the researcher’s main source of 
data, it was felt that ‘theoretical saturation’ occurred (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) 
and that additional interviews will not provide new or contradictory data and 
any further improvement will be marginal. 
                                                 
17 Theoretical saturation is the point at which incremental learning is minimal (Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967). 
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6.2.8.2 Iterating Between Data and Theory 
 
The second closure issue is when to stop iterating between data and theory. 
Data analysis of categories continues until theoretical saturation occurs (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967). Analysis concludes at the point where “the analysis itself 
appears to have run its course – when all the incidents can be readily classified, 
categories are ‘saturated,’ and sufficient numbers of ‘regularities’ emerge” 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 62). This is consistent with the  Eisenhardt 
(1989a) method. She believes saturation is the key idea, that is, “when the 
incremental improvement to theory is minimal” (p. 545). This point is kept in 
mind as the iterative processes of analysis form, develop and come to a close. 
In this study all interview data to do with board roles is classified in one or 
another of the concepts or subconcepts described in the findings.  
 
The Eisenhardt (1989a) method involves constant iteration between the eight 
steps outlined above as the empirical evidence converges into a “single 
theoretical framework” (p. 547). According to Eisenhardt (1989a) this is likely 
to “result in a theory that is empirically valid because of its intimate tie with 
the evidence” (p. 547). Indeed, Eisenhardt (1989a) sees “that the accumulation 
of knowledge involves a continual cycling between theory and data” (pp. 548-
549) and later the extant literature (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 25). The 
findings form an inductively developed conceptual framework, with 
supporting evidence, of the roles of governing boards of New Zealand and 
Australian co-operative dairy companies from the perspective of the 
participants. It is to how these findings are presented that the thesis now turns. 
6.3 Presenting Empirical Evidence 
 
As the most tangible outcome of this process, the thesis’ presentation of 
findings is critical to the confidence readers have in the research effort. The 
presentation of the findings in this thesis closely follows the recommendations 
of Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007). They see presenting each case as 
infeasible. The challenge is within spatial limits to convey both the “research 
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objective and the rich empirical evidence that supports the theory” (Eisenhardt 
& Graebner, 2007, p. 29).  
 
In presenting the emergent theory Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest 
sketching the theory in the introduction, providing “a visual theory summary 
such as a ‘boxes and arrows’ diagram” (p. 30). They believe the theory should 
be used as the “overarching organizing frame” of the document (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007, p. 29). Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) advise developing the 
theory in sections in a way that each part of the theory is demonstrated by 
evidence from at least some of the cases (p. 29). To facilitate this, Eisenhardt 
and Graebner (2007) judge the use of extensive tables to signal the depth and 
detail of the empirical grounding as central. They suggest a “separate table that 
summarizes the evidence for each theoretical construct” as a particularly 
effective way to present the case evidence (p. 29). The supporting evidence 
needs to be “drawn from the case evidence (e.g., an informant explaining the 
logic)” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 30). As Yin (1994) suggests, a 
“linear-analytic structure” is utilised in this thesis with a statement of the 
“problem being studied, a review of the relevant prior literature, the methods 
used, the findings from the data collected and analysed, and the conclusions 
and implications from the findings” (p. 138). 
 
All these suggestions are utilised in the presentation of these findings. A 
diagram, or theoretical model, is displayed (Figure 7-1, Chapter 7) and utilised 
as an “overarching organising frame”. Each of the theoretical constructs that 
make up the model are tabulated with supporting empirical evidence from at 
least some of the cases shown. 
6.4 Conclusions 
 
In this chapter the method used and research design are discussed. Each of 
Eisenhardt’s (1989a) eight steps undertaken in this research are elucidated as to 
how they enable the research aims to be achieved. How the findings of the 
theory-building process are to be presented is outlined. The following two 
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chapters, 7 and 8, present the conceptual model and findings and empirical 
evidence from this process. 
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CHAPTER 7 FINDINGS I 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the theoretical model. Outlined below in Figure 7-1, 
the  model of New Zealand and Australian dairy co-operative governance is 
induced from the empirical field data utilising Eisenhardt’s (1989a) multi-case 
method. Examples of interim steps in the development of the data driven-
induced conceptual model are shown in Appendix D to illustrate the 
conceptual development process.  In  line with  Eisenhardt and Graebner’s  
(2007) suggestions,  this chapter sets out the basic framework and its rationale; 
the remaining sections in this chapter and Chapter 8 evaluate, and provide 
evidence of each concept of the model.  
 
Five main theoretical concepts are elucidated;   Exogenous-issues, Supplier-
Shareholder-Needs/Benefits, Supplier-Shareholder-Controls, Board Architect-
ure, and Board Roles. Seven subconcepts are also evaluated. Within this 
chapter (7) the subconcepts of Individual-Distinctions, Engagement-Forums, 
and Dynamics are defined along with supporting evidence. In Chapter 8 the 
four key subconcepts of Board Roles; Unite, Strategic-Involvement, Control 
and Serve are similarly highlighted with supporting evidence. 
 
Evidence from the interviews is presented in italics, and is largely verbatim. 
Questions from the researcher during interviews are presented in brackets to 
enhance understanding. The quotations are ascribed to individuals using the 
researchers coding to protect anonymity. Evidence from documentation is 
presented as noted.  
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Figure 7-1 A Theoretical Model 
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The large box in dark outline in the theoretical model represents the 
“boundaries” of the dairy co-operative. Inside of which are the key 
stakeholders of dairy co-operative governance. The theoretical framework is 
driven by Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits. The concepts of Supplier-
Shareholder-Needs/Benefits, and Supplier-Shareholder-Controls relate to 
“why” the governing boards do what they do. The dotted box within the large 
box focuses on the governing board. Within this doted box two more solid 
boxes are highlighted. The first of these solid boxes is Board Architecture, the 
second Board Roles.  
 
The Supplier-Shareholders -Needs and -Controls influence the Board 
Architecture and Board Roles. The first of these influenced structures, Board 
Architecture, conceptualises “who” the board are (Composition), and the skills, 
knowledge and abilities they bring to the board table (Competencies). How the 
board organises itself and goes about its decision-making is elucidated under 
Engagement-Forums. The third concept within the Board Architecture box is 
Dynamics. This concept describes the relationships, behaviour, conduct, and 
decision making processes or the “how” the board goes about its business. The 
theoretical concepts in the Board Architecture box give the board the 
“capacity” to undertake the second internal box portrayed in the model, the 
Board Roles. Board Roles, conceptualise “what” the directors actually do. The 
boards researched have conceptual roles in Unite, Strategic-Involvement, 
Control, and Serve. Each of the main theoretical concepts and supporting 
evidence is outlined below. 
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7.2 Exogenous-Issues 
Figure 7-2 Exogenous-Issues 
 
 
The first theoretical concept is Exogenous-Issues which is defined as: 
all those contextual issues that have an effect on the co-operative, its 
supplier-shareholders in their relationship with the co-operative, and by 
implication the co-operatives’ governance roles that are external to the 
control of the co-operative governing boards. 
While Exogenous-Issues could cover a vast array of actual and potential issues, 
those repeatedly raised in this fieldwork (see Appendix E for further evidence) 
are classifiable within three categories formed from an analysis of the data: the 
Competitive-Environment, the Regulatory-Environment, and the Physical-
Environment. Judging from the frequency and intensity with which they are 
raised, these emerge most powerfully in terms of their impact on actual 
governing Board Roles. They therefore comprise the subconcepts of 
Exogenous-Issues. 
 
Exogenous-Issues are present as a conceptual theme in all cases studied, and 
are referred to by all but one of the participants during the semi-structured 
interviews (see Table 7-1 for a summary). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exogenous-Issues  
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Table 7-1 Evidence of Exogenous-Issues 
Concept Frequency of mention Examples from interviews 
Cases Respondents
No. % No. % 
Exogenous- 
Issues 
6 100 21 95 [The board needs] to have a very good 
understanding of the markets that we are 
operating in and I mean that in a quite 
wide sense, the market for our products, I 
mean the market for dairy farmers in a 
competitive situation with [another co-
operative], the market for staff, the market 
for everything we deal with, the financial 
markets and everything else (A3, 
appointed director) 
Competitive- 
Environment 
6 100 15 68 So if you are not competitive you are 
going to lose milk supply, the moment you 
lose milk supply you start to lose your 
fundamental base of operation (F3, 
appointed director) 
Regulatory- 
Environment 
6 100 17 77 Recognising that deregulation was on the 
horizon; how would we position ourselves 
to take on the demands of a deregulated 
market? (D4, MD18) 
Physical-  
Environment 
5 83 12 55 Whether they can buy the school clothes 
this year or not. All those things in the 
drought were obviously pretty emotional 
from that point of view. But you know why 
you are here and I think that’s a great 
thing and from a co-operative, a huge 
strength (E4, MD) 
 
The effect of Exogenous-Issues on co-operative governance roles varies 
between the cases studied creating some of the cross-case distinctions19. 
Discourse demonstrating the nature and existence of each of the sub-concepts 
of Exogenous-Issues: Competitive-Environment, Regulatory-Environment and 
Physical-Environment is presented and analysed below.  
7.2.1 Competitive-Environment 
The Competitive-Environment is defined as: 
the (dairy) industry environment within which the co-operative 
company has to compete to both retain (or expand) milk supply and to 
compete for customers of the products the co-operatives choose to 
produce and market.   
 
                                                 
18 Managing Director 
19 Cross-case distinctions are understood as lying along dimensions of the properties which 
define each concept.  
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The Competitive-Environment is raised in 100% of the co-operative cases 
studied and by 68% of respondents (see Appendix E-1 for evidence and Table 
7-1 for summaries). This appointed director highlights the need for directors to 
understand the Competitive-Environment to undertake their governance roles: 
About 75 percent of a board meeting is management educating its 
board. Educating them in what’s going on, how the business is 
changing what’s going on in the world, how customers are changing, 
how competitors are changing, what it means for the company, what 
things could be coming up in the future, what’s the technologies 
involved, how are they changing, all those sort of things (A3, appointed 
director) 
 
The Competitive-Environment relates to issues raised around the threat of 
takeover as a takeover effectively takes over the co-operative’s milk supply 
and governance. The following reflects how the Competitive-Environment 
underlies a supplier-shareholder20 chair’s comments on their own role during a 
takeover attempt:  
It was a very big role, it was an interesting one … we have been  … a 
very successful company for quite some time and we actually pitched 
our price $2 a share less than the raider and we lived on our record 
(E1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The Competitive-Environment relates to competition for milk supply (or 
suppliers’ patronage):  
There is competition for that milk out there … you have got to get your 
raw materials, and if you are not prepared to pay the price you may 
find yourself short of the fundamental raw material (F3, appointed 
director) 
 
The competition for milk appears more acute in Australian than New Zealand 
cases. Product market competition has an important bearing on Board Roles, in 
this case, Strategic-Involvement21, as this CEO outlines:   
                                                 
20 [For ease of understanding the definition of supplier-shareholder is repeated here] The terms 
patron, user, member, farmer, producer, owner, shareholder, member-owner, member-
shareholder and combinations of these appear to be used interchangeably in the literature. 
While they differ, they all refer to those who patronise, own and control the co-operative firm. 
The term supplier-shareholder is utilised as it more accurately reflects the patron’s relationship 
with a dairy co-operative. That is, they are first and foremost a supplier to the co-operative, but 
they also have a (less important) shareholding relationship with the co-operative. 
21 Covered in Chapter 8 
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[The] added value strategy … has its origins … as the company was 
thinking through how it was going to be competitive with the changing 
nature of the dairy industry of the time (A4, CEO) 
 
Also raised within this category are issues around changes in markets that 
drive the Competitive-Environment such as changes in global supply and 
demand and the internationalisation of food markets and its influence on the 
Board’s Role:   
What about China? Or what about free trade agreement in the States? 
But what does that all mean in strategic terms? And what are we going 
to do? (E4, managing director) 
 
Customer preferences around issues such as animal welfare, food safety, 
traceability and sustainable production systems concerns also fall within this 
category: 
GMO free policy … customers who do not trust GMO … they just don’t 
want to see GM material in the food chain” (E4, managing director) 
 
The Competitive-Environment is defined here and shown in this research to be 
an important subconcept of Exogenous-Issues that are required to be 
understood when theorising on co-operative governing Board Roles. 
7.2.2 Regulatory-Environment  
The second sub-concept is the Regulatory-Environment which is defined as: 
changes in legislation / regulation (either inside or outside the 
domiciled country) that affect the co-operative and its governance roles 
and that are outside the control of the co-operative’s board.  
 
Included in this subconcept are issues related to changes in legislation, 
regulations, and market access (as it relates to government intervention in 
market places, e.g., FTA22s) and also changes in financial markets, in 
particular exchange rates. The latter is included under Regulatory-Environment 
because of the extent to which co-operatives may be regulated in a sense by 
market mechanisms and sometimes by monetary (regulatory) policy as well. 
The Regulatory-Environment is raised in 100% of the co-operative cases 
studied and by 77% of respondents (refer to Appendix E-2 for evidence and 
                                                 
22 Free Trade Agreements. Usually undertaken on a government to government level, such as 
the Australia-United States and New Zealand-China FTAs and the ongoing negotiations under 
the auspices of the World Trade Organisation. 
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Table 7-1 for summaries). There are distinctions between the Australian and 
New Zealand regulatory environments and some differences between States in 
Australia. 
 
The following comments reflect how the Regulatory-Environment concept 
captures respondents’ observations about changes in legislation and regulation 
and provides evidence of the relationship of these ideas with co-operative 
governing Board Roles: 
Recognising that deregulation was on the horizon; how would we 
position ourselves to take on the demands of a deregulated market? 
(D4, managing director) 
 
Bear in mind it’s only in this last year it’s been legislated … but 
culturally getting that across the line took the support of the board 
speaking aloud about that at some of our [supplier-shareholder] 
meetings (E4, managing director) 
 
Changes in exchange rates have an effect on the co-operative and on the 
Board’s tasks: 
If you hedge too far and you get it wrong and your competitor for 
supply doesn’t get it wrong then you lose supply and that has profound 
impact … therefore any changes in fundamental policies has to be 
approved by the board (D1, appointed chair) 
 
This chair and managing director highlight the ways in which the international 
environment has an influence on the Strategic-Involvement (section 8.3) Board 
Role: 
With some of the large geopolitical movements - was our strategy still 
appropriate? (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
And on the Unite Role (section 8.2) attributed to co-operative boards: 
The biggest challenge for co-operatives … is as … this business evolves 
and the food industry … continues to get more and more complex - how 
they keep in touch and communicate with the shareholders … otherwise 
you can lose that alignment of what the shareholders want and what 
the board and the company are doing and what the customer wants 
(E4, managing director) 
 
The Regulatory-Environment is thus induced from the evidential data as one 
subconcept of Exogenous-Issues. 
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7.2.3 Physical-Environment  
The third Exogenous-Issue derived is the Physical-Environment (see Appendix 
E-3 for more evidence), is defined as: 
the climate and geographically-influenced community within which the 
co-operative operates. 
 
Dairy farming is a biological process and as such climate and geography have 
a pronounced effect on supplier-shareholders’ farming operations, their 
commensurate needs, and therefore the boards who respond to those needs. 
The Physical-Environment is raised in 100% of the co-operative cases studied 
and by 55% of respondents (refer to Table 7-1 for summaries). 
 
Distinctions in the form of size and geographic location effected cases 
differently. Climatic events, in the form of drought, have a marked impact on 
the governance roles within the Australian co-operative dairy companies at the 
time of data collection:  
[The co-operative] explained exactly where we’re going … and we 
gave them support … with acquiring outside feed, be it hay or silage 
and grain, to try and help through the crisis period … we went out and 
we faced the farmers on their patch … and explained what we were 
doing, the problems we had, and talked about their problems. We put 
field staff in basically to go out and service them, to fill in forms, to 
help them with drought aid, to facilitate many of the things that under 
stress they weren’t handling well … there were a few of them that 
wanted to sell the place and privatise it (E1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
 
The geographic location of the co-operative and the local community in which 
the co-operative operates also has an impact on co-operative governance roles, 
particularly in smaller or geographically isolated co-operatives: 
There are some very practical reasons why we need to be part of the 
community … we need to protect the environment. We make it very 
much a sale point when we’re selling our product … Education - most 
farmers … have children and so education is very much dear to their 
hearts … the opportunity to maybe create employment here for their 
children, so at least they’ve got a choice of living here if they want to, 
which hasn’t been great in the past. All of those things are quite 
important (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
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The Physical-Environment has been identified as a subconcept of Exogenous-
Issues that is important in informing the understanding of Board Roles of co-
operative dairy companies. 
7.2.4 Conclusions – Exogenous-Issues 
 
Exogenous-Issues are defined here as all those contextual issues that have an 
effect on the co-operative, its supplier-shareholders’ in their relationship with 
the co-operative, and, by implication, the co-operatives’ governance roles that 
are external to the control of the co-operative governing boards. Three 
groupings of Exogenous-Issues emerge; the Competitive-Environment, the 
Regulatory-Environment, and the Physical-Environment. These are highlighted 
in the data as having the most significant effect on the co-operatives’ Board 
Roles. Therefore, Exogenous-Issues, while external to the co-operative, cannot 
be excluded from the sources of influence on the governing Board Roles. 
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7.3 Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits 
Figure 7-3 Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits 
 
Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits are defined here as: 
the benefits expected by the supplier-shareholders in their relationship 
with the co-operative dairy company. 
 
The theoretical concept of Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits appears twice 
in the model. The first time the concept is shown describes the needs of 
supplier-shareholders, and the second time the benefits derived from supplier-
shareholders’ association with the co-operative. As such, they relate to the 
same issues. The benefits received by the supplier-shareholders in their 
association with the co-operative are compared with their needs to determine 
satisfaction with the co-operative’s performance. 
 
The evidence suggests that the reason for the co-operatives’ existence and the 
main overall Board Role is to ensure the co-operative is operated to serve the 
needs of supplier-shareholders, as these respondents note: 
Meeting member expectations - which isn’t easy - but in a co-operative 
you are formed to meet those member expectations (D2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
In a co-operative the main general role of a board would be the 
relationship with the shareholders …. Shareholders whose own 
businesses depend greatly on the success or otherwise of the co-
operative company that processes and markets their output from their 
own individual businesses. So perhaps the most important general role 
Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits
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is trying to establish, manage and develop the company to enable it to 
serve the needs of its shareholders (A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Judging from the frequency and intensity of respondents raising this issue, 
Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits emerge as a governance role concept. 
Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits are influential in understanding the 
expectations of, and the actual roles undertaken by, the co-operative boards: 
The role of our directors is to … at all times [be] doing things in the 
best interests of the shareholders (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The key ones the [case A] board focuses on, would be - suppliers would 
priority number one, two and three in the [case A] board mind (A3, 
appointed director) 
or this managing director as he describes articulating, balancing and 
prioritising Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits at the board table: 
Representing the best interests of the farmer and being able to 
communicate the requirements, the needs, the questions, the issues that  
are raised in the field, if you like, by farmers, who actually own the 
company, as it relates to their own businesses and that is very much a 
communication role and being able to decipher the issues and 
prioritise the issues and so on, that's very important for a co-operative 
(F4, managing director) 
 
Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits are induced from the empirical data to be 
demonstrated here and in subsequent chapters (see Appendix F for evidence). 
The evidence suggests Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits are largely 
economic, but also encompass Community (a subconcept) needs. The 
economic needs are divided into enhancing supplier-shareholders’ economic 
well-being by increasing their benefits and/or reducing their costs, and 
secondly, reducing the risks to the supplier-shareholders’ farming business. 
These are termed Income-Enhancement and Risk-Reduction. These needs vary 
by case, in particular, by the Exogenous-Issues faced by the co-operative’s 
supplier-shareholders. Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits are partially met 
by Collective-Action (section 7.3.4), the final subconcept. Supplier-
Shareholder-Needs/Benefits is present in all cases studied and its elements are 
discussed by all participants (see Table 7-2 for a summary).  
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Table 7-2 Evidence of Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits 
Concept Frequency of mention Examples from interviews  
Cases Respondents
No. % No. % 
Supplier-
Shareholder- 
Needs/Benefits 
6 100 22 100 They own the business. The reason they 
have a co-operative is to look after their 
interests as a farmer primarily, as an 
investor secondly (D4, MD) 
Income- 
Enhancement 
6 100 21 95 I’ve got the easiest job in the place, I’ve 
got to pay the highest milk price and 
I’ve got to retain enough of the business 
to keep paying the highest milk price 
[laughter]. Simple (E4, MD) 
Risk- 
Reduction 
6 100 15 67 The security issue, the risk reduction 
issue of being together, better being 
together than alone, unless you are part 
of the bigger group, if you are out a 
long way from anyone you have still got 
that tanker coming all those miles to 
pick you up, or if your market area is 
not so strong you are still going to get a, 
perhaps cross subsidised milk price, you 
know just the advantages of being 
collective  (D2, s-s23 director) 
Community 6 100 10 45 [We are part of a] relatively small 
community and most of the factory know 
someone or knows some farmers or 
whatever. We have a preference to 
employ farmers’ sons and daughters, 
especially if they’ve done some uni and 
whatever else and encourage them to 
come back.  We give them seasonal 
work through their school holidays and 
stuff so we actually purposely have a 
little bit of nepotism I suppose. That’s 
part of the culture and the board can 
make a very, very big influence if 
somebody gets crook or there is a 
motorcycle accident or whatever (E4, 
MD) 
Collective-
Action 
6 100 12 55 It’s just that we can do things more 
better collectively and processing the 
milk so it can be exported than we could 
individually (B1, s-s chair) 
 
 
Examples of evidence from the fieldwork of each of these subconcepts are 
presented below.   
 
Important to the understanding of the co-operative Board Roles is that the 
Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits are not to create profit or wealth at the 
                                                 
23 Supplier-shareholder 
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level of the co-operative firm but to supply benefits that enhance the supplier-
shareholders’ farming businesses. This Supplier-Shareholder-Need/Benefit 
requires a Board Role to ensure that the co-operative company continues to 
supply benefits for the supplier-shareholders patronage relationship in 
preference to their shareholding relationship. As these directors note, there is a 
Supplier-Shareholder-Need/Benefit to process and maximise the value of milk 
to create value inside the farm gate: 
The farmer’s viability relates back to his net income on the farm, the 
company has the role and responsibility of processing that production 
and trying to maximise the price for that milk that the farmer gives to 
the company (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The real value for the shareholders is that [case B] develop as a 
processing unit and they get their wealth out of developing their farms 
and being able to utilise them and work their farms up to as close to the 
maximum capabilities of that farm (B1, supplier-shareholder  chair) 
 
and also a Board Role to ensure the co-operative survives to continue to 
provide those benefits (see section 8.4.5): 
You look at the ones [co-operatives] that fail, well the ones that have 
disappeared from co-operatives, and that determination [to remain co-
operative] has not been there. So they look purely at commercial 
drivers and you come back to well, shares, share value, dividends 
become the driver not, you know, member benefit (F1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
The first two Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits subconcepts are discussed 
below.  
7.3.1 Income-Enhancement 
The first of the Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits subconcepts elicited from 
the data is Income-Enhancement and is defined as: 
those benefits supplier-shareholders expect in financial terms from their 
(patronage) relationship with the co-operative. 
 
This subconcept is raised in 100% of the co-operative cases studied and by 
95% of respondents (sees Appendix F-1 for evidence and Table 7-2 for 
summaries). Outlined below are examples, drawn from the fieldwork, 
illustrating the text from which this subconcept is derived. Income-
Enhancement at farm level can be achieved by revenue enhancement or cost 
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reductions. Cost reductions can come in the form of lower prices for farm 
requisites24 and also through economies of scale at the co-operative level. 
These Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits have implications for the 
strategies the co-operative follows and hence the boards’ Strategic-
Involvement and Control roles.  
 
As payout25 has the largest effect on the profitability of supplier-shareholders’ 
individual businesses, their primary interest is normally the payout price they 
receive for their milk, as these directors maintain: 
We satisfy the shareholding requirement by paying out the best possible 
payout we can, the higher the better (B2, supplier-shareholder 
director) 
 
I’m being a bit facetious but probably the top three items would be milk 
price, milk price, milk price (D1, appointed chair) 
 
The co-operative board therefore has a role in setting strategies and policies to 
produce a payout that is both high and sustainable: 
One of the key objectives will be the sustainability of adding value to 
and maximising the payout for milk (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
I would say we’re [the board] actually there to maximise the payout on 
a sustainable basis, that's our number one priority (C1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
All the co-operative cases’ main business is the collection, processing and 
marketing of their supplier-shareholders’ milk, allowing economies of scale 
and scope in collection, production, co-ordination and marketing of milk 
products. None of the supplier-shareholders can achieve this individually. 
Supplier-shareholders therefore have an expectation that the board will ensure 
this process of vertical integration26 into the future:  
As a company we are in the business, or we have the policy if you like, 
of being in the business of collecting, processing, marketing and adding 
value to our farmers’ milk (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
                                                 
24 Provisions required for the operation of the supplier-shareholders’ farming business. 
25 the term usually used by respondents in this research for the payment for the valued 
components of milk. 
26 All co-operatives in the study employ a co-operative model of vertical integration where 
many (between 120 and 12,000 individual businesses) act voluntarily and collectively to 
vertically integrate into collection, processing and marketing of milk products. 
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This vertical integration and collective action allows supplier-shareholders to 
enjoy economies of scope and scale in production and marketing as well as 
sharing costs and/or enjoying profits further down the value chain: 
It’s the farmers’ company, it is their business, it’s an extension of their 
farm business. To me all a co-op is, it’s effectively the post farm gate 
bit of what is an all encompassing supply chain business that the 
farmer owns from farm to market (F4, managing director) 
 
I think it’s fair to say that everybody has accepted that the reason why 
the [case A] shareholders are better off is because collectively they’ve 
made those investments in added value, therefore have derived a better 
payout, therefore have seen a substantial capital increase in the value 
of their farming property. So they are better off as a consequence of 
what we’ve done (A4, CEO)  
 
At the time of data collection all co-operatives ran (or had significant stakes in) 
farm requisite stores to (presumably) reduce the price of farm requisites to 
their supplier-shareholders and/or to provide missing services, allowing 
supplier-shareholders to enhance their income. Some co-operatives also 
offered financial services to supplier-shareholders and independent advice on 
farm matters, as this chair observes: 
There will be some with pasture expertise, some with dairy equipment 
expertise, so they work as a team if people have a particular problem, 
so not necessarily all generalists and it seems to work very well. That is 
supported by our electronic ... it is called [‘Case F Farm’] and the 
website ... They can get their production details, their pay details and 
those sorts of things off it as well, and it does have a free accounting 
programme which they can use if they want (F1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
 
There is evidence of using the co-operative as a vehicle to Unite (section 8.2) 
for political action. This allows supplier-shareholders to enhance their well-
being by (collectively) negotiating better terms and conditions: 
 The water issues are a very good example.  There’s government issues, 
which I take a strong lead in on behalf of the company. But they [the 
board] can talk on behalf of the company and behalf of farmers and 
that is very useful in this context because there’s more votes in that 
than just the company itself [laughter] (E4, managing director) 
 
So the brief of a director in a co-operative company sometimes goes 
beyond the fact that it is strictly the company, but go further out into 
some of the on-farm activities, the viability of farming, some areas such 
as animal health, requirements in terms of animal health, work, 
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welfare, international requirements as far as standards on the farm are 
concerned, the whole raft of issues in relation to farming that the 
directors of a co-operative may have to take into account (A2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
The Income-Enhancement subconcept of Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits 
is defined and evidence presented as to its existence. 
7.3.2 Risk-Reduction  
The second economic subconcept of Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits 
induced from the evidence, Risk-Reduction, is defined here as: 
supplier-shareholders’ need to reduce the risk of being taken advantage 
of in their economic transactions due to their vulnerability in their 
dependence on the performance of the milk processing company, the 
need for a daily market due to the perishability of their produce, and 
having very specific assets that are very fixed in nature.   
 
Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits for Risk-Reduction is raised in 100% of 
the co-operative cases studied and by 67% of respondents (refer to Appendix 
F-2 for evidence and Table 7-2 for summaries). Included in this subconcept are 
issues raised by respondents around risks related to the dependence of 
supplier-shareholders on the performance of the co-operative, the perishability 
of milk, the need for a market, the lack of diversification of assets, and the 
need for a competitive yardstick27. Supplier-shareholders have an expectation 
that the board has a role to ensure that their risks are reduced by their 
relationship with the co-operative. The board has a role to ensure that the co-
operative company continues to collect, process and market all supplier-
shareholders’ milk at a competitive price over a long period of time. As such, 
an understanding of Risk-Reduction is important to the understanding of Board 
Roles. 
 
Supplier-shareholders are very dependent on the performance of the co-
operative and much of their (and their families’) well-being is tied up with the 
co-operative, hence creating an even more substantive personal risk to the 
supplier-shareholders. This has implications for the Composition of the board 
                                                 
27 Concept developed by Nourse (1922) ensuring that a fair farm gate price is being paid for 
produce. This concept has been explored in Chapter 2, the agricultural co-operative context. 
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and their Strategic-Involvement and Control roles, as is explained in this rather 
long but enlightening quotation from a supplier-shareholder director:  
If you look at a farmer all his income generally speaking is derived 
from the farm, that income is generated by the co-operative company, 
he generally lives on the farm so his house is on the farm, he lives in 
the community so all his schooling, friends, relationships, business 
associations such as lawyers and accountants tend to be pretty closely 
aligned with the local community … the farmer-shareholder is very, 
very close association with the company. Dependent on the company 
for their livelihood, dependent on the company in terms of where they 
live and for example, if things went wrong not only would they lose 
their income but they potentially also lose the place in which they live.  
So the interest of the shareholder are totally aligned with the 
performance of the company and therefore its most important, in my 
opinion, that the farmers have representatives as directors on the 
board of directors to ensure that the company’s strategies and policies 
are very closely aligned with the interests of the farmer-shareholders 
(A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Supplier-shareholders’ dependence on the co-operative is accentuated by their 
own personal lack of diversification: 
They [supplier-shareholders]actually have invested in this co-operative 
for their interests as a farmer which probably represents 90 percent  of 
their wealth anyway (D4, managing director) 
 
For a dairy farmer his whole livelihood depends on his company. So 
he’s got this vast amount of money tied up in his farm and he’s got all 
this money tied up in the company through shareholding and through 
his entitlement to supply, it just creates a different way of thinking (A4, 
CEO) 
 
As supplier-shareholders produce a highly perishable product, in quantities that 
may vary from day-to-day and year-to-year (as noted under Exogenous-
Issues), they require a market for that produce each day:  
Obviously securing their milk off take, I mean they are not dispensable 
to us so whatever they produce we will process and will pay a 
commercial price (D2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
 As all cases export dairy products and there is a requirement to manufacture 
that perishable product into a shelf-stable product and to market it. The co-
operative must have sufficient infrastructure to process and market all the milk 
supplied, therefore:  
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What’s [a supplier-shareholder director] say? ‘don't spill a drop of 
milk’ [laughter] (C3, appointed director) 
 
The board is accountable to the farmers for security of milk off take, for 
providing an ongoing viable option for them to grow if they want to 
grow (D1, appointed chair) 
 
This supplier-shareholder expectation has physical capacity allocation 
implications. That is, resources may need to be allocated to milk processing 
infrastructure even if doing so does not appear to be economically sound for 
the co-operative as a whole. This managing director explains: 
The issue of putting money into facilities to process milk where there is 
no margin or very little margin, but very, very important to the dairy 
farming community because they just need this constant growth (D4, 
managing director) 
 
It is felt the co-operative not only needs to provide a market for tomorrow’s 
milk but also a market for milk produced by future generations, requiring a 
sustainable business: 
[We have] got to have a business here that is sustainable in the future, 
in its own right (E2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
I think a co-operative is, in particular a farming co-operative, has to 
take a far longer term view on its initiatives, on its investments (A2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Apart from having a few sacred cows like this co-operative needs to be 
sustainable for generations (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
In the New Zealand and Australian dairy industry there are a limited number of 
‘buyers’ of milk and a large number of small ‘suppliers28’ (co-operative 
memberships ranged from 120 to 12,000 supplier-shareholders). This suggests 
a Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefit for countervailing market power,29 
which is achieved through collective action. With this difference in market 
power between supplier-shareholders and buyers (especially when combined 
with the perishability of milk), there is a risk of supplier-shareholders being 
taken advantage of by the buyer. As this appointed director muses: 
I don't know what it was, and presumably it was in England or Ireland 
somewhere, but they thought about a means for getting their produce 
                                                 
28 Predominately family farms. 
29 Discussed in Chapter 2. 
136 
 
aggregated, processed, and finding a market for it, without being 
screwed by those nasty bastards down the city of London or Queen 
Street, Auckland or wherever it was (C3, appointed director) 
 
This risk is reduced by collectively owning and controlling (through the board 
of directors) the processor and marketer of that milk, that is the co-operative: 
The co-operative will say bugger it, we might have to trade off some 
economic efficiency in doing things really well and being best in class, 
but at least we’ll own the bastard and no one gets control of it and 
exploits us (C3, appointed director) 
 
Milk producers also need a competitive yardstick (Nourse, 1922) against 
which to set the milk price. Otherwise milk producers risk being paid less than 
fair value: 
It’s the 70% of milk that’s in this country that is controlled by co-
operatives that have driven the price. It wasn’t the Nestlés or the 
Krafts. And I used to work for Nestlé. I used to set their milk pricing 
policy (E4, managing director) 
 
It is in the best interests of Australia for there to be a strong co-
operative because there is no doubt about it, that basically the co-
operative sets the milk price (F3, appointed director) 
 
The co-operatives also reduce supplier-shareholders’ risks by pooling benefits 
across products, time and markets and hence reducing variation in supplier-
shareholders’ income. 
 
Demand for Risk-Reduction thus has an effect on the roles undertaken by the 
governing board. Risk-Reduction needs may constrain a board’s strategies: 
I believe that [case B] made a decision to go independently ... it did so 
for the sake of the [region], development of the [region] and the 
benefits it could bring to its own farmer-suppliers. To start hiving off 
into other activities outside, despite all the temptations that are put in 
front of you, you have to be very, very thoughtful about why you would 
want to do that (B3, appointed director) 
 
and/or affect their Control Role (section 8.4) as these chairs acknowledge: 
I believe that we actually bank the farmers. Equity is part of our drive 
and if we in any shape or form try to run the company with low equity 
we would then put a lot of pressure ... on farmers  ... we couldn’t expect 
farmers to take the risks they do with the weather and the market prices 
where they have to take the price they get. I believe that we would slow 
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down the growth of what we were trying to do within the region (B1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The reason for being there [the board] is to protect the shareholders’ 
interests and their investment (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The evidence presented here suggests Risk-Reduction is a subconcept of 
Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits and is useful for the understanding of co-
operative Board Roles. 
7.3.3 Community  
The third of the Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits subconcepts is 
Community needs (see Appendix F-3 for evidential data) and is defined as:  
those benefits that do not relate economically to the supplier-
shareholder’s farming business that are expected (or provided) to 
supplier-shareholders by the co-operative. 
 
Of far less import to the respondents, but evidenced in the empirical data, are a 
range of Community needs that are raised in 100% of the co-operative cases 
and by 45% of respondents (refer to Table 7-2 for summaries). Included in this 
subconcept are issues raised by respondents around local employment 
opportunities, regional invigoration, retention of local facilities, environmental 
issues and sense of community. These concerns appear more intense in the 
smaller, geographically-isolated co-operatives. This director outlines a board 
role in the areas of community and the environment: 
I think we have become aware as a board that we have a duty to not 
only within our shareholding but to the wider community. I am thinking 
that in environmental matters we have taken a particular note of those 
issues, we are working with regional council because we think that is 
really important (B2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
This director notes the co-operative’s role (and by implication the Boards’ 
Roles) in (creating) local employment, the local community and education: 
Education, most farmers, most of our shareholders, have children and 
so education is very much dear to their hearts … the opportunity to 
maybe create employment here for their children, so at least they’ve 
got a choice of living here if they want to, which hasn’t been great in 
the past. All of those things are quite important (B1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
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Supplier-shareholders also pursue social goals from their association with their 
co-operative, which include the desire to interact with other members and 
management and develop personal and business relationships: 
When you are a co-operative and got a common thread it’s so much 
easier to bring things together because you find your management team 
are really part of the district and understand a bit of the culture of the 
local farmers and even though you’ve got to be careful that you don’t 
get the local small issues mixed up with the prime goals of the 
company, they are not that far apart (E1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Because we live here and all the elected directors live here, there’s a 
sense of wanting to be part of the community and do well by the 
community so that’s just a given that we would feel that way (B1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
A consideration of Community Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits may be 
important in understanding co-operative governing Board Roles. 
7.3.4 Collective-Action  
The final Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits subconcept is Collective-
Action (see Appendix F-4 for evidential data) and is defined as:  
the requirement for supplier-shareholders to act collectively to meet 
their needs. 
 
Although issues around Collective-Action are seldom raised by respondents 
(presumably largely taken for granted) by implication all co-operative cases 
studied achieve Collective-Action. Many of the Supplier-Shareholder-
Needs/Benefits are achieved by Collective-Action and vertical integration: 
[Case B] co-op. is really an extension of the farm and it’s just that we 
can do things more better collectively, and processing the milk so it can 
be exported than we could individually … My suggestion is that if the 
farmers could sell the milk at the farm gate and have the security that 
[case B] gives them, many of them would probably do that. The only 
reason they go as part of the co-op is because they’re prepared to enter 
into a collective agreement because they know that a collective process 
[is] how they’ll get their milk processed everyday and the security of 
that is worth a hell of a lot of money to them, more than what they 
would be concerned about whether their share value was x, y or z (B1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
It is a co-operative number one. So there is a very, very, high degree of 
alignment between a shareholder’s business activity, his farming 
activity, and the co-operative. And I tend to think of the co-operative as 
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simply an extension of his farming activity.  If you actually could take a 
co-operative and slice it into 11,000 pieces and just join it on so there 
is sort of 11,000 joint ventures there that just happen to be welded into 
a single unit, to create a business model that was actually workable ... 
a co-operative is very closely tied to their business and is an extension 
of their business and that the success of their business is significantly in 
part due to how well that co-operative runs (C3, appointed director) 
 
This highlights a board role in ensuring that this Collective-Action continues.  
 
The co-operatives studied provide a vehicle for that collective action. Co-
operatives give supplier-shareholders the opportunity to pool their resources 
and carry out business activities they could not perform as effectively as 
individuals: 
For me the co-operative view is the utilisation of all resources, for the 
good of all, but there will be times when some will get, gain more and 
depending on what stage of their life or what stage of their farming 
career, they will gain more than they will in others (B1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
To continue to act collectively, all supplier-shareholders’ need to feel they are 
benefitting from their relationship with the co-operative. However, 
heterogeneity of needs leads to less consensus and thereby creates difficulties 
in acting collectively. A board role therefore is to continue to gain broad 
consensus and to enhance co-operative strategies with supplier-shareholders. 
Thus, an understanding of the heterogeneity of Supplier-Shareholder-
Needs/Benefits, and how the board deals with this, is important to the 
understanding of Board Roles. 
 
Heterogeneity in supplier-shareholders’ characteristics identified in the 
interviews include: scale of operation (large versus small supplier-
shareholders); age (supplier-shareholders looking to enter the co-operative, 
expand their farming operations, or retire from farming); business focus (e.g., 
large economies of scale versus adding value to milk); stage in their 
investment cycle (money to invest in the co-operative versus no money to 
invest); distance from markets; and the effect of Exogenous-Issues: 
Given that you can define generally what the goals of the shareholders 
are, because they will vary from individual to individual. They will vary 
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because of family circumstances; they will vary because farmers are at 
different stages in their own business cycles, so there’s a whole lot of 
variation in goals (A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
I can put the farmers as shareholders and suppliers in a number of 
categories … large farmer with a large number of shares and no next 
of kin to take over the farm - he has got a certain attitude which is more 
exit- focussed. A young farmer, just in, very few shares, wanting to 
grow the business has got a supply focus. An established farmer with 
quite a number of years still to go but not wanting to grow has a focus 
which is different to his neighbour of the same age with the same long 
term expectations wanting to grow. The farmers in a region where 
there are no competing processor whatsoever … has a different attitude 
to a farmer in an area … [where] they have got three or four other 
processors … so I can raise all those sort of categories of farmers, both 
as suppliers and as shareholders and each one has a different 
expectation. Therefore if ever you to try to do anything with your 
capital structure then all of a sudden you know you are going to end up 
with a best fit proposition because you will never have a proposition 
which will be right, for each one of those categories (D1, appointed 
chair) 
 
Heterogeneity appears to be greater in larger more geographically dispersed 
co-operatives. To continue to act collectively all supplier-shareholders need to 
feel they are benefiting relatively equally (see section 8.2, Unite) from their 
relationship with the co-operative and to trust that the co-operative is working 
in their interests, as this supplier-shareholder director notes: 
You do end up with degrees of envy and issues that you deal with (C2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
If supplier-shareholders do not feel they are benefiting equitably they may 
choose to Exit (section 7.4.3) the co-operative at the expense of Collective-
Action, that is, supplier-shareholders not continuing to contribute resources 
(milk and capital) to the co-operative. Collective-Action is important for all 
supplier-shareholders to achieve their individual needs: 
It’s the whole relationship of the people with the business, the suppliers 
with the business. That is what a co-operative is about. If they get 
alienated from the business, then why have a co-operative (B3, 
appointed director) 
 
The maintenance of Collective-Action appears to require the board to have a 
role in understanding Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits and to try to 
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maintain an adequate level of homogeneity in those needs, as this supplier-
shareholder chair suggests:  
There is a lot to be said for trying to get a consensus or at the very 
least a very substantial majority in any controversy or issue, and I 
think given time allows, time should be taken to try and achieve that 
(A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The board has a role in understanding, finding balance and consensus in 
Supplier-Shareholders-Needs/Benefits: 
[Supplier-shareholders] certainly do have diverse interests. And all the 
board can do is try and balance those interests but always it has to be 
with the underlying best interests of the vehicle, being the co-operative, 
in mind. And ensuring that the vehicle, the co-operative is sustainable, 
both today and into the future. So sure, the board has to be very 
mindful of different needs and they are there and they are real, but it’s 
got to be very careful not to pander to one in particular. In the end it’s 
got to be, the decision has got to be made in the best interests of the 
vehicle as a whole (F4, managing director) 
 
The board tries to the largest extent possible to treat all shareholders 
as equal, but there are certain circumstances where that is not in the 
co-operative’s best interest, not in the interest of the whole. And so the 
board’s job is to define those parameters of whether a certain action 
will treat suppliers differently but is in the broader interest of the co-
operative. The board has to define what that balance is, sometimes they 
may get a recommendation from management but that's clearly a board 
responsibility (C4, CEO) 
 
The supplier-shareholder’s need to undertake Collective-Action and the 
boards’ role in maintaining Collective-Action is demonstrated. The 
heterogeneity of Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits is highlighted from the 
data, as is the role of the board in finding adequate homogeneity in those needs 
to allow the supplier-shareholders to continue to act collectively.  
7.3.5 Conclusions – Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits 
 
Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits are defined here as the benefits required 
by the supplier-shareholders in their relationship with the co-operative dairy 
company. Four theoretical subconcepts of Supplier-Shareholder-Needs 
/Benefits are identified from the evidence; Income-Enhancement, Risk-
Reduction, Community, and Collective-Action. The heterogeneity of Supplier-
Shareholder-Needs/Benefits is highlighted, as is the issue of Supplier-
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Shareholders-Needs/Benefits being facilitated (or achieved) through 
Collective-Action, vertical integration, and trust. Supplier-Shareholder-
Needs/Benefits are identified as an important theoretical concept in 
understanding the sources of influence on the roles of governing boards of co-
operative dairy companies. 
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7.4 Supplier-Shareholder-Controls 
 
Figure 7-4 Supplier-Shareholder-Controls 
 
Supplier-Shareholder-Controls are defined here as:  
the mechanisms available to supplier-shareholders to ensure that the 
co-operative continues to meet their needs.  
 
Supplier-Shareholder-Controls are present as a conceptual theme in all cases 
studied and are referred to by 100% of the participants during the semi-
structured interviews (see Table 7-4 for a summary and Appendix G for more 
evidence). In this section archival data, particularly co-operative constitutions, 
are utilised to provide evidence. Three subconcepts emerge from the empirical 
evidence; the ability to Vote, the use of Voice, and Exit or the threat of Exit. 
These are discussed below along with evidence supporting each subconcept. 
 
The concept of Supplier-Shareholder-Controls is important in understanding 
Board Roles as it is the mechanism supplier-shareholders use to communicate 
their expectations. Supplier-Shareholder-Controls also help in understanding 
who undertakes Board Roles and why.  
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Table 7-3 Evidence of Supplier-Shareholder-Controls 
Concept Frequency of mention Examples from interviews  
Cases Respondents
No. % No. % 
Supplier-
Shareholder- 
Controls 
6 100 22 
 
100 Ultimately the farmers have the final say 
who their board directors are, either 
through election or through ratification 
(C1, s-s chair) 
Vote 6 100 19 86 Probably ultimately I am accountable to 
my shareholders because it’s they who 
put me in, or take me out (B2, s-s 
director) 
Voice 6 100 22 100 With directors, and we have had them, 
confronted by a meeting in their town or 
their area or their district. They get a lot 
of questions, a lot of pressure from the 
average dairy farmer (D4, MD) 
Exit 6 100 17 77 I’ve watched, seen what’s happened in 
the Manawatu, Rangitiki area with this 
latest terrible floods and a number of 
dairy farmers are talking about exiting 
(B3, appointed director) 
 
7.4.1 Vote 
The first Supplier-Shareholder-Control subconcept is the supplier-
shareholders’ ability to Vote and is defined here as:  
the ability of supplier-shareholders to vote on major co-operative 
decisions and for members of the co-operative board. 
 
The ability of supplier-shareholders to Vote is enshrined in legislation and the 
various co-operative constitutions30. The supplier-shareholder Vote mechanism 
is at the heart of the co-operative user-control principle (Barton, 1989a). Of 
most importance to the understanding of co-operative Board Roles is the 
ability of supplier-shareholders to Vote on the co-operative constitution and 
changes to it. As set out in Table 7-4, the co-operative constitutions outline the 
rights, powers and obligations of the board, shareholders and the company. 
The constitution establishes who may be a shareholder and how they may 
Vote. Constitutions also outline who may be a board member, how they may 
be removed, the number and type of board members and the “type” of director 
the chair must be. The constitutions also outline the powers of the board and 
the principal activities of the co-operative. By Voting for board members, 
                                                 
30 Four cases have constitutions, one has articles of association, and one has “Rules of …”. The 
term constitution is used in this thesis to cover all these forms. 
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much of the Supplier-Shareholder-Control is delegated upward to fewer of the 
supplier-shareholders on their representative board. 
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Table 7-4 Vote: Constitutional Arrangements 
Constitutional 
Principles 
Example evidence from co-operative constitutions Effect on Board Roles 
Constitutional 
effect 
2. EFFECT OF THE CONSTITUTION. The constitution defines the rights, powers and obligations 
of the Company, the Board, each Director and each Shareholder – the one with each other ([case A] 
constitution) 
Defines the rights, powers, and 
obligations of the board 
Shareholder 
requirements 
5. Shareholding requirements 
5.1 Suppliers only to hold ordinary shares 
Ordinary shares may only be held by suppliers ([case F] constitution) 
Defines who may be a 
shareholder and exercise 
supplier-shareholder control 
Democratic 
control 
Voting on 
Patronage 
21. VOTES OF SHAREHOLDERS 
21.1Voting on a Poll 
Upon a poll, every supplying shareholder entitled to vote in person or by proxy shall be entitled to: 
One vote for every 10,000 kilograms of milksolids or part thereof  in the dairy produce supplied by him to 
the Company during the financial year immediately preceding the taking of such a poll with a maximum 
of ten votes for any shareholder ([case B] constitution)
Can not have a dominant or 
corner stone shareholder 
influencing the board 
High vote 
thresholds 
2.5 Alterations to certain rules requires a special majority 
A special resolution altering or adding to this rule [Primary objects] … will not have effect unless the 
resolution is passed by an affirmative vote of the members representing at least  90% of all the ordinary 
shares … held by members present at a meeting of members ([case F] constitution) 
Changes to the principal 
activities requires substantial 
majorities. Limits strategies 
Powers of the 
board 
Powers of the Board 
57. (1) The business and operations of the Co-operative shall be managed and controlled by the Board. For 
that purpose the Board … shall have and may exercise the powers of the Co-operative as if such powers 
had been expressly conferred on the Board at a general meeting of the Co-operative (Rules of [case D]) 
Sets out the powers of the co-
operative board 
Qualifications of 
directors 
22.2 Qualifications of Directors  
(a) No person shall be qualified to act as a director (other than as Managing Director or as an Appointed 
Director) unless he or she is a supplying shareholder of the company or is a member of a company or 
partnership which is a supplying shareholder of the Company –  
(i) holding not less than 20,000 shares in the capital of the Company; and  
(ii) having supplied to the company in the immediately preceding financial year not less than 20,000kg of 
milk solids” ([case B] constitution) 
Limits who may carry out Board 
Roles 
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Constitutional 
Principles 
Example evidence from co-operative constitutions Effect on Board Roles 
Makeup of the 
board 
12.1 Number of Directors: There shall be: 
(a) not more than 9 Directors elected by Shareholders in accordance with clause 12.2 [to be shareholders] 
… 
(b) not more than 4 Directors appointed by the Board …[appointed directors] ([case C] constitution) 
Specifies the size and ‘type’ of 
board to carry out Board Roles 
Chair 3.2  Chairman 
In accordance with the Company’s Constitution and the Companies Act 1993, the Directors elect the 
Chairman of the Board from among the shareholder-elected Directors ([case C] board charter) 
Sets out the chair must be a 
supplier-shareholder elected 
director 
Director removal 20.12 Removal of Director: At a meeting of Shareholders the Shareholders may be an ordinary resolution 
passed by a majority of not less than 60% of those present and voting remove any Director before the 
expiration of that Director’s term of office … ([case A] constitution) 
Allows supplier-shareholders to 
remove directors 
Principal 
Activities 
1. PRINCIPAL ACTIVITY 
1.1 The principal activities of the Company are: 
(a) The manufacture of butter, cheese, dried milk, or casein, or any other product derived from milk or 
milksolids supplied to the company by its shareholders; and 
(b) The sale to any person of the milk or milksolids so supplied; and 
(c) The collection, treatment, and distribution for human consumption of milk or cream so supplied ([case 
B] constitution) 
Limits the strategies the board 
may follow 
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The supplier-shareholders’ ability to Vote for changes to the constitution and 
for members of the governing board is therefore demonstrated as a subconcept 
of the theoretical construct of Supplier-Shareholder-Controls, which is useful 
in understanding the actual Board Roles of directors of New Zealand and 
Australian co-operative dairy companies. 
7.4.2 Voice 
The second subconcept of Supplier-Shareholder-Controls emerging from the 
data is the supplier-shareholders’ ability to exercise “Voice” and is defined 
here as:  
the ability of supplier-shareholders to influence co-operative decision 
making by voicing their issues with co-operative decision makers. 
 
Voice is the ability of supplier-shareholders to influence key decision makers 
in the co-operative. Voice is characterised as a mechanism of Supplier-
Shareholder-Controls, and is highlighted by 100% of respondents and in all 
cases (sees Appendix G-2 for further evidence). As key decision makers, board 
directors may have a role in facilitating, listening to, understanding, 
prioritising and addressing issues Voiced by supplier-shareholders. Supplier-
shareholder use Voice as a mechanism to communicate their interests, as this 
managing director states: 
There’s the representative issue in representing the best interests of the 
farmer and being able to communicate the requirements, the needs, the 
questions, the issues that are raised in the field, if you like, by farmers 
(F4, managing director) 
 
The same managing director goes on to suggest an important Board Role is to 
listen, understand, and prioritise supplier-shareholders’ issues: 
That is very much a communication role and being able to decipher the 
issues and prioritise the issues and so on, that's very important for a 
co-operative (F4, managing director) 
 
Supplier-shareholder Voice may be used to convey dissatisfaction as well: 
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So being value added I think complicates our relationship with the 
members. They ask us are we doing a good enough job for them (D2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The use of supplier-shareholder Voice may diminish with superior 
performance, as this chair explains: 
It’s a chicken and egg situation, in that good performance, exceptional 
performance produces behaviours in shareholders and directors ... 
maybe less critical than would otherwise be the case (A1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
The use of supplier-shareholder Voice can place co-operative directors under 
intense pressure:  
With directors, and we have had them, confronted by a meeting in their 
town or their area or their district. They get a lot of questions, a lot of 
pressure from the average dairy farmer (D4, managing director) 
 
Larger co-operatives find it more difficult for supplier-shareholders to exercise 
Voice: 
It’s not like that anymore. ‘I can't even find a director within 200 miles 
of me I can go and complain to, I could ring him up but it is never as 
much fun ringing someone up and bawling him out over the phone as it 
is getting him in the sale yards is it, on the rails and telling him what’s 
wrong with the place [the co-operative]’ (C3, appointed director) 
 
Listening to supplier-shareholders’ Voice may be a time-consuming role of the 
co-operative board: 
We spend a lot of time, I guess listening to them and communicating 
with them where we are going (E2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Exogenous-Issues such as deregulation may diminish the effectiveness of 
supplier-shareholder Voice: 
Our farmers historically have been very collective in their voice and 
their dairy industry groups, and had local meetings every month and 
they’re very well attended and their voice had outcomes because 
regulation is a political process (D2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The directors place a great deal of emphasis on facilitating the use of supplier-
shareholder Voice, through personal relationships, informal meetings, 
telephone calls, shed meetings,31 local district communication meetings,32 and 
                                                 
31 Groups of  local supplier-shareholders meeting in one supplier-shareholder’s milking shed 
with one or more directors and co-operative management to discuss co-operative matters. 
150 
 
the more formal special or annual general meetings. As such, co-operative 
directors appear to have a role to create avenues for supplier-shareholders to 
exercise Voice. For supplier-shareholders to exercise Voice, directors should 
be available: 
Okay, number one, we are always available. Okay, our phone numbers 
are published. We live here we are not sort of clandestine type people 
who are hidden away somewhere (E2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Directors have a lot of contact with shareholders (A2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
Supplier-shareholder Voice is also facilitated through the Voting process. The 
majority of directors on co-operative boards are supplying-shareholders 
themselves and have an intimate knowledge of the relationship between their 
own farming business and the co-operative company. They generally live in 
the communities of supplying-shareholders and as such interact with them on a 
frequent basis, thus facilitating the exercise of Voice: 
There is an interaction between the shareholders and the directors 
which is quite personal in a way, because you can physically know 
everyone of the shareholders in your own area who … in my case I’m 
elected by the area and I really do know the seventy farmers who would 
have elected me.  So you have a personal relationship with them almost 
(B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
All co-operative cases place great emphasis on facilitating supplier-shareholder 
Voice:  
We run sort of information sessions ... there will always be at least half 
the directors there, maybe more, so we are available to talk and chat 
over whatever the issues. We have formal regional meetings where 
directors speak and are available to be questioned and obviously we 
have annual meetings (E2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The more formal meetings, say the AGM … they’re not forums I think 
that suppliers feel particularly comfortable in. So we know that when 
we go out around these district meetings that we’re going to get some 
good feedback and we certainly do (B4, CEO) 
 
This communication appears easier to achieve in smaller co-operative cases; 
nonetheless, larger co-operatives go to great lengths and expense to keep 
                                                                                                                                
32 Meetings of geographically related groups of supplier-shareholders, perhaps in a local rural 
hall. 
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channels of communication open between supplier-shareholders and the 
decision makers in the co-operative company so that Voice can be expressed.  
Directors play a large role in this, as this CEO of a large co-operative explains: 
The board will get out in front of shareholders formally about twice a 
year ... in a series of small farmer meetings where a director will go 
into a certain geography, paired with a member of management and 
will be going out and talking to farmers and dialoguing with farmers 
about specific issues. That’s done as a blitz of the country  ... all of our 
farmer directors will be very actively involved in that and it will be a 
week of meetings, three meetings a day, right through the week so that 
we can cover the whole country.  The second one is obviously through 
the annual meeting where the board is responsible for shareholders 
and that's an annual one … Beyond that there is a lot of informal 
things, if there is a ward dinner that’s going on, generally a director 
will be involved, there is numerous, numerous, numerous times that all 
of our farmer directors are involved in specific shareholder related 
things from small to large shareholder meetings, speaking at 
shareholder events, all of that. I call that the broadly informal part 
(C4, CEO) 
 
The exercise of supplier-shareholder Voice, however, is not without some 
frustrations: 
The thing that pisses me off the most in this job is dealing with ill-
informed farmers (a supplier-shareholder director) 
 
It’s a bit disappointing sometimes when shareholders hear something 
and they don’t ring you up to clarify it. They hear down the pub, 
instead of ringing you up and saying hey is this right or wrong, they tell 
somebody else, those issues are a bit disappointing, but it’s pretty good 
really (E2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
There is a need to continue to keep alignment between the needs voiced by 
supplier-shareholders and the other stakeholders: 
The biggest challenge for co-operatives I think is … how they keep in 
touch and communicate with the shareholders … otherwise you can 
lose that alignment of what the shareholders want and what the board 
and the company are doing and what the customer wants and we pride 
ourselves on keeping that alignment pretty close (E4, managing 
director) 
 
The evidence suggests that the co-operative board has a role in addressing, in a 
real sense, the issues raised in Voice: 
That farmers’ interests, concerns and issues are properly represented 
and a balanced decision is made about concerns and issues that are 
152 
 
raised by farmers  … the farmers [have] got to really feel and know the 
issues are being dealt with fairly and that there is something in it for 
him, it is worth hanging on for (F4, managing director) 
 
You’ve got to be able to build a rapport with the farmers, understand 
the issues they have and be able to communicate with the farmer. And I 
have found that as a key in my experience has probably been that those 
CEOs that haven’t been able to do that have probably struggled, 
compared to those that can (F4, managing director) 
 
The exercise of supplier-shareholder Voice is seen as a subconcept of Supplier-
Shareholder-Controls and is useful in understanding Board Roles.  
7.4.3 Exit 
The final Supplier-Shareholder-Control subconcept highlighted from the data 
and included in this conceptual model is Exit and is defined as: 
supplier-shareholders withdrawal of patronage (and capital) from the 
co-operative. 
 
Supplier-shareholder Exit is important for the understanding of actual Board 
Roles. Exit may come at the expense of Collective-Action (section 7.3.4). The 
withdrawal of patronage may have severe effects on the co-operative as it not 
only withdraws raw material (milk) from the co-operative’s operation, it may 
also withdraw capital33 which may affect the co-operative’s viability. This may 
require a board role to try to retain the loyalty of supplying shareholders. 
 
Exit of a supplier-shareholder from the co-operative is achieved in a variety of 
ways. A supplier-shareholder may sell their dairying operation to a new buyer 
with all the rights and obligations attached to the farming business carrying on 
under the new owner. This form of Exit has minimal affect on the co-operative 
and those supplier-shareholders remaining in the co-operative and as such has 
minimum effect on Board Roles. If the supplier-shareholder leaves due to 
dissatisfaction with the co-operative, this may have implications for the exiting 
supplier-shareholder in terms of employment, housing, and social factors (such 
                                                 
33 Most co-operatives have the supply of milk linked to capital contributions. Withdrawal of 
milk often leads to the resumption of that (ex-)supplier-shareholder’s capital. The so-called 
“redemption  risk”. 
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as friends, family, children’s education etc.). The board may have a role in 
understanding that supplier-shareholder’s dissatisfaction.  
 
Exit can also be achieved by supplier-shareholder(s) leaving the co-operative 
and supplying their milk to another milk processor, either another co-operative 
or an investor-owned firm (IOF). The supplier-shareholders ability to exercise 
this form of Exit is dependent on alternative processors of milk within 
transportable distance of the supplier-shareholder and varies between cases. 
Some co-operatives, or geographic areas within a co-operative, are effectively 
monopsony buyers of milk. Exit to another dairy processing company is 
therefore very geographically dependent due to spatial monopsonies, as this 
director succinctly points out:  
Well I think it’s important not so much to keep them [supplier-
shareholders] on board because it’s difficult for them to jump off the 
ship [laughter] (B2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Different institutional arrangements may also have an effect on supplier-
shareholders’ ability to Exit the co-operative. Supplier-shareholder Exit 
appears easier to achieve for the majority of supplier-shareholders in 
Australian cases than New Zealand ones: 
Probably exacerbated more here in Australia than in New Zealand 
because here a dairy farmer can leave any day he likes, it is not the 
30th June or 31st May or whatever it might be. It can be anytime and 
they can leave today, join a company tomorrow and if they don't like it 
in a week’s time they can move again. There is a total freedom of 
movement (F3, appointed director) 
 
A supplier-shareholder may also Exit from the co-operative, by reducing or 
ceasing the supply of milk to the co-operative, for instance, by a change in land 
(or water) use to another form of farming operation. The latter two co-
operative Exit options (Exit to another milk processor or from dairying) has a 
more pronounced effect on the co-operative and its remaining supplying-
shareholders. The Exit of supplier-shareholders will starve the co-operative of 
both milk (raw materials) and capital (varying depending on the constitution). 
A critical mass of supplier-shareholders utilising the Exit option will have dire 
consequences for a dairy co-operative, putting the remaining supplier-
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shareholders’ benefits and the co-operative businesses at risk. This suggests a 
Board Role in identifying and addressing issues that may cause supplier-
shareholders to Exit the co-operative. 
 
The most likely cause of Exit is uncompetitive performance; that is, not 
meeting supplier-shareholders economic needs: 
It’s maintaining milk price because you know damn well that if you 
can't pay the same amount of money for your milk as your neighbour 
[competing dairy company], you are going to lose the farmers (F3, 
appointed director) 
 
the implications of this on the co-operative are: 
So if you are not competitive you are going to lose milk supply, the 
moment you lose milk supply you start to lose your fundamental base of 
operation. And therefore you will see companies stretch their finances 
and weaken their accounts to maintain their competitiveness (F3, 
appointed director) 
 
The final outcome could be the demise of the co-operative:  
If you have a look at the history of what happened to [another co-
operative] it is probably the best example that you can see. They kept 
paying milk prices that were way beyond their profitability because 
they had to, to maintain [milk supply] ... without [another co-operative 
buyer] they basically would have I think been folded up (F3, appointed 
director) 
 
Supplier-shareholder Exit may also be caused by Exogenous-Issues such as 
severe drought:  
There were a few of them that wanted to sell the place and privatise it 
(E1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Or different Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits requirements: 
Large farmer with a large number of shares and no next of kin to take 
over the farm - he has got a certain attitude which is more exit focussed 
(D1, appointed chair) 
 
The ability for supplier-shareholders to Exit the co-operative may suggest the 
board has a role in understanding and responding to the causes of Exit. It may 
also require a role for the board in encouraging member loyalty. 
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Due to the commitment, in terms of physical, intellectual and emotional capital 
of supplier-shareholders to the dairy industry and their co-operative (as 
outlined above under Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits, Risk-Reduction), 
Voice (and possibly Vote) may be used extensively before Exit is considered, 
as this example of a board’s role in response to a drought and some supplier-
shareholders wanting to Exit: 
[We went] out there on their patch and explained what we were doing, 
the problems we had and talked about their problems, we put field staff 
in basically to go out and service them, to fill in forms to help them 
with drought aid to facilitate many of the things, that under stress they 
weren’t handling well. And that in itself took the pressure off a little bit.  
Them wanting to tear the place down, there were a few of them that 
wanted to sell the place and privatise it you know one percent, one 
percent, two percent. But it was all because of a clear direction by this 
company and not leaving them out there (E1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
 
Evidence supporting the third Supplier-Shareholder-Controls subconcept of 
Exit is presented and found to be useful in the understanding of actual co-
operative Board Roles. 
7.4.4 Conclusions – Supplier-Shareholder-Controls 
Supplier-Shareholder-Controls are defined here as the mechanisms available to 
supplier-shareholders to ensure that the co-operative continues to operate in a 
manner that meets their needs. Three subconcepts of Supplier-Shareholder-
Controls are identified from the data; Vote, Voice and Exit. Supplier-
Shareholder-Controls are identified as an important theoretical concept in 
understanding the sources of influence on the roles of governing boards of co-
operative dairy companies. 
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7.5 Board Architecture 
 
Figure 7-5 Board Architecture 
 
The fourth theoretical co-operative governance concept induced from this 
research is Board Architecture and is defined here as: 
the people who carry out board roles, their skills, knowledge, abilities 
and engagement in their tasks, how they organise themselves, make 
decisions, and relate to each other and others. 
 
Board Architecture consists of three sub-concepts; Individual-Distinctions, 
Engagement-Forums, and Dynamics. Individual-Distinctions identify who the 
board members are and the competencies, skills and motivations they bring to 
their roles. The leadership role of the chair is highlighted. The subconcept of 
Engagement-Forums focuses on the forums the board use to carry out their 
roles. The final subconcept of Board Architecture that emerges from the data is 
Dynamics, which explores the relationship(s) between board members, 
between the board and management, and the processes the boards use in 
coming to significant decisions. Board Architecture is an important theoretical 
concept in the understanding of co-operative Board Roles as it explores the 
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‘who’ (Individual-Distinctions) and ‘how’ (Engagement-Forums and 
Dynamics) of co-operative governance before the ‘what’ of Board Roles.  
 
Issues surrounding the theoretical concept of Board Architecture are 
perceptible in every case studied. The concept is displayed in Figure 7-5.  
Table 7-5 Evidence of Board Architecture 
Concept Frequency of mention Examples from interviews 
Cases Respondents
No. % No. % 
Board Architecture 6 100 22 100  
Individual-Distinctions 6 100 22 100 See Table 7-6 
Engagement-Forums 6 100 22 100 See Table 7-8 
Dynamics 6 100 22 100 See Table 7-9 
 
Each of the subconcepts is explored and supporting evidence utilised in 
explanation for the remainder of this chapter. 
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7.5.1 Individual-Distinctions 
 
Figure 7-6 Individual-Distinctions 
 
The first Board Architecture subconcept is Individual-Distinctions and is 
defined here as: 
that composite of knowledge, skills, commitment, and leadership 
brought and applied to the role by individual members and how those 
people and their characteristics together bring balance and strength to 
the board of directors. 
 
This subconcept refers to the characteristics of those who undertake the Board 
Roles. Evidence of Individual-Distinctions of the board members is drawn 
from archival data, annual reports in particular, as well as interview data and, 
as such, is evident in 100% of the cases as displayed in Table 7-6. Three sub-
subconcepts of Individual-Distinctions emerge from the data; Composition, 
Competencies and Leadership. Each is discussed below with supporting 
evidence. 
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Table 7-6 Evidence of Individual-Distinctions 
Subconcept Frequency of mention Evidence  
Cases Respondents
No. % No. % 
Individual-
Distinctions 
6 100 22 100 Our farmer directors ... [have] a broad 
range of experience and from time to time 
have also been able to give significant 
assistance, guidance, help, introductions, 
knowledge to the company and assist the 
management (A2, s-s  director) 
Composition 6 100 22 100 Under the constitution the chair must be 
a farmer and we must have nine farmer-
elected directors and four non-farmer 
elected directors (C1, s-s  chair) 
Competencies 6 100 22 100 So the interest of the shareholders are 
totally aligned with the performance of 
the company  ...  its most important  ... 
that the farmers have representatives as 
directors on the board of directors to 
ensure that the company’s strategies and 
policies are very closely aligned with the 
interests of the farmers shareholders (A2, 
s-s director) 
Leadership 6 100 22 100 The culture of the board is very much in 
the hands of the chair and how he wants 
to run meetings, how he wants to 
interface the board and management, 
how decisions are reached and the 
culture of the board and the style it 
operates with is very much driven by the 
personality and the aspirations of the 
chair (A3, appointed director)   
 
7.5.1.1 Composition 
 
Composition is defined here as: 
 the makeup of the board; their number and their backgrounds. 
 
An understanding of Composition is important to this model as it identifies 
who is undertaking Board Roles. The distinctions in the number and 
composition of the case boards is displayed in Table 7-7 below. 
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Table 7-7 Board Compositions across Case Studies 
Case Number 
of 
directors 
Number of 
supplier-
shareholder 
directors 
Supplier-
shareholder 
majority 
% 
Number 
of 
appointed 
directors 
Chair 
 
Executive 
directors 
A 9 7 77 2 s-s 
director 
0 
B 10 8 
 
80 2 s-s 
director 
0 
C 12 9 75 3 s-s 
director 
0 
D 14 10 71 3 Appointed 1 
E 6 
(- 8) 
5 
+ 1** 
associate 
director 
83 
(or 75) 
0 
(1 advisor 
to the 
board 
(no voting 
rights)) 
s-s 
director 
(rotated) 
1 
F 12 10 83 1 s-s 
director 
1 
*These figures are taken from Annual Reports at the time of data collection. Some of the case 
boards are in the process of downsizing. 
** Case has an associate director. This director is a supplier-shareholder but not a full director. 
If elected the associate director is expected to become a full member of the board sometime in 
the future. 
 
Table 7-7 indicates the overall number of board members on the case study. 
Boards range from between six (to eight, depending on definition) members 
and fourteen (this company is downsizing its board at time of data collection).  
All board members are white and of European origin aged from their early 
forties into their seventies. Only two boards have women members with only 
one women director on each of those two boards. 
 
Table 7-7 distinguishes between three “types” of directors on the co-operative 
boards; supplier-shareholder directors, appointed directors, and executive 
directors. Supplier-shareholder directors are those who are suppliers and 
shareholders of the co-operative, and are nominated and elected from the 
supplier-shareholder base in a democratic way. Appointed directors are those 
who are both non-executive and non-suppliers of the co-operative and are 
generally brought on to the board for their specific skills to complement 
supplier-shareholder directors’ competencies. Respondents often refer to them 
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as Independents34. Executive directors are employed by the co-operative (and 
are non-supplier-shareholders) of the co-operative. All the executives with a 
seat on the board are managing directors (equivalent in many respects to a 
CEO). Three of the cases have an executive seat on the board. All but one of 
the cases has a supplier-shareholder director as a chair (Table 7-7). The 
majority of supplier-shareholder directors are also highlighted in Table 7-7.  In 
agency theoretical terms (see section 3.3.1) the Composition of these boards 
would be considered to be very independent of the executive. Each of these 
three types of co-operative director is considered in turn.   
Supplier-shareholder directors 
 
In line with the co-operative constitutions (section 7.4.1) supplier-shareholder 
directors are nominated and elected by the supplier-shareholders to ensure they 
are represented in co-operative decision making: 
Farmer shareholder directors are elected by the shareholders ... they 
have to be nominated and seconded by a shareholder to put their hat in 
the ring  ... they’re elected for a term of three years, they retire by 
rotation and either retire permanently or offer themselves for re-
election. The shareholders elect them on the basis of their 
shareholding, although in [case A]’s case we have a limit on the 
amount of votes that any individual shareholder can have, so that we 
actually have our voting entitlement capped at about 5% of 
shareholding (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
There is variation in how cases elect their directors. As an example, case B has 
five directors from geographic regions and three from co-operative-wide 
elections, bringing geographic representation: 
At present we’ve only got 330 shareholders and we have eight elected 
directors, and five of them are elected from regions … the company’s 
regionalised and three of them are elected by the whole company so we 
have five different regions with one director per region (B1, supplier-
shareholder chair)  
 
Consistent with co-operative theory (see Chapter 2) and the need for user-
control (Albaek & Schultz, 1997; Hansmann, 1996) all co-operative cases  
have a majority of supplier-shareholder-elected members on the board.  The 
                                                 
34 A term utilised along with “external” in IOFs for directors who are non-executive and 
independent of management. Supplier-shareholder directors also conform to this definition. 
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six cases range from just over 70% to 80% majority. This appears to be the 
will of the boards and supplier-shareholders:  
Well I have a personal view, rather strongly held, that we should 
always have a substantial majority of farmer elected directors who are 
farmers (A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
So the interest of the shareholder are totally aligned with the 
performance of the company and therefore it’s most important in my 
opinion that the farmers have representatives as directors on the board 
of directors to ensure that the company’s strategies and policies are 
very closely aligned with the interests of the farmers shareholders (A2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
Appointed directors 
 
In all cases35 the number of supplier-shareholder directors is supplemented by 
appointed directors. Appointed directors are selected and appointed by the 
board and in most cases ratified by the supplier-shareholders in annual general 
meetings. The appointed directors are usually appointed for their skills and 
abilities that supplement the supplier-shareholder directors’ skill-range: 
It’s really a question of looking at the skills of the existing farmer 
directors and ... determine whether there are any specific gaps or 
opportunities where someone with another set of skills outside ... the 
farmer directors would be beneficial to the company and trying to find 
that person (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The board looks at the skills of their board that they have, and being an 
all farmer directors, in general terms has been that we lack in areas of 
probably finance in this occasion and marketing in choosing the two 
that we have (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
Executive directors 
 
Three of the cases have executive directors. In each case this is the managing 
director, who appears to undertake the same roles as the CEO in other cases. 
That is, they appear to carry out an executive role: 
I probably would struggle to differentiate it at the moment [between a 
CEO and an MD] but I very much see my role as, if you like dual, it is 
not only to manage the business but also to be a hopefully an effective 
member of the board and not only in terms of the decision making 
ultimately and so on but as it relates to farmer relations as well, even 
though I am not necessarily directly farmer elected (F4, MD) 
                                                 
35 In one case a non-voting board ‘advisor’ is utilised. This advisor attends all board meetings. 
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Executive directors are in a (small) minority. There is no CEO duality. 
7.5.1.2 Competencies 
 
The second sub-subconcept of Individual-Distinctions is Competencies. 
Evidence of Competencies is also drawn from archival data, in particular 
annual reports, as well as interview data (see Appendix H-1 for further 
evidence). All but four respondents had various levels of tertiary qualifications 
(including five to PhD level). While academic records and work histories give 
some guidance to Competencies in performing Board Roles, this is a far more 
subjective (and likely transient) sub-subconcept that is more difficult to 
pinpoint, except in very broad terms. As such, the sub-subconcept of 
Competencies is raised as an important concept in co-operative governance 
and some issues that are seen as important in co-operative governance are 
raised. Directors bring, and are expected to contribute, a range of 
Competencies to their role. Competencies are defined here as: 
the balance of skill and knowledge each member brings and applies to 
the board roles. 
 
Two types of co-operative directors identified in Table 7-7 are considered in 
turn, followed by some evidence of their engagement in Board Roles. 
Supplier-shareholder directors 
 
The supplier-shareholder directors in the co-operative cases have a range of 
formal educational attainment, many with tertiary qualifications (including up 
to PhD level). By implication, all are (relatively) successful businessmen in 
dairying with substantial personal wealth in their dairy farming businesses: 
[Supplier-shareholder directors] Many of them run very big 
businesses, not one or two farms.  So they are good businessmen 
already, they’re hard working, they’re intelligent, they have virtually 
all got degrees, whether it be a Bachelor of Commerce or Degree in 
Marketing or whatever, they’ve got common sense, they’ve survived in 
business (C3, appointed director) 
 
A person capable of running the farming business is quite capable of 
being a director of a co-operative dairy company (A1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
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According to some respondents, sometimes what they bring to their role does 
not always meet all the needs of a major enterprise: 
You can't expect typically that you are going to have the skill on a 
board like ours to be setting policy in that area ... which is sometimes 
in areas that are a bit foreign to them, particularly when you haven’t 
had the experience (F4, MD) 
 
Of course we’ve got business skills as dairy farmers but I’m talking 
about governance, company governance skills. Frankly, they’re no 
different between a co-operative if they’re doing their job and any 
company in the end, and when they’re doing that role they’ve got to be 
thinking about the company (B3, appointed director) 
 
Although they generally have a rounded background: 
We’re also fortunate in our company that all our directors have a 
variety of experiences whether they be in the academic or university 
area, commercial area, other farming or agri-business related entities 
or just for a variety of reasons, or their general interest in life a whole 
range of people that they know in a variety of areas (A2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
The “sameness of background” of supplier-shareholder directors is perceived 
to be a limiting factor by some respondents: 
[Supplier-shareholder directors] have a sameness of background 
which is a disadvantage. Too much of a sameness of background, 
sameness of sex, sameness of age, everything with just one or two 
exceptions (D1, appointed chair) 
 
The issue I think for them [farmer directors] is that, and for the board 
of [case C], is that they are essentially machine pressed out of the same 
mould so ... there is going to be a tendency naturally to come at a 
problem from much the same direction (C3, appointed director)  
 
Some of the supplier-shareholder directors have multiple directorships, usually 
in related industries, hinting of bringing knowledge resources, as outlined in 
resource dependency theory (section 3.3.5).  
 
Given the importance of supplier-shareholder directors to the governance of 
the co-operative, and supplier-shareholders lack of experience of governing 
companies, all co-operatives had in place training for prospective and new 
directors: 
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I have some responsibilities in my latter years now to make sure that 
we do spend some time and we’ve just put together a group of … 
farmers to come in and do what we call potential directors course ...  
they come to days when we put them through governance programmes 
and what have you (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
We take succession very, very seriously, because the issues that we’ve 
got I think are fundamental for [case C]. How do you get farmer-
elected directors to get a global perspective? And you just can't come 
out of the cowshed and end up on the [case C] board. The roles are just 
poles apart (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
Appointed directors 
 
Appointed directors are generally appointed for their skills, knowledge and 
competencies that complement those of the supplier-shareholder directors: 
None of us can be experts in all these areas and so when we come to 
say some issues like marketing, strategy or perhaps treasury policy, an 
external director can be extremely valuable in that area (B4, CEO) 
 
The principal reason why you have independent directors on these 
boards is because these people have got experience in the functional 
areas of business that the farmer directors probably haven’t got.  ... 
every one of the four independent directors on [case C] has first hand 
management line experiences as CEO or CFO or both in a major 
public company or companies (C3, appointed director) 
 
and their ability to fit in to board culture: 
Identifying individuals that might be suitable based on skill sets, based 
on their personality and the way in which they would empathise with 
their fellow directors and the company .. .and then perhaps subjectively 
assessing whether or not the they would be a good fit as far as the 
makeup of the board, the personality of the board, the personality of 
the company was concerned (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
It’s important to have a blend of personalities around your board as 
well, so real care needs to be taken in getting that mix of personalities, 
not only in terms of who you want to have there, you know, going 
forward for your elected producer representatives, but also, you know, 
your independents as well (B3, appointed director) 
Engagement 
 
Important to the understanding of Competencies is the level of engagement of 
board members in their roles. For the boards’ Competencies to have an effect 
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on the co-operative they must be utilised. For this, directors are required to 
engage in their tasks: 
I know we get a bit passionate about that at this little place (E1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
They [supplier-shareholder directors] have a capability and a 
knowledge and an empathy with the co-operative which is very, very 
difficult for someone who comes from an investor owned firm to have, 
it’s a philosophical position to be taken with respect to the co-operative 
that is unique and if that is not present in the directors, it will be very, 
very difficult for a co-operative to continue in a truly co-operative 
fashion (A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Where the uniqueness of a co-operative governance structure is 
different to a corporate governance structure - shows that a director 
wants to get involved in more detail of the performance, this is why we 
provide that kind of venue [conference calls].  (C4, CEO) 
 
All supplier-shareholding directors have, as supplier-shareholders, a great deal 
of their personal wealth at stake in the performance of the co-operative. This 
clearly aligns the supplier-shareholder directors’ interests with those of the 
supplier-shareholders. It also appears to motivate the engagement of the 
supplier-shareholder directors in their duties: 
The thing that sets the co-operative apart from the normal corporate is 
the fact that the shareholder and the director - their primary source of 
income comes from investment in that co-operative …  for the farmer 
it’s everything and that puts a lot more pressure on the board and the 
directors and everyone. And that’s where that passion I talked of comes 
from … that’s what makes co-ops different, that’s where the passion 
comes from the fact that it’s the primary source of income, if something 
goes wrong they’ve lost their source of income (F4, MD) 
 
Each one of the directors that sits is an elected member has a large 
stake of their investment and generally speaking in most cases it’s 
nearly 100% … of what they’ve invested ... is very much tied up in 
[case B performance]. So I think the driver for a director of a co-op is 
very integrated with their own business and they understand, they have 
a terrific understanding of what their fellow shareholders are going 
through.  So you are very close (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Moreover, by living in the communities they represent, a heightened level of 
engagement amongst the supplier-shareholder directors appears to occur. The 
enthusiasm and commitment to the co-operative organisations was palpable 
across all cases during the data collection:   
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The board is a representative of the owners, it’s not just a board of 
directors, they represent the owners and that’s quite an important 
difference from a CEO’s perspective is we’re just not talking about a 
group of people that come around to chat every month, they do actually 
represent the people who own the [business] … So they really are 
hands on because they are talking about their money and their 
neighbours’ money and their wellbeing what’s more (D4, MD) 
 
The commitment of a [farmer] co-operative director is directed very 
much towards member benefits, or should be, and to me the 
commitment is probably the most important part of the directors’ 
responsibilities (F1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
This level of commitment engenders a great deal of empathy and trust with the 
co-operative and its members: 
[The case B board is] a very good board and we have people who are 
so genuine and where they might lack a little bit in skills they make up 
for in just sincerity and dedication in trying to do the job right (B1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
In a co-operative generally I think its fundamental, I think as farmers, 
as farmer directors you have a terrific empathy with your fellow 
shareholders who are farmers, supplying shareholders or farmer 
shareholders in a co-operative organisation have a very active interest 
in the business, in the co-operative (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The work load of supplier-shareholder directors is seen as relatively high by 
these appointed directors: 
The workload in a co-operative as a director is often higher than it is in 
a corporate because of the amount of time spent on the supplier side of 
it … but other farmer directors spend a disproportionately higher 
amount time on the governance functions of a co-operative than does a 
corporate director (A3, appointed director) 
 
I have real admiration for the way the farmer directors at [case C] 
work, they put in huge hours those guys. They’ve probably put in about 
as much I suspect as I do on the commercial side of the business itself, 
somewhere around a day, a day and a half a week, but then they double 
that up in dealing with the co-operative side, managing the shareholder 
relationships and all the other stuff that goes on (C3, appointed 
director) 
 
A risk identified by some respondents was the lack of engagement and 
understanding of the co-operative nature of the organisation of appointed (non-
supplier-shareholder) directors:  
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The difficulty is that the focus of external directors, if they are not 
being brought up through a co-operative culture …  if you get the right 
person they add a great deal of value, the difficulty is to get right 
person that can fit into the culture of the organisation and not because 
of their experience, dominate over the farmer members (F1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
Commercial directors -  some of them may not understand the co-
operative nature of the business in terms of the co-operative philosophy 
and farmer ownership and retention is all very important to that 
principle … shareholders might run a risk ... the company could hive 
off into a direction that was undesirable (B2, supplier-shareholder 
director) 
 
Appointed directors appear to have a special role, and influence amongst the 
board: 
Because of their [appointed directors] areas of expertise they have an 
influence on the board’s thinking because they are perceived to be 
stronger in that area (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Through having independents on the board … we believe that we can 
stimulate and challenge management more (D1, appointed chair) 
 
The appointed independent directors, that's their primary role to be 
able to challenge the management on whether they really are 
delivering to potential, to assess their performance  and to mentor 
management in areas in which they have expertise (C3, appointed 
director) 
7.5.1.3 Leadership 
 
The third sub-subconcept of Individual-Distinctions is Leadership and is 
defined here as: 
 the presence and influence of a leader of the board. 
 
Consistent with co-operative user-control principle, five of the six cases under 
investigation have a supplier-shareholder leading the board; 
Having the chairman as a farmer is probably a good thing as well.  
Just because of the importance of managing the supplier relationship 
(C3, appointed director) 
 
One case had a policy of a revolving chair: 
This company has run a system with the chairman where they’ve just 
revolved it every two years for quite a long time.  I think it has ended, 
but I am not sure [laughter] (E2, supplier-shareholder director) 
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Of particular note is the special leadership role of the chair playing a 
significantly larger role than other directors:  
[The chair has a] significantly larger role … at least double in my view 
normally, maybe three times, somewhere between two and three times 
(C3, appointed director) 
 
The chair appears to lead in terms of being a figure head of the co-operative: 
I guess [as chair] you’re the head of the organisation. So the time 
commitment would be more, opening doors would be more, like [at 
meetings in] Geneva, Brussels, DFA, Australia, those sorts of things 
(C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
We have a concept that [the chair] speaks on behalf of the board, no 
other members go out and say on [case F‘s] behalf (F2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
As far as those issues of stakeholder groups and the public face, [the 
chair] is very, very out front there (D2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The chair has a major influence over the boards’ culture: 
As a general rule I would say board culture is determined by chairman, 
the chairman sets the tone generally and should do (C3, appointed 
director) 
 
The culture of the board is very much in the hands of the chair and how 
he wants to run meetings, how he wants to interface the board and 
management, how decisions are reached and the culture of the board 
and the style it operates with is very much driven by the personality 
and the aspirations of the chair (A3, appointed director) 
 
The chairman plays a huge role in that [determining board culture] 
and rightly or wrongly that's the way it is (C2, supplier-shareholder 
director) 
 
and is a leader: 
They’re my chickens in a way, the rest of the board. I am responsible 
for making sure that they say the right things, that they do the right 
things, they are educated … I think for the good of the company it is my 
job to look after the board (F1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
You do need good strong characters like that [chair of another case] to 
keep a ship on its, or a company, on its path (E1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
 
The chair has a task in leading the evaluation and training of fellow directors: 
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Each year … with each director, [I] spend some time talking about 
what they think, maybe, are ways that they could better contribute to 
the company or whether they need education or whether they need … 
what resources they might need to help them do that (B1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
 If we feel a director would benefit from doing extra training, I guess 
when I say we, it is probably the chairman, but we’ll say, well look do 
you want to do that course (F1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
and disciplining fellow board members: 
I have taken a very dim view … if that looks like it’s happening it would 
be the one key area that I would have no issues about talking to a 
director about, and I have done [that] on a number of occasions (B1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
It is sometimes a little bit hard for new directors to come to grips with 
that one … so … we pummel them a little bit, try and mould them into 
the right shape and generally we have succeeded (F1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
and ensuring that the board is kept adequately informed: 
The chairman of the company probably has an important role in 
ensuring that that reporting is adequate for the needs of the directors 
(A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
I have a responsibility as chairman to make sure that our directors are 
kept informed (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The chair also has a closer relationship with the CEO or MD than other board 
members: 
[The chair is] charged with forming a constructive relationship with 
the chief executive, you will lead the board initiatives as far as matters 
of performance review, monitoring the performance in relation as far 
as the chief executive is concerned (A2, supplier-shareholder director)  
 
Interfacing with the chief executive is fundamental (C1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
In conclusion, the Leadership role, usually held by the chair, is realised in 
several ways: in setting the board culture; being the figurehead; evaluating, 
training and disciplining board members; keeping the board informed; and 
having a closer relationship with CEO. 
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7.5.1.4 Conclusions – Individual-Distinctions 
 
Individual-Distinctions is a theoretical subconcept of Board Architecture and is 
defined as that composite of knowledge, skills, commitment, and leadership 
brought and applied to the role by individual members and how those people 
and their characteristics together bring balance and strength to the board of 
directors. Three sub-subconcepts of Composition, Competencies and 
Leadership emerge from the data and are suggested as important for 
understanding co-operative Board Roles. 
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7.5.2 Engagement-Forums 
 
Figure 7-7 Engagement-Forums 
       
    
The second Board Architecture subconcept is Engagement-Forums and is 
defined here as: 
building, using and capitalising on formal and informal structures. 
 
Issues surrounding the theoretical subconcept of Engagement-Forums is raised 
in all of the cases and by all of the respondents (see Appendix H-2 for further 
evidence, and Table 7-8).  
Table 7-8 Evidence of Engagement-Forums 
Subconcept Frequency of mention Evidence  
Cases Respondents
No. % No. % 
Engagement- 
Forums 
6 100 22 100 There’ll be special meetings, there’ll be 
telephone conference calls involving the 
directors, there’ll be opportunities for the 
directors to get together for various 
functions, visitors and the like when they 
come together. The directors will also 
depend to some degree on the chairman 
of the company. I have a very regular 
dialogue with the chairman … [who] is in 
a position to also talk with the directors 
about how the company is going and 
about how the CEO is going … it’s 
through that combination of means really 
that we do what we can to keep the 
directors fully up to the play with what’s 
happening (A4, CEO) 
 
Engagement-Forums are an important subconcept in understanding Board 
Roles as they identify where boards operate their roles, which has implications 
for how boards undertake their roles. The dairy co-operative governing Board 
Roles, and particularly the board’s decisions, are undertaken in a range of 
forums.  The governing board sometimes operates as a single cohesive group 
173 
 
(particularly during formal board meetings), and sometimes more 
independently within smaller sub groups (such as an audit committee) and 
sometimes as individuals (particularly the chair). Consistent with McNulty and 
Pettigrew (1999), this research finds boards (and individuals within the board) 
have a number of venues for undertaking their Board Roles. Engagement-
Forums emerging from the evidence include; the monthly board meeting, 
strategy away days, committee meetings, informal meetings, conference calls, 
AGMs, and communication meetings. While cases vary as to the utilisation of 
various forums some of these Engagement-Forums and supporting evidence 
are outlined below: 
Board meetings 
 
The most important of the Engagement-Forums for carrying out Board Roles is 
at the regular (often monthly) board meetings: 
Most governance is at its board meetings and it monitors ... the 
performance of management on a monthly basis and from that 
monitoring role ... [which includes] analysing and assessing and 
evaluating management performance. Some strategic direction would 
occur (D2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Meeting the business plan and the budget, which are reviewed 
obviously on an ongoing basis at our monthly meeting as well (E4, 
MD) 
 
At the regular board meetings the board reviews board papers, largely prepared 
by management, covering a vast range of topics around the operations of the 
co-operative: 
Every board meeting obviously the total business is presented to it [the 
board], in terms of all of the senior managers report to the board 
personally, so that the company is aware of the performances of each 
one of the operating divisions, it might be export or domestic retail, 
domestic industrial, R and D, nutritionals, each one of the trading 
store. Each one of these report to the board on a monthly basis so that 
we are aware of what’s happening there ... obviously any major capital 
expenditure within the organisation is also a board, requires a board 
decision (F3, appointed director) 
 
We [management] do apply ourselves I mean hugely … to the 
preparation of papers for our board … we try to prepare them to a high 
standard … so that it achieves maximum possible understanding of 
what it is that we’re doing, of reassuring our board that we’re doing 
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what we’re supposed to be doing, at the same time making sure that we 
bring to the board’s attention any matters that are not going so well, 
any matters that might have a material impact on the company … I 
would always err on the side of telling the board more rather than less  
(A4, CEO) 
Strategy away days  
 
Most co-operatives hold away day(s) strategic planning sessions from time to 
time: 
Annually we do a strategic planning exercise, we get away from the 
company for a couple of days (E2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
To step out of the boardroom and away from the factory and sort of just 
deliberate on some of those things. We take currently a couple of 
opportunities a year, one or two day session ... so we have the resetting 
of the strategy, the looking long term, any new things, whatever we 
need to address as well as reviewing as how we are going against the 
performance to achieve the strategic targets (E4, managing director) 
 
These sessions while discussing strategic issues appear to be appreciated 
(Board-Management-Relationships, section 7.6.3.2) for providing opportune-
ities for stimulating conversation and getting comfort around strategies: 
We had one of these love-ins [strategy sessions] as some people call 
them (F1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
I found that [strategy sessions] quite invigorating and a good way of 
taking the management team with the directors and vice versa with the 
directors understanding some of the new ideas that management come 
up with (E1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
Committees 
 
All co-operatives utilised committees to varying extents for some aspects of 
their roles; in particular, Control through the Audit committee. Committees 
included: standing committees, such as the audit and remuneration committees; 
and Ad hoc limited-life committees around major decisions such as the 
appointment of a new CEO, or a major acquisition. Committees allow smaller 
groups of directors (sometimes working in conjunction with management) to 
be involved at a deeper level of the decision-making process of some issues: 
Normally what would happen, there would be three or four directors 
that work with two or three management, set out some framework of 
options for the board, to be in a workshop. I would guess that three or 
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four times a year we would workshop strategy issues (C2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
[The board] does it through the remuneration committee - how they 
[management] are incentivised, how they’re trained, how their 
succession planning works and all that sort of thing (A3, appointed 
director) 
 
Ad hoc committees are often utilised in doing the preparation for the hiring of 
a new CEO or MD: 
When we were preparing to change and appoint a new CEO the board 
appointed a small committee ... [and] those people  ended up making a 
recommendation to the board (D1, appointed director) 
 
or for major decisions: 
It is the big fundamentals, like if it’s a two billion dollar acquisition, if 
it is fundamentally changing the capital structure of the co-operative, if 
it is changing the control mechanism of the co-operative like the 
governance or if there is fundamental change at the interface with the 
shareholders, there are subcommittees set up to deal with those things 
(C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The board may be involved in formal committees to gain comfort and 
confidence in strategic proposals: 
If there are big initiatives which are likely to have an impact on [case 
C], that's [case C] the business, [case C] the co-operative, we usually 
set up a subcommittee of the board that does a much deeper dive into 
any proposal that comes in (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
[The committee] it’s a no surprises thing for the board when you’re 
doing major projects … it just means that there is some comfort in the 
board that anything that comes out of left field, the board directors will 
be made aware of it through the committee (B1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
 
Committees do not make decisions; they make recommendations to the full 
board: 
That subcommittee, it cannot make decisions, but it recommends to the 
board and that gives the board the confidence that a lot of the details 
are actually thrashed out (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
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Conference calls 
 
The boards sometimes meet by other means such as conference calls, as this 
CEO explains for his board: 
The board gets a monthly financial report on the results of the 
business. What we do is we have a conference call with any interested 
director who has queries on monthly performance.  Rather than doing 
it in the board meeting we do it as a separate meeting  (C4, CEO) 
Informal  
 
In line with the findings of Stiles and Taylor (2001) and McNulty and 
Pettigrew’s (1999), boards’ involvement in decisions occurs informally outside 
board meetings as well. The chair and small groups of directors may have an 
earlier “informal” involvement in, for example, shaping strategic initiatives: 
They go through a gestation period and your strategies will be sort of 
mulled over, probably first with the chairman (F1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
It might even be in other venues … it might be for instance travelling 
with one of the directors, just talking about the issues associated with 
the business, but the majority is through more formalised lines (B4, 
CEO) 
 
If I was to say make a suggestion that would be something that would 
be out of the ordinary I would very likely do a fair amount of legwork 
on a one on one basis with the chairman and possibly two or three 
other directors to just get the general sense before I was to take 
something formally to the board (C4, CEO) 
 
or sections of the board may be involved, partly informally, most importantly 
including the chair: 
If we in management started thinking about something, it might be very 
challenging to what the board would generally think of as the direction 
of [case C], it is the earliest warning system, generally I go to [the 
chair] saying this is what we are thinking, can you think about it. And 
there’d be a dialogue of me and [the chair].  [The chair] might ring up 
two or three of the other directors and then there would be a great 
feedback loop, what it is all about is creating feedback loops.  There is 
a lot of formal interaction and then there is a very important informal 
piece that keeps it all together (C4, CEO) 
 
The governing board may form informal groups, particularly during 
development of ideas or processes: 
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There’s always quite an informal thing that always goes on between 
directors and with the chair as you develop things (A3, appointed 
director) 
 
We tend to have mid-month board meetings, or informal get-togethers I 
should say, and I always listen with interest at the mid-month board 
meeting when there is no formalities, because that’s when you get more 
of a feel of where the little glitches are going wrong or where we 
perhaps need to hone in when we get to a board meeting (E1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
Sometimes we will have small groups, where members from 
management will meet with a few directors at a time, taking them 
through an issue in detail, more in an education process as well. But 
sometimes there is a two way feedback process so when we end up with 
the finished product we have properly tested it (C4, CEO) 
7.5.2.1 Conclusions – Engagement-Forums 
 
The theoretical subconcept of Engagement-Forums is defined as building, 
using and capitalising on formal and informal structures. Evidence is shown to 
support its existence as a subconcept that is useful in understanding co-
operative governance roles. 
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7.5.3 Dynamics 
 
Figure 7-8 Dynamics 
    
 
Dynamics are defined as:  
actions and means of key relationship maintenance.  
 
This research identifies board Dynamics as a co-operative governing board 
subconcept as issues raised by respondents around what has been defined here 
as Dynamics are repeatedly raised in this fieldwork (see Appendix H-3 for 
further evidence). Dynamics are categorised from an analysis of the data into 
three sub-subconcepts; Within-Board-Relationships; Board-Management-
Relationships; and the board’s Decision-Making-Style. Board Dynamics are 
present as a conceptual theme in all cases and are referred to by all participants 
during semi-structured interviews (see Table 7-5 for a summary). The 
Dynamics subconcept, within Board Architecture, conceptualises the internal 
working processes of the board or “how” co-operative board members relate. 
This subconcept endeavours to understand how board members relate to each 
other and to management, individually and as a group. The Dynamics 
subconcept also helps to bring understanding to the boards’ decision making 
processes. As such, the theoretical subconcept of Dynamics is important in  
order to understand actual Board Roles.
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Table 7-9 Evidence of Dynamics 
Concept Frequency of mention Examples from interviews 
Cases Respondents
No. % No. % 
Dynamics 6 100 22 100 A respect between board and management 
for the respective roles that they have, an 
open communication, no secrets, we are all 
in this together, that's what drives the 
culture on a board. The ability to be able to 
have a blue behind closed doors, reach a 
decision and then back it. It’s people. 
People drive culture and the right sort of 
people are prepared to fit with the culture 
that's there. When people come on board 
they have to be able to bend and respect 
what’s there and not impose themselves too 
quickly, that assimilate into the way things 
are done and then it evolves and strengthens 
as we go (F3, appointed director) 
Within-Board- 
Relationships 
6 100 22 100 The directorate, because they are making 
difficult decisions from time to time -  there 
are no personality clashes in there, there is 
no unkindness.  There are tough things said 
but they are always said  with charity and 
they are always said for the best of the 
company, it’s about moving the company 
forward and as I said to you before, that 
enables, I think, progress to be made very 
quickly (B2, s-s director) 
Board-
Management- 
Relationships 
6 100 22 100 It really, really rests on the chairman and 
the CEO keeping those backs and forwards 
[board and management] together … these 
are subtle things and they are not easy to 
get right, but it needs people with balance, 
and perspective, and maturity, and good 
judgement to also recognise that sometimes 
you can't brush an issue under the table, we 
are going to have a Donny Brook about it 
but we have also got to keep the ship moving 
forward (C3, appointed director) 
Decision-
Making-Style 
6 100 22 100 When strategy is developed and approved 
you tend to find it’s an interface between an 
experienced management team and an 
experienced board … management will 
develop nuances of strategy and put them up 
to the board and the board will discuss them 
and provide guidance and add value 
hopefully in that process of strategy 
development to management and feedback 
to management so it’s a proactive thing … 
management proposes core strategy 
bounces it around the board, it’ll often take  
… some number of meetings to fully develop 
that and have a new approved business plan 
endorsed that management then is 
authorised to put into place (A3, appointed 
director) 
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Two key relationships (and a number of sub relationships) are highlighted in 
the data that are important to gain an understanding of the actual roles of 
governing boards of New Zealand and Australian co-operative dairy 
companies. They are the relationships among board members and the 
relationship between the board and management. 
7.5.3.1 Within-Board-Relationships 
 
Within-Board-Relationships are raised in 100% of the co-operative cases and 
by 100% of respondents (see Table 7-5 for summaries of evidence). Within-
Board-Relationships are defined here as: 
 the relationship(s) between board members. 
 
The empirical evidence suggests that the culture of the board is important to 
the success of the co-operative company, as this appointed director suggests: 
The success of companies is often not determined by the skills of the 
people around the table but by the culture of the board table (A3, 
appointed director) 
 
The relationship between board members is often likened to that of being a 
member of a team: 
I’ve got a responsibility to them [the board] as one of the members of a 
team, I’ve got a responsibility to the chair as the leader of the team … 
the team one is quite a strong responsibility, it’s unspoken and so on 
but it’s a powerful one (A3, appointed director) 
 
You’ve got to accept as a board that you’re one of a band of blood 
brothers and you have to have trust in each other (C3, appointed 
director) 
 
[We are] also very well aware that we are members of a team (F2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Consistent with the notion of being part of a team, there needs to be a level of 
social cohesion among board members: 
Generally you need a pretty cohesive board to run an organisation (A3, 
appointed director) 
 
The [case B] board certainly in my experience has been a pretty 
harmonious board … they’re very tolerant and they’re very 
understanding in terms of points of view (B2, supplier-shareholder 
director)  
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Everybody feels comfortable with one another. There has never been, 
in the time I have been in the company, I have never ever seen a faction 
in the board. They work together, it doesn't mean to say there is not 
occasionally a disagreement, but that is a very rare occasion (F3, 
appointed director)    
 
The co-operative boards’ cohesion may be assisted by relatively stable board 
participants, as these two directors suggest: 
We have been very fortunate that we have a relatively slow, significant 
but relatively slow, changeover of board members … not in big swings, 
it’s just been piece by piece by piece and that gives continuity of 
culture (F3, appointed director)  
 
The culture as I see it has survived various CEOs, there were two 
chairmen before me on the board, it survived … it’s been passed on 
from generation to generation if you like but it could easily be 
destroyed, it’s a bit like a democracy. While people believe in it and it 
works I think you can keep it alive, but you get the wrong people here, 
they could destroy it in 12 months, six months (F1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
The board relationship(s) are part of a culture of nurturing those relationships: 
As far as the governance is concerned, to me that is just part of a 
culture that has been developed in the company, which is an add-on to 
… because of the nature of the company and who we actually represent 
and the purpose of the company being there, it’s a very important part 
of it (B1, supplier-shareholder  chair) 
 
The presence of nine [supplier-shareholder] directors who all come 
from a fairly similar background and  ... a set of values and ideals, that 
tends to create a culture in residence almost.  It has a very pervasive 
fairly conservative rural New Zealand sense about it and the things 
that wouldn’t fit well in that idiom wouldn’t go well at [case C] (C3, 
appointed director) 
 
However, there is a danger of co-operative board relationships becoming too 
cohesive, it is important for there to be some constructive tensions around the 
board table:  
You don’t want a fully compliant board … constructive tension and 
hard questioning is a positive attribute in my mind. Because you can 
have it wrong (A3, appointed director) 
 
That's one of the great strengths of a board in my view, a good board 
will, there will be a creative tension around strategy and testing 
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management because the individual directors hopefully all come at it 
from slightly different directions (C3, appointed director) 
 
Constructive tension, however, needs to be limited. The tension should not get 
to a level where it becomes destructive: 
I have had the usual tensions with a number of board members but I 
don’t think that’s unhealthy and those tensions, I think, are probably 
quite good as long as they don’t get to be, and I don’t think they were, 
they weren’t destructive, they’re just annoying and that’s okay (D4, 
MD) 
 
We have consensus decisions in here like most boards would in my 
judgement, if they don’t they’ll end up having a split board (E1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Board tensions have a negative effect when they affect board relationships and 
lead to “split boards” which are considered to be very dangerous for the 
functioning of the co-operative:  
I have never had a split board, if anything I wouldn’t go anywhere with 
a split board, I just wouldn’t want to take that step at the end of the day 
because it’s a dangerous, dangerous place to me (C1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
As split boards lead to ineffective decision making: 
[Researcher; What would the effect of a split board be?] Oh, ineffective 
decision making. Management come to the board ultimately to look for 
the guidance - what’s that going to do to management?, half the board 
think we should be going this way and the other half think we should be 
going the other way - in those sort of situations I just take the issue off 
the table, a lot more work needs to be done (C1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
 
Board cohesion combined with constructive tension allows for free, full, frank, 
open and honest debates amongst board members: 
We as a board are reasonably uninhibited. We say what we think. We 
say it with charity often ... in some ways we’re detached in terms of 
there is no ill feeling about what is said and I found that very 
refreshing in the board … I find that quite important because the 
correct functioning of a board becomes very difficult if you’ve got 
disharmony in the board and you move much quicker on issues, I think, 
if the board has free and frank discussions (B2, supplier-shareholder 
director) 
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For me the key thing is to try and create an environment around the 
board where - the words we use are - openness and honesty (C1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Furthermore, directors rely on each other, defining an element of their 
relationships: 
If I’m good at some things and only okay at other things and I have 
confidence in people who cover the areas that I am inadequate and 
know more in, I think I add more value to the board by developing my 
strengths further than becoming half as good as somebody else who is 
a specialist in something else (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
As a board you’re one of a band of blood brothers and you have to 
have trust in each other and it’s better to divide your resources and 
rely on three or four of your fellows on another subcommittee to do the 
job properly than try and get across all the bases yourself and fall in 
between each of them in doing so and making a hash of everything  
(C3, appointed director)  
 
In conclusion, Within-Board-Relationships highlight a team focus; the need for 
cohesion with some constructive tension allowing full, frank and open debate 
of co-operative issues without leading to dysfunctional or split boards. While 
there may have been, in reality, less constructive Within-Board-Relationships 
these were not referred to by respondents. 
7.5.3.2 Board-Management-Relationships 
 
The second Dynamics category is defined here as: 
 the relationship between the board and management. 
 
The relationships between the board and management are raised in 100% of 
the co-operative cases studied and by 100% of respondents (see Appendix H-3 
for evidence and Table 7-5 for summaries). 
Power 
 
It appears in all cases, consistent with Supplier-Shareholder-Controls, that the 
respective co-operative boards have formal “power” over the operations and in 
particular the management of the co-operative. The board has the decision 
making authority within the co-operative. Boards have Veto-Approve rights 
(see section 8.4.1 below) to all significant decisions and have formal authority 
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over the operations of the co-operative through their authority to accept or 
reject any executive proposals.  In particular, although reluctantly used, all 
case boards have the ability to fire the CEO / MD, a very real lever of power.  
 
The power or Control (see section 8.3) of the co-operative rests with the board 
(as opposed to management36): 
The ultimate power has got to rest with the board. The board appoints 
the chief executive. The board finally must authorise all capital 
expenditure and any movements outside policy. Any policy changes 
must be signed off by the board.  That’s what a board’s there for.  After 
all, who is going to defend the position with the shareholders. The 
board is accountable for that (B3, appointed director) 
 
All activities of the business is conducted under the supervision of that 
[the co-operative] board (D1, appointed chair) 
 
The board appears to retain substantial power by requiring the “sign off” of all 
substantial decisions that are delegated to management: 
The buck stops with the board. The board has to be very familiar with 
those [delegated authorities] and signing them off (A3, appointed 
director) 
 
The business measures … need understanding and sign off by the board 
(D4, MD)  
 
The co-operative boards all appear to have the “real” ability to hire and fire the 
CEO37 or MD: 
The board has got to be sure that they have got the right person [as 
CEO] and if there is any doubt at all they have got to be tough and firm 
to make the decision to change that person. That's one of the biggest 
issues for a board of directors within the co-op structure (F4, MD) 
 
[Researcher: If the board don’t believe the company’s well run?] the 
starting point I think has to really be a serious heart to heart with the 
chief executive … having the strength to deal with that I think is hugely 
important as long as they [the board] follow a proper process (A4, 
CEO) 
 
                                                 
36 This appears to be in contrast with managerial hegemony theory, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
37 Over the course of this study 5 out of 6 of the cases changed CEOs (or MDs). While in no 
way inferring the CEOs were all fired, the power of the co-operative boards to hire and fire 
CEOs appears real. 
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The power to hire and fire the CEO may allow the board members’ views to 
prevail over management’s. Although seldom used, this supports Stiles and 
Taylor’s (2001) research that removal is only done in the “most drastic of 
circumstances”, however, this lack of use “does not detract from the fact that 
the latent power this option gives the board acts as an important discipline to 
top management” (p. 78) as these respondents suggest: 
There will be a good dialogue both ways, if I have real trouble with the 
board recommendation I’ll push back, there will be a dialogue but in 
the end the board’s call is final (C4, CEO) 
 
Management will have a view but on that particular matter the board 
has prevailed (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
This suggests board dominance over management and little sign of managerial  
hegemony (Kosnik, 1987; Mace, 1971).  
 
Despite legally and constitutionally being charged with the running of the co-
operative, boards delegate this to management. All the case study boards instil 
skilled professional executives to manage the co-operatives: 
The governing board in accordance with the laws of the country 
through the Companies’ Act is charged with the task of managing the 
company and of course for that task it delegates that role as it’s able to 
do under the legislation, to a chief executive (A4, CEO) 
Boundaries 
 
These relationships are driven by boundary concerns. The board put in 
Delegations (see section 8.3.2) to give a framework for the executive to work 
within, as these CEOs note: 
The reason for policies is going to be a broad control framework of 
[case C] to ensure again that there is appropriate boundaries that 
management can work in. And management knowing that beyond a 
certain level they don't have the deity or the authority - to have to go 
back to the board (C4, CEO)  
 
[Policies provide] management with the proper sort of disciplines and 
guidelines for the conduct of the business. I cannot for example go out 
and commit the company to an expense beyond a certain sum because 
collectively we agree as board and management that that’s putting me 
under too much exposure. On the other hand I’ve got to have enough 
authority to run the business … so that management is not improperly 
exposed nor is management in the position to do things that we 
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shouldn’t be doing, like speculating. So I think having the directors 
make their positions clear on such matters is very important (A4, CEO) 
 
Beyond setting formal delegated authorities for the CEO (or MD), the co-
operative boards have a task in setting expectations and boundaries for 
executives and employees of the co-operative. Hence, the relationship again 
has to do with boundary-setting: 
The board sets the parameters (E2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
You’ve got to go through the correct process of making sure that the 
CEO understands the board’s concerns and that he’s given every 
opportunity to put things right … make sure that the CEO understands 
what’s expected of him (A4, CEO) 
 
[The MD] knows what’s acceptable to bring to the board (F2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
These expectations and boundaries appear from the data to be semi-pervious 
and are developed and subtly tested by the management, as these directors 
explain: 
The chief executive often, if they’re good, is pushing the boundaries 
(B3, appointed director) 
 
The board would encourage management to really to test the 
boundaries. But having said that if we get into areas that we are saying 
hey look this, we don't like this or we don't like that, then it will be 
made known in no uncertain terms that that's going beyond the 
boundaries (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Boundary concerns include a strongly held view that the governing board is 
“not to manage”: 
A board can’t be the “doing function” it can’t really do any executive 
function at all. In fact it’s dangerous if it starts to … keep a very clear 
distinction between what is the executive function and what is the 
governance function (A3, appointed director) 
 
There’s a very clear understanding of the role of management and the 
role of the governors of the business (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
You have got to know where to draw the line between the role of the 
director and the role of management and not to interfere in the 
operation of management, that's critical (F4, MD) 
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A board managing the co-operative is seen as a problem by respondents 
because of the inability to hold management to account and their lack of 
expertise in this area: 
If the board has its own fingers in the pie outside the CEO, the CEO 
can’t then be held accountable and has confused delegated authorities 
(A3, appointed director) 
 
If you have got the board telling the management what you are going to 
do, how can you then sack management if the boards told them to do 
that? (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Next thing they’re [the board are] micromanaging it and of course you 
have got a very, very, bad situation on your hands because you have 
got the board with their hands in the gearbox, but really not holding on 
to all the levers (C3, appointed director) 
 
The exception to the “not to manage” rule appears to be in “emergency” 
circumstances, as these directors explain: 
[Directors] should only get involved [in co-operative management] in 
emergency situations (B3, appointed director)   
 
I’ve been involved in one or two things where from a governing 
position, you have got problems with management and you step in, you 
shouldn’t do it, but you naturally do it, until such time as you rectify the 
issues, it’s what happens by default (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Anywhere where you see a board getting particularly hands on, unless 
it’s a very material issue (C4, CEO) 
 
The evidence suggests the boundaries between what is considered management 
and what is considered governance appear to be relatively fluid and more a 
matter of negotiation and tradition rather than formal documentation:  
If there is too much day to day contact between the directors and the 
management you can end up with directors having an influence on 
management activity, so there’s no right and wrong in any of this it’s 
sort of a sense of how does it feel (B4, CEO) 
Relationships 
 
The key relationship in co-operative governance is between the CEO (or MD) 
and the board: 
The CEO really is the key individual in the interface between the 
management of the company and the board itself (A1, supplier-
shareholder chair)  
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[The chief executive is] the primary conduit, primary contact point 
between the board of directors and the company in its day to day 
workings (A4, CEO) 
 
It’s management’s role to execute and implement the strategy okay, 
and the board holds the chief executive to account, so it’s the chief 
executive that is accountable to the board. He is the person that we 
hold responsible for the execution of the budget, execution of the 
business plan (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The CEO’s skills are crucial in meeting Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits: 
If the board itself has a general strategic view of where it wants to go it 
can’t do a huge amount about that unless it can get a senior 
management in place that can explore and pursue the implications of 
that general strategy (A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
[The board] needs somebody to turn a vision and the principle 
strategies into reality and so it has to delegate the authorities to an 
individual to then undertake the executive function (A3, appointed 
director) 
 
As the key relationship great care is taken by the board with its relationship 
with the CEO/MD, particularly in their recruitment: 
The number one priority of the board is to recruit, retain and support 
the chief executive (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The CEO (or MD) needs an empathy with the co-operative nature of the 
company: 
The CEO and his or her direct reports if they can’t have empathy for 
the farmer I don’t think they’ll last very long and they won’t really do 
what the farmer owners want (D4, MD) 
 
You’ve got to be able to build a rapport with the farmers, understand 
the issues they have and be able to communicate with the farmer … 
those CEOs that haven’t been able to do that have probably struggled, 
compared to those that can (F4, MD) 
 
[Researcher: Does your CEO or your managing director need a co-
operative empathy as well?] I believe that's absolutely essential …he 
has to be pretty much attuned to where the board wants that company 
to go (F1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
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Similar to the empirical evidence as to the directors’ relationships with each 
other, many of the respondents characterise the relationship between the board 
and management as team-oriented, as this series of quotations suggest: 
One of the great attractions of the co-operative is that, is the element of 
teamwork that goes with the co-operative. I always think of the 
managers and the directors of the company really functioning as an 
integrated team (A4, CEO) 
 
The chairman and the CEO have just got to keep all the senior 
management and all the board in a state of mind where they believe 
absolutely they are all on the same team. They are backs and forwards 
in the same team, they are not two different teams (C3, appointed 
director) 
 
Absolutely fundamental [to the] culture of this organisation is the 
almost family relationship right across management and board, it 
really is … everybody feels comfortable with one another (F3, 
appointed director) 
 
The co-operative board and management acting as a team highlights the co-
dependency between the board and management in a co-operative, as opposed 
to the need for independence as characterised by agency theory (discussed in 
Chapter 3). That is, there is no simple linear explanation for this relationship. 
 
Also, similar to the board members’ relationship with each other, the board and 
management work together as a team through debate and discussion to come to 
decisions and develop, in particular, co-operative strategies and policies: 
Issues like the strategy, it is management and the board coming up 
together with the boundaries. I mean they are tested in debate, 
discussion and the conversation. So it is not saying these are the 
boundaries, go ahead and find the strategy, it’s done in consultation 
and dialogue between board and management (C1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
You have a team approach and we are all [management and board] 
marching to the same tune and heading forward (F2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
Part of the team approach is the building of mutual trust and confidence 
between the board and management:  
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I often say that one of the single most important assets that I can have 
is the trust and the confidence of the board in me because if they trust 
what I and the team do ... (A4, CEO)  
 
Important in this operation is getting the trust of the directors by 
having a high level of transparency … there has to be that 
transparency, because with that transparency comes trust … and quite 
an important part of my role is to try and build the relationship 
between the management team and the board (B4, CEO) 
 
The board must sign off, must be comfortable with the strategic 
direction, must be comfortable with the chief executive and the 
management of the business (C4, CEO) 
 
If the board does not trust and have confidence in its management, this has a 
consequence for the performance of the co-operative: 
The culture of the organisation depends on a good relationship 
[between board and management] … a board member has to support 
his CEO otherwise the thing will tear itself apart, especially the culture 
that we use, we are fairly, we are fairly open with one another, and if 
that trust is destroyed the relationship between the CEO and the board 
becomes stilted (F1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The key responsibility arise for the directors in a co-op like ours is to 
make sure you’ve got the right management and to make sure that they 
ask all the questions so that they can form the right view about whether 
they can trust management (F4, MD) 
 
Co-operative performance may be an important element in building the board’s 
trust and confidence in the management team, as this managing director 
explains: 
Business performance was really, really important. That they [the 
board] could have faith in me and the management team that we 
actually knew what we were doing and we could only do that if we 
improved our bottom line performance. Which we did. (D4, MD) 
 
As part of the Board-Management-Relationship some respondents highlight 
how important it is for the board to stimulate, challenge and be challenged by 
management:  
 [I] have an attitude that the role of the board is to stimulate and 
challenge and I think they are the two key words, stimulate and 
challenge … its more than simply a passive look at what’s going on  
(D1, appointed chair) 
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We would be disappointed if they [management] didn’t challenge the 
board (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
[The board] are hiring professional management and they are paying 
professional management well to drive the business, not just exactly a 
board prescribed strategy, to be constantly challenging that strategy as 
to whether that's the right situation for [case C] (C4, CEO) 
 
and to test management: 
A good board will, there will be a creative tension around strategy and 
testing management (C3, appointed director) 
 
There is a constant testing of the boundaries between management and 
the board so that the board can get itself comfortable that the business 
is being run in the interests of the shareholders (C4, CEO) 
 
Respondents suggest a constructively supportive relationship between the 
board and management is important: 
In terms of encouragement a lot of it is in terms of the manner in which 
the board conducts itself when these sort of [management] initiatives 
are being reviewed, the board needs to be constructively supportive ... 
that they’re going to get a fair and full hearing … so management are 
enthusiastic about bringing initiatives to their board (A2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
[Researcher: Does the board at [case F] have a role in supporting the 
CEO and management?] Absolutely, there is not doubt about that, I 
think it makes for a successful co-op … good managers can make good 
decisions and react to it and also likes a pat on the back when it is due 
(F4, MD) 
 
If there’s a proposal to actually go in a direction or put up some 
capital generally the board are very positive (E4, MD) 
 
If the board is not supportive of management respondents believe that it may 
have an effect on the performance of the co-operative, as this director explains: 
If the board tries and plays it both ways, so rides the chief executive 
hard, challenges in a negative way doesn’t support him in public 
forums or with staff or other resources then you’ve got a win / lose 
situation and the CEO can’t succeed and that means the company can’t 
succeed and therefore it just all deteriorates (A3, appointed director)   
 
The co-operative boards offer advice to management in a supportive and non-
confrontational way: 
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I’ve shown other board papers to [A4] for instance and to [the CFO] 
to say that you can do better here in a non confrontational way just to 
show them what can be done (A3, appointed director) 
 
It’s very nice to be able to get good advice from well meaning and well 
intentioned and competent directors.  It doesn’t matter whether they’re 
farming directors or non farming directors …  they can in fact actually 
be very very helpful in knowing who to speak to, to get further help (A4, 
CEO) 
 
If the chief executive has a bit of an issue with his own personnel … if 
he needs a little bit of mentoring etc then, you know, clearly someone is 
sitting on your board who’s got experience, you should try to use them 
(B3, appointed director) 
 
and in assessing, critiquing and testing management: 
The responsibilities of management towards the directors are assessed 
by the directors, I think, in terms of the quality of the work that they do 
which is reflected in the reporting procedures and results (A1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
After delegating the running of the co-operative within proscribed limits to 
management, the relationship also requires management to be held accountable 
to the board for the running of the co-operative: 
The chief executive is totally accountable to the board (B3, appointed 
director) 
 
The philosophy around [case C] is that we give management the 
autonomy to deliver against the budget and the business plans okay, 
but we hold management to account. So the more autonomy the more 
accountability there needs to be, and there cannot be a grey area, and 
there cannot be anything that's uncertain about that (C1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
Management need to get on with the job and be accountable for doing 
that work (B4, CEO) 
 
Accountability expectations are then fundamental in conceptualising the board-
CEO (MD) relationships, as these directors explain: 
The board’s been very strong on the view that we needed measures to 
be able to judge the business, and of course the chief executive is the 
person who drives that, so we’ve developed into his performance 
measures … to measure the performance of the business (B1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
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 [The board] might set aside once or twice a year without the CEO 
present, just as a board and discuss how the CEO is doing and 
determine whether there is a problem and any aspect of his 
performance that should be communicated to him either through either 
the rem. committee or the chairman (A3, appointed director)   
 
Part of that accountability relationship calls on board members to make 
judgements: 
I think so much around monitoring management is around your ability 
to judge people and read people, sometimes it is not what they are 
saying it is how they are saying it, it tells a thousand stories.  If they 
don't like what they’re saying, if you don't believe they’re saying what 
they really think, then that's when you go in for the kill I guess (C2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Also, as to accountability, board members are expected to question and 
challenge management, as these quotes from MD / CEOs illustrate: 
The most important thing they [the board] do is question. What they 
should do is exhaustively question the operation of the business, such 
as they can form a view that the CEO and then the management team 
are doing the best possible job that they could (F4, MD) 
 
The board would certainly - if they felt I was going in the wrong 
direction, they’d question very strongly of me what I am doing and why 
(C4, CEO) 
 
It’s the board’s job to ask if we are meeting these milestones? If we are 
not meeting them, what are we doing about it? Can they be fixed? 
Sometimes you can’t fix them, not every problem can be solved.  If we 
can’t fix them what else are we going to do about it? That’s the sort of 
behaviour you’d like to have around a board table (D4, MD) 
 
By the board and management acting as a team, and having confidence and 
trust in each other, it appears that the board and management expect to be 
engaged in open, full and frank debates: 
[Strategies] are tested in debate, discussion and the conversation.  So it 
is not saying these are the boundaries go ahead and find the strategy, 
it’s done in consultation and dialogue between board and management 
(C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
We have arguments around the board table and … I think that’s 
healthy … of course we have disagreements, you’d hope we would (D4, 
MD) 
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In [case F] we have had a very open relationship and we have had a 
fair discussion, fair and frank discussion with management about 
opportunities that might be available (F2, supplier-shareholder 
director) 
 
It also appears that CEOs have a different level of accountability to the chair 
than to the remainder of the board, as this evidence suggests: 
The chief executive is really appointed by the board but on a day to day 
basis he’s accountable to me (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
If the board felt that I was going off base on that, then certainly there 
would be a dialogue between, most likely between the chairman and 
myself (C4, CEO) 
 
The CEO is accountable to the board, but he is accountable to the 
board through me. That doesn’t mean to say that I am a filter, but there 
is a protocol there, the CEO is accountable to me not on a day to day 
management basis but on a delivery of the expectations of the board, 
but is accountable to me not in an absolute sense, but simply as the 
means of being accountable to the board as a whole (D1, appointed 
chair) 
Educate 
 
As well as keeping the board well informed, management in their relationship 
with the co-operative, appear to be tasked to “educate” the board, as the 
following suggests: 
[Director market visits] that's a perfect example of where management 
is educating the board. We’ll take them overseas and it is an 
opportunity for them to understand the strategic direction of that aspect 
of the business in more detail, both strategic direction as well as the 
performance and the prospects and all of that, so that's quite common 
(C4, CEO)  
 
We have numbers of board training sessions … where we will attempt 
to take board members through the fundamentals of finances, how does 
the company operate … through numbers of technical sessions, product 
manufacturing … how do we make these various products (F3, 
appointed director) 
 
The education process works both ways, board members must be prepared to 
be educated: 
Information is the key. Management has got to be prepared to give it 
and the board’s got to be prepared to make sure that the meeting 
doesn't finish until they are satisfied that they understand it and that 
they are on the right track, that's a key (F4, MD)   
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A challenge for management is to actually sit there and listen and 
realise that the farmers around the board can actually genuinely add 
value to the management (D1, appointed chair) 
 
Management likes to know that the board knows what they are doing, 
management likes the fact that the board can question them sensibly on 
what they are doing and make them accountable. Good managers like 
that and a good board should know that a good manager likes that (F4, 
MD) 
 
Closely associated with the governing boards’ requirement to be well informed 
is the board’s requirement to receive “no surprises” from management: 
[The board needs to know] what’s going on in the business and what’s 
likely to be coming up in the business. So that again no surprises, the 
board’s taken along with the whole process (A3, appointed director) 
 
It is an ongoing process that we have to ensure … that management 
never engages the board where the board is caught unawares or 
unprepared for what we might be talking about (C4, CEO) 
 
As the board meetings progress over a period of time, very rarely does 
anything come to the board that's a surprise because it’s been chatted 
about and in a very informal way (F3, appointed director) 
Chair/CEO (or MD) relationship  
 
The empirical data suggests that the relationship between the chair and CEO 
(or MD) is central to the successful running of a co-operative: 
It’s the most critical relationship in the governance structure; because 
it’s about trust and confidence (C3, appointed director) 
 
The working relationship between chairman and CEO is absolutely 
critical and we are very fortunate that we have got an excellent 
combination there (F3, appointed director) 
 
A successful co-op - it’s probably the same as any business - but 
certainly in co-ops experiences to relationships between CEO and the 
chairman is bloody important. Bloody important (F4, MD) 
 
According to the respondent in this informative quote, the relationship between 
the chair and the CEO can be characterised as the peak decision making 
authority: 
So it is just an ongoing dialogue to ensure that we are connected ... if 
we in management started thinking about something ... generally I go 
to [the chair] saying this is what we are thinking, can you think about it 
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and there’d be a dialogue of me and [the chair] ... There is a lot of 
formal interaction and then there is a very important informal piece 
that keeps it all together (C4, CEO) 
 
The chair appears to have a large role in the employment relationship with the 
CEO / MD: 
The number one priority of the board is to recruit, retain and support 
the chief executive … it’s the particular responsibility of the chairman 
of course (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
and in developing a constructive relationship: 
[The chair is] directly responsible … with forming a constructive 
relationship with the chief executive (A2, supplier-shareholder 
director)   
 
It is also the chair’s task to have regular, informative, open and frank 
communications with the CEO / MD: 
I have a very regular dialogue with the chairman … on the phone most 
days and we can see each other reasonably frequently (A4, CEO) 
 
There needs to be complete frankness between those two [chair and 
CEO] and they need to talk regularly. It is a communication thing (C3, 
appointed director) 
 
[between the chair and the MD] the mutual respect, the trust, the 
ability to draw the line on who does what and what the responsibilities 
are, the ability to be able to talk openly about the board or about the 
managers is really important (F4, MD) 
 
The relationship between the chair and the CEO/MD also appears to entail 
individual guidance and support from the chair: 
He [the CEO] doesn't come up to the board and say well I don't know 
what to do here, I am looking for the board for guidance, I  mean [the 
CEO] and I have those discussions outside the boardroom, but that's 
not the role of the board (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
If I was to say make a suggestion that would be something that would 
be out of the ordinary I would very likely do a fair amount of legwork 
on a one on one basis with the chairman (C4, CEO) 
 
Just a great sounding board … it’s really good as a CEO to have 
somebody to bounce things off … that’s a key thing for the chairman to 
do (E4, MD) 
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As part of this relationship, the chair can act as an early influencer in the 
decision making process: 
There might be something from the strategic business point of view, 
starting to take place where … it is not appropriate to bring it to the 
board table. [The chair] will know about it. So it’s happening at that 
very early stage between the CEO and the chairman, and the chairman 
has given the green light … but that might be three, six months or more 
before it actually gets to the point where [it goes to the full board]  (F3, 
appointed director) 
 
The relationship between the chair and CEO is a conduit between the wider 
board and the wider management: 
If a director noted to me that they had some issue with a manager … I 
would then go to the chief executive and I would say there is an issue 
here (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Any concerns that ... directors have, around any aspects of 
management capability or management behaviour - the most likely 
forum would be for somebody to talk to the chairman, the chairman to 
then feed that through to the CEO (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The chairman and the CEO really have to provide that conduit. The 
chairman will be picking up signals and concerns from directors and 
he will be taking those up with the CEO, and he will receive feedback 
coming the other way from the CEO (C3, appointed director) 
 
The chairs, with their closer relationship with the CEOs/MDs, appear to have a 
larger task than the remainder of the board in reviewing and assessing 
CEO/MD performance:  
The relationship with the chairman was a very important one. I mean 
I’d have to say I felt as if I reported to the chairman as well as the 
whole board (D4, MD) 
 
[The chair will] lead the board initiatives as far as matters of 
performance review, monitoring the performance in relation as far as 
the chief executive is concerned (A2, supplier-shareholder director)  
 
I have one to one sessions with the CEO in terms of performance 
assessment (D1, appointed chair) 
Finding balance 
 
Some of the relationships between board and management appear to be 
contradictory. For example, the independence required of the board to assess 
and hold management to account may be contrasted with the interdependence 
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required between the board and management to have the confidence to work 
together as a team in the development of strategy. Some of the responses to 
this observation suggest fine judgement calls and balance in relationships are 
required: 
I think directors have to see themselves as both mentors and monitors.  
We are a bit two-hatted because they can get into conflict. But if you 
only monitor all the time and you are continually pulling people up and 
growling … it is only a question of time before everything hits the fan 
… if the monitoring role is the only role that is going on, people do get 
pissed off with being constantly pulled up. So the mentoring role is a 
chance for a board member to be constructive and positive in the 
relationship they have with management (C3, appointed director) 
 
It’s like being a parent with children. I think there has been a 
philosophical mindset that's changed, you can yell and scream till you 
are blue in the face but ultimately the child’s going to do what it wants 
to do so you try and steer them in the right direction. You can't live 
their life for them, you can’t manage the business on behalf of 
management. I mean the principles are the same (C1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
Management likes to know that the board knows what they are doing, 
management likes the fact that the board can question them sensibly on 
what they are doing and make them accountable. Good managers like 
that and a good board should know that a good manager likes that and 
he is prepared to work a little bit harder on that one (F4, MD) 
 
In conclusion, the relationship between the co-operative board and 
management is defined and explained here and evidence used from the data to 
support the observations made. The co-operative board appears to be the peak 
decision making body in the co-operative with power over the executive. The 
board and management have boundary concerns. The co-operative board and 
management portray themselves as a team describing characteristics such as 
openness, trust, confidence, support, stimulating, challenging, advising, 
assessing, constructive tension and full and frank debates. Management 
educates the board. The criticality of the CEO (or MD) and the relationship 
between the chair and CEO (or MD) is highlighted, as is the boards’ need to 
find balance. 
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7.5.3.3 Decision-Making-Style 
 
As the peak decision making body in the co-operative, the means by which co-
operative boards go about making decisions forms an important part of 
understanding actual co-operative governing Board Roles. These ‘means’ are 
therefore also identified as a sub-subconcept of Dynamics. The processes 
boards go through in making decisions are raised in 100% of the co-operative 
cases and by 100% of respondents (see Appendix H-3 for evidence and Table 
7-5 for summaries). 
 
The co-operative board Decision-Making-Style is defined here as: 
the processes the co-operative boards go through when making 
significant decisions. 
 
The word “significant” in this definition of decision making processes is used 
because many of the decisions relating to the day to day running of the co-
operative are left in the hands of management. Given the power of the co-
operative board, “significant” may be any decision the co-operative board 
wishes it to be. From the evidence, it appears that board decisions cover a vast 
range of areas, including decisions around co-operative Control (described 
below), such as the levels of delegated authorities, strategies (Strategic-
Involvement, described below, section 8.2) and matters affecting supplier-
shareholders that have a marked impact on the co-operative. Understanding 
how those decisions are made is often discussed and therefore important in 
understanding agricultural co-operative governance.  
  
This research finds, from the empirical data, a remarkably similar common 
decision making process in and out of the boardrooms amongst the co-
operative cases. The Decision-Making-Style can be characterised as iterative, 
symbiotic and fairly lengthy. Many ideas are floated in the boardroom, some of 
which are pursued, others dropped or put on the “back burner”. Those ideas 
that are pursued are developed and thrashed out between the board and 
management, and moulded, quite often over a series of meetings, taking 
perhaps months to come to resolution. This Decision-Making-Style allows all 
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participants to question, contribute and to shape the formulation of decisions 
until everyone (the board and management and in some cases the supplier-
shareholders) are comfortable. Once made, decisions are often revisited and 
“tweaked”, or reassessed, in light of actual experience. This decision making 
process allows for substantial involvement by the co-operative board. The 
process also allows the board and management to act as a team, maintaining 
and enhancing relationships. This decision making process is consistent with 
Long et al., (2005) notion of a decision process evolving “through complex, 
non-linear and fragmented processes over time, and are conducted as a 
continuous debate” (p. 672) and quite at odds with the sequential decision 
making process as characterised by agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). 
 
Formal decisions are generally made at formal board meetings by the full 
board. Although there is variation, the case boards met formally, regularly, 
usually monthly, for one to two days. As such as a decision making group all 
the boards meet sporadically and the decision making could be characterised as 
episodic. Formal meetings tended to have specific agendas, including written 
management reports covering a range of issues, some of which were 
standardised, such as financial monitoring and some non-standard such as 
strategy issues that floated around the meetings and any number of one-off 
items. Any questions could be asked at board meetings. Although most of the 
decisions are taken by the full board in board meetings, the decision 
development process is at times taken out of the boardroom, either formally in 
the case of committee work, or informally, such as chair/CEO discussions. 
 
Committees comprising of subgroups of the board (sometimes with 
management representation) are often utilised to investigate specific issues in 
more depth, with recommendations made to the full board for approval. Audit 
and executive remuneration committees, for example, are common among the 
cases. Beyond this, boards often meet semi-formally, either in person or by 
conference call, or in strategic planning sessions as part of decision making 
processes team. The Decision-Making-Style sub-subconcept is described in 
more detail with supporting evidence given below. 
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From the evidence significant decisions appear, to be made by the full board as 
these chairs suggest: 
There is no click, or inner sanctum, that gets together and makes 
decisions (D1, appointed chair) 
 
[Researcher: Do decisions ever get taken out of the boardroom?] No, 
no, that's why the terms of reference of the committees - they cannot 
make decisions, they can only bring recommendations to the board, 
okay … I’d be very disappointed if decisions were made outside the 
boardroom, and I wouldn’t allow that to happen (C1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
Co-operative board decisions appear to be made by consensus, as these chairs 
explain:  
We have consensus decisions in here like most boards would in my 
judgement, if they don’t they’ll end up having a split board anyway 
(E1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Other people may disagree and it’s not to say my view will always 
carry.  I’m only one director around the table (B3, appointed chair) 
 
As we have seen (Board-Management-Relationships, above), the (full) board 
of the co-operative appears to be the ultimate or peak decision-making 
authority in the co-operative and as such have the power to accept or reject 
management proposals, as these directors highlight: 
A formal presentation of whatever that strategy is going to be and then 
the board decides (F1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The board has actually got to … in the end sanction those policies (B3, 
appointed director) 
 
The ability for the co-operative boards to accept or reject management 
proposals, although seldom used (e.g., firing of the CEO/MD), is very 
powerful in the decision making process. The ability to reject proposals 
enables the board to be engaged and influential in the decision-making process 
at a number of levels (chair, formal and informal committees, and the whole 
board) over a period of time, despite delegating the day to day running of the 
co-operative to professional management. The following quotations highlight 
the potential power of rejection and management’s sensitivities to it: 
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Nothing management hates doing more than bringing a paper in and 
not being approved. So if the thing is never going to be a flyer, why 
hang the bastard out to dry (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Good management sense that, they read the tea leaves around the table 
and they instinctively come to know that there are certain proposals or 
ideas which aren’t ever going to fly with the board (C3, appointed 
director) 
 
If you’ve got the board saying no to management, then you have got the 
wrong chief executive, I mean then the boards got another decision to 
make [laughter] (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
In line with the notion of teamwork outlined above, the empirical data suggest 
the development of proposals for significant decisions is often a joint process 
between management and the co-operative board, as these chairs outline: 
Issues like the strategy, it is management and the board coming up 
together with the boundaries. I mean they are tested in debate, 
discussion and the conversation. So it is not saying these are the 
boundaries go ahead and find the strategy, it’s done in consultation 
and dialogue between board and management (C1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
It tends to take the two together instead of having management come up 
with a wonderful idea over here and the directors pulling it apart, it’s a 
bit of a joint process (E1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
It appears from the data that management does much of the “work” in the 
development and thinking around proposals and in bringing forward 
recommendations to the co-operative board, as these respondents attest:  
[The board] will use the management to draft them [constitutions] up, 
provide options, to analyse different ways to go. But the buck stops with 
the board (A3, appointed director) 
 
That process is still however, fairly management driven. In that the 
management will come up with a lot of the issues or do the risk review 
or put papers and presentations to the board … management do most 
of the work and I suppose the CEO in this context (E4, MD) 
 
The hard work and generally the strategy is developed initially by staff 
and executives which probably means that the MD does most of it (F1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
This may be because management is hired to bring these particular skills to 
bear on co-operative decisions as this managing director suggests: 
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My experience within the co-operative is that the CEO drives the 
strategy and decides to bring the board with him, and it’s where most 
of the ideas have to come from. Just because that's what his skill should 
be, his experiences in the marketplace, post farm gate is in the 
manufacturing, marketing, finance, all those skills that he should have 
(F4, MD) 
 
The ability of co-operative boards to reject management proposals appears to 
allow the boards’ considerable influence in the development of proposals that 
come before the board, as these respondents outline: 
The board has to buy into that or say no, that’s not where we want to 
go.  Please go back and look at this or look at that or no, we want to go 
this way (B3, appointed director) 
 
It appears from the empirical evidence that co-operative boards influence 
management as they develop proposals:  
We do interact to the extent that we can influence, and do influence, 
direction (D1, appointed chair) 
 
Certainly our senior management, not just our CEO are being prodded, 
cajoled, whatever you like into the co-operative mould. They 
understand what the business is about, and that's member benefits (F1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The culture of the board and the emphasis the board places on issues influences 
management, according to these directors: 
[The board] sets the tone and the tone you can express in a hundred 
and one different ways but the best way is through examples. If the tone 
of the board is make the investment and get on with it then you will find 
that there is, overtime, a more aggressive approach within 
management towards capital investment projects (D1, appointed chair) 
 
[The board] do [influence management] in the context of simply how 
they - the emphasis they put on things, the support they show for 
management in every facet almost. How they react to certain things, 
even the squeaky wheels (E4, MD) 
 
It appears that the co-operative boards have many opportunities to influence 
and mould the development of proposals before decisions are made. The 
combination of the ability to reject management proposals, early issue 
exposure, and the iterative decision-making process, appears to allow co-
operative boards to shape and flesh out decisions in order to gain comfort with 
them so that they can eventually be approved, as these directors suggest: 
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[Strategies] go through a gestation period and your strategies will be 
sort of mulled over, probably first with the chairman and then 
developed and then talked about as an idea. So directors have some 
time to create input at that stage … it is a moulding process (F1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
There will be other discussions going on during the normal course of a 
board meeting that will be sending signals, a little bit coded, to 
management about where the board feels the company should be 
heading in a strategic sense. So I think when you see management 
come back they will suggest strategies … and then there will be an 
engagement between the board and the management which will drive 
out a common view about where the company should go strategically 
(C3, appointed director) 
 
Management will come up with proposals and then we flesh them out 
within board meetings and sometimes outside board meetings (E1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
Decision timing 
 
To assist in this moulding process, it appears, according to respondents, co-
operative boards’ exposure to (and ability to influence) the development of 
decisions often occurs very early in the decision-making process, as these 
directors describe: 
At most meetings there will be strategic issues always hanging out 
there just on the edge, not quite on the table, but in due course they’ll 
come clearly into focus as strategic imperatives (C3, appointed 
director) 
 
Almost every board meeting we would spend at times up to an hour on 
an item that's hardly even on the agenda … often they’re ideas at the 
very, very early stage that [the MD] will just throw out there … and 
some of those things may never even come back to the board … others 
may not be back until 12 months, 18 months down the track … so it 
never comes up to the board as just an absolutely total surprise (F3, 
appointed director) 
 
So it is very much a planting seeds and growing them attitude rather 
than having a plan delivered to you and say no that's not on (F2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Early exposure in the decision-making process by the board and the ability to 
mould proposals greatly lessens the risk of rejection, as these directors explain: 
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It very rarely gets to a presentation to the board if the board is not 
acceptable with - because it goes through this moulding process (F1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
I have not been aware of one [a management proposal] that has been 
kicked out like that [rejected by the board] … the board and 
management - because they work together you kind of have a feel for 
what would be acceptable to the board and what wouldn’t be (F3, 
appointed director) 
 
From the evidence, it appears that to allow the board to participate in the 
moulding of decisions requires the decision making processes to (often) go 
through a number of iterations. These iterations appear to allow the board to 
probe, question and to gain comfort that the decisions are in the best interests 
of supplier-shareholders, and give management time to revise and flesh out 
proposals: 
When strategy is developed and approved you tend to find it’s an 
interface between an experienced management team and an 
experienced board … management will develop nuances of strategy 
and put them up to the board and the board will discuss them and 
provide guidance and add value hopefully in that process of strategy 
development to management and feedback to management so it’s a 
proactive thing … management proposes core strategy bounces it 
around the board, it’ll often take … some number of meetings to fully 
develop that and have a new approved business plan endorsed that 
management then is authorised to put into place (A3, appointed 
director) 
 
Lead to a number of iterations inside of [case C]. First of all 
management will prepare a paper outlining the opportunity, it will be 
at quite a high level, it will come to the board for a preliminary, in 
principle agreement as to whether in fact management should commit 
significant resource to evaluating the opportunity to … make sure that 
the board is satisfied that in fact is on strategy, that it is consistent with 
where [case C] should be heading ... Management will get effectively a 
permit to continue discussions and work up a firm proposal which will 
then … go typically through a board due diligence committee before 
coming back finally to [the] board [for] approval (C3, appointed 
director) 
 
[Strategy] comes from management to the board, it might be stewed 
around and played with and then go back again and modify it and 
come back again, those are the things that when you have got that 
interaction (F3, appointed director) 
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Given this symbiotic and iterative process, many significant decisions often 
develop over long periods in conjunction with board and management, as this 
supplier-shareholder chair explains around a strategic decision:  
I think strategic ideas and visions really do come out of a melding 
together of someone or some group with an idea and putting together 
the means by which that can be put into practice. And it’s not 
something that happens in isolation. It happens over a period of time 
with people working together, aligning their ideas and putting together 
the capital and wherewithal to make it happen. And this might take 
several years to try to develop some real content …  It’s more a group 
type activity which develops over time … something that’s worked upon 
month by month and develops slowly and progressively, jointly with 
management is more likely to yield results (A1, supplier-shareholder  
chair) 
 
During the iterations, the governing board and management explore issues and 
access information to help them come to decisions, as this chair explains: 
An investigation was conducted to see what co-operatives around the 
world were trying to do in terms of structure and so on, which led to 
the, to some knowledge about new generation co-operatives and some 
time was spent distributing information to directors about that in the 
form of written papers and a commentary and so on with discussions at 
board level … so the strategy sort of evolved.  It wasn’t something that 
could be taken up and applied.  It had to be adapted, developed, to the 
particular situation that [case A] was faced with (A1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
Decision types  
 
It appears from the data that different but significant decisions have differing 
levels of board and/or management involvement. Day to day decisions are left 
in the hands of management, consistent with the ‘not to manage’ principle 
(above). Broadly speaking it appears that the closer the decision is to supplier-
shareholders the larger the board input. The closer the decision is to the market 
the greater the management input into the process, as these respondents 
suggest:  
Because it was so closely associated with the farm and the 
shareholders interest, there was a greater director input in that one. So 
case by case. I suppose it would be fair to say that customer driven 
initiatives very much in the management domain (A2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
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Capital structure is clearly board driven, whereas international 
business would be more management driven and board approved (C4, 
CEO) 
 
However, significant decisions, such as the selection of a new CEO/MD 
appear to have very little executive involvement: 
When we were preparing to change and appoint a new CEO the board 
appointed a small committee. That committee was comprised of the 
chairman of the remuneration and succession planning committee, 
myself, [an appointed director] and I think at that stage one other 
farmer directors … the whole committee met and interviewed those 
people and ended up making a recommendation to the board (D1, 
appointed chair) 
 
To facilitate this decision making process, the evidence suggest boards may 
utilise special meetings to come to decisions, as this appointed director 
explains:  
If you’ve got a particular issue that comes up that is going to bog down 
a board meeting and requires a particular in-depth … its quite common 
for boards  … [to have] a number of special meetings to be able to drill 
down on those particular areas (A3, appointed director) 
 
In particular, strategic planning meetings are popular with the co-operative 
cases: 
To step out of the boardroom and away from the factory and sort of just 
deliberate on some of those things [strategic issues]. We take currently 
a couple of opportunities a year, one or two day session … we have the 
resetting of the strategy, the looking long term, any new things, 
whatever we need to address as well as reviewing as how we are going 
against the performance to achieve the strategic targets (E4, MD) 
 
At the end of a three or four day, usually a three day strategic planning 
session we tend to come out with a list of ticked off directions, for 
management then to move on with (E1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
and meetings for critical events: 
[In a takeover attempt] we had the offer made. We then quickly came 
together as a board and collected our collective thoughts, we then went 
to our bankers, we then moved to corporate advisors within the 
bankers. Naturally our legal people on the corporate side - and we 
developed a strategy … we were virtually meeting fortnightly at that 
stage (E1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
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Devolvement 
 
All co-operatives use formal board sub committees as part of their decision-
making processes to “drill down” on specific areas of the co-operatives 
business, such as audit, remuneration and supplier-relations. Some co-
operatives utilise ad-hoc limited time-frame committees when making 
strategically large decisions. These seem to give boards more comfort in their 
decision making. Committees make recommendations to the full board to 
endorse, as these directors highlight: 
[Committees] cannot make decisions; they can only bring 
recommendations to the board (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
[I] don't think you delegate decisions to committees obviously. You 
delegate due diligence, you delegate the drill down things. But 
basically it is a committee’s job to do the hard yards, and then make a 
recommendation back to the board on an appropriate course of action 
for the board with a supporting report which the board is guided by in 
making a decision (C3, appointed director) 
 
As such, committees appear to give the board confidence in their decision 
making: 
[Committees] gives the board the confidence that a lot of the details 
are actually thrashed out (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
If we get to a major acquisition, something very significant for [case 
C], what the board tends to do then is set up a subcommittee that can 
be more involved in the detail of an acquisition, just to make sure that 
the board is comfortable about it (C4, CEO) 
 
Then it is up to those directors [on the committee] to form a view, be 
comfortable and then pass that or to express that comfort to the rest of 
the group (F4, MD) 
 
Specific one-off committees may be utilised to give the board comfort around 
decisions of fundamental issues/risks, as this chair explains:  
It is the big fundamentals, like if it’s a two billion dollar acquisition, if 
it is fundamentally changing the capital structure of the co-operative, if 
it is changing the control mechanism of the co-operative like the 
governance or if there is fundamental change at the interface with the 
shareholders, there are subcommittees set up to deal with those things  
(C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
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The use of committees in decision making appears to also be around utilising 
specific skills from around the board table: 
If you have confidence in your fellow board members and their skill 
sets, rather than me try and improve my accounting skills to go to 
another level, I have confidence in the two or three people that we have 
that have real skills in there [the audit committee] (C2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
In making some decisions, the co-operative boards appear willing to go outside 
the board and management to help in the process, for example, the use of 
outside facilitators and experts: 
This external facilitator… the facilitator took the whole board and the 
senior executives through each of those issues, over several days and 
eventually reached a stage where a vision statement, a 10 year vision 
and a 10 year strategy was decided upon and endorsed by the board 
(D1, appointed chair) 
 
Getting an external consultant in which we do every couple of years, in 
fact this year we are using a consultant again for our process (E4, MD) 
 
The audit committee and the compliance committee have external 
advisers who are responsible to the committee not to management. So 
that gives professional oversight that the board members might not 
have (F1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Although, as discussed above, full boards make decisions by consensus, it 
appears certain members of the board may be more influential than others, as 
this director outlines:  
If you have got a board of 13, you have four or five power brokers in it, 
that's just the way life works. And I’m sure that in [the researcher’s co-
op] even with eight there’d be three people that will lead the other 
people, the other people will be good people and they’ll use their 
judgement to back the leaders within it, and that's just the way people 
work (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
It appears some of the boards’ input into the development of decisions may be 
more “informal” and taken out of the formal board or committee meeting as 
these respondents suggest: 
Maybe outside of the boardroom, look do you guys think you are going 
in the right direction? or have you thought about this? and they may 
also say that in the boardroom  (B4, CEO) 
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We frequently will have a number of those people join the board the 
night before the board meeting at dinner. We would normally look to 
have at least one away, a two day type of love in as one would call it 
from time to time, where the senior management team and the board 
will go away together for - not only just incorporate the board meeting 
but just sit down and talk about where things are going and what are 
your ideas in the future etc and that is how the board has its indirect 
influence  (F3, appointed director) 
 
There is evidence of informal influence between either small groups of 
directors and/or the chair in the development of decisions, as these respondents 
suggest: 
If I was to say make a suggestion that would be something that would 
be out of the ordinary I would very likely do a fair amount of legwork 
on a one on one basis with the chairman and possibly two or three 
other directors to just get the general sense before I was to take 
something formally to the board … you’d see quite an informal process 
of getting to a point (C4, CEO) 
 
Strategy in general concepts are fleshed out between perhaps a couple 
of members, two or three members of the board and management and 
then management go and do more work for the whole board to then 
workshop (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
[The CEO] doesn't come up to the board and say well I don't know 
what to do here, I am looking for the board for guidance, I  mean  [the 
CEO] and I have those discussions outside the boardroom, but that's 
not the role of the board (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
From the evidence, it appears that once a decision is made, the board may 
continue to have influence. Regular review of co-operative performance 
against targets and (some) decisions allow co-operative boards to have 
continuing influence in the decision making process: 
There is a process therefore, at the very highest level, for revisiting 
every year or two the strategic framework and making sure that the 
themes and the goals are consistent with where the company needs to 
be going in a business sense and which are consistent with shareholder 
aspirations for the company (C3, appointed director) 
 
We review those things. For example, with the foreign exchange policy 
that was sent to the audit committee, we got external advice in relation 
to all of that (E2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
We’re about to do that again next week to test ourselves again and 
really also test whether some of the strategies we set four or five years 
211 
 
ago are coming off and if there’s need for more to be added to or the 
honing of some of the ones we’re doing (E1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
 
Coming to decisions is not all analytical, as this appointed director points out 
when talking about monitoring: 
This is an intuitive thing. It’s how well something is going, how 
smoothly things are being run.  Are things being done.  Can the board 
feel comfortable about what’s being achieved. Those are the sort of 
things that you’re doing in terms of monitoring management 
performance (B3, appointed director)   
Finding balance 
 
Governing boards, as the peak decision-making body in the co-operative, 
appear to regularly face complex decisions. Apparent from the empirical data 
is the requirement for co-operative boards to continually find middle ground or 
“find balance” between competing issues. Drawn from the data, a number of 
the more important examples of the co-operative boards’ need to find balance 
are illustrated below. 
 
As has been seen above regarding relationships, respondents feel it is 
important that boards finds balance in their relationship with management. 
This requires balance, between cohesion and constructive tension; support and 
leadership; and monitoring and mentoring: 
It is just sometimes I think valuable a little bit of constructive tension 
but not if it’s to the point of negativeness or a divided board or 
anything like that (A3, appointed director) 
 
It’s a fine line between supporting them [management] and then also 
being able to in a very constructive way change their direction if you 
feel a requirement of it, because you want a chief executive to have 
drive and show initiative but they’ve got to be also careful that … they 
truly understand what the drivers of the business are and it’s a fine line 
(B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
There is times when you have got to get the whip out to management 
and there is times when you have got to put a cuddly blanket around 
them too.  They are all very fine judgement calls that need to be made 
(C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
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There also appears to be a need to find balance in the style of questioning. 
According to these respondents hard questions need to be asked with tact to 
enhance the cohesiveness of the board management relationship, as these 
directors note: 
A basic rule is never play the person, only play the issue … once it 
starts to become personal, personality driven, at that point, you know 
you are going to have trouble (C3, appointed director) 
 
I think some of them [directors] know how to probe pretty well, but that 
is an individual skill … in knowing how to smell a better question. How 
to go on with the question without being insulting or offensive or 
whatever … the question asked to score points gets no respect at all.  
The question asked for greater understanding and you know the asker 
has got the ability to probe that’s quite healthy (D4, MD) 
 
The empirical evidence also suggests the co-operative boards have to find 
balance in the emphasis they place on Board Roles (outlined below, Chapter 
8): 
I think we are getting the balance better. In the early days of [case C] 
we were spending so much of our time on shareholder related issues, 
pulling this whole monster together and not so much on value creation 
for the business; it might have been three quarters, one quarter for a 
year or two. I think we are actually now getting to a point where we get 
three quarters of our time on wealth creation type issues and one 
quarter on shareholder issues (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The CEO, has produced a result that’s made the board, the directors, 
pretty happy, and the shareholders pretty happy …  that has enabled I 
think the directors and the shareholders to behave in a very supportive 
way.  If that hadn’t happened there could have been a lot more debate 
on a whole lot more issues, yeah.  It’s a chicken and egg situation, in 
that good performance, exceptional performance produces behaviours 
in shareholders and directors, I was going to say it was more 
accommodating, but maybe less critical than would otherwise be the 
case.  I mean directors don’t ask, tend not to ask questions, well why 
don’t you double your profit, when the profit is already very high.  That 
kind of debate just doesn’t happen (A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Boards are also faced with finding balance amongst (sometimes) seemingly 
contradictory Board Roles as these directors note: 
It is probably easier for a board member to criticise than support too - 
so it has always got to be a bit of both. And good directors who do that 
well are very much respected by the management (F4, MD) 
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The bigger the organisation the more disciplines you actually require 
and is a big challenge for us always. You can't let process get in the 
way either so it is getting the right balance between process and 
outcomes … the pendulum does swing (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
As we have seen in Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits, it appears vitally 
important to the success of the co-operative that the governing board finds 
balance between the many competing supplier-shareholder needs, as these 
interviewees suggest: 
As a director it’s important to listen to and understand the needs of 
your range of shareholders and really to take a balanced approach to 
the overall needs of the shareholding base in a co-operative when 
you’re making some decisions on policy whether it be expansion of the 
milk supply, reinvestment in the company versus paying money out.  
Long term need versus short term needs. There are always going to be 
different interests (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
[Diverse shareholder interests] you are getting into the really tricky 
area of any co-operative … the board has to define what that balance 
is … that's clearly a board responsibility (C4, CEO) 
 
It also appears from some respondents that the board also needs to balance the 
needs of the co-operatives’ various stakeholders as these respondents suggest: 
As management and directors together [we] have to strive for a 
common purpose, that common purpose clearly has to be the 
enhancement of the prosperity of the shareholders and in so doing 
providing worthy and rewarding career paths for the staff who work 
here (A4, CEO) 
 
We have a debate once a year around the board to make sure we have 
got alignment between ‘the shareholders’ ‘the company’ and ‘the staff’ 
and the alignment through the KPIs is very much around payout and 
wealth creation (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
I sometimes wonder whether board decision making, co-operative 
decision making holds us back, I think it sometimes does in a strategic 
sense. The best example I can think of is not even relevant to us is a 
board not wanting to close factories that had to be closed … I think 
we’re to some degree inhibit[ing] the commercial ruthlessness of the 
business (D2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Co-operative board decision making often needs to find balance between long 
and short term effects of decisions, as these quotes acknowledge: 
It is a big challenge for a board … it’s the balance between short term 
decisions and longer term decisions … make too many short term 
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decisions you won’t get to the long term, but if you are always thinking 
about the long term … you won’t get their either, big question, very, 
very relevant to our sort of board (F4, MD) 
 
Do we build anhydrous milk-fat plant? or do we continue with the same 
production systems. And should we bring in our protein strategy earlier 
or, you know, it’s a matter of priorities. Those are the sort of debates 
[the board has] (B3, appointed director) 
 
Co-operative boards are also required to find balance between competing 
strategies: 
That’s quite a good example of how a strategy was developed to cope 
with a particular set of circumstances whereby [case A], principal 
strategy of not increasing the milk supply, was satisfied at the same 
time as trying to satisfy another strategy of maintaining an 
international share in a very specialised market which was at the same 
time very profitable (A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Where a board will have a different view maybe to management.  
Management will be looking for as much milk supply as possible as you 
make each investment in new capacity. The board will … will be saying 
are we buying a fight here that’s going to get our eye of the ball.  
That’s a good example of management and governance actually 
working through issues (B3, appointed chair) 
 
Although there is widespread agreement amongst respondents that co-
operative boards should not manage the co-operative, what ‘not managing’ 
means appears to exercise the board in finding balance, as this data suggests: 
If there is too much day to day contact between the directors and the 
management you can end up with directors having an influence on 
management activity, so there’s no right and wrong in any of this it’s 
sort of a sense of how does it feel (B4, CEO) 
 
There should be an understanding between the chairman and the CEO 
and I think it should be a line in the sand as opposed to in concrete and 
you don’t want to be too precious about it either … all you are trying to 
do is establish rough areas where you go and where I go (D4, MD) 
 
As the peak decision making body in the co-operative, the governing boards 
are often dealing with complex decisions in turbulent environments 
(Exogenous-Issues). As such, it appears that boards have to find balance in 
changing circumstances, as these quotes suggest:  
The board’s got to ask itself those questions is divergence from the plan 
a result of management or is it outside of their control but could they 
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have policies and procedures in place to mitigate those divergences? … 
it is an area that the board has got to think very hard about ... It’s not 
an easy area (A3, appointed director) 
 
The sheer nature of the business we were entering had an impact on the 
board, so a hundred million dollar decision or thereabouts was a big 
decision.  So that brought out the best in a lot of them, you know if you 
like, if you lift the standard of topic most of the board will respond (D4, 
MD) 
 
The co-operative governance decision making process subconcept of Decision-
Making-Styles is defined and data from the case studies are utilised to 
demonstrate its existence. 
7.5.3.4 Conclusions – Dynamics 
 
The Board Architecture subconcept of Dynamics is covered above. The 
relationships between board members and the board and management are 
highlighted and evidence displayed in support of their existence presented. The 
co-operative boards’ decision-making processes, induced from the data, are 
defined and evidence elucidated to support their existence. An understanding 
of the theoretical subconcept of Dynamics is important in the understanding of 
dairy co-operative Board Roles. It is to Board Roles that the thesis now turns 
its attention in Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 8 FINDINGS II 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter (8) introduces the four co-operative Board Roles induced from the 
empirical data and relationships between them. The concept of Board Roles 
defines what the co-operative boards actually do and are defined here as: 
the actions the co-operative board actually undertake.  
 
Board Roles, are raised in all cases and by all respondents, and are broken into 
four theoretical subconcepts, or Board Roles. These are entitled: Unite, 
Strategic-Involvement, Control and Serve. These roles and their relationships 
are represented diagrammatically below in Figure 8-1. 
Figure 8-1 Board Roles   
 
Each of these subconcepts and supporting evidence is elucidated below. 
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8.2 Unite 
 
Figure 8-2 Unite    
 
The first of the four Board Roles highlighted in this theoretical model of co-
operative governance is Unite and is defined here as:  
the co-operative boards role in uniting supplier-shareholders in a 
common vision. 
 
The Unite Board Role includes issues raised by respondents around the tasks 
of representing, leading, conveying and sharing information, finding 
consensus, and ultimately acquiring and maintaining the trust and loyalty of 
supplier-shareholders. Parts of the Unite Role may broadly relate to what 
Ravasi and Zattoni (2006) term a fourth important function of the board of 
“facilitating the reconciliation of diverging goals and interests of represented 
shareholders” the board “may perform a critical function in facilitating the 
reconcilement of conflicting views regarding strategic issues and the definition 
of a common set of goals and guidelines to direct managerial action” (p. 1697). 
 
Issues surrounding the theoretical concept of Unite are raised in 100% of the 
cases and by 100% of the respondents. The subconcept of Unite is broken into 
three interrelated sub-subconcepts: Active-Representation, Deep-Listening, 
and Familiarity (see Table 8-1 for summaries and Appendix I-1 for further 
evidence). 
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Table 8-1 Evidence of Unite 
SubConcept 
 
Frequency of mention Examples from interviews 
Cases Respondents
No. % No. % 
Unite 6 100 22 100 You need to look after those people [s-s]. 
You need to take them with you on big 
decisions, you need to make sure that the 
co-op’s meeting their needs, you need to 
make sure that it’s going in a direction 
they’re comfortable with because if it 
aint there is going to be revolution 
somewhere, it is going to get very messy. 
You need to deliver on their expectations 
and all of that takes time (C3, appointed 
director)  
Active-
Representation 
6 100 22 100 There’s the representative issue in 
representing the best interests of the 
farmer and being able to communicate 
the requirements, the needs, the 
questions, the issues that  are raised in 
the field if you like by farmers, who 
actually own the company, as it relates to 
their own businesses and that is very 
much a communication role and being 
able to decipher the issues and prioritise 
the issues and so on, that's very 
important for a co-operative (F4, MD) 
Deep-
Listening 
6 100 21 95 We spend a lot of time, I guess, listening 
to them and communicating with them 
(E2, s-s director) 
Familiarity 
 
6 100 18 82 To maintain the troops if you like and 
their loyalty to the organisation so that 
your suppliers feel part of that co-
operative. Because a co-operative 
depends on a family type relationship, it 
depends on people saying I want to be 
part of that, we can get more out of our 
dairying if we work together than if we 
work as separate entities (F1, s-s chair) 
 
Unite appears to be the defining Board Role of New Zealand and Australian 
dairy co-operative governance. It is this role that uniquely distinguishes the 
governance of the co-operative from the more actively studied corporate IOF: 
First and foremost the engagement with shareholders is very 
dramatically different than what it would be if we were publicly listed 
(C4, CEO)  
 
The only really, really, major difference [between a co-operative and 
an IOF] is that there is an appreciable amount of time spent by the 
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board … around managing the interface between the company and its 
supplier, its co-operative supplier (C3, appointed director) 
 
In my experience with other boards that co-operative boards have a lot 
more exposure [to its] shareholders (E4, managing director) 
 
We have a much bigger PR role and relationship role with our 
suppliers, it is almost a political role which is separate to a director’s 
conventional role … we probably spend twice as much time as … a 
corporate director … so it is a much bigger commitment (F1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
The relationship between the co-operative and its supplier-shareholders is a 
comparative, competitive strength over the co-operative’s competitors, 
particularly for smaller co-operatives: 
[Leveraging] that relationship with our farmers in fact is our strength 
… the one thing that other people [competitors] can’t emulate … 
especially with a smaller co-operative is that communication and that 
relationship … that is our competitive advantage. You can wash out all 
of the others; that’s the strongest one. So when you talk about supplier 
and shareholder relations it’s about protecting your competitive 
advantage too (E4, managing director) 
8.2.1 Active-Representation  
 
The first sub-subconcept of Unite is Active-Representation and is defined here 
as:  
the board’s task in actively representing, leading and finding consensus 
among the supplier-shareholders to collectively meet their needs. 
 
Active-Representation encapsulates issues raised by respondents around their 
relationship(s) with supplier-shareholders, including representation, 
accountability, leading and finding consensus among diverse supplier-
shareholder needs. 
 
The co-operative boards, in particular supplier-shareholder directors, appear to 
have a role in representing the supplier-shareholders’ interests in all aspects of 
the co-operatives’ operation. This representation occurs within the boardroom 
and outside it (Engagement-Forums, section 7.6.2). As supplier-shareholder 
directors are Voted (section 7.4.1) on to the governing board, supplier-
shareholder directors represent the interests of their constituents: 
220 
 
The shareholders of course choose the farmer-elected representatives 
on the board, so they have constituents to represent (A4, CEO) 
 
Particularly to represent the shareholders and their interests and that 
goes without saying over the whole … the reason for being there [on 
the board] is to protect the shareholders interests and their investment 
(B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
[Ensure] that farmers’ interests, concerns and issues are properly 
represented and a balanced decision is made about concerns and 
issues that are raised by farmers (F4, managing director) 
 
The evidence also suggests the notion of representation of shareholders in New 
Zealand and Australian dairy co-operatives is at a deeper level than 
representation of an IOF board: 
It’s not just a board of directors, they represent the owners … we’re 
just not talking about a group of people that come around to chat  
every month, they do actually represent the people who own the 
business. And it’s a lot more closer in a dairy farmer owned co-
operative because they actually own the businesses that own the 
business. So they really are hands on because they are talking about 
their money and their neighbours’ money and their wellbeing what’s 
more (D4, managing director) 
 
You could argue every director in any business represents the 
shareholder, supposedly, but it is much more strong and compelling 
within our co-operative structure (F4, managing director) 
 
Across-case comparisons highlight the size of the co-operative as being an 
issue for the co-operative boards’ ability to satisfactorily represent its supplier-
shareholders: 
[Case C] came through a series of amalgamations … it is a pretty big 
company. We can't have 50 people sitting around the board table, so 
there are 13 sitting there, and you have got 11,000 shareholders (C3, 
appointed director) 
 
As such, the larger co-operative cases tend to have ‘tiers’ of representation. 
This supplier-shareholder director explains his progress through the 
representation system to the governing board: 
I was elected to [case D] board in 1998 after having spent a period of 
years as a ward representative, farmer representative, and a district 
chairman. They are the tiers in our representative system (D2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
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One case attempts to distance the representative task of the board from its 
governance role(s) with the establishment of a shareholders’ council, as this 
supplier-shareholder director explains: 
We have the shareholders council and their role is representative 
rather than governing … The people you want on the council are 
representative type people who listen to the shareholders and listen to 
what’s happening in the business and they’re representing the views 
both ways. Now that’s not necessarily a similar skill base at all to 
being a governor of the business, hugely different (C2, supplier-
shareholder director)   
 
The representative task has, in some cases, led to some conflict with other 
governance roles: 
We occasionally have directors when they first join the co-op still think 
they are representing their area and they are very keen, too keen, to 
bring members from their areas points of view to the board. They are 
pretty soon told that that's not their role, that they have to make 
decisions on behalf of the whole company and their role in the 
boardroom is to represent the whole company and in the main that 
happens fairly quickly. Some directors take a little while to understand 
(F2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Analogous to the representative task is an accountability of the board to the 
supplier-shareholders: 
I am accountable to the shareholders, very, very much, it’s 
fundamental to governance (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Accountability is played out through the reporting mechanisms of the co-
operative: 
We ensure that the [co-operative] performance is accountable to the 
owners (D1, appointed chair) 
 
and at the ballot box (Vote, section 7.4.1): 
Ultimately I am accountable to my shareholders because it’s they who 
put me in, or take me out (B2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
and is also carried out during the daily interaction between directors and their 
constituents as we have seen under Voice (section, 7.4.2): 
Directors … confronted by a meeting in their town or their area or 
their district. They get a lot of questions, a lot of pressure from the 
average dairy farmer (D4, managing director)  
 
Part of Active-Representation is in leading supplier-shareholders:  
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The board plays a leadership role ultimately in actually leading the 
shareholders, to what we think is in the interest of the company (C1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
We represent the owners, we ensure that the business from our 
perspective is going in the direction that the owners want it to go in 
(D1, appointed chair)  
 
In this example, the board has a task in leading and explaining a major change 
in strategic direction. Note the active and responsive way in which the board 
conducts leadership activities: 
We held shareholder meetings, we explained to them what we intended 
to do, how we saw the future forward and this wasn’t new to them at 
all,  I mean people talk about how the company can go forward, what 
are the options. And to a man, and woman, every person to my 
knowledge agreed that it was added value. It was the meetings 
essentially reinforced that message to them and outlined areas where 
they could increase their payout through added value and that was 
pretty consoling to a lot of shareholders because they were concerned 
about whether the company in its new environment would be able to 
move forward in a commercial way satisfactorily (B2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
and in leading changes to the constitution: 
Certainly advise shareholders and recommend shareholders any 
changes in constitution or matters related to policy (B1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
and in this example, changes to new on-farm milk quality standards: 
Getting that across the line took the support of the board speaking 
aloud about that at some of our [supplier-shareholder] meetings which 
I asked them to do for us. I said you guys have to tell them this is the 
way the business has to go and you’ve got to get on board with the 
programme otherwise we won’t have a business because this underpins 
everything we are doing (E4, managing director) 
 
and in the production of value-added products: 
We use a colostrum sub-committee which is made up of some directors 
as well as management … to really get it to the stage of being a sound 
commercial activity we needed the input of those directors to be able 
to, I guess, stir up the interest, keep the communication going with the 
suppliers involved, or the suppliers that may want to be involved (B4, 
CEO) 
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The co-operative boards in their relationship with supplier-shareholders have a 
task of promoting and striving to find consensus amongst diverse supplier-
shareholders’ needs. Their needs are sometimes heterogeneous (section 7.3.4). 
Acceptable middle ground and a notion of equity need to be found amongst 
their diverse interests to encourage them to continue voluntary co-operation. 
As co-operatives are built around a need for Collective-Action (section 7.3.4), 
it is important all supplier-shareholders feel as if they are benefiting from their 
involvement, roughly equally, and that the co-operative is pursuing strategies 
they are comfortable with, otherwise supplier-shareholders could choose to 
Exit (section 7.4.3). This chair highlights the need to try and gain supplier-
shareholder consensus: 
There is a lot to be said for trying to get a consensus or at the very 
least a very substantial majority in any controversy or issue, and I 
think given time allows, time should be taken to try and achieve that 
(A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Ultimately, for the overall good of the co-operative, it appears that decisions 
need to be made using an active approach: 
They certainly do have diverse interests. And all the board can do is try 
and balance those interests but always it has to be with the underlying 
best interests of the vehicle, being the co-operative, in mind. And 
ensuring that the vehicle, the co-operative, is sustainable, both today 
and into the future. So sure, the board has to be very mindful of 
different needs and they are there and they are real, but it’s got to be 
very careful not to pander to one in particular.  In the end it’s got to be, 
the decision has got to be made in the best interests of the vehicle as a 
whole (F4, managing director) 
 
However, sometimes tough decisions need to be taken to ensure the co-
operative continues to serve the needs of the majority, as these directors 
explain in reaction to drought (an Exogenous- Issue): 
You have got to protect the interests of 3,000 [suppler-shareholders], 
you can't jump in and try and save 20 and risk 3,000, that's always got 
to be the argument. So in making decisions about how far you push the 
envelope to get as many people as you can through a situation, you’ve 
always got to make sure that you are protecting the overwhelming 
majority even though the pressure might be there from a small minority 
(F4, managing director) 
 
There’s always got to be a lot caution in co-operatives that you don’t 
allow the emotion of the moment to pull the capital out of the company 
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and not have a good strong company to move on after a bit of a dip in 
the road. I think that’s one of the most important things that a director 
must remember is his prime focus is to [case E] or [the researchers co-
operative] and the wellbeing of that. And taking into consideration all 
the parameters that the farmers also have to handle (E1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
The board not only needs to find consensus among supplier-shareholders, it 
also has to balance supplier-shareholder needs with the requirements of the co-
operative and its customers: 
The biggest challenge for co-operatives … [is] … how they keep in 
touch and communicate with the shareholders about really where [the 
co-operative’s] been going … That’s the challenge because otherwise 
you can lose that alignment of what the shareholders want and what 
the board and the company are doing and what the customer wants and 
we pride ourselves on keeping that alignment pretty close (E4, CEO) 
 
The sub-subconcept of Active-Representation is thus presented with 
supporting evidence.  
8.2.2 Deep-Listening 
 
The second sub-subconcept is Deep-Listening and is defined here as:  
a deep and personal understanding of supplier-shareholder needs 
through informing, listening, understanding and responding to supplier-
shareholders. 
 
The Deep-Listening theoretical sub-subconcept encapsulates issues raised by 
respondents about their communications with supplier-shareholders, in 
particular, informing, listening, understanding, and responding to them. 
Communicating with supplier-shareholders appears to be a major task for the 
co-operative boards: 
As their elected representatives the board does have a major role to 
play in the ongoing communication with the shareholders (A4, CEO) 
 
The board clearly have a very important role with the communication 
with shareholders (B4, CEO) 
 
To continue an active connective dialogue with shareholders (C4, 
CEO) 
 
This is seen as an important task: 
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The farmer owns from farm to market. So they ought to be 
communicated with and to and that should be very open and honest, it 
is just a no brainer for me (F4, managing director)  
 
[The board has a role in] managing the expectations of the 
shareholders and ensuring that the company’s objectives and strategy 
are clearly and adequately transmitted to them (C3, appointed 
director)  
 
The directors, and in particular the chair, appear to play a primary role in 
supplier-shareholder communications: 
Clearly the nine farmer directors in [case C] are doing a lot of hours 
and put in a lot of time into keeping that shareholder constituency 
feeling as best they can loved and cherished, which I am sure you know 
isn't easy.  But that's one of the things they have to do, it is a large part 
of their work and it is probably peculiar to a co-operative, but in a co-
operative it is that stakeholder group you have got to get right first, 
second, and third (C3, appointed director) 
 
When it comes to the broader communication with the shareholders I’d 
say that the primary means of doing that is through the chairman and 
the board of directors (A4, CEO) 
 
[The chairs] ability to be able to communicate with the shareholders 
and to be accessible, is a very important part of [the co-operative’s] 
development (B3, appointed director) 
 
Communication is carried out in a variety of forums; from formal meetings 
(such as the AGM), annual reporting, newsletters and letters, communication 
meetings through to very informal meetings such as social gatherings and 
telephone calls:  
Okay, number one, we are always available. Okay, our phone numbers 
are published. We live here we are not sort of clandestine type people 
who are hidden away somewhere. The company has a .... newsletter, at 
different times directors will write articles in there. We run sort of 
information sessions ... there will always be at least half the directors 
there, maybe more, so we are available to talk and chat over whatever 
the issues. We have formal regional meetings where directors speak 
and are available to be questioned and obviously we have annual 
meetings. So we are available (E2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Co-operative boards may need to find alternative forums to facilitate 
communications with supplier-shareholders: 
 [AGMs are] not forums I think that suppliers feel particularly 
comfortable in. So we know that when we go out around these district 
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meetings that we’re going to get some good feedback and we certainly 
do (B4, CEO) 
 
All co-operative-related topics would appear to be food for discourse at these 
forums: 
We go through issues like company performance, market performance, 
environmental performance, what we need to be doing, and any other 
topical issues that we think are relevant at the time … its quite a long 
presentation generally … we would then have a sort of informal 
discussion with shareholders (B2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
There are issues that come up at those meetings such as the one we had 
yesterday, there will be things like the prices at the store and the tanker 
going too fast down the track all the way through to share value issues 
or milk policy issues or milk price issues and dividend issues and 
whether we put in a dividend or whether we put in a milk price (E4, 
managing director) 
 
These forums are used to gain understanding of the needs and issues of the 
supplier-shareholders and to gauge their satisfaction with the benefits they 
receive from their relationship with the co-operative: 
That’s one of our risks in fact, there is a gap between what [is required 
of the] company … and what the company does and the understanding 
of that from shareholders. And we try and communicate as much as we 
possibly can but it’s a huge gap (E4, managing director) 
 
The board also receives feedback and endorsement on major co-operative 
strategies, which builds supplier-shareholder confidence in the co-operative’s 
operations:  
The shareholders need to feel that the company has the right strategy, 
they need to understand it, they need to know and believe in it and they 
need to know that the board is driving as hard as they can to execute it 
(C3, appointed director) 
 
We have made it clear for many, many years now that this is the 
company strategy. We are into value added activities, we’ve a 
longstanding programme of capital investment to bring that about, and 
that is shared with the shareholders extensively and widely, I know it 
(A4, CEO) 
 
Across-case comparisons suggest larger co-operatives may have greater 
challenges for Deep-Listening: 
It is something that is a real challenge Kevin for a large company 
because I can't think of any issues that I get more mixed messages on 
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than shareholder communication. Where roughly speaking half the 
people are saying the company’s too big, we don't know what’s going 
on and we don't feel part of it, and half the people will say we are 
getting so much paper coming through our letterbox with you trying to 
keep us up with everything, just get on and run the business. I just don't 
know what the right answer there is (C2, supplier-shareholder 
director) 
 
Directors make themselves available for Deep-Listening: 
The formal round of twice a year, the managing director and myself, 
and one or two senior staff members will spend two weeks a year going 
round our suppliers and with supplier meetings. We usually get about 
1500 max ... so we get a reasonably good representation of members at 
those. So that's the most formal part of it, but then there is the informal 
contact, being at Fieldays, and industry meetings, those sorts of things 
where you are keeping up a fairly close contact with the membership 
(F1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Communication between the board and supplier-shareholders varies with 
circumstances. For example, unique events may exacerbate the need for 
supplier-shareholder discourse: 
And through the drought we were doing that [holding meetings] every 
week almost. We’d have a barbeque a week to see the farmers and just 
to hold their hand a little bit, so quite a bit of that (E4, managing 
director)  
 
In the early days of [case C] we were spending so much of our time on 
shareholder related issues, pulling this whole monster together and not 
so much on value creation for the business; it might have been three 
quarters, one quarter for a year or two (C2, supplier-shareholder 
director) 
 
The governing board has a task in informing the supplier-shareholders of the 
sometimes hidden benefits of co-operation, as these directors acknowledge: 
Probably really close to the top of the list [of board roles is] … getting 
into the community, working with the members, to drive a better 
understanding of what the co-op’s all about, and what's the co-op 
function, what it should mean to them, why it is so important to protect 
it. That is a massive role for the directors … so yeah that's a big point, 
big point (F4, managing director) 
 
The big challenge for us is to communicate those benefits because 
when you’ve got farmers that have been here a lifetime and they 
haven’t seen anywhere else it’s a bit hard for them to understand the 
value they do get out of their own company. But I think basically we do 
a reasonable job of that (E4, managing director)  
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By developing a deep and personal understanding of supplier-shareholders’ 
needs, by listening and understanding, co-operative directors can inform and 
respond to Supplier-Shareholder-Needs. The sub-subconcept of Deep-
Listening is outlined above and evidence utilised to support its existence. 
8.2.3 Familiarity 
 
The final sub-subconcept of Unite is Familiarity and is defined here as:  
the board’s task in obtaining trust, co-operation and loyalty from 
supplier-shareholders through engendering familiarity. 
 
The Familiarity theoretical sub-subconcept encapsulates issues raised by 
respondents around in developing trust and loyalty in their relationship with 
the co-operative through the sharing of similar values, challenges and needs. 
 
The board have a task to foster the trust of the supplier-shareholders in the co-
operative. Others have also found that trust may be important to loyalty, or the 
continuing patronage of the co-operative (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Borgen, 
2001; Hakelius & Osterberg, 2004; Hansen & Morrow, 1999, 2003; Hansen et 
al., 2002; James & Sykuta, 2006; Morrow et al., 2004; Wilson & Kennedy, 
1999). Both trust and loyalty may be critical to a dairy co-operative as co-
operation is a collective activity (see section 7.3.4). In order to gain the 
benefits of co-operation, a critical mass of people are required to continue to 
co-operate through patronising the co-operative and providing resources (in 
terms of milk and capital), as these directors suggest:  
It’s the whole relationship of the people with the business, the suppliers 
with the business. That is what a co-operative is about. If they get 
alienated from the business, then why have a co-operative? (B3, 
appointed director) 
A co-op is very much about a culture it is just not about the structure ... 
if the co-op movement is going to survive and I hope it does for the 
sake of farmers that culture has got to be right. The farmers [have] got 
to really feel and know the issues are being dealt with fairly and that 
there is something in it for him, it is worth hanging on for (F4, 
managing director) 
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This may involve a board task of gaining and maintaining a connection or 
Familiarity with supplier-shareholders: 
The board must … have a strong connection to the shareholders … it 
must have that aggregate connection with shareholders (C4, CEO) 
 
Keeping solidarity, keeping the shareholders happy, bringing the 
shareholders along with us. I am a great believer in involving people 
and keeping people in the loop (B2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Having strategies to which supplier-shareholders personally relate may also 
build supplier-shareholders’ trust in the co-operative’s ability to meet their 
needs; needs which are shared by the directors’ own life experiences: 
The shareholders need to feel that the company has the right strategy, 
they need to understand it, they need to know and believe in it and they 
need to know that the board is driving as hard as they can to execute it 
(C3, appointed director) 
 
[Researcher: Is the high level of communication a strength?] Is it a 
commercial strength? I really believe it is, when the crunch is there, we 
believe our farmers are in a better position to actually understanding 
what we are trying to do (D1, appointed chair) 
 
Trust and loyalty is also fostered by the supplier-shareholders’ confidence in 
the directors’ shared knowledge and willingness to go on the line for them: 
Obviously securing their milk off take, I mean they are not dispensable 
to us so whatever they produce we will process and will pay a 
commercial price (D2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
We’ve got to be able to convince farmers, the farmer suppliers that this 
company actually knows what it’s doing (B3, appointed director) 
 
To maintain the supplier-shareholders trust, the co-operatives must also be 
seen as a competent agent for them: 
Continue to convey to suppliers that the strategy of the business and 
just where we are. Giving, providing, reassurance to suppliers that yes 
the company’s in good hands (B4, CEO) 
 
I reckon you need to be open and honest and we are pretty good (E2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
A shared culture with open and honest interaction may also build trust between 
supplier-shareholders and the co-operative’s directors: 
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To encourage and maintain that culture that we think is very important 
for the future of our co-operative (F1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Long serving board members enhance Familiarity: 
They think we’re doing a good job …  they know the person [director], 
they think he’s genuine, they can’t see how he performs on the board.  
They tend to be, for safety’s sake, they stick with the status quo. And so 
we have very few elections and when we do, generally speaking the 
sitting member gets in. Since I’ve been on the board there’s only once 
has the sitting member been deposed (B1, supplier-shareholder chair)  
 
Personal relationships appear to foster the trust of supplier-shareholders: 
There is an interaction between the shareholders and the directors 
which is quite personal in a way, because you can physically know 
everyone of the shareholders in your own area who … in my case I’m 
elected by the area and I really do know the seventy farmers who would 
have elected me. So you have a personal relationship with them almost 
(B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The chairs and their connection with dairy farming appear to have a larger role 
than all other directors in the fostering of trust through Familiarity, as these 
directors suggest: 
Having the chairman as a farmer is probably a good thing as well.  
Just because of the importance of managing the supplier relationship 
… while I used the word “manage”, the right words are probably 
“empathize with”, and “understand”, and “relate to”, suppliers which 
is a two way thing, and I don't think it would work, not in the 
foreseeable future for me, if that person wasn’t a farmer (C3, 
appointed director) 
 
So the chairman’s role is really critical in terms of the shareholders.  
He’s got to have … the confidence of the shareholders … you have to 
be a more open person chairing an organisation like a co-operative. 
[The chair] does that very well (B3, appointed director)  
 
Having local and dairy-engaged management as part of the co-operative may 
also assist in the building and retention of trust: 
When you are a co-operative and got a common thread it’s so much 
easier to bring things together because you find your management team 
are really part of the district and understand a bit of the culture of the 
local farmers (E1, supplier-shareholder chair)  
 
It’s the farmer relations, it’s the fact that you’ve got to be able to build 
a rapport with the farmers, understand the issues they have and be able 
to communicate with the farmer. And I have found that as a key … My 
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experience has probably been that those CEOs that haven’t been able 
to do that have probably struggled, compared to those that can. It’s a 
big issue and so it should be (F4, managing director) 
  
or conversely, destroy trust as this takeover suitor found in one case: 
When we had the annual meeting to finally consummate all these share 
movements and all of that, he turned up in a lovely big Mercedes at the 
front with a good looking secretary with him, and the farmers just said 
get out … strategically he was quite dumb, cause you just don’t do that 
to farmers, you know they see a Mercedes and a fancy secretary turn 
up, it doesn’t work (E1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
  
Cross-case comparisons suggest, similar to Active-Representation and Deep-
Listening, Familiarity appears to become more difficult to achieve the larger or 
more geographically dispersed the co-operative, as this appointed director 
explains: 
That’s one of the tradeoffs that's been made by wrapping this thing up, 
that we have depersonalised the relationship between the co-op and the 
suppliers. I am sure it causes suppliers, particularly the older ones a 
fair bit of angst and bewilderment … I think it is a big challenge for 
[case C] that one (C3, appointed director) 
 
And you have got 11,000 shareholders, so we aren’t going to have that 
sense of identification with our shareholders that a smaller more user 
friendly, more intimate regional type of co-op has (C3, appointed 
director) 
 
The sub-subconcept of Familiarity is induced from the evidence and empirical 
data is used to support its existence. 
 
The three sub-subconcepts outlined above of Active-Representation, Deep-
Listening, and Familiarity appear interrelated. Active-Representation requires 
Deep-Listening. Deep-Listening is important in building and maintaining trust, 
confidence, and loyalty of supplier-shareholders in the co-operative 
highlighted in Familiarity. Familiarity, in the pursuit of Collective-Action, is 
linked to Active-Representation. While respondents were fully consistent with 
the expectations of the Unite Role, except for those points highlighted above, 
subsequent actions of co-operatives, such as attempted and actual sales of co-
operatives’ ownership interests to outside investors, could be construed to be at 
odds to aspects of the Unite role. Such actions, where they occurred, were 
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usually rigorously opposed, an action which is itself very much in 
conformance with Unite concepts. 
 
As has been discovered under Individual-Distinctions (section 7.6.1), the 
contributions of individuals on the board may vary. The chair appears to have a 
far greater role in Unite than his38 fellow directors. The chair appears to have a 
larger role than other directors in communications with supplier-shareholders 
(Deep-Listening), in particular the formal and written artefacts. The chair also 
appears to have a larger role in leadership and finding consensus (Active-
Representation) and in maintaining the trust and confidence of supplier-
shareholders (Familiarity). Examples of evidence of the chairs’ enhanced role 
follows: 
The chairman does have the major role in communicating with the 
farmers through, for example, regular letters, newsletters and through 
presentations at our communication meetings (A4, CEO)  
 
[The] most important to us is the welfare of the farmers and there is no 
better spokesperson for a company like ours than the chairman who is 
a dairy farmer and who is one of [them], in terms of their career (F4, 
managing director)   
8.2.4 Conclusions – Unite 
 
The first of the actual Board Roles identified is the theoretical subconcept of 
Unite and is defined as the co-operative board’s role in uniting supplier-
shareholders. The concept and three interrelated sub-subconcepts of Active-
Representation, Deep-Listening, and Familiarity are highlighted and empirical 
evidence utilised to support their existence. 
                                                 
38 All chairs in the study are male. 
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8.3 Strategic-Involvement 
 
Figure 8-3 Strategic-Involvement 
   
      
 
The second Board Role induced from the empirical data is the theoretical 
concept of Strategic-Involvement and is defined here as: 
the governing board’s involvement in the co-operative’s strategic 
processes and decisions. 
 
Issues surrounding Strategic-Involvement are raised in 100% of the cases and 
by 100% of the respondents (see Table 8-2 for summaries and Appendix I-2 
for further evidence). This subconcept represents the importance, type, and 
level of involvement of the governing board in the strategic processes of the 
co-operative cases and how this involvement occurs. The Board Role of 
Strategic-Involvement is largely a decision-making process for the co-
operative board. As the highest decision-making group, the strategies the board 
follow are important to the co-operative if it is to meet the needs of supplier-
shareholders. While each case follow markedly different strategies given the 
industry they were in there is a remarkable consistency in the way the boards 
involved themselves in the co-operatives strategic processes. Following the 
Eisenhardt (1989a) method, reference is made to existing literature to refine 
and enrich the subconcept. 
 
The board’s role in strategy has been described as the definitive board role 
(Stiles & Taylor, 2001) and a key requirement for directors (Ingley & Van der 
Walt, 2001). Consistent with these notions, this research finds that respondents 
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see issues around board involvement in strategy as a highly-rated role of the 
co-operative board: 
 It comes back to setting the strategic direction is by far the biggest 
[role] (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
[The] most important thing [board role] is to ensure that the long term 
direction and focus of the business is right. So we are talking about 
vision and strategy, so that’s one. That’s by far the most important (D1, 
appointed chair) 
 
Well it [the board] no doubt sets the strategies and the goals and 
objective of the company (E1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
As we have seen in the corporate governance literature (Chapter 3), there is 
limited consensus on how boards go about fulfilling their strategy role, their 
impact on the strategic process, and on any overarching theoretical perspective 
(Hendry & Kiel, 2004; Stiles & Taylor, 2001). This lack of consensus has been 
exacerbated by a lack of qualitative empirical research (Huse, 2007; Ingley & 
Van der Walt, 2001; Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006) and 
by not taking account of contextual factors (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Hendry & 
Kiel, 2004). This lack of empirical understanding has led to theoretical 
prescriptions (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992) about desirable levels for board 
involvement in strategic processes with little understanding of the actual 
undertakings of boards (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Hendry & Kiel, 2004). These 
findings help to explain how boards of directors are involved, in one context. 
 
Three sub-subconcepts of Strategic-Involvement are induced from the 
empirical evidence: Strategic-Control, the co-operative board’s authority to 
accept or reject strategic proposals, hire the CEO and review strategies; 
Boundary-Makers, setting the purpose of the co-operative and the strategic 
domain that management is able to operate in; and Shaping-Strategies, the co-
operative boards’ ability to influence the development of strategies. There is a 
substantial body of literature that touches on related elements, which is 
referred to in the following section, where it may be capable of further 
informing the findings. The conceptualisations of McNulty and Pettigrew’s 
(1999) three levels of part-time board member involvement in strategy are 
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broadly similar; taking strategic decisions, shaping strategic decisions, and 
shaping the content, context and conduct of strategy (p. 55).  
 
Table 8-2 Evidence of Strategic-Involvement 
Subconcept 
 
Frequency of mention Examples from interviews 
Cases Respondents
No. % No. % 
Strategic-
Involvement 
6 100 22 100 The board is responsible for establishing 
the direction, the vision and approving the 
strategy of the business going forward 
(D1, appointed chair) 
Strategic-
Control 
6 100 22 100 The board endorses and approves this 
strategic plan and from within the 
strategic plan the annual business plan 
each year (A3, appointed director) 
Boundary-
Makers 
 
6 100 22 100 The board will say, fundamentally, there is 
some very broad parameters - we are a co-
operative, we are linked to our farmers, we 
have so much equity available to us, we 
are these core things and we must pick up 
our suppliers milk and we must convert 
that, we must move up the value chain, 
those are very broad parameters (C4, 
CEO) 
Shaping-
Strategy 
 
 
6 100 22 
 
100 [Strategies] go through a gestation period 
and your strategies will be sort of mulled 
over, probably first with the chairman and 
then developed and then talked about as 
an idea. So directors have some time to 
create input at that stage and then 
crystallise and then presented as a formal 
presentation of whatever that strategy is 
going to be and then the board decides …. 
but it is a moulding process (F1, s-s chair) 
 
As strategic decisions are significant decisions for the co-operative, the board 
follow the Decision-Making-Style outlined in Dynamics (section 7.6.3.3, 
chapter 7). Strategic-Involvement’s three theoretical sub-subconcepts are 
discussed below. 
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 8.3.1 Strategic-Control 
 
As seen under Board-Management-Relationships (7.6.3.2), the co-operative 
boards have the task of ratifying or approving strategies and as such have the 
authority to accept or reject strategic proposals. This is the idea of Strategic-
Control: 
the co-operative board’s authority to accept or reject strategic 
proposals, and make CEO hiring decisions. 
 
Issues surrounding Strategic-Control are raised in 100% of the co-operative 
cases and by 100% of respondents. Broadly in line with Fama and Jensen’s 
(1983b) ratification step in the decision making process, Strategic-Control 
highlights the board’s task at the end of a decision process in “taking strategic 
decisions” (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999) as the “ultimate arbiter” of the 
strategic decision (Stiles & Taylor, 2001). In what Stiles and Taylor (2001) 
term ‘Gatekeeping’ (see section 8.3.1), the board acts as a screening 
mechanism to ensure there is alignment between the strategic direction 
outlined by the board and the strategic actions undertaken by management. 
Strategic-Control is a key factor in determining the co-operative’s strategic 
direction and it also enables the board’s input into strategic development. This 
relationship also creates a link between Control and Strategic-Involvement 
(illustrated later in this chapter). 
8.3.1.1 Authority 
 
The co-operative board’s authority to reject strategic proposals (and 
management’s aversion to having proposals rejected39), (see above, Board-
Management-Relationships), and to hire and monitor the CEO, allows director 
influence into other parts of the strategic process (see Shaping-Strategies, 
below). The board is the ultimate gatekeeper (section 8.3.1) to resources, 
largely through “signing off” strategies, business plans and budgets that allow 
resources to be put into place to pursue strategies. All co-operative case boards 
                                                 
39 McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) for example, find that the high approval of proposals by the 
board was not due to the managerialist notion of the board as a rubber stamp but the high level 
of self-regulation by the executive as rejection of proposals is very undesirable for executives 
(pp. 60-61) 
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ratify or endorse strategic initiatives, that is, they are authoritative gatekeepers 
to strategies: 
The board of course endorses, sometimes creates, but in our case 
endorses the company’s strategy (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The board has to approve the overall strategic direction (C4, CEO) 
 
A ten year strategy was decided upon and endorsed by the board (D1, 
appointed chair) 
  
Consistent with Stiles and Taylor’s (2001) notion of “ensuring the alignment 
of company purpose with shareholders’ interests” (p. 32), the evidence shows 
that the ability to accept or reject strategies allows the governing boards to 
align the strategies with the needs of the supplier-shareholders40: 
The most important thing is to ensure that we don’t become miss-
aligned with what the shareholders want and that then rolls into the 
strategy setting (E4, managing director) 
 
Ensuring that the strategic direction of the company is aligned with 
where the shareholders want the company to go and is commercially 
rational and executable. So a strategy that fits the shareholders and is 
a sensible business like strategy, is number one [role of the board] (C3, 
appointed director) 
8.3.1.2 Hiring the CEO 
 
As has been highlighted in Board-Management-Relationships (section 7.6.3.2) 
respondents see the selection of the CEO (or MDs) as a decision with large 
strategic consequences. In line with the findings of Stiles (2001) and Stiles and 
Taylor (2001) and the arguments of Westphal and Fredrickson (2001) and 
Hendry and Kiel (2004) this research finds, within the context of New Zealand 
and Australian co-operative dairy companies, that boards influence the co-
operatives’ strategies by selecting CEOs (or MDs) who they believe have 
competencies to enhance, develop and execute the co-operative’s strategies: 
The board made the strategy, the board then looked for a CEO who 
could implement that strategy (B2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
[The board] are hiring a chief executive and approving a management 
team that has the capabilities not only to deliver on the strategic 
                                                 
40 Thus establishing a link between the theoretical concepts of Strategic-Involvement and 
Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits, particularly Income-Enhancement and Risk-Reduction.  
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framework, but also to challenge and improve on it over time (C4, 
CEO) 
 
In terms of choosing this manager [MD], it was quite clear that … we 
really had to find a person that could drive strategic thinking. That was 
really important … this company strategically had to - there had to be 
some changes made, there’s no doubt about that (E2, supplier-
shareholder director)  
8.3.1.3 Monitoring 
 
Once strategies have been endorsed, the co-operative boards are involved in 
Monitoring (see section 8.4.4.1), reviewing and evaluating the progress of the 
strategies implementation: 
It is the responsibility of management, but also of the board to ensure 
that there is a proper reporting function through to the board on a 
regular basis, at present monthly, so that targets of the strategies that 
we have set are being met or otherwise  (F4, managing director)  
 
Reviewing as how we are going against the performance to achieve the 
strategic targets (E4, managing director) 
 
Ultimately what I [the CEO] will sign off on the board with is those 
hard financial KPIs and a series of other KPIs that would be sometimes 
less financially driven but strategically driven (C4, CEO) 
 
The monitoring and reviewing of strategies also allow the board to continue to 
have an involvement in the strategic process after strategic decisions are made 
by enabling the board to reopen strategic discussions and provide ongoing 
input into (re)shaping the strategy (see Shape-Strategy, below). Stiles (2001) 
believes that the board  may be “instrumental in breaking organizational habits 
and forcing change” by its constant review of business definition and corporate 
strategy (p. 646). Strategies are continually revisited, evaluated, tweaked or 
altered as more information becomes available or circumstances change, 
allowing the board continual involvement in the strategic process: 
We’re about to do that again next week [strategy session] to test 
ourselves again and really also test whether some of the strategies we 
set four or five years ago are coming off and if there’s need for more to 
be added to or the honing of some of the ones we’re doing (E1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
At least once a year we review that [our strategy] - the big fundamental 
drivers - to see whether there needs to be a tweaking of the strategy … 
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three years after that we did what we call a strategy refresh where we 
did a deep dive into the strategy, just to make certain that we were 
firstly comfortable, and secondly with some of the large geopolitical 
movements - was our strategy still appropriate? (C1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
Changes in the co-operative’s environment41 is particularly important for the 
board to take into account when reviewing strategies, as this director suggests: 
In recent times we come back and revisit that September/October, just 
see from an overall policy, okay what’s shifted? [a competitor] has 
done this or the world market’s have done this, or the Australian dollar 
is crashing or proteins are good or … (E4, managing director) 
 
Strategic-Control is introduced and defined as the co-operative boards’ 
authority to accept or reject strategic proposals, hire the CEO and review 
strategies and is an ongoing part of board involvement in the co-operative’s 
strategic decision making process. This authority allows co-operative boards to 
ensure that there is alignment between the strategies and the needs of the co-
operative’s supplier-shareholders.  
8.3.2 Boundary-Makers 
 
The second sub-subconcept of Strategic-Involvement is as Boundary-Makers 
and is defined as: 
the board’s role in defining the purpose of the co-operative; its general 
strategic direction and the strategic domain in which management are 
able to operate. 
 
This research, in line with Stiles (2001), finds boards set the “business 
definition” and the “overarching direction” of the organisation (p. 637). Stiles 
and Taylor (2001) describe the corporate definition as answering the “what 
business are we in?” question. They see this “setting of the overarching 
direction of the organization” as a defining characteristic of the boards’ role 
(Stiles & Taylor, 2001, p. 39). The findings in this research are also consistent 
with the observations of Mizruchi (1983) and the findings of Stiles and 
Taylor’s (2001), that boards may set the “strategic parameters” of strategic 
decisions and the “domain of discretion” of managers. Boundary-Makers is 
also broadly in line with what Mintzberg and Waters (1985) describe as 
                                                 
41 theoretical concept of Exogenous-Issues 
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“umbrella” strategies, which limit the actions of management and provide 
direction for the co-operative. McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) note boards’ 
involvement in shaping the context, content, and conduct of strategy through 
“the construction of contexts in which strategy is formulated and debated” (p. 
65). Similarly, Ravasi and Zattoni (2006) suggest (some) boards set “the 
overall goals and the boundaries within which strategic plans were expected to 
be formulated”  (p. 1691).  
 
Co-operative boards are active Boundary-Makers defining things such as “we 
are a co-operative dairy company”, “we collect, process and market our 
supplier-shareholders’ milk”, “we aspire to add value to our supplier-
shareholders’ milk,” largely restricting their business to the collection, 
processing, and marketing their supplier-shareholders’ milk42.  
As a company we are in the business, or we have the policy if you like, 
of being in the business of collecting, processing, marketing and adding 
value to our farmers’ milk (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Those top line things about the philosophy, the culture, the sort of 
company we are, and the sort of targets in milk returns and return on 
assets etcetera we want, and where the balance sheet should be the 
board do a fair bit on  (E4, managing director) 
 
[The board] agrees the core strategies for the business (A3, appointed 
director) 
 
The following evidence suggests co-operative governing boards are involved 
in setting the boundaries of the strategies: 
The board clearly sets the boundaries, that's what they have to do (C4, 
CEO) 
 
The management team really needs to be driving the strategy for the 
company with the board setting the overall parameters in terms of 
returns to the shareholders and so on and the more umbrella material 
if you like (B4, CEO) 
 
To start hiving off into other activities outside, despite all the 
temptations that are put in front of you, you have to be very, very 
                                                 
42 All co-operatives in the study have unrelated businesses, not least of which are retail farm 
requisite stores. These are, however, in terms of their turnover a relatively minor percentage of 
the co-operative’s business and arguably in line with Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits 
(see section 7.3 above) 
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thoughtful about why you would want to do that (B3, appointed 
director) 
 
While retaining Veto-Approve (section 8.4.1) rights over strategic decisions 
the board expects the CEO or managing director (and senior executive team) to 
also test those strategic boundaries. 
 
The theoretical sub-subconcept of Boundary-Makers is presented here and 
evidence displayed to support its existence. Co-operative boards set and 
maintain core strategies and strategic boundaries in which management may 
operate, although these boundaries are loosely defined and the board expects to 
be tested by management on those boundaries.  
8.3.3 Shaping-Strategy 
 
Due to their involvement and authority in strategies, co-operative governing 
boards are also in a position to help form strategies. The final sub-subconcept 
of Strategic-Involvement is Shaping-Strategy. Issues surrounding the sub-
subconcept are raised in all cases and by 100 percent of respondents. Shaping-
Strategies and is defined as: 
the co-operative board’s active and ongoing involvement in the 
development of strategies. 
 
In line with Rindova (1999), these findings (Decision-making-Styles, section 
7.6.3.3) suggest strategic decision-making evolves “through complex, 
nonlinear and fragmented processes” that are “interactive and iterative” (p. 
956). The evidence here suggests that within the context of New Zealand and 
Australian dairy co-operatives, boards are involved in shaping  strategies and 
the evidence also finds considerable sympathy for what Hendry and Kiel 
(2004) describe as strategic control: 
Strategic control involves the board exerting a continuous process of 
formal and informal influence over management, beginning early in 
strategy development and involving iterative consultation from 
development through to implementation and evaluation. It also 
involves the board evaluating management based on their strategic 
proposals pre-implementation as well as on the financial results post-
implementation. (p. 511) 
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Shaping-Strategies, however, more accurately reflect the boards’ involvement 
in the co-operatives’ strategic processes. The board not only controls 
management’s development of strategy but also adds value to the strategy 
through advice and counsel: 
It doesn't mean that where you start is where you end in terms of 
strategy. Again a good co-op is about the taking on board the 
suggestions and the ideas of others then you pull together something in 
the end that everybody is comfortable with and that happens a lot (F4, 
managing director) 
 
Consistent with what we have seen empirically (Decision-Making-Styles, 
section 7.6.3.3), McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) find that executives self-
regulate proposals in anticipation of the board’s response, rarely allowing a 
recommendation to be rejected. As such, even the threat of rejection is 
sufficient to change strategic proposals and ideas:  
Good management sense that, they read the tea leaves around the table 
and they instinctively come to know that there are certain proposals or 
ideas which aren’t ever going to fly with the board (C3, appointed 
director) 
 
The board and management - because they work together you kind of 
have a feel for what would be acceptable to the board and what 
wouldn’t be (F3, appointed director) 
 
The boards have considerable involvement in the shaping of strategies by 
working collaboratively with management through the strategic process in a 
continuous and iterative way: 
That [strategy] is something that has been developed by both, a 
combination of the directors and the managers, so it’s been a joint 
effort would be my view (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
It tends to take the two together instead of having management come up 
with a wonderful idea over here and the directors pulling it apart, it’s a 
bit of a joint process (E1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
There will be an engagement between the board and the management 
which will drive out a common view about where the company should 
go strategically (C3, appointed director) 
 
Similar to Rindova’s (1999) findings, co-operative boards are able to influence 
strategies by having early exposure in the strategic decision making process: 
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 [The strategy will] be first of all exposed at a principle level, there will 
be a good high level strategic discussion in the board, the comfort level 
and the confidence is there around being on strategy, then it will go 
down into a much more detailed process before coming back finally to 
board approval (C3, appointed director) 
 
The co-operative boards debate, question, assess, advise and review through 
the strategic process. The board requires adequate information from 
management on an ongoing basis to form opinions: 
[Management] need to be able to present a full, complete, accurate 
story, a picture, take all the time that is necessary to explain to the 
board the hows, whys, and whens, the money involved, the whole thing 
… the key then to the board is that they form a view that they are 
getting all the information, complete and accurate so that ultimately 
they will sign off on a decision to go a particular way (F4, managing 
director) 
 
Co-operative boards assess strategic proposals, as the same managing director 
states: 
There is a real need and a requirement for the board to be able to 
decipher the good from the bad and to be able to really question that 
stuff to detail so that they are - in the end they have to make the 
decision (F4, managing director) 
 
Directors constantly engage and question proposed strategies: 
Are we broad enough? Are we diverse enough? Are we in the growth 
markets? Are we in the growth products? Does it fit with our 
technology? Our R and D etc?  We put all of those things back up to 
the board and say well we think we ought to do a bit of this, head in 
this direction (E4, managing director) 
 
[At a strategy planning session] we said well ‘what if?’; what if there is 
a drought?, well okay, this is what farmers will do and so on, what if 
there is a price crash? … okay well this is what we’ll do… there were 
three what ifs? Nobody said what if those three happened together, and 
they did. But … our strategy was to be flexible and we’ve come out of 
that circumstances in pretty good shape relative the rest of the industry 
… we had created a management team which is pretty flexible and 
proactive and that was our best strategy (F1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
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The co-operative boards may also be involved in shaping strategies by offering 
strategic advice43 as these respondents suggest: 
It’s pretty poor if a board can't actually from their lofty vantage point 
up there in a helicopter, not bogged down in the day to day issues, if 
they can't add some value and provide some constructive strategic 
thinking. It certainly is what I see at [case C], I do see that happening 
(C3, appointed director) 
 
The other appointed director at the present time gives us access again 
to international experience, the formation of joint ventures, across the 
world, and probably access to government organisations through trade 
and industry (A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
It is the intense, personal and ongoing nature of this involvement that informs 
the sub-subconcept of Shaping-Strategy. 
8.3.3.1 Finding balance 
 
Consistent with the Board Role of Unite (section 8.2) and similar to what 
Ravasi and Zattoni (2006) term as “facilitating the reconciliation of diverging 
goals and interests of represented shareholders” (p. 1697), the board attempts 
to find a balance of views, even toward reconciling diverse views: 
[The strategy] would have the ability to add value to milk. As long as 
that also gave the farmers who own the business, the opportunity to 
grow their business because we saw that was the greatest opportunity 
for them and they perceived it as the best opportunity for them to grow 
their own wealth (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
This managing director battles with the strategic need to balance supplier-
shareholders’ need for milk processing assets and a need for return on 
investment on capital:  
This constant battle with the co-operative of balancing volume … and 
business performance is a really difficult thing to grapple with. The 
issue of putting money into facilities to process milk where there is no 
margin or very little margin, but very, very important to the dairy 
farming community because they just need this constant growth … that 
makes it really, really difficult and I don’t know the answer to that, I 
really don’t (D4, managing director) 
 
                                                 
43 Also a Serve Role (see section 8.4 below), thus highlighting a relationship between the 
Board’s Role in Strategic-Involvement and Serve. 
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or involvement in finding balance in ensuring individual strategies fit with 
overall strategy: 
We don't actually discuss necessarily the Australian strategy in 
isolation, it is where it fits with the overall strategy (C2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
Before ratifying a strategy (Strategic-Control) the board must be comfortable 
with it. Co-operative boards gain comfort by working with management, 
demanding accountability/information, questioning, debating and assessing:  
You have got to make sure everybody’s comfortable. The questions that 
have been asked have been fairly answered, you have got to be flexible 
enough to accept and take on board suggestions from the board (F4, 
managing director) 
 
What’s [strategies] presented to the board is eventually a moulded 
decision between well basically executive work, but the board is 
brought along with it so that it doesn't get to that final stage unless the 
board is reasonably comfortable with it (F1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
 
Finding balance between strategic interests is part of the co-operative board’s 
role in Shaping-Strategies and part of their Strategic-Involvement Board Role. 
8.3.3.2 Involvement 
 
The research finds, in general, that boards initiate and have greater 
involvement in the development of strategies that are closely associated with 
the supplier-shareholders: 
Milk growth strategy because it’s very much closer to the farmer 
directors, much better knowledge of what is going on than management 
typically do. They [the board] tend to get much … more involved in 
that particular area … there is certainly much more involvement by 
directors (B4, CEO) 
 
That particular initiative had a very, very high board content or input, 
because it was very much a shareholder related project or strategy. 
And therefore by its very nature the directors were in a very good 
position to discuss, debate, suggest, provide very constructive input 
into the process (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The research also finds that management is the primary driver, initiator and has 
greater involvement in strategies closely associated with manufacturing and the 
market: 
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The CEO drives the strategy and decides to bring the board with him 
and it’s where most of the ideas have to come from. Just because that's 
what his skill should be, his experiences in the marketplace, post farm 
gate is in the manufacturing, marketing, finance, all those skills that he 
should have, he can't typically expect as a primary that the board have 
got those … the primary driver for the strategic direction, has to be in 
my view within the co-op is the CEO (F4, managing director) 
 
Part of [the MD’s] charter is obviously to be in the market place and 
he deals day to day with the customers and countless potential 
customers … clearly he has a key role in development of strategy. And 
here are the opportunities, which ones are we going to go with (E2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
There is evidence the larger the strategic initiative (in relation to the co-
operative) the greater the board involvement in the strategic process. Case C 
(and B in the past) use board committees and management to gain confidence 
in the strategic process: 
A major acquisition, something very significant for [case C], what the 
board tends to do then is set up a sub-committee that can be more 
involved in the detail of an acquisition, just to make sure that the board 
is comfortable about it (C4, CEO) 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are another example: 
Merger acquisition was definitely driven by the board and only part of 
the board, sometimes in defiance of the board. When it got to the more 
complex acquisitions of non-co-operatives it’s being driven by the 
management … mergers with other co-operatives was driven without 
exception by the board, acquisition of other businesses driven very 
clearly by the management … they lose patience looking at co-
operative mergers (D1, appointed chair) 
 
Within-case comparisons suggest variation in management and the boards’ 
perceptions of their involvement in strategy. The differentiation in types and 
levels of strategies may explain respondent variation about whether the board 
or management drives strategies, as evidenced from these two respondents 
(from the same case): 
It’s up to the management team in my view to lead the board in terms 
of the strategy. Obviously the board has an input but the management 
team really needs to be driving the strategy for the company … the 
detail of the strategy comes from the management team (B4, CEO) 
 
It was a board initiative. I think it was obvious to [case B] having made 
a decision to go on its own that we could not compete with commodity 
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against the larger players … so we essentially said in terms of policy 
this is what we want to do (B2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
This variation of view over the role of management and the role of the board in 
the strategy process is articulated by this CEO:  
This is where we may get differences of views, I would say generally 
[the board] to approve strategic recommendations from management. 
Most of the work that goes on here in [case C] is management develop 
strategy and the board approves it, the board does have input into it, so 
there is a fine line between directs and approves (C4, CEO) 
 
These respondents acknowledge differing influences at differing times by 
management and the board in the strategic process: 
At times of course we’ve had management who have, if you like, 
brought that thinking to the board and at times we’ve had exceptionally 
good directors who have really been able to take that overall 
philosophy, you know a great deal further in its thinking (A2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
That probably the simplest one, would be capital structure is clearly 
board driven, whereas international business would be more 
management driven and board approved (C4, CEO) 
 
A possible explanation for this variation may be that of utilising strengths in 
information and expertise of both board and management as they try to realise 
Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits. 
8.3.3.4 Implement 
 
The co-operative boards (apart from MDs) have very little involvement in the 
execution of strategies: 
The board doesn’t run the company, the board sets the parameters (E2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
In a nutshell I guess the broad direction strategically is the part of the 
directors, but the execution of that on the part of the management and 
the [management] team (A4, CEO) 
 
The question of how we implement that was left to the CEO who is 
expert in that area (B2, supplier-shareholder director) 
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Only in strategies very directly related to supplier-shareholders or in crisis 
situations do directors appear to have involvement in the implementation of 
strategies. In this example of a takeover, the board played a more active role in 
the execution of the strategy:  
[18 years ago] a company tried to take us over … it was a very big role 
[for the board], it was an interesting one … the directors, and I can 
remember nights where I just never got off the phone … and some of 
the older directors did that more prominently than I did (E1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
In the strategic process the board have little involvement in the “work” 
associated with getting the strategies to a level that they can be ratified: 
Management will come up with a lot of the issues or do the risk review 
or put papers and presentations to the board about - we could go and 
do this and we could do that  … management do most of the work and I 
suppose the CEO in this context (E4, managing director) 
 
All done by the management, reviewed by the board, but all the 
initiatives and the leg work if you like, done, definitely by the 
management (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
8.3.3.5 Exogenous Issues 
 
Board involvement in strategy is contingent on contextual factors (Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999; Lynall et al., 2003; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006). Issues 
surrounding the theoretical concept of Exogenous-Issues (see Chapter 7, 
section 7.2) have an impact on board involvement in the strategy process44. 
Many strategies appear to be in response or shaped by Exogenous-Issues 
making them dynamic documents: 
I have another one [strategy document] to prepare because that needs 
to be a fairly dynamic document because things do change over the 
year (B4, CEO) 
 
For example, the effects of drought on the need for milk processing capacity 
and the flow-on effect require board review of strategies: 
For quite some time in the future now we don’t need to retain as much 
earnings as we used to because there is no [milk] volume growth and 
we actually have probably a processing capacity for a hundred million 
litres of milk that we don’t need.  ... So we can look at much more high 
                                                 
44 Thus highlighting a link between the theoretical concepts of Exogenous-Issues and 
Strategic-Involvement. 
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value things and that’s much more healthy (E2, supplier-shareholder 
director) 
 
This respondent highlights the effect of deregulation on the co-operative’s 
strategies: 
The board was saying that well we need a vision for this business 
because deregulation has certainly impacted badly on the business 
(D2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
And these respondents note the effect of competition on strategies: 
If [case D] hadn’t of grown geographically and grown its product base 
it simply wouldn’t be here, it just would have just disappeared …  it 
had to become nationally relevant and it had to have a far broader 
range of products than it currently had so it had to expand 
geographically and product definition (D4, managing director) 
 
As you know there has been some considerable rationalisation of the 
industry in Australia. The positioning of [case F] during that 
rationalisation - how we might approach some companies, whether it is 
good to amalgamate, take over, buy or whatever (F3, appointed 
director) 
 
Some strategies seem to be historically driven: 
[The added value strategy] … was driven by the history … it was 
because of that’s how we were made and then because of our 
geographic spread and our, perhaps lesser pools of farmers which 
obviously you best be in a value added product if you can (D2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
It’s something that probably originally developed twenty years ago but 
it has evolved as a overall company policy or philosophy or strategy, 
call it what you like, so that everyone if you like, is indoctrinated with 
the concept (laughter) (A2, supplier-shareholder director)   
 
Overall, Shaping-Strategies refers to the co-operative boards’ role in 
developing strategies. The evidence suggests that co-operative boards shape 
the strategies of the co-operative through the co-operative decision-making 
process, iteratively, over time, with management, at a number of strategic 
levels, in a number of different forums, both formally and informally, by 
receiving information, debating, questioning, and finding balance, until 
comfort is found. The boards respond to Exogenous-Issues in the strategic 
process. 
250 
 
8.3.4 Conclusions – Strategic-Involvement 
 
The Strategic-Involvement role has been defined as the governing board’s 
involvement in the co-operative’s strategic processes. Evidence in support 
suggests that New Zealand and Australian dairy co-operative boards are 
involved in the co-operatives’ strategic processes on an ongoing basis. Three 
sub-subconcepts are identified as Strategic-Control; Boundary-Makers; and 
Shaping-Strategies. The boards have an involvement in Strategic-Control. The 
boards ratify strategies. The boards hire the CEO (or MD) with an eye on the 
co-operative’s strategy. The boards have involvement in setting core strategies 
and strategic boundaries. The boards have involvement in the shaping and 
reviewing of strategies. The extent of this involvement is dependent on the 
strategic decision. The co-operative boards play very little part in the 
implementation of strategies45 except in times of crisis and in strategies closely 
associated with supplier-shareholders. 
                                                 
45 Apart, of course, from managing directors 
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8.4 Control 
Figure 8-4 Control 
 
 
The third of the theoretical Board Roles is Control and is defined as: 
 
the many aspects of being in charge of decisions and activities at any 
points in the year, to initiate or veto actions and to have general 
oversight in multiple ways. 
 
Issues surrounding the theoretical concept of Control are raised in 100% of the 
cases and by 100% of the respondents (see Table 8-3 for summaries and 
Appendix I-3 for further evidence). 
 
As has been seen in Board-Management-Relationships (section 7.6.3.2 above), 
the co-operative boards have formal “power” over the operations, and in 
particular, the management of the co-operative. In overview, the boards are the 
peak decision-making authority within the co-operative with the ability to veto 
significant decisions. Boards have the authority to accept or reject any 
executive proposals, including strategies. The co-operative boards have a role 
in hiring, firing and remunerating the CEO (or MD), as well as management 
succession. The co-operative boards have a task in delegating (most) aspects of 
the management of the co-operative to the CEO (or MD), through delegated 
authorities and policies that allow a framework for the executive to work 
within before having to come back to the board for permission to act. The 
boards monitor and evaluate co-operative and management performance. The 
board also has a task to protect the assets of the co-operative and to retain the 
co-operative nature of the company. These various tasks grant boards 
significant Control over the operations of the co-operative. Again there was 
remarkable consistency in respondents’ views on the board’s role in Control. 
There is however some variation in actions post data collection in some cases 
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around protecting the co-operative nature of the company (Protect) as some 
boards attempted to, or sold to, outside investors. 
 
The co-operative board’s Control role is largely internally focussed (to the co-
operative) and principally applies to the relationship between the board and 
management. The board’s Control role, insofar as it, or elements of it, are 
recognised elsewhere, receives attention from the popular and business press, 
shareholders, regulators and researchers. Corporate scandals and the 
dominance of agency theory and its effect on governance codes and legislation 
lead Control, in its recognised corporate sector forms, to being the most 
prominent of the board’s roles (Van den Berghe & Baelden, 2005).  
 
As highlighted in the co-operative context (Chapter 2), the theoretical 
subconcept of Control has a close association to the co-operative principle of 
user control, as Ginder and Deiter (1989) explain: 
the board of directors plays a particularly important role in a co-
operative corporation because of its importance to the co-operative 
control principle. By law, the management of the co-operative is the 
board’s responsibility. (p. 318)  
 
This excerpt from one of the co-operative’s annual report highlights many 
aspects of the co-operative board’s Control Role:  
 Key responsibilities of the Board include: 
• Defining the strategic direction for [case A] and establishing 
policies to support the effective management of the company; 
• Appointing and overseeing the performance and review of the 
CEO; 
• Setting the terms of CEO and executive management 
employment; 
• Monitoring the financial performance of the company and, [case 
A’s] risk management; 
• Ensuring that [case A] has robust corporate governance 
practices; and  
• Ensuring [case A’s] regulatory and legislative compliance  
([case A] 2008 Annual report) 
 
The power or Control of the operations of the co-operative rests with the 
board. The board has authority to manage the operations of the co-operative 
through the board’s mandate from the supplier-shareholders, the co-operative 
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constitution and statutory acts46 of Parliament. Under the co-operative 
constitution the boards are empowered to manage the co-operative (see 
Supplier-Shareholder-Controls, Chapter 7, Vote) as this example from the case 
C constitution states: 
 13  POWERS OF DIRECTORS 
13.1 Management of Company: The business and affairs of the 
Company shall be managed by, or under the direction or supervision of, 
the Board, provided that the chairperson of the Board shall be a 
Director elected in accordance with clause 12.247  
       ([case C] constitution) 
 
This power grants the board a Control role in managing the operations of the 
co-operative and in making significant decisions across the range of the co-
operative’s operations. In practice, the boards delegate, through a series of 
delegated authorities and policies (see section 8.3.2) much of the day-to-day 
operations of the co-operative to professional managers and Oversee 
management’s performance in this endeavour. This research finds that co-
operative boards retain the right to make significant decisions and Oversee 
(Table 8-3) the activities of management. 
 
 
                                                 
46 In New Zealand the Co-operative Companies Act 1996, and the Companies Act 1993. 
47 Elected by shareholders 
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Table 8-3 Evidence of Control 
Subconcept Frequency of mention Examples from interviews 
Cases Respondents 
No. % No. % 
Control 6 100 22 100 [The board] concerns itself with the 
questions of delegation and of 
authorities, it concerns itself with 
making sure that the  chief executive 
and his team are meeting the 
objectives with regard to the dairy 
company  ... and making sure that the 
company through its multitude of tasks 
is managed properly, that the chief 
executive is doing what he’s supposed 
to be doing … [and] making sure that 
all the things get done that need to get 
done  ... while complying with all 
applicable legislation that we must 
live with.  So that to me is the primary 
task of the [case A] board (A4, CEO) 
Veto-
Approve 
 
 
6  100 22 
 
100 This board has no compunction to say 
I’m not happy with this … make no 
mistake the policy is signed off by the 
board, it’s not rubber stamped (E2, s-s 
director) 
Delegate 6 100 22 
 
100 [The board] defines the policies that 
are to operate, agrees the delegated 
authorities with the CEO and then 
monitors the performance of the 
organisation through the CEO (A3, 
appointed director) 
Hire-
Remunerate-
Fire 
6 100 22 
 
100 It’s the board’s lever on management 
that its solely the board’s 
responsibility to appoint the chief 
executive and at some time should it 
ever happen, the removal of the chief 
executive.  It’s such a fundamental 
issue I should think for any board, 
whether it is a co-operative board or a 
corporate board  (C1, s-s chair) 
Oversee 
 
6 100 22  
 
100 I’m very, very confident that if I was 
trying to go off in a different direction 
[as Enron’s CEO did] we have 
sufficient feedback loops in this 
business that the board would 
intervene (C4, CEO) 
Protect 6 
 
 
 
100
 
 
 
22 
 
 
 
100 As a set of co-operative shareholders I 
think that they can feel very pleased 
about the fact that their board of 
directors over the years has been able 
to apply these [co-operative] 
principles and bring back to them 
through their milk payment the 
benefits of those investments (A4, 
CEO) 
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The empirical evidence suggests that the board use Control to guide the 
operations of the co-operative to meet the needs of the supplier-shareholders: 
Ultimately the board is responsible to shareholders for all the activities 
of company … the board’s hiring of the Chief Executive and 
monitoring of the performance and the ability to remove the Chief 
Executive is critical to the board’s obligation to the shareholders to 
make sure the business is run well (C4, CEO) 
 
The ultimate power has got to rest with the board. The board appoints 
the chief executive. The board finally must authorise all capital 
expenditure and any movements outside policy. Any policy changes 
must be signed off by the board. That’s what a board’s there for. After 
all, who is going to defend the position with the shareholders? The 
board is accountable for that (B3, appointed director) 
 
Evidence is presented below demonstrating the existence of a Control role for 
the governing boards of co-operative dairy companies utilising five theoretical 
sub-subconcepts; Veto-Approve, Delegate, Hire-Remunerate-Fire, Oversee, 
and Protect. 
8.4.1 Veto-Approve 
 
After delegating (see Delegate, section 8.3.2 below) much of the day-to-day 
management of the operations of the co-operative to managers, the board retain 
the Veto rights to usually significant decisions across a range of the co-
operative’s operations. Things a board may Veto include decisions: to hire, fire 
and remunerate the CEO (or MD); to establish delegated authorities and 
policies; to accept or reject strategies and business plans; to ratify budgets, 
capital and financial, and what to Oversee. That is, the board has a Veto to 
significant decisions. Evidence of the theoretical sub-subconcept of Veto-
Approve appears in 100 % of cases and respondents and is defined here as: 
the co-operative boards’ task in approving or rejecting significant 
decisions. 
 
The following respondents provide examples of the co-operative board’s Veto-
Approve task with significant decisions: 
Things like treasury policy that is set by the board, the terms of any 
committees are set by the board, in respect of strategy … they [the 
board]  would sign off on the blueprint for the future and they would do 
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that on an annual basis …  Also statutory compliance reporting and so 
on, they ultimately sign off on that (B4, CEO) 
 
A typical or normal board role [is to]… approve the recommendations 
of management as it relates to all issues of a two billion dollar 
business, from manufacturing through marketing, through finance, 
everything (F4, MD) 
 
The co-operative boards may have a role in Veto-Approving the allocation of 
resources: 
The board, of course, ultimately has to approve the budget every year 
and the budgeting process has to incorporate as much as we 
[management] possibly can. The expenses that will be incurred in 
pursuing these various activities, and obviously the revenues that will 
be gained because of those activities (A4, CEO) 
 
[Management] bring in capital budgets and explain where we are early 
in the season as to what the budget will be for that year, what are the 
projects that are envisaged. We [the board] then, as each of those 
projects is brought forward, we approve or disapprove of capital 
expenditure in line with that budget (F2, supplier-shareholder director)  
 
The board has a role in Veto-Approving strategies: 
Well it [the board] no doubt sets the strategies and the goals and 
objective of the company (E1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Eventually reached a stage where a vision statement, a 10 year vision 
and a 10 year strategy was decided upon and endorsed by the board 
(D1, appointed chair) 
 
The co-operative boards also have a Veto-Approve role for the policies that act 
as a framework for management discretion: 
The board has actually got to … in the end sanction those policies (B3, 
appointed director) 
 
The board will be active in approving those policy levels (C4, CEO) 
 
The board’s Veto-Approve role underpins the board’s Control role of the 
operations of the co-operative. As we have seen in Decision-Making-Style 
(section 7.6.3), the Veto-Approve role may be seldom used but in line with 
Stiles and Taylor (2001), this research also finds:  
the board’s potential for refusing to sanction management’s proposals 
affords it strong latent power … and management’s reluctance to face 
tough questioning or appear foolish under fire in the board room 
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ensures that strategic proposals are of a high standard. (p. 44, their 
emphasis) 
 
The sub-subconcept of Veto-Approve is presented and empirical evidence 
utilised to support the board’s Control Role in accepting and rejecting major 
decisions. 
8.4.2 Delegate 
 
While retaining the responsibility for the management of the co-operative, the 
boards, in all cases, appear to have a task in delegating authority for the 
running of many aspects the co-operative. They delegate to executives skilled 
in the management of sophisticated, complex, commercial businesses, the CEO 
or managing director in particular (the CEO further delegates to their staff – 
cascading down through the organisation). The second theoretical sub-
subconcept of Control is Delegate and is defined as:   
the boards’ task in establishing delegated authorities and co-operative 
policies as an operational framework for the management of the co-
operative. 
 
Under the co-operative constitutions, the board has authority to delegate any or 
all of its powers to manage the co-operative as this extract, typical of the case 
studies, from the case C constitution makes clear: 
13  POWERS OF DIRECTORS 
13.3 Delegation of powers: The Board may delegate to a committee 
of Directors, a Director, an employee of the Company, or to any 
other person, any one or more of its powers, other a power set 
out in the second schedule of the Act [the Companies Act 1993] 
       ([case C] constitution) 
 
Co-operative boards delegate authority through a framework of delegated 
authorities, policies and job descriptions to the management of the co-
operative. Boards maintain some decision rights and then Oversee the 
delegations. The boards delegate as much authority to management as board 
members wish: 
[The board] can delegate the authority to do things and boards of 
directors delegate, delegate to the chief executive officer, the authority 
to run the company on a day-to-day, week-by-week basis (A1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
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The same respondent suggests that co-operative boards generally delegate the 
task to management, not the responsibility, of running the co-operative: 
A board of directors can never delegate responsibility. It is always 
ultimately responsible ... they cannot delegate their responsibility to the 
shareholders for what happens (A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The delegations cover a wide range of decisions: 
[Policies] will be across a very full spectrum. It will be on staff issues, 
it will be on legal issues, it will be on financial, it’ll be on cash issues, 
it will be on PR things. Can the chief executive make statements for the 
media without reference to the board? Can he make a commitment on a 
capital expenditure item of a hundred thousand dollars that wasn’t in 
the budget or not? Can he appoint new legal advisors without authority 
of the board? (A3, appointed director) 
 
The parameters of how we operate it is quite clearly enunciated. Who 
is responsible is quite clear and enunciated in that, the limits they are 
allowed to deal with are enunciated  ... there is policy in a whole range 
of areas - cars, travel, FX there’s heaps of them (E2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
The co-operative boards, therefore, work “through” a CEO (or MD) and 
management, and as such, a board’s effectiveness in meeting Supplier-
Shareholder-Needs/Benefits is mediated by a delegate, usually management. 
The co-operative’s performance is very dependent on the CEO: 
The performance of the company is really very dependent on the 
performance of the CEO. I think this is the case in most instances (F3, 
appointed director) 
 
The board can’t be effective without a good chief executive. Can’t be 
(B3, appointed director) 
 
In their Delegate role, the board sets the domain of management authority 
before management is required to come to the board for a decision to be made:  
A chief executive has to know the boundaries of his authority … and a 
board needs to know what is the boundaries for the chief executive so 
there needs to be written very clear delegated authorities between the 
board and the CEO, so he knows exactly what you can and can’t do 
and at what point decisions need to go to the board and so that will be 
across a very full spectrum … All those sorts of things need to be 
documented and so that the board and CEO are clear on what is 
expected of each other (A3, appointed director) 
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[Policies are] really a framework for management to work in on a day 
to day basis but at the same time with the monthly involvement of the 
board (B4, CEO) 
 
and provide clear expectations of what management is allowed to do: 
[Policies and delegated authorities are] to protect everybody and have 
very clear understanding of what is expected of each other [the board 
and management] so it protects the CEO so he knows, yes I’ve got that 
authority because here it is, it’s written its formally endorsed by the 
board, I’m very clear I can make this decision (A3, appointed director) 
 
[Policies and delegated authorities are] a way of giving a comfort 
zone, if you like, for both directors and for management (B4, CEO) 
 
The delegated authorities and policies “cascade” through the co-operative 
organisation thus giving the board some Control over the operations of the co-
operative: 
And equally it’s cascaded down through the organisational structure.  
His [the CEO’s] own staff needs to know their levels and them under 
them (A3, appointed director) 
 
The board (or a committee of the board) has a role in “negotiating” these 
delegations with management using the iterative Decision-Making-Style 
(section 7.6.3), with the full board always having the Veto task of approval: 
The board is not expected to write these things. We [management]  
write them, put them in front of the board and then modify them to meet 
the board’s overall wishes (A4, CEO) 
 
The policy needs to be generated by management but it needs to be 
presented to the board in a very clear and concise way. And what the 
board needs to do is make sure that they don't let it go until they 
understand what the … policy is ... then it is their role to ratify it, 
authorise it (F4, MD) 
 
While co-operative boards Delegate much of the management of the co-
operative they appear to delegate back to themselves very big decisions that 
are likely to have a major impact on the co-operative: 
We bring in a subcommittee [of the board] around a large acquisition 
… any time there is an activity which has a major, potentially major 
impact on the business, it’s logical for a board to dive down a little bit 
more into more detail to make sure that they are on side (C4, CEO) 
 
Anything which has an impact upon the basic performance of the 
business, the board plays an important role … therefore any changes in 
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fundamental policies has to be approved by the board  ...  Any policy 
that has a potential to have a significant impact upon the direction or 
management of the business is developed not by the board but by 
management but it’s aired at a committee of the board and any 
variation from it has to be approved by the board (D1, appointed 
chair) 
 
In the board’s role in Delegate, they need to find balance between allowing the 
executive enough autonomy to do their job efficiently and enough Control to 
give the board comfort that significant risks are not being taken by 
management without their knowledge: 
Providing management with the proper sort of disciplines and 
guidelines for the conduct of the business. I cannot for example go out 
and commit the company to an expense beyond a certain sum because 
collectively we agree as board and management that that’s putting me 
under too much exposure. On the other hand I’ve got to have enough 
authority to run the business and make purchases of raw materials for 
example without having to run back to the board all the time (A4, CEO) 
 
The board also has a task to review delegations from time to time or as 
circumstances change: 
You [the board] have to go back and review those delegated authorities 
because with a new CEO the board may not be quite so comfortable 
about extending quite as much rope as it would of with the previous 
one. They’ve got to be reviewed pretty regularly and certainly reviewed 
as it pertains to the CEO (A3, appointed director) 
 
The theoretical sub-subconcept of Delegate is introduced and evidence used to 
support its existence. Delegate allows the day-to-day management of the co-
operative to be assigned to executives and a framework established for them to 
work within. 
8.4.3 Hire-Remunerate-Fire  
 
Co-operative boards have Control over the activities of the co-operative by 
their role in selecting, appointing, firing, and remunerating the CEO (and to a 
lesser extent the senior management) of the co-operative. The boards also have 
a role in overseeing the succession of the CEO and senior executives. This 
theoretical sub-subconcept is Hire-Remunerate-Fire and is defined as: 
the board’s task in all aspects of the employment of the co-operative’s 
management, usually applied to the CEO. 
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Examples of the board’s role in Hire-Remunerate-Fire follow. As noted in 
Board-Management relationships (section 7.6.3.2), the co-operative boards 
have the authority under the constitution and the law to hire and fire the CEO 
(or MD):   
That is one of the primary powers of the board of directors, they 
employ the CEO, at the end of the day the actual power to employ a 
CEO resides in the board (F2, supplier-shareholder director)  
 
Like any board its prime responsibility in that area of course is the 
appointment and remuneration of the CEO (F3, appointed director) 
 
The co-operative board’s role in hiring and firing the CEO (or MD) is 
considered by respondents to be one of the major levers of Control directors 
have over the operations of the co-operative: 
One of the most important roles of a board would be to appoint or 
dismiss, if the need arose, of the chief executive officer who is the key 
managerial … position in the company (A1,supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
It is often said that it’s probably the most important decision you [the 
board] make, hiring the CEO (C3, appointed director) 
 
The number two [most important board role] would be hiring and 
firing of the CEO (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
It is seen by respondents as a critical task of the board to appoint the “right” 
CEO (or MD): 
The critical issue for me for [case B] was to get an appropriate chief 
executive and, you know, that’s number one (B3, appointed director) 
 
Well, number one [board role] is to appoint the right chief executive 
officer, managing director slash (E1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Make sure that we have got the right manager … That's number one 
[board role] (F2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The board Control the selection of the CEO to meet the needs of the supplier-
shareholders: 
Before you [the board] hire a new CEO you need to think very, very 
carefully about where the company is at that point in time, where it 
needs to be going, and what kind of skills you need to execute that 
strategy and go in that direction (C3, appointed director) 
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If they [the board] are to fulfil their responsibilities adequately they 
have got to take great care that they select a chief executive officer that 
can enable them to fulfil their responsibilities … it needs a very careful 
assessment of needs and requirements and then a selection process that 
tries to get the best person for that job (A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Amongst the skills the co-operative board require of a CEO (or MD) is an 
empathy with the co-operative model of business: 
If you’re going to be running a farmer co-operative, you’ve got to have 
an empathy with that. To be someone who’s come from a big public 
company into a co-operative, I think it’s a hell of a hard, a big mindset 
difference … a chief executive … [not having] any empathy with that, 
it’s dangerous (B3, appointed director) 
 
If you do what [a defunct co-operative] did and got the wrong person 
[as CEO], if they didn’t fit with what the shareholders do or didn’t 
have empathy with the farmers you can destroy a business quickly too, 
so it’s quite a risk (E4, MD) 
 
The board’s Hire-Remunerate-Fire role also extends to the appointment of the 
senior management team: 
[The board] also actually approve the appointment of anybody who 
reports to me [CEO], so not only are they signing off on the CEO but 
when I am hiring somebody who’s reporting to me, ultimately the 
board … will sign off on my direct reports. So both appointment, 
termination, and salaries of my direct reports (C4, CEO) 
 
Sympathetic with Daily et al., (2003a) who see the removal of poorly 
performing executives as “a central task” of effectively functioning boards (p. 
377), these findings suggest the removal, or threat of removal, of the CEO (or 
MD) is a powerful lever of Control over the operations of the co-operative: 
The board has got to be sure that they have got the right person and if 
there is any doubt at all they have got to be tough and firm to make the 
decision to change that person (F4, MD) 
 
If you haven’t got a good CEO you’d better develop him quickly or you 
might as well get rid of him or her (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
If they [the board] felt I was totally off the page they would change the 
chief executive, so the board is always going to have that responsibility 
and that power (C4, CEO) 
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These findings suggest, contrary to managerial hegemony theory (Kosnik, 
1987; Mace, 1971), the power to remove executives is a co-operative board 
role: 
 The majority of CEOs don't retire. I don't know what the stats are but 
I’d guess that the majority of CEOs don't voluntarily resign, they 
usually say they resign and that's what you [the board] agree on … but 
most CEOs don't leave by their own choice (C2, supplier-shareholder 
director) 
 
 If I have real trouble with the board recommendation I’ll push back, 
there will be a dialogue but in the end the board’s call is final on that 
And if I am given my marching orders over a specific thing relating to 
shareholders then I am going to live by my marching orders.  I want to 
keep my job [laughter] (C4, CEO) 
 
The co-operative boards appear to remove the CEO (or MD) in times of poor 
co-operative performance: 
Satisfying themselves [the board] that the company is being run well 
and then having the courage to make a change if it’s not being run well 
… it is very important that if a company’s not going well for whatever 
reason and the board has the courage then to deal with it [remove the 
CEO]  (A4, CEO) 
 
If you [the CEO] don't make it in three to five years the board are at 
risk if they haven’t done something about it and found someone else 
who can … if they’re not performing by the time you are getting to year 
two, somewhere towards the end of year two, they are likely to get 
burned off, because today’s world isn't really accepting of failure (C3, 
appointed director)  
 
The co-operative boards also remove CEOs when they lose confidence in the 
strategic direction: 
If the CEO is going down a different path to the board he’s not going to 
last very long. It’s a limited tenure ... So yeah they play a very 
important role (D4, MD) 
 
The older members of the board said that this company is not going 
anywhere, unless we get rid of this CEO we will go broke, he is taking 
us in the wrong direction ... and that CEO was asked to leave and he 
left and we appointed somebody from within the company who had a 
vision (F2, supplier-shareholder director) 
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The decision to remove a CEO (or MD) is not an easy choice48 for a board: 
While I have been on the board of [case F] we have exercised that 
power [to fire the MD] … it’s not a pleasant duty … to a board of 
directors it is very hard to go to a CEO and say look, your time with us 
- is just not with us. We are not making the progress that we expected 
to make. Sorry we think that we have to part company, you have to 
leave (F2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Given the importance of senior management to the operations of the co-
operative and the board’s role in hiring and firing the CEO/MD, it appears that 
the co-operative boards have a role in the succession planning for the co-
operative’s management, in particular, the CEO (or MD):  
The CEO must have in place a policy of succession even for himself, he 
should groom … two potential successors and that the general 
manager should be aware of the need for succession planning ... [the 
present managing director] came through that network (D2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
The appointments and remuneration committee - there’s a list of people 
who are seen as out and out rising stars and people who are coming 
through the system who are competent … we [the board] would want to 
have a good handle on who are the people that are coming through 
that look to have real promise (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The board also has a role in setting the terms of CEO and executive 
management remuneration:  
Other ways they [the board] would exercise control? Well things like 
remuneration policy yes, they have to approve the remuneration of 
myself and my top team (C4, CEO) 
 
Boards attempt to align the CEO (or MD) and top management remuneration 
to the performance of the co-operative and Supplier-Shareholder-
Needs/Benefits: 
Top tier management here - the remuneration is pretty much in the 
framework of the salary, short term incentives and long term 
incentives, and those short term and long term incentives need to be 
aligned to what’s in the interests of the shareholders or the farmers 
(C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
                                                 
48 One possible explanation for this is the close trusting relationship that must be built up 
between the board and the CEO (or MD). See Board-Management-Relationships (section 
7.6.3.2). 
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We have incentives …  the chief executive’s salary is now attached to - 
has a [milk] payout element in it, along with other performance 
measures and he in turn has his line managers with bonuses and 
performance measures developed into it (B1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
 
This alignment in remunerating executives can be a difficult task for the co-
operative board due to Exogenous-Issues: 
Well if the KPIs start to show a divergence from what is expected of the 
company in what it had planned and budgeted then the board has to 
ask itself, are these faults of management or are these external factors 
which the management cannot be held accountable for. But then should 
management have had contingency plans or risk management 
mitigation plans to mitigate against? (A3, appointed director) 
 
The board in its Hire-Remunerate-Fire role holds management accountable 
(see section 7.6.3.2) for the operations of the co-operative delivering against 
the purpose and strategy, and takes action when performance is unsatisfactory: 
The philosophy around [case C] is that we [the board] give 
management the autonomy to deliver against the budget and the 
business plans okay, but we hold management to account. So the more 
autonomy the more accountability there needs to be, and there cannot 
be a grey area, and there cannot be anything that's uncertain about 
that (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
This accountability is through the CEO: 
[Researcher: How is senior management held accountable at [case 
C]?] C1: Through the chief executive, very, very important. He decides 
his team, in conjunction with the A,R and D committee, but ultimately it 
is his decision - otherwise if it’s your decision how the hell do you hold 
him to account? Very, very important. If you have got to tell your chief 
executive who his management team is then you have got another 
decision, you might as well get rid of him [laughter](C1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
The present chief executive’s … greatest measure will be how 
successful he is in the strategy which he has had a very large part of 
designing … he will be measured very hard on his strategy of growing 
added-value business (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
With implications for executives: 
[The previous MD] wasn’t held accountable enough … we made some 
strategic misses and businesses do, you know, that’s the risk of 
business. So I think through that confusing post-regulation era, 
management was not held accountable enough because we were all 
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confused as to what was happening ... we probably needed a new 
broom [MD] even earlier (D2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
I think it is true that when performance is good and acceptable, in 
[case A’s] case exceptional, then the accountabilities become much 
less formal, and that in itself could be a danger, if when things turned 
down, the situation may not be examined in the detail that it should be 
(A1, supplier-shareholder chair)  
 
Hire-Remunerate-Fire is introduced and evidence used to support its existence. 
The co-operative boards have a role in appointing, removing and remunerating 
the CEO (or MD). Boards take an active interest in management succession 
and in holding the CEO (or MD) to account for the performance of the co-
operative. 
8.4.4 Oversee 
 
Having delegated much of the management of the co-operative to the CEO, the 
board has a role to oversee the management of the co-operative’s operations. 
This is the third theoretical sub-subconcept of the board’s Control role and 
Oversee is defined as:  
the board’s task in monitoring and evaluating co-operative and 
executive activities. 
 
The boards Oversee all the co-operative’s operations: 
The governing board to all intents and purposes oversees the conduct 
of the [case A] dairy company (A4, CEO) 
 
All activities of the business is conducted under the supervision of that 
[case D] board (D1, appointed chair) 
 
Monitoring and evaluation are functional tasks of the Oversee role. Boards 
monitor co-operative and management activities: 
Monitoring management’s activities is a key role for the board (A1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
It appears a vast array of co-operatives’ activities are monitored and evaluated 
by the co-operative board. The boards monitor co-operative performance, 
particularly the performance of the CEO (or MD) and the top management 
teams, and progress toward strategic goals. The boards monitor: co-operative 
finances, audit, regulatory and legislative compliance; environmental 
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performance; identifying and addressing risk; company culture, customers, 
staff, other dairy industry participants and other stakeholders and the co-
operatives relationship with supplier-shareholders. Each board decides what 
monitoring will be done. The selection of what the board monitors helps 
Control the operations of the co-operative as it focuses management attention. 
Examples of evidence supporting the co-operative board’s monitoring task 
follow. Co-operative boards have a role in monitoring management 
performance and the quality of senior management: 
The first important role [of the board] is to monitor the performance of 
the chief executive and make sure first of all that they’ve picked the 
right chief executive and then monitor his performance that goes 
without saying (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
What you [the board] want to make sure is that there is a proper 
infrastructure in the organisation ... that the chief executive is putting 
in place the building blocks for the organisation. He can only do that 
by surrounding himself by good people.  No chief executive can do it all 
on his own. So the key is to make … is to encourage the chief executive 
to get the right people (B3, appointed director) 
 
and progress toward the co-operative’s strategic goals: 
The principal role of the monthly board meeting is in fact to monitor 
the progress, or lack of it, of the company’s progress towards a set of 
goals (A1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Second [most important board role] would be to monitor the 
performance of the management and the company in general to make 
sure that we are tracking with and delivering to that strategy. So going 
in the direction we’ve said we wanted and going there as fast as we can 
(C3, appointed director) 
 
and compliance to various rules and regulations: 
There are certain areas of compliance where we regularly monitor how 
the company’s going in terms … [of]  ensuring that we are abiding by 
the laws of the land in terms of the environment and …  a number of 
people related compliance and regulation things that we have to keep 
an eye on in terms of human resource management, in terms of the 
legal environment, in terms of compliance with taxation and 
accounting laws, so there’s a whole range of compliance issues (A2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
There are formal procedures like receiving accounts, there is 
compliance, statutory compliance … any board should have from 
management a set of statutory compliance that should be signed off.  In 
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other words management has said these things have been done and you 
look at the various statutory requirements and they should be … the 
board should be satisfied that they are in order (B3, appointed 
director) 
 
The co-operative boards also monitor the co-operative’s (staff) culture: 
[The board needs] to ensure that the management culture within an 
organisation is a culture - not only the people but the people and the 
culture capable of - compatible with that vision. So that’s more than 
simply appointing of a CEO but ensuring that the CEO generates the 
culture (D1, appointed chair) 
 
The people side of it  ... the directors [have a role in] just getting to 
know the staff and understanding, getting the feel of the culture of the 
organisation (A3, appointed director) 
 
The co-operative boards also monitor customers and other stakeholders: 
One of the most important roles of the board to make sure that the 
management has good relationships with their major customers (D4, 
MD) 
 
With stakeholders the board mainly does a monitoring role and it 
ranges from customers DIFOTs, franchise owners or distributors 
DIFOTs, the employees ... so that’s the major way, through monitoring 
(D1, appointed chair) 
 
adherence to co-operative policies: 
Make sure on a regular basis that we are complying with it [the policy] 
and that again is just a matter of questioning against the policy. But it 
is also a matter of board structure in making sure that we are reporting 
against that policy on a regular basis (F4, MD) 
 
and the capital investment programme: 
 A proposal for capital expenditure is approved once a year and then 
during the year that capital expenditure programme is monitored (A2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
We have people that bring in capital budgets and explain where we are 
early in the season as to what the budget will be for that year, what are 
the projects that are envisaged (F2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The boards carry out their monitor task in a variety of ways. Much of the 
monitoring is reviewing formal financial and other reporting prepared by 
management, and questioning of executives during regular board meetings. 
This is supplemented by committee-work and informal monitoring. The 
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Oversee task takes a substantial amount of the board’s time, particularly in 
formal board meetings. This is explained in this lengthy but insightful quote: 
The monitoring role again I think is pretty conventional, through 
reporting, documentation, that comes to the board typically on a 
monthly basis. The two principle documents are of course a fairly 
substantial financial report ... It covers all the major activities of [case 
C’s] operations in a financial sense, it includes KPIs, measures of 
performance, profitability, so that's one piece of it. Then supplemented 
alongside that is a narrative report from the Chief Executive Officer … 
and that contains a dialogue on all the issues, typically it has got the 
red flags, the issues, the successes, and other matters that the board 
needs to be appraised of. And by means of those two principal 
documents the board is provided with a, if it is not quite real time at 
least it is a reasonably up to date, overview of what’s going on in the 
company and its subsidiaries (C3, appointed director) 
 
The board has a role in ensuring adequate reporting is in place to monitor the 
co-operative business: 
It is the responsibility of management, but also of the board to ensure 
that there is a proper reporting function through to the board on a 
regular basis, at present monthly, so that targets of the strategies that 
we have set are being met or otherwise (F4, MD)  
 
Key performance Indicators (KPIs) are popular for monitoring the performance 
of the co-operative and its management. The board has a role in agreeing with 
management the KPIs to be monitored. The choice of KPIs (and other 
reporting requirements) focuses management attention on specific areas of the 
co-operative’s operations that the board sees as important. As such, KPIs act as 
a further method of Control: 
Yearly we have a business budget process, which would be essentially 
the first year of that three year plan and within that budget there is a 
series of KPIs that are objectives for the business. And those KPIs, 
ultimately I am accountable for delivering those KPIs and ... there will 
be hard financial KPIs ... and a series of other KPIs that would be 
sometimes less financially driven but strategically driven (C4, CEO) 
 
The board having defined the strategic plan, the business plan and the 
core strategies has worked with management in identifying the key 
performance indicators that measure the stages of progress against 
that plan and so there is a monthly report to the board of the KPIs that 
measure progress (A3, appointed director) 
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In conjunction with the co-operative boards’ monitor task, they have a role in 
evaluating co-operative and management performance: 
[The board] have to be able to form a view as to the competence of 
management and the accuracy, and the confidence of the decision 
making … [the board] do have to have the nous and the acumen and 
the people judgement to be sure that their company is properly 
managed with the best interests of their farmers, shareholders in mind  
(F4, MD) 
 
First of all the business plan is presented and approved by the board 
with the KPIs or the milestones; whatever the language might be so the 
board can assess whether we are making progress. If you are not 
making progress then it is up to the management to either put another 
plan forward or to fix it (D4, MD) 
 
KPIs are also used for this purpose: 
KPI’s, we set targets for all of our managers on an annual basis, they 
are reviewed against those targets on an ongoing basis, time in, time 
out, with obviously a formal review process once a year (F4, MD) 
 
The board will evaluate my performance on the hard KPI’s from the 
budget and then the other priorities that we have agreed are the 
priority of the business in an individual year (C4, CEO) 
 
The boards evaluate, in particular, the CEO (or MD) and top management, 
through formal evaluations: 
I have one to one sessions with the CEO in terms of performance 
assessment and he is also assessed by the board as a whole in a way 
that is not formal enough.  This year it will be (D1, appointed chair) 
 
When you talk about monitoring there is an annual review done, that’s 
normally done by the chairman and deputy chairman but that’s quite a 
separate formal evaluation of his [the MDs] performance (E2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Other “softer” techniques are often utilised in evaluation, sometimes outside 
the formal board meetings: 
Monitoring ... it’s not one where you sit down with a checklist, you 
know, tick off … this is an intuitive thing. It’s how well something is 
going, how smoothly things are being run. Are things being done?  Can 
the board feel comfortable about what’s being achieved? Those are the 
sort of things that you’re doing in terms of monitoring management 
performance (B3, appointed director) 
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I think so much around monitoring management is around your ability 
to judge people and read people, sometimes it is not what they are 
saying it is how they are saying it, it tells a thousand stories. If they 
don't like what they’re saying, if you don't believe they’re saying what 
they really think, then that's when you go in for the kill I guess (C2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
As has been outlined in Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits (section 7.3), the 
purposes of the co-operative are not simply profit maximisation or wealth 
creation. These findings have some sympathy with Spear’s (2004) notion “the 
goals and measures of performance of the enterprise may well be more 
complex and more numerous than conventional firms” (p. 46). This makes the 
evaluation of co-operative performance a little more difficult a task for co-
operative board members than IOF directors: 
We run the measurement stick across management on return on funds 
or even sales or some other more traditional method of management, 
but in fact one of the things that can drive it down is the product mix 
that is necessary to shift the milk. So that makes it really, really difficult 
and I don’t know the answer to that, I really don’t … that’s an issue for 
co-operatives. How does it balance off volume and profits? (D4, MD) 
 
What do you do in a co-operative? You make a profit - you give it all 
back to the farmers in increased milk price. The benchmark that 
ordinary companies use can't be used in a co-operative because you 
keep on building up the members’ net worth. You … trade in the profit 
each year (F2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
As such, in their Oversee role, co-operative boards have a task in finding this 
balance (see section 7.6.3.3, Decision-Making-Style): 
This constant battle with the co-operative of balancing volume … and 
business performance is a really difficult thing to grapple with. The 
issue of putting money into facilities to process milk where there is no 
margin or very little margin, but very, very important to the dairy 
farming community because they just need this constant growth (D4, 
MD) 
 
 It comes back to a balance that the farmers own the business, it’s their 
money, they want to see primarily their success as a farmer, and the 
success of the co-operative going hand in hand. When the more 
successful the co-operative, really the more successful the farmer … So 
if the co-operative has a view that it wants less milk its incompatible 
with what a farmer member would want (D4, MD) 
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The co-operative boards also need to find balance (section 7.6.3.3 above) 
between Delegate and Oversee: 
How deep should a board delve into the nitty gritty of the total 
financial operations of the company? I don't think you can go that far 
at the board level, you have got to rely on an overview and that's the 
primary responsibility, here’s the budget, this is what we have agreed 
to spend it on, how are we tracking against budget? ... it doesn't matter 
if it’s a). has gone over, but has been compensated by b). (F3, 
appointed director) 
 
After evaluation, co-operative boards can then take action, for example, relay 
the co-operative board’s dissatisfaction to the CEO, overturn management 
decisions (Veto) or remove poorly performing management (Hire-Remunerate-
Fire). Evidence is presented for the theoretical sub-subconcept Oversee, 
involving the monitoring and evaluation of co-operative and management 
performance. 
8.4.5 Protect 
 
The theoretical co-operative board role Protect is the fifth sub-subconcept of 
Control and is defined here as:  
the board’s task in protecting the co-operative nature and assets of the 
co-operative company. 
 
This is a role for the board as this managing director suggests: 
It is a very important role for the board ... probably really close to the 
top of the list ... is that getting into the community, working with the 
members, to drive a better understanding of what the co-op’s all about, 
and what's the co-op function, what it should mean to them why it is so 
important to protect it, that is a massive role for the directors (F4, MD) 
 
The co-operative boards have a task in preserving the co-operative nature of 
the organisation. Only by maintaining the co-operative nature of the business 
can the co-operative benefits be gained in order to meet the needs of the 
supplier-shareholders: 
You [the board] cannot afford to make a mistake … of the magnitude 
that would change that co-operative nature of the company (A2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
 
It is in the best interests of Australia for there to be a strong co-
operative because there is no doubt about it, that basically the co-
operative sets the milk price (F3, appointed director) 
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To ensure the co-operative nature is protected, the boards have a role in 
ensuring any changes to the co-operative constitution and policies are in line 
with co-operative principles (Chapter 2). That is, to maintain the co-operative 
by retaining the co-operative features of user-owned, user controlled, user-
benefited (Barton, 1989b; Kyriakopoulos et al., 2004): 
We are a co-operative. We have to act in terms of the constitution of 
what is required of a co-operative (B2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
We [the board] have a very, very strong desire to maintain the co-
operative structure (F3, appointed director) 
 
This includes employing a CEO (or MD) who an empathy with the co-
operative philosophy: 
To my mind the CEO and his or her direct reports - if they can’t have 
empathy for the farmer I don’t think they’ll last very long and they 
won’t really do what the farmer owners want (D4, MD) 
 
A lack of empathy with the co-operative nature of the enterprise from the CEO 
can be a risk to meeting the needs of supplier-shareholders, as these 
interviewees state: 
One of the weaknesses is if you do what [a dairy co-operative that was 
taken over] did and got the wrong person [as CEO], if they didn’t fit 
with what the shareholders do or didn’t have empathy with the farmers 
you can destroy a business quickly too, so it’s quite a risk (E4, MD) 
 
To cut a long story short [another dairy co-operative] doesn't exist 
anymore and he [their MD] is, in my view 99% of the cause of the 
company because he sent them in a completely different direction (F3, 
appointed director) 
 
This is seen as an important role for the co-operative board: 
The second [most important] one [role] is to encourage and maintain 
that culture that we think is very important for the future of our co-
operative ... to maintain the troops if you like and their loyalty to the 
organisation so that your suppliers feel part of that co-operative, 
because co-operative depends on a family type relationship, it depends 
on people saying I want to be part of that, we can get more out of our 
dairying if we work together than if we work as separate entities (F1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
One of their [the board’s] greatest roles is to keep articulating the 
value of the co-operative to the shareholder members ... unfortunately 
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our forebears knew the value of having a co-operative because they 
farmed before a co-operative ... we have got a role, the board has got a 
definite role in keeping on telling people that because if we don't tell 
them where will they get the information (F2, supplier-shareholder 
director) 
 
The board has a role in the protection of co-operative assets. The co-operative 
assets need to be protected to ensure there is an ongoing market for supplier-
shareholders: 
We [the board] are elected by shareholders, who are obviously dairy 
farmers, to look after their assets in this company (E2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
Thirdly [most important role of the board] … make sure that the 
ongoing long-term viability of the company is maintained … making 
sure that we maintain a strong balance sheet … maintain a very stable 
financial company and not run the company down (B1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
This role is undertaken by the board in the setting of policies and delegated 
authorities and monitoring of risk and by ensuring risk mitigation measures 
such as insurances are in place. The board also ensures that the co-operative 
strategies are not so risky as to endanger the co-operative assets:  
We are a dairy co-operative and that's our business and therefore on 
those things that are not our prime business we should be fairly 
conservative (F3, appointed director) 
 
Most shareholders would take the view that the sustainability of their 
performance over a five or even a ten year period ... So the 
sustainability performance, the long term viability of the company I 
think would be in terms of the directors responsibilities are different 
[than in a corporate]. A different emphasis on timeframe (A2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
8.4.6 Conclusions – Control 
 
The third theoretical Board Role of Control is defined here as “the many 
aspects of being in charge of decisions and activities at any points in the year, 
to initiate or veto actions and to have general oversight in multiple ways.”  
Five sub-subconcepts making up the board’s Control role are introduced along 
with supporting evidence: Veto-Approve; Delegate; Hire-Remunerate-Fire; 
Oversee; and Protect.  
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8.5 Serve 
 
Figure 8-5 Serve 
      
 
The fourth, and final Board Role of the dairy co-operative board identified 
from the empirical evidence and conceptualised in this theoretical framework 
is to Serve and is defined here as: 
the board’s role in making a personal and ongoing investment of their 
time, energy, skills and resources to the co-operative. 
The Serve role involves issues raised by respondents and from researcher 
observations around providing advice and counsel to management, particularly 
the CEO (or MD). The role also involves acting as the public face of the co-
operative, including dealing with the media, undertaking “ceremonial 
functions”, enhancing legitimacy and interacting with (other) stakeholders. The 
Serve role also involves directors utilising networks in “opening doors” for 
executives. Issues around Serve are raised in 100% of co-operative cases and 
by 100% of respondents (see Table 8-4 for summaries). Again this theoretical 
concept displayed a surprising homogeneity of views between respondents in 
all cases. Individual-Distinctions and Exogenous-Issues however affected 
individual director’s ability to contribute to this role. 
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Table 8-4 Evidence of Serve 
Subconcept Frequency of mention Examples from interviews 
Cases Respondents 
No. % No. % 
Serve 6 100 22 100  
Advice- 
Counsel 
6 100 22 100 [Directors] can sometimes save 
management a lot of time and from falling 
into a lot of holes if we can short circuit 
the learning curve of management by 
pointing them in the right direction 
sometimes.  A recent example … luckily 
I’ve had quite a bit of experience with 
setting up companies in Japan and the 
governance functions that operate in that 
environment.  In the board meeting and in 
phone calls with [the CEO] he would 
bounce ideas off me. He’d rung me from 
Japan sometimes and it’s just an informal 
way of adding to how you can help (A3, 
appointed director)  
Public-Face 
 
 
6 100 18 82 I think the chairman’s got to be the public 
face …  I think in the end the chairman is 
the most important person in the company 
… He needs to be seen and he needs to 
carry the flag where key stakeholders are 
involved.  So that those stakeholders feel 
that they are engaged here with the board 
of the company (C3, appointed director) 
Appeasing-
Stakeholders 
6 100 22 100 Other stakeholders the board would have 
a consideration of would be staff … a 
certain amount with customers … other 
related parties like [other dairy co-
operatives] and so on there would be 
regular contact at director level, at chair 
level.  Other stakeholders?-  the bit with 
government - particularly when there’s a 
key issue going on either locally or 
nationally with regulatory authority (A3, 
appointed director) 
Network 6 100 22 100 Some of our farmer directors too … have 
had quite extensive knowledge about the 
external world and have been able to 
bring in a number of very good contacts 
for us.  So that’s one way in which of 
course the board can be very helpful … 
from a CEO’s point of view … it’s very 
nice to be able to get good advice from 
well meaning and well intentioned and 
competent directors.  It doesn’t matter 
whether they’re farming directors or non 
farming directors… they can in fact 
actually be very very helpful in knowing 
who to speak to, to get further help (A4, 
CEO 
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The Serve Board Role appears to be both internally- and externally-focussed. 
The provision of support, advice and counsel and utilising networks are 
internally-focussed on the co-operative’s management. The public face (where 
it doesn’t relate to supplier-shareholders), appeasing stakeholders, legitimacy 
and networks tasks are externally-focussed in smoothing the way in the co-
operative’s external environment. 
 
The Serve role appears to be broad-ranging, carried out for the overall benefit 
of the co-operative and the environment in which it exists. Induced from the 
empirical data are four sub-subconcepts of the Serve Board Role: Advice-
Counsel; Public-Face (including legitimacy and ceremonial functions); 
Appease-Stakeholders, and Network. 
8.5.1 Advice-Counsel  
 
The first sub-subconcept of the theoretical co-operative governance role of 
Serve is Advice-Counsel and is defined here as: 
the board’s task in providing support, advice and counsel to decision 
makers in the co-operative. 
 
Evidence follows:  
The role of our directors is to support the chief executive (A2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
You’ve got that the key decision of having appointed a CEO and the 
board has got to then support that CEO until it fires him or retires him 
and that is quite important (A3, appointed director)  
 
The CEO has got a lonely, tough, hard job and he needs the 
chairman’s support (C3, appointed director)   
 
The board may offer support as a sounding board for the CEO (or MD): 
Just a great sounding board … it’s really good as a CEO to have 
somebody to bounce things off … you’ve got to have a sounding board 
somewhere …  the board has an important role there (E4, MD) 
 
and support in public forums, as these two respondents from the same co-
operative note: 
I believe in a public sense we are very supportive, we are not like some 
of the, some traditional co-operatives, where its board versus 
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management … with the current board it’s definitely the case without 
exception that there is public support (D1, appointed chair) 
 
Well no negative support if you like with directors like they do … if they 
can’t be supportive, they should be pretty clever and say nothing … so 
in terms of supporting the management team you would expect that 
support … I think the measure of support is the fact you are still there 
(D4, MD) 
 
The co-operative board may also offer support by mentoring and coaching 
members of management by offering perspectives distant from the day-to-day 
operation of the co-operative, as these directors suggest: 
Mentoring is something that a good director can do a) because they 
have got the benefit of distance and b) because good executives in my 
experience will come and ask directors, ‘could you come in and have a 
chat to me and I’ll just bounce something off you.’  … see if there are 
any other perspectives that I have got from outside [case C] that may 
be relevant (C3, appointed director) 
 
The board can counsel, the board can advise, it can mentor, it can 
coach, it can put ideas on the table (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
It also appears that the co-operative boards have a task in advising 
management: 
The advisors49  are very important because they do have the skills that 
you can talk on a particular issue without it being politicised in any 
way but, the board has an important role there (E4, MD) 
 
[The board] are more a sounding board and quite valuable at times - 
gives the management a practical guidance as to whether what the 
management is suggesting is acceptable to the members of the co-
operative (F2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
There is some empirical evidence that appointed directors provide advice not 
only to the executive but to the board itself: 
Through having independents [appointed directors] on the board … we 
also believe that we can assist the board to focus on the issues that the 
commercial board should be focussed on and that helps management 
(D1, appointed chair) 
 
Our [appointed directors] experience was very useful I think in the 
selection process of the chief executive (B3, appointed director) 
 
                                                 
49 Very similar to an appointed director. Please refer to Individual-Distinctions for a fuller 
description.  
279 
 
and according to this managing director, mainly for the board: 
If we [management] need the skills … we will go and get them …. But I 
said what you [the board] need is to make sure you have got enough 
skills and advice and knowledge around to ask the right questions or to 
make sure that you are satisfied that things have been done or its 
heading the right way or we haven’t missed something or whatever, so 
that’s your responsibility. I’ll help you find the people and the skill sets 
you think you need but don’t think it’s something I need (E4, MD) 
 
Evidence suggests that co-operative directors have a role in supporting, 
advising, and counselling senior executives in the co-operative. 
8.5.2 Public-Face 
 
The second sub-subconcept of the theoretical co-operative governance role of 
Serve is Public-Face and is defined here as: 
 the boards task in presenting the co-operative publicly. 
 
Public-Face covers issues raised by respondents around the boards’ dealings 
with the public at large, particularly through the media, ceremonial functions, 
and the boards’ task in lending legitimacy to the co-operative dairy company: 
The chairman is the primary spokesperson for the company in matters 
dealing with the press … our board at that level does have quite a 
longstanding … practice of being the public face of [case A] (A4, CEO) 
 
The task of being the public face of the co-operative is largely shared between 
the chair and the CEO (or MD), as these respondents note: 
Public face if you are a shareholder - it’s the chair and the CEO in that 
order … Nationally would be I think the CEO first and the chairman 
second (A3, appointed director) 
 
It is shared between the board and management, generally managed 
according to - when it is talking to shareholders the board plays a role, 
if they are talking to the broader New Zealand public then management 
will take a role (C4, CEO) 
 
The clear understanding is that when we are talking about corporate 
performance per se I have a clear expectation that the CEO is the 
public face. When I am talking about policy direction or structure of 
the co-operative or the business to industry, at a level relevant for 
farmers (D1, appointed chair) 
 
As a general rule of thumb, the division of duties appears to be broken down 
according to whom the audience would expect to hear from: 
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A co-operative is quite different. I think the members of a co-operative 
would expect the chairman to be the person … if they are getting a 
comment about the general direction of the co-operative they wouldn’t 
expect management to be doing that (D4, MD) 
 
If it’s a management issue C4 comments on, if it’s a governance issue I 
comment on (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
It just depends on the issue again … more operational, more market, 
more the business it will be me [the MD speaking to the press], but 
again all the issues surrounding the industry generally and farmer 
related, shareholder related, is typically [the chair] (F4, MD) 
 
It also appears that the board may have a series of tasks that could be loosely 
described as “ceremonial” or “flag waving”, These are undertaken largely by 
the chair, but also by the members of the board, with various groups such as 
co-operative employees and in the community: 
Waving the flag was with employees, gathering of employees, if we had 
things like our 25 year dinner then I’d get a local director to turn up 
and represent the board …  … they liked to see members of the board 
there. Like people are interested in it. So that sort of flag waving is very 
healthy (D4, MD) 
 
I would say I would get probably three to four invitations a month to 
speak at - it is usually things that are agricultural extension but it can 
be service clubs (C2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Part of the board’s Public-Face task is to enhance co-operative legitimacy. The 
legitimacy of the position the director holds, in particular the chair, allows 
executives to access, largely political or industry-related people, from whom 
they need something, as this chair explains: 
If management want to get in to see someone, quite often they use a 
director, because they can't get to the right person at the right level so 
it’s through those relationships. Or like when I go to Geneva to talk to 
the very highest level people there, for our management to get in the 
room, they wouldn’t be able to get a sitting. And it is really the 
chairman of [case C] not [C1], so it’s the role rather than the person.  
So it opens doors to a different level (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
This managing director explains the advantage of being a managing director 
(on the board) as opposed to a CEO: 
Managing director on the back of your business card when you’re in 
Japan means the president, whereas CEO could be two or three levels 
below that. So when you’re talking to customers you’re talking across 
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the world managing director means something …  lots of good status 
and it’s more about dealing with external authorities including 
government and whatever else than it is about effective use internally 
(E4, MD) 
 
There is also some evidence of appointed directors possibly providing 
legitimacy (Hillman, 2005) to the co-operative through their public presence 
on the board, as this appointed director explains: 
I’d hope so, but I don't know, analysts make judgements about the 
quality of governance in  public companies, I guess if you rang around 
a few analysts and said well do you think [the appointed directors] add 
anything to [case C],  or are they four also rans, are the best that [case 
C] could get. The object is to add credibility and robustness. I don't 
know about prestige, that’s just a bonus (C3, appointed director) 
 
There is also evidence of directors being used to give the co-operative 
company profile: 
I went on [to the board of] Dairy Insight as much for the sake of the 
[the case B] company to have a profile at this particular stage in the 
early stages of it because I felt that we needed that profile. I know I was 
known nationally … (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The chairman nationally is pretty well known … [the chair] would 
probably be one of the more prominent people in the dairy industry at 
the present time … it’s hard to see many that would have a higher 
public profile within the industry than  he would  (B4, CEO) 
 
And one of the strategies that goes with getting more people in a pool 
[training for prospective directors], really, is to be able to take on 
board positions if they were so elected is that they are also 
ambassadors for the company about what’s really going on (E4, MD) 
 
Evidence suggests that co-operative directors have a role in providing a Public-
Face for the co-operative by dealing with the media and ceremonial functions 
and in doing so, lend legitimacy to the co-operative in dealing with the co-
operative’s stakeholders. 
8.5.3 Appease-Stakeholders 
 
The third sub-subconcept of the theoretical co-operative governance role of 
Serve is Appease-Stakeholders and is defined here as: 
the boards task in assisting the co-operative in engaging with (other) 
stakeholders. 
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“Other” stakeholders in this definition refers to stakeholders outside the key 
board relationships identified in this research; that is, the supplier-shareholders 
and the senior management team (in particular the CEO (or MD)). This sub-
subconcept, Appease-Stakeholders, covers issues raised in all cases and by 100 
percent of the respondents around their dealings with (other) stakeholders (see 
Table 8-4 for summaries). 
 
From the empirical evidence, the stakeholders who the boards appear to 
appease are co-operative employees (below the senior management team); 
others from within the dairy industry (largely governance people); politicians 
(local, regional, national, and sometimes international), and customers. 
According to respondents, there appears to be a need for interacting with 
stakeholders: 
I would feel responsibility to the whole business, to the staff, to 
everybody, to try and make sure that all the stakeholders have 
satisfactory dealings with the company (A1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
 
[The chair] needs to be seen and he needs to carry the flag where key 
stakeholders are involved.  So that those stakeholders feel that they are 
engaged here with the board of the company (C3, appointed director) 
 
The appeasement of most stakeholders is largely left to management, as this 
CEO suggests: 
So we try and look after the stakeholders at large. The practicalities of 
looking after that of course lie very largely in management hands. The 
directors on the other hand want to know that we’re being good 
citizens in these areas and they themselves of course can assist 
particularly through presentations being made to various regional 
groups, conferences, seminars and the like (A4, CEO) 
 
This is consistent with the governing boards Not-to-Manage principle (section 
7.6.3.2) as it is seen as vaguely dangerous for the board to be too involved in 
appeasing (some) stakeholders: 
It could be a bit dangerous to let directors run amuck in Wellington 
with politicians or with groups, because often the people that you are 
trying to influence will have a lot more of the detail than board 
members will, bearing in mind board members aren’t management. 
You might just shoot yourself in the foot (C3, appointed director) 
 
283 
 
For most appeasement of stakeholders, the boards appear to take an active 
interest in a more ‘monitoring’ sense: 
With major customers, domestic customers, the board does what a 
board should be doing and that’s ensuring that all the relevant KPIs to 
see that customers are being satisfied such as DIFOTs, are delivered in 
full, on time, statistics etcetera. We monitor all of those at a board level 
but we do not interact on a face to face basis. But with stakeholders the 
board mainly does a monitoring role and it ranges from customers 
DIFOTs, franchise owners or distributors DIFOTs, the employees very 
strong belatedly, on occupational health and safety which is very much 
relevant to employees so that’s the major way, through monitoring (D1, 
appointed chair) 
 
Although the board may, on a case-by-case basis, engage with (other) 
stakeholders more directly than simply monitoring as these directors suggest: 
So depending on who the stakeholder is, would depend for a large 
extent how much interaction and how, if you like, the directors actually 
relate to the stakeholders (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
Well it depends on … the particular relationship, the particular set of 
circumstances, for example … we have to maintain a very close 
working relationship with Environment Waikato, because of the 
regulatory requirements … but as far as the business is concerned, 
those relationships must be kept in order, so that all parties can, you 
know, do business in a reasonable sort of way (A1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
[Board involvement with stakeholders] more those issues that are more 
farm related like local government, water, the inputs to that - to farm. 
Not so much in a business input like finance or market to be honest, 
that doesn't happen. But certainly again agri-politics is important in 
our business as you know in that local government, government, water 
board, those sort of things definitely (F4, MD) 
 
This leads to a board task in prioritising stakeholders. This is done mostly on 
the basis of the (potential) effect of the stakeholder on the co-operative and its 
supplier-shareholders: 
The environmental thing is very important because potentially it has 
the ability, if it was handled badly to go off the tracks and there would 
be real animosity between regional council and the dairy company and 
regional council could start reacting in a fairly draconian way which 
would cause the company problems so I think that is important (B2, 
supplier-shareholder director) 
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They would prioritise stakeholders from shareholders and supplier, 
absolutely number one and first and community and government and 
environment type things next. Employees they would say probably after 
that and then customers after that because it’s mostly the management 
that deal with the customers ... shareholder suppliers and our 
customers are the two key things (E4, MD) 
 
The board’s prioritisation of supplier-shareholders above other stakeholders 
leads to co-operative boards operating a different way according to this 
appointed director: 
There would be a quite different weighting of priorities on stakeholders 
… so the prioritisation would be different, the KPI’s would be different, 
the measures of performance, the way board papers are constructed 
and so on, and the style of reporting would be quite different because of 
those things (A3, appointed chair) 
 
The board appears to “own” relationships with some stakeholders: 
[The CEO] and I [the chair], we’ve had discussions about which 
relationships are going to be owned by who (C1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
 
Management can generally manage the customer and employees side, 
so that probably leaves the farmer directors and board more with the 
responsibilities in the government, trade and shareholder sides (C3, 
appointed director) 
 
What follows are examples from the empirical evidence of appeasement of 
stakeholders where the board takes a greater role than Oversee (section 8.4.4). 
The co-operative board members have a task to deal with other members of the 
dairy industry, at a “political level”, nationally and internationally:  
Another role that our board has played historically, which is very 
important, and that is protecting the company in the political hurly-
burly that has been the dairy industry for so many years … that’s been 
another way in which I think a board of directors can play a huge role 
in defending the company and looking after its interests in a politically 
uncertain and difficult time (A4, CEO) 
 
If it is the chairmen of other co-operatives, issues around Brussels, 
issues around Geneva and those sort of relationships, that 
[relationship] I own (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
With other related parties like [other dairy co-operatives] and so on.  
There would be regular contact at director level, at chair level (A3, 
appointed director) 
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The boards have a task to interact with other agri-political organisations such 
as bodies associated with water allocations (in Australia) and farmer lobby 
groups:  
There’s agri-political … the water issues are a very good example … 
they [directors]can talk on behalf of the company and behalf of farmers 
… see our board members do is to get involved in the industry 
community stuff. So whether it’s united dairy farmers, whether it’s 
catchment authorities, whether it’s water advisory committees or 
whether it’s special government task force (E4, MD) 
 
Local government … water authority … generally government type 
issues as it relates to council or local government, yes we tend to 
expect and use the board, in those sorts of relationships. Agri-political 
issues (F4, MD)  
 
The board also has a task, carefully boundaried, of interacting with employees: 
The other stakeholders the board would have a consideration of would 
- be staff and it exercises that through informal systems just moving 
around, meeting them, having them come to the board and present 
papers that sort of thing so it gets a window into that sort of staff 
resources that the company has (A3, appointed director) 
 
The boards don’t get as much involvement [with employees], we do 
however have pretty good loyalty service awards programme … and 
the board get involved in that process to pat them on the back (E4, 
MD) 
 
The co-operative boards have (boundaried) interactions with customers: 
[The chair] and I [deputy chair], in certain circumstances, more a 
political role really in terms of showing the flag and generally, 
particularly with the Asians, generally going up visiting customers as a 
sort of a social thing (B2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
The other is customers from time to time, it’s important to roll them out 
- the chairman - and show them the farms and things like that which 
they [directors] do very well (E4, MD) 
 
The chairman has a relationship role with some of the major customers 
… certainly customers particularly like to visit the chairman’s farm or 
something like that. It is not, in time input it is not significantly large at 
all (F1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
The governing boards have interaction with government at local, regional, 
national and in some cases international levels: 
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There’s been a consistency of political presence if you like at the senior 
most level of this country all the way up to government ministers on the 
part of the [case A] board (A4, CEO) 
 
Most of our local directors would know their local politicians … State 
and National also… some of our other directors have relationship with 
the Federal Ministers … I guess the board keeps those relationships 
open but the practical hard work is probably done by management (F1, 
supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
[Case C] is slightly different around the WTO, Brussels, Geneva, and 
that's just the global dynamics of the dairy industry. So we probably, 
because of our size and our influence in the global dairy trade, the 
directors are a lot more active in that area than maybe directors of a 
corporate (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
   
The board have interaction with the local community: 
[The board has] fairly strong input to the local communities as 
stakeholders and because we have got factories all around the 
countryside and suppliers all around the countryside. Your local 
directors will talk to the local shire guys, you become part of that 
society I suppose, you are made aware of the issues (F1, supplier-
shareholder chair) 
 
possibly due to rooting of the co-operative governance board in the local 
communities: 
We are definitely very much part of the community.  We’re the biggest 
… business on the Coast … because we live here and all the elected 
directors live here, there’s a sense of wanting to be part of the 
community and do well by the community so that’s just a given that we 
would feel that way (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
 
Whether it’s government policy or local development issues or helping 
us clear the way on, you know, if we want to get approval from the 
council for a new building or whatever else. They [the board]  play an 
unwritten role in all of that, much more than other boards perhaps 
would because they’re part of the community … we’re very lucky to 
have a board that’s also very involved in our community and it’s one in 
the same almost  (E4, MD)   
 
Evidence suggests the co-operative directors have a role in Appease-
Stakeholder mainly in an oversight role. The board tasks are more hands-on 
however with appeasing some stakeholders, in particular co-operative 
employees, others in the dairy industry, politicians and customers.  
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8.5.4 Network 
 
The last sub-subconcept of the theoretical co-operative governance role of 
Serve is Network50 and is defined here as: 
the boards’ task in the utilisation of relationships to assist the co-
operative in obtaining resources that are important to the co-operative. 
 
The co-operative boards utilise their networks with the external (to the co-
operative) world: 
I’ve had a lot to do with Wellington. I know where to go to in terms of 
helping, you know, the market access issues or where to go to in the 
bureaucracy or who we should talk to in terms of what government 
agencies might be able to help … I know who to go to, to help, or I can 
actually make a suggestion. Why don’t you contact so and so? or have 
you thought of this?  I mean I think that’s what a group of directors do 
(B3, appointed director) 
 
One of the advantages of an experienced board is they’ve all got 
networks with people they know of organisations that they’ve got 
relationships with and they can put people in touch  ... I can help them 
out a little bit in some government relations work with linkages to 
financial institutions, legal firms with overseas companies and that sort 
of thing. Somebody like [the other appointed director], again would 
have a complete different sort of network and he can bring things to the 
table that can be helpful to management (A3, appointed director) 
 
These board networks are utilised for “opening doors” for management to 
utilise and exploit:  
It is still up to management at the end of the day to be given the 
introduction to the necessary point of contact or to be given the idea, 
and it is then for the management to follow up, and actually follow 
through and execute on that idea rather than the director (A2, supplier-
shareholder director) 
 
As we have seen under the theoretical Board Role Unite, the directors appear 
to have a task to facilitate resources, in particular raw materials (milk) and 
capital into the co-operative. This is critical to the successful performance of 
the co-operative. While there are parallels, access to traditional resources as 
                                                 
50 Borch and Huse’s (1993) definition of  Network is utilised here “as long-term contacts 
between persons or organizations in order to obtain information and building resources” (p. 
23) . 
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understood in resource dependence theory (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) does not appear to be a part of the board’s role here. Although a number 
of the directors have extensive networks and multiple directorships51 they do 
not appear themselves to provide resources52 critical to the operation of the co-
operative. 
[Researcher: a link to important external resources that are critical to 
the company, like finance?] No, I mean at the end of the day the size of 
[case C], those relationships need to be handled with management. The 
board directors always are there as a resource to management if they 
want doors opened and those sorts of things (C1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
 
In conclusion, the empirical evidence suggests Network as a theoretical sub-
subconcept of Serve. Board members use their own personal and business 
networks to introduce management to people who may be of use to them in the 
management of the co-operative. An individual director’s usefulness in this 
task varies between directors and cases. Although similar to resource 
dependence theory in providing ‘resources’ (Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978), what they bring is more personal than tangible or marketable. Directors 
in this study did not bring critical resources to the co-operative beyond their 
fair share of milk and capital (Unite, section 8.2). 
8.5.5 Conclusions – Serve 
 
The final Board Role of Serve is identified as a theoretical subconcept and 
defined here as the board’s role in making a personal and ongoing investment 
of time, energy, skills and resources to the co-operative. Four theoretical sub-
subconcepts are also induced from the data; Advice-Counsel; Public-Face; 
Appease-Stakeholders and Network. Evidence has been presented in support of 
the theoretical concept’s existence. 
 
 
                                                 
51 See Individual-Distinctions (section   7.6.1) 
52 Beyond their own personal fair share as supplier-shareholders 
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8.6 Conceptual Interactions 
 
As the arrows on the theoretical model of co-operative governance indicate the 
five main theoretical concepts of Exogenous-Issues, Supplier-Shareholder-
Needs/Benefits, Supplier-Shareholder-Controls, Board Architecture and Board 
Roles operate together. Board members draw on one to apply another. 
Exogenous-Issues affect all concepts of co-operative governance. The 
framework is ultimately driven by Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits. The 
concepts of Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits, and Supplier-Shareholder-
Controls relate to “why” the co-operative governing boards do what they do. 
The Board Architecture concept relates to “who” undertakes Board Roles and 
“how” they are undertaken. The board members with their individual 
competencies (Individual-Distinctions) come together in various ways 
(Engagement-Forums) and relate with each other and management in making 
decisions (Dynamics). These concepts are useful for understanding why the co-
operative governing boards carry out the roles they do, and as such, are 
important in understanding actual Board Roles. The Board Roles comprise of 
“what” co-operative boards carry out and are conceptualised here as Unite, 
Strategic-Involvement, Control and Serve.  
 
For example, the following data suggest a link between the interests of the 
supplier-shareholders (Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits) to have 
representatives (Supplier-Shareholder-Controls, Vote) on the board (Board 
Architecture, Individual-Distinctions) to ensure the co-operative’s strategies 
(Board Role, Strategic-Involvement) and policies (Board Role, Control) are 
aligned:  
It’s most important in my opinion that the farmers have representatives 
as directors on the board of directors to ensure that the company’s 
strategies and policies are very closely aligned with the interests of the 
farmers, shareholders (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
 
and these data note a link between alignment of Supplier-Shareholder-
Needs/Benefits and the Board Roles of Strategic-Involvement and Control: 
The most important thing is to ensure that we don’t become miss-
aligned with what the shareholders want and that then rolls into the 
strategy setting. I think the other most important thing is to review the 
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managing director’s performance and management’s performance in 
that context (E4, MD) 
 
Some evidence of the interactions between the theoretical concepts is 
displayed in Table 8-5. There are multiple examples of each interaction. 
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Table 8-5 Evidence of Conceptual Interactions 
 
Concept Exogenous-Issues Supplier-Shareholder- Needs 
/Benefits 
Supplier-Shareholder- 
Controls 
Board Architecture Board Roles 
Exogenous-
Issues 
 The company in the drought actually 
returned five plus million dollars of its 
capital to the farmers, because they 
needed it (E2) 
[In response to a change in 
legislation] the decision taken by the 
[case B]  suppliers is in their longer 
term interests, because they chose the 
path of going independent (B3) 
Under the co-operatives’ 
legislation farmers have got to 
be in the majority (D1) 
 
There has been  short term 
issues with drought, 
restructuring and the 
deregulation issues we have ... 
a refresher session on strategy 
each six months (E4) 
Supplier-
Shareholder- 
Needs 
/Benefits  
[Strategy of] adding value to the milk 
and therefore increasing the payout to 
the farmers  ... as a smaller company 
in an area where there are a lot of 
large scale dairy companies (A2) 
 The directors are elected by their 
constituents, the dairy farmers, and 
therefore have to make sure that the 
interests of the dairy farmers are 
being looked after (A4) 
They [supplier-shareholder’s] 
presume that the road to the 
best payout is best handled by 
the company’s directors (B2) 
We ensure that those sort of 
fundamental expectations of 
the owners are translated into 
strategies (D1) 
Supplier-
Shareholder- 
Controls  
[The drought], in a farming sense, 
financially it’s a bloody disaster ... 
there are a number of those people 
who look at the co-operative and say 
we’ll maybe we’ll float it, or sell it off 
or something and take the assets out of 
it (E2) 
There’s no dominant shareholder that 
can control the company, and in any 
event the constitution limits the influence 
of any particular shareholder to 5% of 
the votes (A1) 
 I’m elected by the area and I 
really do know the seventy 
farmers who would have 
elected me. So you have a 
personal relationship with them 
almost (B1) 
As their elected 
representatives the board does 
have a major role to play in 
the ongoing communication 
with the shareholders (A4)  
 
Board 
Architecture 
Some big environmental issues  ... and 
the regulatory environment is 
changing, so the board needs to 
continue to be educated by 
management (A3) 
It’s most important in my opinion that 
the farmers have representatives as 
directors on the board of directors to 
ensure that the company’s strategies and 
policies are very closely aligned with the 
interests of the farmers shareholders 
(A2) 
I see the constitution as the framework 
between the shareholders and the 
board. So those are the parameters 
that the shareholders have given the 
board a mandate to actually operate 
in (C1) 
 [The board] do set the tone 
that way, you do act as one in 
terms of the general direction 
you are going in and that 
enables you to set the culture 
(D4) 
 
Board Roles If the KPIs start to show a divergence  
... then the board has to ask itself, are 
these faults of management or are 
these external factors which the 
management cannot be held 
accountable for (A3)  
One of their greatest roles is to keep 
articulating the value of the co-operative 
to the shareholder members (F2) 
The shareholders need to feel that the 
company has the right strategy, they 
need to understand it, they need to 
know and believe in it and they need to 
know that the board is driving as hard 
as they can to execute it (C3)  
Clearly the nine farmer 
directors in [case C]  ... put in 
a lot of time into keeping that 
shareholder constituency 
feeling as best they can loved 
and cherished (C3) 
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8.6.1 Board Role Relationships 
 
The model (Figure 7-1) also has arrows connecting Board Roles, specifying a 
relationship between each. This research finds Board Roles to be complex, 
interdependent and interrelated. This evidence, for example, suggests ongoing 
day-to-day board tasks to evaluate management (Control) give guidance 
(Serve) and strategic direction (Strategic-Involvement): 
The ongoing day-to-day operations of the board would be to measure 
management’s performance, set targets and measure them towards the 
targets and give guidance to managers, particularly the chief executive 
on areas of policy and strategic direction (B1, supplier-shareholder 
chair) 
 
Many of the Board Roles appear to be occurring concurrently. As we have 
seen from the evidence, the board task in the appointment of the CEO has 
implications for all four of their roles. Another example may be a director 
accompanying the CEO on a market visit. The director may be simultaneously 
“flying the flag” for the co-operative (Serve Role); monitoring and evaluating 
the CEO’s performance with customers (Control Role); discussing and 
informing strategic processes (Strategic-Involvement Role); and acquiring 
information that will be shared with supplier-shareholders upon the director’s 
return (Unite Role). It appears likely that every board meeting (Engagement-
Forums) contains elements of each of the Board Roles. 
 
The close involvement allowed by the board decision-making process 
(Decision-Making-Style) and the close trusting and supportive relationship 
between board members and management (outlined in Dynamics above) may 
facilitate the concurrent use of Board Roles. For example, early and close 
involvement between the board and management in strategy formulation 
(Strategic-Involvement) allows the board to offer advice (Serve role) and to 
gain the knowledge to exert a controlling influence (Control role). In terms of 
complexity these findings have some sympathy with those of others (see, 
McNulty et al., 2005; Pye, 2002; Roberts et al., 2005).  
 
293 
 
As such, these findings see Board Roles as being interdependent with board 
members undertaking all roles (to varying degrees). In this regard, these 
findings have some sympathy with the views of several writers (see for 
example, Fields, 2007; Leblanc & Gillies, 2005; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 
2003). Chapter 9 follows, which draws conclusions and offers suggestions for 
future research.  
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the contribution of the model of the roles of dairy co-
operative governing boards (Figure 7-1). The implications for theory, the 
literature, practitioners and policy makers are highlighted. Suggestions for 
further research are made and conclusions are drawn. 
9.2 Filling Theoretical Gaps 
 
Almost all of the theories of corporate governance (see section 3.3) shed some 
light on dairy co-operative board roles, yet none encapsulate the nuances of the 
roles as does the model developed here (Figure 7-1). To illustrate this point, 
Table 9-1 shows existing governance theories and how this fieldwork and this 
model reveals them to be operating in the New Zealand and Australian co-
operative setting. Each is discussed below.  
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Table 9-1 Corporate Governance Theories: Applied to Dairy Co-operatives  
Theory Evidence in 
support 
Board Composition and 
Competencies 
Examples from evidence board roles 
Agency Partial Independent; 
Not expert monitors 
Those short term and long term incentives [for management] need to be aligned to what’s in the 
interests of the shareholders or the farmers (C1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
Transaction 
cost economic  
Substantial Majority of members with 
transaction specific assets 
The directors  ... have a large stake of their investment,  generally speaking in most cases it’s nearly 
100% … of what they’ve invested is tied up in ... the profitability of ...[case B]. So I think the driver for 
a director of a co-op is very integrated with their own business and they understand, ... what their 
fellow shareholders are going through (B1, supplier-shareholder chair) 
Managerial 
hegemony  
Very limited Very little management 
representation 
The ultimate power has got to rest with the board.  The board appoints the chief executive. The board 
finally must authorise all capital expenditure and any movements outside policy.  Any policy changes 
must be signed off by the board.  That’s what a board’s there for.  After all, who is going to defend the 
position with the shareholders. The board is accountable for that (B3, appointed director) 
Stakeholder Limited, 
beyond milk 
producers 
No Stakeholder representatives 
beyond  milk producers and 
limited management 
I’m not a great believer in worrying too much about these vast array of stakeholders ... associated  ... 
with the company.  ... otherwise you’ll dilute your efforts ... thinking about peripheral issues instead of 
the main job of the business (A1, supplier-shareholder  chair) 
Resource 
dependence  
Partial Chosen for influence -  only 
suppliers of capital and milk 
[Researcher: a link to important external resources that are critical to the company?] No ... those 
relationships need to be handled with management (C1, supplier-shareholder  chair)   
Resource 
based  
view 
Limited While directors assist where they 
can this is not a dominant reason 
for selection 
If we [management]  need the skills … we will go and get them (E4, MD) 
Stewardship  Partial No CEO duality. Board isn’t 
selected for expertise. Board 
partner and support management.  
Everybody is there as part of a team and not a them and us situation [between board and 
management] (B4, CEO)  
 
Class 
hegemony  
None No evidence No evidence 
Democratic 
perspective 
Substantial Representative structures of 
governance 
It’s most important ... that the farmers have representatives as directors on the board ... to ensure that 
the company’s strategies and policies are very closely aligned with the interests of the farmer 
shareholders (A2, supplier-shareholder director) 
Adapted from Cornforth  (2004),  p. 20. 
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In line with agency theory prescriptions, the co-operative boards are 
independent of management and have a Control Role in monitoring 
management and aligning executive activities with shareholder interests (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Contrary to agency theory, the 
roles of the board are more varied and there is no evidence of distrust between 
the board and management.  
 
The findings support some aspects of transaction cost economics theory 
(TCE). The majority of board members have transaction specific investments. 
While board members engage with market decisions, TCE assumptions around 
human behaviour, such as opportunism and self-seeking behaviour by 
management, is not evident. The boards’ roles beyond the Control Role are not 
enunciated in TCE. 
 
There is little support for the presence of managerial hegemony (Kosnik, 1987; 
Mace, 1971). Signs of managerial domination of the board are absent. The 
boards are not selected by management and do not comprise inside directors 
obligated to management. Co-operative boards hold managers to account and 
are in turn accountable to shareholders, not management. The power to remove 
executives is a role that boards take seriously.  
 
There is little evidence of stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Freeman & 
Reed, 1983) prescriptions. One group of stakeholders (supplier-shareholders) 
have dominant membership on all the governing boards. Appointed directors 
are also brought on largely for the benefit of these stakeholders. Management 
are represented by the MD in half the cases. The boards do not appear to 
represent all stakeholders’ interests in their deliberations.  
 
There is partial support for resource dependence theory (RDT) notions. 
Directors bring the respect they themselves earn as supplier-shareholders 
vested in the co-operative. Access to critical resources (other than their farm-
based shares of milk and capital) and as understood in RDT (Pfeffer, 1973; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) does not appear here however. Likewise, 
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representatives of other institutions critical to the operations of the co-
operatives do not sit on the boards. As such, these findings are similar but 
distinct from RDT.  
 
The resource based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991; Barney et al., 
2001) also receives limited support from these findings. The majority of 
directors (supplier-shareholders) are not selected for their professional skills, 
nor do they bring these skills to their role. Appointed directors may, from the 
evidence, partially fill this role. 
 
Stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; Muth & Donaldson, 1998) has partial 
presence here. Directors are not selected for their management expertise or 
their management positioning. However, in line with stewardship theory, the 
relationship between the board and management is characterised by trust, 
cohesiveness, partnership, and mentorship (Huse, 2007). 
 
There is no evidence of class hegemony theory (Kosnik, 1987; Useem, 1982) 
being applied in the cases studied. The boards do not have close connections 
with management and do not perpetuate a ruling elite. 
 
The findings have considerable sympathy with democratic perspectives 
(section 2.7). The governing boards are elected from, and by, the membership 
to express the members’ interests. Co-operative boards represent members, 
understand their needs, and ensure resources are employed and executives 
controlled in the pursuit of those needs. Co-operative boards preserve the co-
operative character of the firm and keep members informed about the co-
operative’s operations.  
 
So while theories in the corporate governance literature shed light on aspects 
of dairy co-operative boards, none adequately explain the multiplicity of board 
roles this study attempts to capture. These findings, and this model, offer a 
complex and integrated picture of the role. 
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9.3 Contribution 
 
The principal aim of this research, as outlined in chapter one, is to 
conceptualise board roles from evidence obtained about dairy co-operative 
board practice and from the perspective of participants within the New Zealand 
and Australian dairy industry. The understandings from this fieldwork provide 
the basis for the development of this theoretical model with concepts induced 
from the experience of informants. The contribution of this thesis is a 
conceptual model of co-operative governance. This theoretical model advances 
knowledge in the fields of corporate governance and agricultural co-operatives. 
The resulting theory is presented as Figure 7-1. The findings of this thesis, in 
particular the theoretical model, begin to fill the gap identified in this thesis. 
 
This research has resulted in a unique theoretical model deeply informed from 
practitioners’ experience providing a more unified theory of governance from 
fundamentals. This thesis contrasts with previous conceptualisations of 
governance in the level of detail provided. Following the prescriptions of 
Eisenhardt (1989a), the resultant theory is “parsimonious, testable, and 
logically coherent” and presents new insights (p. 548). This model meets 
parsimonious expectations with five concepts and seven subconcepts. Logical 
coherence is achieved through a lengthy process of constant iteration between 
data and emergent theory and the use of replication logic. Furthermore, the 
theory fits with Miles and Huberman’s (1994) categorisation of a good theory 
whose “categories fit (or have come to fit) the data; that is relevant to the core 
of what is going on; that can be used to explain, predict, and interpret what is 
going on” (p. 144).   
 
Of particular note is the uniqueness of this theoretical model to New Zealand 
and Australian diary co-operative governance. The composition of the board 
and many of the board tasks are firmly rooted in the co-operative nature of the 
organisation. The Unite board role (section 8.2) and the Protect task (section 
8.4.5), for example, are uniquely embedded in the co-operative context.  
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Furthermore, the model extends understanding of co-operative governance to 
take into account relationships unique to this sector including the powerful role 
of supplier-shareholders. This understanding is distinct from much of the 
corporate governance literature where shareholders are often portrayed as just 
one of many outside stakeholders (Huse, 1998). The model highlights the way 
board members of co-operatives are always and continually held accountable 
to their supplier-shareholders.  
 
The boards researched have active roles in Unite, Strategic-Involvement, 
Control and Serve. The model highlights the interrelationships of the 
respective roles (section 8.6). This study’s more nuanced understanding of 
board roles advances current knowledge of governance. 
 
An important contribution of the model is the distinction made between the 
contributions of individual directors. Board members are individuals with 
different skills and emphasis is brought to bear on each of their board roles. 
This is opposed to the more common conceptualisation of the board as a whole 
undertaking roles. The chair, as leader of the board, stands out in this respect.  
 
A major contribution of this study has to do with how members find ‘balance’ 
and how they deal with complexity. These board members continually find 
balance between roles, and there is an emphasis on responding to changes in 
circumstances. While much of the corporate governance literature concentrates 
on the relationship between the board and management (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003; Johnson et al., 1996), this model conceptualises the board overall as part 
of a more open, sometimes concurrent and complex set of  relationships 
between board members and supplier-shareholders. 
 
The model also contributes toward understanding boards’ decision-making 
process (Decision-Making-Style, section 7.6.3.3). The model provides insights 
into how board members are able to undertake what appear to be seemingly 
contradictory roles simultaneously. This broader depiction of governance, 
allowing understanding of board relationships and processes within the 
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specific context of the New Zealand and Australian co-operative dairy industry 
makes a significant contribution to knowledge. 
9.4 Implications 
 
This research provides an empirical contribution to the literature by adding to 
the small pool of qualitative research that seeks to understand the processes of 
corporate governance (Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Pettigrew, 1992, 1997). 
This thesis provides one of the first in-depth case studies of dairy co-operative 
governance in New Zealand and Australia.  
 
The study empirically demonstrates the interrelationships between board roles, 
relationships and processes within the specific context of the New Zealand and 
Australian dairy co-operative. Despite the inductive nature of this research, 
many elements of the model are found in the literature, allowing some 
corroboration of the findings. 
 
These findings represent a contribution to the understanding of the governance 
of one of the most important industries (dairy) and ownership structures (co-
operative) in the New Zealand economy (section 1.3.2). This research has the 
potential to inform and improve policy settings and co-operative governance 
practice. 
 
For policy makers, the participant-oriented understanding inherent in these 
findings allows a more considered position on policy than previous 
understandings. Policy makers have tended to focus on agency theory 
prescriptions. Policy makers could draw on these findings to inform more 
field-grounded recommendations on governance policy.  
 
Governance is critical to the co-operative model (Jussila & Goel, 2006; 
Skurnik, 2002) and presumably its performance. As such, an understanding of 
co-operative governance may have implications for co-operative performance. 
By understanding contemporary co-operative governance practices, a solid 
foundation is provided to make recommendations for improvement. For 
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example, while not normative, the model suggests the need for practitioners to 
train and educate themselves and potential directors. The model also highlights 
practitioners’ need to intimately understand the needs of supplier-shareholders.  
9.5 Future Research 
 
The scarcity of empirical research into co-operative governance suggests 
substantial potential for further studies to test and to build on this contribution.  
 
The model can form a basis for empirical (hypothesis) testing and towards 
generalising these findings to other co-operative situations. Future research of 
a quantitative nature is also suggested to measure the relationships highlighted 
in this model. The Boards’ Unite role appears to be a dominant theme. It is 
suggested that future research test this model on dairy co-operatives beyond 
New Zealand and Australia. Moreover, the theoretical model’s relevance to 
other co-operatives, in particular other agricultural co-operatives, should be 
explored. Indeed, the relevance of the theoretical model could be extended to 
explore its relevance to non-agricultural mutual organisations and other 
organisational forms such as not-for-profits, and the voluntary sector.  
 
As it is beyond the scope of this research, no attempt has been made to 
examine the link between governance and co-operative performance. Further 
research could take the theoretical model induced here to link these findings to 
performance. A useful place to start this research may be an understanding of 
co-operative performance from the perspective of co-operative members.  
 
The evidence suggests that the chair plays a critical role in the functioning of 
the board and the co-operative. Many board tasks are undertaken individually 
by the chair. As such, a deeper understanding of the chair’s roles and 
relationships is a fruitful area for further research. It may be hypothesised that 
the chair has a major effect on board and co-operative performance. 
 
An exploration of trust in co-operative governance appears to be a useful area 
for further research. Trust between the main stakeholders, that is, between the 
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board members, between the board and supplier-shareholders, and between the 
board and management is an exciting field for further research. It is 
hypothesised that high levels of trust between directors, supplier-shareholders 
and management is an important component in successful co-operative 
undertakings 
 
There appears to be an assumption in the literature that specific director skill-
based competencies are important for effective boards. The findings here point 
to other factors, such as “wealth at risk” and “engagement” (section 7.6.1.1) as 
being more important. Likewise, there seems to be, by some commentators, an 
assumption that board diversity leads to better board decision-making. The 
cases here are characterised by a lack of diversity. It may be suggested that the 
need for cohesiveness and clear focus form a reason for the superior 
performance of co-operatives. These subjects also provide a rich vein for 
further research. 
9.6 Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, given the importance of co-operatives to the New Zealand 
economy and the absence of descriptive empirical data, this thesis provides an 
important contribution to knowledge in this field. It extends the literature on 
the understanding of governance, co-operative governance in particular and 
specifically New Zealand and Australian dairy co-operative governance. These 
findings suggest a fine-grained understanding of New Zealand and Australian 
dairy co-operative governance not apparent in prior literature. This thesis 
potentially provides the foundation for theorisation on how co-operative 
directors can contribute to the performance of their co-operative companies. 
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Appendix A Sample Interview Guide 
 
Case F: Interview Guide – Roles of Governing Boards of Agricultural Co-operatives. 
• Could you outline a little of your own background in the governance of [case 
F] and other organisations? 
• In your experience as a director at [case F] what does the governing board do? 
• What part did the board at [case F] play in the selection of the CEO? 
• Why is the selection of the CEO so important?  
• Are management’s goals the same as those of the shareholders? 
• Is one of the board’s functions the monitoring of management to ensure they 
are working in shareholders’ best interests?  
• How is senior management held accountable at [case F]?  
• Does the board at [case F] have a role in supporting the CEO and 
management? 
• How are company strategies developed at [case F]? What part does the board 
play in their development?  
• [Case F] has many stakeholders apart from your farmer-shareholders, 
examples would include employees, consumers, environmentalists, local and 
central government – What part does your board play in stakeholder relations?  
• Does the board play any role as the “public face” of [case F]?  
• What role does the board of [case F] play in communicating with 
shareholders? 
• Do any of the directors on your board provide a link to important external 
resources that are critical to the company? Examples here could be things 
such as finance, academic or government institutions. 
• Does the board have a role in dealing with political institutions? 
• What part does the board play in the development of company culture? 
• What determines board culture? 
• What role does the board play in company policy formulation? 
• What role does the board play in developing the company constitution?  
• Co-operative shareholders can have diverse interests. If it is an issue at [case 
F] what does the board do about these diverse interests?  
• How are your farmer directors elected? 
• Does the board play any part in its own succession? 
• Does the board play any part in management succession? 
• What processes do you use to select and appoint outside directors? 
• What role does management play in the selection of directors? 
• Is the board educated by management and if so in what way is this done? 
• To whom are you accountable to? 
• Who is accountable to you? 
• What are the three most important things you are held accountable for? 
• What do the board of directors do differently at [case F] as a co-operative 
company than would be done if [case F] were a publicly listed company? 
• What are the three most important things that the board at [case F] do? 
• Are there any other things the board does that you have thought of during the 
course of this interview that may be of interest to my research? 
• I may need to come back to you for clarification or further data – would that 
be okay? 
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Appendix B Ethical Approval Documents 
B-1 Ethical Approval Form 
WAIKATO MANAGEMENT SCHOOL 
APPLICATION FOR ETHICAL APPROVAL 
 
Outline of the Research Project 
(for the benefit of the Waikato Management School Ethics Committee) 
 
1. Title of Project: 
 
An integrated theory of the roles of governing boards of co-operative dairy 
companies. 
 
2. Researcher’s name and contact information: 
 
Kevin Old 
102 Allen Rd 
R.D.4 
MORRINSVILLE 
Ph. (64 7) 889 3901 
Email: old@waikato.ac.nz 
 
3. Supervisors name and contact information: 
 
Associate Professor Karen Van Peursem 
Department of Accounting 
The University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
HAMILTON 
Ph. (64 7) 856 2889 ext: 8647 
Email: kvp@waikato.ac.nz 
 
4. Brief Outline of the Project (what it is about and what is being investigated): 
 
This project will investigate and document the roles of governing boards of co-
operative dairy companies in Australasia in order to develop a theory of the 
roles of governing boards of co-operative dairy companies.  
 
5. Methodology: 
 
The research adopts a positivist methodology. It will use a case study method 
inspired by Eisenhardt’s (1989) article “Building theories from case study 
research.” Evidence will be gathered by interviewing influential people using 
semi-structured interviews. 
 
6. Expected Outcomes of the Research: 
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A theoretical contribution from an analysis of empirical data as to the roles of 
governing boards of co-operative dairy companies in Australasia. The data will 
contribute toward a PhD thesis. 
 
7. How will participants be selected and how many will be involved? 
 
Theoretical sampling will be used. Governing boards (and individuals within 
them) that are expected to provide the greatest insights will be selected. While 
some flexibility is envisaged eight cases will initially be selected with a likely 
three people per case interviewed (approximately 24 interviews). A survey 
could be conducted involving all directors in each case (say, 64 respondents).  
 
8. How will participants be contacted? 
 
Initially a letter will be sent to the chairperson of the selected cases outlining 
the study, followed by telephone contact. Colleagues may be utilised with 
introductions. 
 
9. Explain incentives and/or compulsion for participants to be involved in this 
study. 
 
There will be no incentives or any compulsion for participants to be involved 
in this study. 
 
10. How will your processes allow participants to: 
a) refuse to answer any particular question, and withdraw from the study at any 
time. 
 
Participants will be asked to sign, prior to the interview, a consent form 
highlighting that they may refuse to answer any question(s) and may withdraw 
from the study at any time.  
 
b) ask any further questions about the study, which occur during participation. 
  
Participants will be asked to read the participation information sheet 
encouraging them to ask and receive adequate responses to any question(s) 
they have about the study. This will also be highlighted orally at the beginning 
and end of the interviews. 
  
c) be given access to a summary of the findings from the study when it is 
concluded. 
 
Interviewees will be provided with a copy of their interview transcripts and be 
invited to comment on them. A summary of findings will be made available to 
participants at the conclusion of the study. 
 
11. Explain how any publications and/or reports will have the consent of 
participants, and how the anonymity of participants will be protected. 
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Prior to each interview each participant will be asked to read and sign a 
consent form for participants. The confidentiality of all participants will be 
protected by the use of pseudonyms for both individuals and firms. These 
pseudonyms will be used for both the transcription of interviews and the 
reporting and publication of data.  
 
12. What will happen to the information collected from participants? 
 
The data collected from the participants will be analysed and will contribute 
toward a PhD thesis. Upon completion of this study the evidence collected in 
this research will be archived and may be used for further research.  
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B-2 Information Sheet for Participants 
 
Information Sheet for Participants 
 
1. Title of Project: 
 
An integrated theory of the roles of governing boards of co-operative dairy 
companies. 
 
2. Researcher’s name and contact information: 
 
Kevin Old    
102 Allen Rd, R.D.4, MORRINSVILLE 
Ph. (64 7) 889 3901.   
Email: old@waikato.ac.nz 
 
3. Supervisor’s name and contact information: 
 
Associate Professor Karen Van Peursem    
Department of Accounting, The University of Waikato, Private Bag 3105, 
HAMILTON 
Ph. (64 7) 856 2889 ext: 8647. Email: kvp@waikato.ac.nz 
 
4. Brief Outline of the Project (what it is about and what is being investigated): 
 
This project will investigate and document the roles of governing boards of co-
operative dairy companies in Australasia in order to develop a theory of the 
roles of governing boards of co-operative dairy companies.  
 
5. Company or Organisation sponsoring or funding the research: 
 
No company or organisation is sponsoring or funding this research. All costs 
are borne by the University of Waikato or the researcher.  
 
The researcher is currently a dairy farmer and a director of the Tatua Co-
operative Dairy Company Limited.  
 
6. Explain how any publications and/or reports will have the consent of 
participants, and how the anonymity of participants will be protected. 
Prior to each interview each participant will be asked to read and sign a 
consent form for participants. This form encourages you (as the participant) to 
receive satisfactory replies to any questions regarding the study and highlights 
your ability to withdraw from the study at any time. The confidentiality of all 
participants will be protected by the use of pseudonyms for both individuals 
and firms. These pseudonyms will be used for both the transcription of 
interviews and the reporting and publication of data.  
7. How will your processes allow participants to: 
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a) refuse to answer any particular question, and withdraw from the study at any 
time 
As a participant you will be asked to sign, prior to the interview, a consent 
form outlining that you may refuse to answer any question(s) and may 
withdraw from the study at any time.  
b) ask any further questions about the study, which occur during participation  
You will be asked to read this participation information sheet encouraging you 
to ask any questions you may have about the study. This will also be 
highlighted orally at the beginning and end of the interviews.  
c) be given access to a summary of the findings from the study when it is 
concluded 
As an interviewee you will be provided with a copy of your interview 
transcripts and be invited to comment on them. A summary of findings will be 
made available to participants at the conclusion of the study. 
8. Explain what will happen to the information collected from participants? 
The data collected from the participants will be analyzed and will contribute 
toward a PhD thesis. Upon completion of this study the evidence collected in 
this research will be archived and may be used for further research.  
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B-3 Consent Form for Participants 
 
THE UNIVERSITY OF WAIKATO 
Waikato Management School 
 
An integrated theory of the roles of governing boards of co-operative dairy 
companies 
 
Consent Form for Participants 
 
I have read the Outline of Research Project form for this study and have had 
details of the study explained to me. My questions about the study have been 
answered to my satisfaction, and I understand that I may ask further questions 
at any time. 
 
I also understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time, or to 
decline to answer any particular questions in the study. I agree to provide 
information to the researchers under the conditions of confidentiality set out on 
the Information Sheet. 
 
I agree to participate in this study under the conditions set out in the Outline of 
Research Project form. 
 
Signed: __________________________________ 
 
Name: __________________________________ 
 
Date:  __________________________________ 
 
Researcher’s name and contact information: 
Kevin Old 
102 Allen Rd 
R.D.4 
MORRINSVILLE 
Ph. (64 7) 889 3901 
Email: old@waikato.ac.nz 
 
Supervisors name and contact information: 
 
Associate Professor Karen Van Peursem 
Department of Accounting 
The University of Waikato 
Private Bag 3105 
HAMILTON 
Ph. (64 7) 856 2889 ext: 8647 
Email: kvp@waikato.ac.nz 
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Appendix C Triangulation of Data 
 
The table below outlines where data is collected from to develop each of the 
theoretical concepts. 
Concept Data 
 Interview 
Data 
Co-operative 
Constitutions
Annual 
Reports 
Popular 
Press 
Other 
(e.g. 
observation, 
legislation) 
Exogenous- 
Issues 
9   9  9  9  
Supplier-
Shareholder-
Needs/Benefits 
9  9  9  9  9  
Supplier-
Shareholder- 
Controls 
9  9  9  9  9  
Board- 
Architecture 
9  9  9  9  9  
Board Roles 9  9  9  9  9  
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Appendix D Examples of Steps in Theoretical Model Development 
 
Appendix D outlines examples of some of the stages in the conceptual model 
development as the theory is inductively developed driven by the empirical 
data. Below is an example of the model early in data analysis. Note the 
reliance on terms from the literature at this stage. This occurred because the 
uniqueness of the concepts yet-to-emerge had not yet been conceptualised. 
Note also the multiple categories under each concept don’t (as yet) set out how 
each element is related to the others 
 
Service
Support management 
Expertise, Advice, Networks
Stakeholders
Public face
Training/Education/
Development
Shareholder-Suppliers
Control
Fire CEO
Monitor and 
Evaluate
(formal & Informal)
- CEO 
performance 
- Co-op 
performance 
- Stakeholders
Gatekeeper
-Resources
-Strategies
Delegate 
Authorities
Remuneration
Shaping Decisions
Strategy
Hire CEO
Core Strategy
Strategic Boundaries
Formulate (some) 
strategies
Evaluate
User-benefited
Milk Price   Collect Milk   Reduce Risk     Social
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As governance actors and processes emerged as important from the analysis of 
the empirical data these concepts grew and were included as distinct concepts 
as can be seen from an interim theoretical model displayed below.  
Service
Strategy
Control
Sh
are
ho
lde
r -
Su
pp
lie
rs
Bo
ard
 C
om
po
sit
ion
Bo
ard
 Pr
oc
es
se
s
Us
er-
Be
ne
fits
Board 
Roles
 
 
In this later theoretical model, outlined below, the importance of external 
issues and the unique co-operative board role with the Supplier-Shareholders 
or “users” emerged as unique concepts.  
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Service
Control
Strategy
Co
nte
xt 
/ C
on
tin
ge
nc
ies
Bo
ard
 Ar
ch
ite
ctu
re
Bo
ard
 Pr
oc
es
se
s
Us
er-
Be
ne
fits
Board 
Roles
Users
 
As an example of the analysis a model of the boards’ strategic decision making 
process is developed leading to a more nuanced understanding of Board 
Processes which became part of the Dynamics concept.  
 
Revision
Informal - Chair
Discussion and evaluations
Management BoD - Papers
Anywhere
Customers
Management
Board of Directors
Ideas Business Plan
Strategic boundaries
Shareholder-supplier benefit
Strategy executionBoD endorse Management
MonitorUnsatisfactory?
Co-operative Philosophy
BoD
Allocate Resources
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A final theoretical model, inductively developed from the empirical data, with 
the extra concepts of Supplier-Shareholder-Controls and a more nuanced 
conceptualisation of Board Architecture and the relationships between its 
component parts is displayed below. 
Exit
Dynamics
Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits
Board Roles
Composition-
Competencies
Structures-
Leadership
Board Architecture
Control Serve
Strategic-
InvolvementUnite
Exogenous-Issues 
Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits
Supplier-Shareholder-Controls
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Appendices E to I 
 
Appendices E to I listed below comprise the coded content of the transcribed 
interviews. There are over 100 pages and for cumbersomeness reasons have 
been left out of the thesis. To assist the reader, one page samples of each of the 
appendices, taken unaltered from the case study database are displayed. This 
gives a flavour of the appendices. The samples are selected to allow the reader 
some variation of participants. The full appendices are held electronically, in a 
case study database and can be viewed by contacting the writer.  
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Appendix E Exogenous-Issues 
E-1 Competitive-Environment 
Document 'A2',  2 passages, 573 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 18, 449 characters. 
Having a company that is more likely to succeed as a smaller company in an 
area where there are a lot of large scale dairy companies who can process 
larger volumes of milk at a far cheaper cost than what [case A] could, so in a 
nutshell we decided that to survive we needed to add value to milk, the best 
way to add value to milk is to ensure that the money and the resources go into 
adding value rather than into processing large quantities of milk.  
Section 0, Paragraph 22, 124 characters. 
we manufacture lactoferrin, we had a situation where our customers required 
more lactoferrin than we could perhaps supply.  
Document 'A3',  4 passages, 982 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 22, 248 characters. 
What’s going on in the world? how customers are changing, how competitors 
are changing, what it means for the company, what things could be coming up 
in the future, what’s the technologies involved, how are they changing? all 
those sort of things.  
Section 0, Paragraph 60, 163 characters. 
Look at the commercial operating environment that we are in, the competitive 
environment, what shocks could be coming up, what contingency is needed to 
be in place 
Section 0, Paragraph 68, 239 characters. 
Firstly, I suppose, to have a very good understanding of the markets that we 
are operating in and I mean that in a quite wide sense, the market for our 
products, I mean the market for dairy farmers in a competitive situation with [a 
competing co-operative] 
Section 0, Paragraph 70, 332 characters. 
The market is changing dramatically, the foreign exchange market is changing 
dramatically, the market with [a competing co-operative] and so on is changing 
dramatically and will change further and the regulatory environment is 
changing. 
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E-2 Regulatory-Environment 
Document 'B4',  1 passages, 768 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 69, 768 characters. 
[the chair] because of his involvement with Dairy Insight and various other 
activities will have a reasonable amount of involvement with him in the 
government bodies which is beneficial for the company, and [the deputy chair] 
is probably more of a regional role, can give us quite a lot of support when it 
comes to say the more regional issues.  But also even to national issues, 
because of his own association with some of the government bodies and that, 
and the same with the external directors.  [An appointed director] more in the 
accounting area and the knowledge of consultancy service.  There’s the Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, Deloittes and so on, contacts, and that sense more of an 
operational sense perhaps.  [Another appointed director] certainly has some 
government contacts and is able to advise in some of those areas. 
Document 'C1 Kevin Old',  3 passages, 707 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 15, 83 characters. 
with some of the large geopolitical movements - was our strategy still 
appropriate? 
Section 0, Paragraph 139, 274 characters. 
The [case C size] of [x] farmers, I just can't afford to have directors out in the 
shareholder base all the time, I want them to be outward focused - what are the 
geo-political trends? What are the big shifts happening globally? that's where 
the boards focus needs to be. 
Section 0, Paragraphs 165-167, 350 characters. 
[Researcher:] select and appoint independent Directors? 
C1: Okay, I spend too much time doing this [laughter]. The process that we 
go through firstly, we go through a search firm, and then we set - the board 
actually signs off on the criteria and there is always three or four criteria. But 
one is always the global perspective, that's always the first criteria. 
Document 'C2',  7 passages, 1860 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 28, 216 characters. 
Appointed directors play a key role. And in looking for our four directors, we 
specifically look for maybe a couple of compliance type directors, general 
practitioners and a couple of more worldly global view people. 
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E-3 Physical-Environment 
 
Document 'E4',  8 passages, 4153 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 5, 255 characters. 
We annually have a review and if things are moving fairly quickly, there’s a lot 
happening in the industry as there has been with short term issues with 
drought, restructuring and the deregulation issues we have actually had over 
the last couple of years. 
Section 0, Paragraph 47, 872 characters. 
And through the drought we were doing that every week almost.  We’d have a 
barbeque a week to see the farmers and just to hold their hand a little bit, so 
quite a bit of that. The board have joined in that process since I established it 
because it’s just a great two way communication with, you know, 30 or 40, and 
not too many in one hit and that works really well. But there are issues that 
come up at those meetings such as the one we had yesterday, there will be 
things like the prices at the store and the tanker going too fast down the track 
all the way through to share value issues or milk policy issues or milk price 
issues and dividend issues and whether we put in a dividend or whether we put 
in a milk price and so very much crosses the board and crosses the barrier 
between management and the board areas. So it’s good to have them there and 
to cover that too. 
Section 0, Paragraph 51, 469 characters. 
One of the beauties of having a store out the back is you can bump into 
shareholders every day and you know who you are working for, and that’s a 
great asset, keeps the focus - and the kids and their wives and you know 
whether they can buy the school clothes this year or not. All those things in the 
drought were obviously pretty emotional from that point of view. But you 
know why you are here and I think that’s a great thing and from a co-operative 
a huge strength. 
Section 0, Paragraph 90, 898 characters. 
When the anthrax event happened in 1997 in this region it was actually on [a 
director’s] property, his son’s property as well and other properties, but he was 
directly involved, and he’s also at the time the chairman of [case E] milk.  And 
so was making some comments on behalf of [case E] as well as on behalf of 
those farmers affected, which didn’t do the company’s management of their 
customers etc. that much good. And aligned the company straight to the 
problem too quickly and it’s been very strong since then 
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Appendix F Supplier-Shareholder-Needs/Benefits 
F-1 Income-Enhancement 
 
Document 'A2', 11 passages, 7693 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 10, 333 characters. 
One of the key indicators of, and this is in my personal opinion, of the success 
of the organisation is the sustainability of the earnings and therefore the payout 
back to the suppliers, the ability for those suppliers to grow their own 
businesses as opposed to perhaps a dividend or a share price or some other 
measures of success.  
Section 0, Paragraph 14, 369 characters. 
But we have what I would term a policy that we are a cooperative, we are in 
the business of collecting and processing our farm owners’ milk, we are in the 
business of adding value to that milk, so as a company we are in the business, 
or we have the policy if you like, of being in the business of collecting, 
processing, marketing and adding value to our farmers’ milk. 
Section 0, Paragraph 14, 478 characters. 
Our philosophy has been to, in some, at imperative time to restrict our milk 
growth, milk growth so that we are not investing our resources and capital, 
people time into the sheer processing of farmers’ milk but rather processing the 
milk that we have or that our existing farmers are currently giving to us and 
spending our time, energy and resources and capital on ways in which we can 
add value to that milk by creating specialised, high-value products based 
around dairying. 
Section 0, Paragraph 18, 609 characters. 
The share holders are farmer share holders, and farmers get paid for their work 
as farmers, by the payout, times the production or the number of kilograms of 
milk solids they produce less their on-farm costs, so the farmer earns his 
money by what the company pays them to kg of milk dollars multiplied by the 
number of milk solids he produces in a season less his on-farm costs.  So the 
farmer’s viability relates back to his net income on the farm, the company has 
the role and responsibility of processing that production and trying to 
maximise the price for that milk that the farmer gives to the company.  
338 
 
F-2 Risk-Reduction 
 
Document 'A4',  1 passages, 597 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 40, 597 characters. 
The shareholder owns the company, 100%, in a public company shareholders 
might have a portion of their income tied up in, of their assets tied up in a 
business through shareholding, but it’s rare that they would ever actually have 
so much money tied up in the company that their whole livelihood depends on 
it, whereas for a dairy farmer his whole livelihood depends on his company.  
So he’s got this vast amount of money tied up in his farm and he’s got all this 
money tied up in the company through shareholding and through his 
entitlement to supply, it just creates a different way of thinking. 
Document 'B1',  5 passages, 1563 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 6, 89 characters. 
The reason for being there is to protect the shareholders interests and their 
investment. 
Section 0, Paragraph 22, 207 characters. 
And so [case B] is really, [case B] co-op is really an extension of the farm and 
it’s just that we can do things more better collectively and processing the milk 
so it can be exported than we could individually. 
Section 0, Paragraph 22, 542 characters. 
My suggestion is that if the farmers could sell the milk at the farm gate and 
have the security that [case B] gives them, many of them would probably do 
that.  The only reason they go as part of the co-op is because they’re prepared 
to enter into a collective agreement because they know that a collective 
process, because they know that that’s how they’ll get their milk processed 
everyday and the security of that is worth a hell of a lot of money to them, 
more than what they would be concerned about whether their share value was 
x, y or z. 
Section 0, Paragraph 24, 176 characters. 
Manager, because their skills are much more transferable and farmers shifting 
their land and the farmers are very much and their investment is tied up very 
much in their land  
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F-3 Community 
 
Document 'B1',  4 passages, 1662 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 38, 62 characters. 
* B1:  Well we are definitely very much part of the community. 
Section 0, Paragraph 38, 198 characters. 
Because we live here and all the elected directors live here, there’s a sense of 
wanting to be part of the community and do well by the community so that’s 
just a given that we would feel that way.  
Section 0, Paragraph 38, 712 characters. 
Education, most farmers, most of our shareholders, have children and so 
education is very much dear to their hearts … the opportunity to maybe create 
employment here for their children, so at least they’ve got a choice of living 
here if they want to, which hasn’t been great in the past.  All of those things 
are quite important.  Schooling, picking - going into the local schools and 
sponsoring   them.  We have four scholarships at the moment for students 
going to university.  We hope to promote people to go on to do their Masters a 
little later, we haven’t got anyone at the moment doing that and we want to.  
We have a programme that we would actually promote a PhD if that was what 
they wanted to go down. 
Section 0, Paragraph 38, 690 characters. 
So community-wise, important part of the, I guess, culture of the company or 
the sort of - the spirit of what we do because we are a sustainable type business 
and one of the things we don’t want to do is in long term - and most of our 
investments are long term, whether they be on the farm or in the company.  So 
there’s a real will to be good employers, to be good citizens, to be a good 
corporate governance company.  And so it’s quite a proud - I guess in the size 
of what the community is, there’s a real pride within the company as having 
achieved what they are in a region which is not perceived to be one of the most 
forward going regions in the country.  So there’s a real pride here. 
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F-4 Collective-Action 
 
Document 'F4 Kevin Old,  4 passages, 2832 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 125, 580 characters. 
They certainly do have diverse interests. And all the board can do is try and 
balance those interests but always it has to be with the underlying best interests 
of the vehicle, being the co-operative, in mind. And ensuring that the vehicle, 
the co-operative is sustainable, both today and into the future. So sure, the 
board has to be very mindful of different needs and they are there and they are 
real, but it’s got to be very careful not to pander to one in particular.  In the end 
it’s got to be, the decision has got to be made in the best interests of the vehicle 
as a whole. 
Section 0, Paragraph 152, 831 characters. 
And the other one that’s big for us is to best represent the interests of the 
farmers, that's a key for a farmer or an agriculture based co-op.  You could 
argue every director in any business represents the shareholder, supposedly, 
but it is much more strong and compelling within our co-operative structure. 
That farmer’s interests, concerns and issues are properly represented and a 
balanced decision is made about concerns and issues that are raised by farmers.  
A co-op is very much about a culture, it is just not about the structure, a good 
co-op to me and if the co-op movement is going to survive and I hope it does 
for the sake of farmers that culture has got to be right. The farmers got to really 
feel and know the issues are being dealt with fairly and that there is something 
in it for him, it is worth hanging on for. 
Section 0, Paragraph 156, 875 characters. 
F.4. Absolutely, I’ve overlooked that but I was very - I wish I had of said that 
earlier it is a very important role for the board to me, is very important role, 
probably really  close to the top of the list you’ve made me think about it - is 
that getting into the community, working with the members, to drive a better 
understanding of what the co-op’s all about, and what's the co-op function, 
what it should mean to them why it is so important to protect it, that is a 
massive role for the directors I believe. If they believe in it, and I think usually 
if you are going to get onto the board in the first place you do, on the co-op, so 
yeah, big, big issue, big issue I think. We have got a saying at [case F] 
probably driven by [a director] which is good co-ops you don't know what you 
have got until it is gone, a rock bottom sign and so yeah that's a big point, big 
point. 
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Appendix G Supplier-Shareholder-Controls 
G-1 Vote 
 
Document 'F2  Kevin Old',  10 passages, 3424 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 18, 218 characters. 
The board may have the right selection of skills, it may have some really good 
footballers, it may have some really popular people, but they may not have 
been elected because of the skill needs of the particular co-op. 
Section 0, Paragraph 22, 269 characters. 
The board in most cases is elected by the people who are the farmers. So the 
farmers have a pretty good nose for people who will be good directors but they 
haven’t any idea whether or not the person they are electing has some special 
skills that are needed by the board. 
Section 0, Paragraph 26, 175 characters. 
We are guided by our constitution in that regard. I guess we could go to the 
farmers and say we want to stop having farmer directors being elected, we 
want a skill-based board. 
Section 0, Paragraph 26, 143 characters. 
The constitution of [case F] allows for two directors with special 
qualifications, two additional directors to be appointed with special skills.  
Section 0, Paragraph 28, 609 characters. 
But at the moment there are ten farmer directors elected from ten zones within 
[case F]. Again this is a strength and a weakness, the zoning system ensures 
that that person is known by the people who are doing the electing, we have 
farmers from South Australia to central New South Wales, to right across 
Victoria and if you have the entire 3,000 farmers electing those people they 
will be electing on a reputation and a piece of a paper that identifies what their 
skills are.  If you live within 50 to 80 kilometres of that person it is quite a lot 
more likely you will know something about that person’s skills. 
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G-2 Voice 
 
Document 'D2',  3 passages, 996 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 20, 294 characters. 
I think the members probably expect more from us because they know, they 
see that their product in the market place is worth so much more than the farm 
gate price.  So being value added I think complicates our relationship with the 
members.  They ask us are we doing a good enough job for them. 
Section 0, Paragraph 107, 359 characters. 
Our farmers historically have been very collective in their voice and their dairy 
industry groups, and had local meetings every month and they’re very well 
attended and their voice had outcomes because regulation is a political process, 
political concept you know, leverage is there increasing price in droughts and 
CPI adjustments and all this sort of stuff. 
Section 0, Paragraph 107, 343 characters. 
They still have got to vote for us, and we are still their representatives, but less 
interested in meetings and so on.  So I think we are good representatives Kevin 
obviously for some of us hopefully for most of us that’s why we are here 
because we are co-operators, growing through this representative system, we 
are interested in our farmers. 
Document 'D4',  1 passages, 187 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 48, 187 characters. 
With directors, and we have had them, confronted by a meeting in their town 
or their area or their district. They get a lot of questions, a lot of pressure from 
the average dairy farmer.  
Document 'E1',  1 passages, 472 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 60, 472 characters. 
One side understanding the other, you can imagine what that did to stem - 
because naturally the farmer sees [the MD] driving a Statesman, a director 
driving a Fairlane and all of that. So there’s - when we’re down we always 
strike at something and if it’s close to you and you think you own it because 
it’s a co-operative, you know, that understanding and the understanding shown 
by the staff means a hell of a lot.  I know we get a bit passionate about that at 
this little place. 
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G-3 Exit 
 
Document 'B2', 1 passages, 131 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 58, 131 characters. 
* B2:   Well I think it’s important not so much to keep them on board because 
it’s difficult for them to jump off the ship [laughter] 
Document 'B3', 1 passages, 715 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 36, 715 characters. 
You know it becomes, if you just take even for example like, you know, I’ve 
watched, seen what’s happened in the Manawatu, Rangitiki area with this 
latest terrible floods and a number of dairy farmers are talking about exiting.  
They’re taking short-term views.  They’re saying well lets have the cash for 
selling my shares in [another co-operative].  I need that.  This is one of the 
problems of a co-operative, at times when it does happen.  If they can get cash 
out easily and there’s a large value put alongside that, then they’ll want to go.  
Now I’ve seen that because you can imagine, here I was at one time myself, 
very much promoting the approach of farmers owning a business.  And they 
abandon it.  They took the money. 
Document 'D1', 2 passages, 854 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 52, 709 characters. 
Foreign exchange is a good example, where as [another dairy company] for 
reasons that are suitable for [it], I believe, go to a 15 month because if they get 
it wrong they don’t lose their farmers, because their next biggest competitor 
doesn’t exist to take the farmers whilst they recover from the 15 month.  That 
situation doesn’t apply in Australia, if you hedge too far and you get it wrong 
and your competitor for supply doesn’t get it wrong then you lose supply and 
that has profound impact and you only have to ask [a defunct co-operative] 
about that having lost 800 million litres to [this co-operative] for pretty well 
that reason over a two year period, therefore any changes in fundamental 
policies has to be approved by the board.  
Section 0, Paragraph 64, 145 characters. 
 Large farmer with a large number of shares and no next of kin to take over the 
farm - he has got a certain attitude which is more exit focussed. 
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Appendix H Board Architecture 
H-1 Individual-Distinctions 
 
Document 'C2',  19 passages, 11950 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 24, 409 characters. 
Traditionally co-operatives - and when you end up with a farmer dominated 
board, you come from a very, very restricted background. Whether you like it 
or not we mightn’t like to think that but we really do, we are different people, 
the nine farmer directors there but we do come from a pretty standard sort-of-a 
background. So I think that the board would encourage management to really 
to test the boundaries. 
Section 0, Paragraph 28, 240 characters. 
Obviously, the board - appointed directors play a key role. And in looking for 
our four directors, we specifically look for maybe a couple of compliance type 
directors, general practitioners and a couple of more worldly global view 
people. 
Section 0, Paragraph 36, 413 characters. 
The appointment of the directors. The appointments and remunerations 
committee, which is chaired by the chairman of the company, will set out the 
scope with the A, R and D committee will set up a scope for a search firm. We 
usually use a search firm for our appointed directors - not necessarily, or it 
might even be that we use a search firm but we provide one or two names to 
perhaps go into that hat as well.  
Section 0, Paragraph 38, 556 characters. 
Now it would also canvas board members outside of the appointment and 
remuneration committee and I think that we would also canvas senior 
management about some of the things that they think would add to the board 
diversity as well.  You don't know what you don't know.  I am not saying that 
we would pander to management, and I am not saying that management leads 
the company at all but don't think you have all the answers. So I guess you ask 
management, senior management’s view and then you choose whether you 
want to take those matters on board or not. 
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H-2 Engagement-Forums 
 
Document 'F2  Kevin Old’  3 passages, 2333 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 68, 856 characters. 
F.2. [The chair] and I are the only two members on the Remuneration 
Committee which has a role of setting or recommending to the board the salary 
for the CEO and as part of our discussions we discuss the succession of the 
company with [the MD]. Now the board has asked several times what happens 
if the big red bus comes along and knocks over the CEO, what are the plans 
that are in place and we have discussed that with [the MD] and we believe that 
it depends entirely on the age of your CEO, if you have a CEO who is 55-60 it 
is pretty important that there be someone fairly close at hand or there is a very 
clear path ready in case.  [The MD] is still very young, he is only in his early 
40’s and so therefore, we don't see that there is a need to have a deputy 
Managing Director sitting in a chair behind him because we don't think that 
that's the way to have logical succession. 
Section 0, Paragraph 86, 1011 characters. 
In the board meetings we get a series of reports by people who normally report 
to the Managing Director; the Marketing Manager, the Trading Stores 
Manager, the Export Sales Manager, a series of managers walk into the 
boardroom and have given us a written report to study several days before in 
our agenda papers. Some of them read that, some of them take it as read and 
ask for questions and in that way they are very open to us asking any questions 
to that level of management that we like.  The Managing Director is usually 
there and if there is any clarification as to what this director might have said or 
done or what they have done they are usually quite - the Managing Director 
doesn't get many surprises out of his managers reporting to the board. So when 
you say are we monitoring management to that extent we are making sure that 
the managers and the Managing Director, we are not getting all of our 
information on how the company is running from one person, we are getting it 
from a series of people. 
Section 0, Paragraph 94, 466 characters. 
The Audit Committee for instance may meet at a different time to the board 
meeting. Because of the immense amount of travel a lot of the committees of 
the board meet the day before the board, or tomorrow we are going to have a 
meeting the day after a board for one of the committees. So that happens, but 
not very often, the majority of the work is done at that today session at the 
board meeting. [Note: The interview was conducted on the evening of a board 
meeting] 
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H-3 Dynamics 
 
Document 'A4',  17 passages, 20739 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 4, 417 characters. 
The governing board in accordance with the laws of the country through the 
Companies’ Act is charged with the task of managing the company and of 
course for that task it delegates that role as it’s able to do under the legislation, 
to a chief executive so that’s the role that I fulfil then is to be the primary 
conduit, primary contact point between the board of directors and the company 
in its day to day workings. 
Section 0, Paragraph 6, 243 characters. 
It seems to me that one of the great attractions of the co-operative is that, is the 
element of teamwork that goes with the co-operative.  I always think of the 
managers and the directors of the company really functioning as an integrated 
team.  
Section 0, Paragraph 6, 1204 characters. 
The directors are not in a position to manage the company day to day, that’s 
not expected of them.  They come together once a month for the formal 
process of considering board papers.  It’s really up to the management to make 
sure that the company tasks are attended to day by day, but I can’t do my job 
unless I know, unless I’ve got the confidence of the board.  I often say that one 
of the single most important assets that I can have is the trust and the 
confidence of the board in me because if they trust what I and the team do then 
it does make the overall conduct of the company so much more 
straightforward, so we really, I think, as management and directors together 
have to strive for a common purpose. That common purpose clearly has to be 
the enhancement of the prosperity of the shareholders and in so doing 
providing worthy and rewarding career paths for the staff who work here.  So 
to me it all comes down to partnership.  It’s a partnership between the skills 
that the managers bring and the governance, oversight and wisdom that the 
board of directors can bring and those things working together really in my 
view constitute the partnership that is necessary for the company to progress. 
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Appendix I Board Roles 
I-1 Unite 
 
Document 'E4', 14 passages, 14559 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 3, 806 characters. 
In my experience with other boards that co-operative boards have a lot more 
exposure in is the shareholders. And in fact many of the board members of 
course are not independent as such, they are farmers as well and in 
representing that there is a lot more interface and direct involvement in 
shareholder relations because it is supplier relations and other farmers and 
whatever. So there is always a little bit of a cross over between what’s a milk 
supply issue versus what’s a shareholder issue. Those two things are always 
grey in a co-operative in the milk industry and I am not so sure it’s such a bad 
thing either. I think it helps with the communication and keeping everyone 
focussed on what they are here for so - but that is a bit of a difference I find 
from other listed companies sort of boards. 
Section 0, Paragraph 43, 230 characters. 
That’s one of our risks in fact; there is a gap between what the company 
requires and what the company does and the understanding of that from 
shareholders. And we try and communicate as much as we possibly can but it’s 
a huge gap. 
Section 0, Paragraph 47, 1124 characters. 
E4:  Management do quite a bit and myself personally and our field staff of 
course. But I have meetings monthly and then we have our major regional 
meetings and then we have our AGM and that sort of thing. But monthly in 
small groups around the farms. And through the drought we were doing that 
every week almost.  We’d have a barbeque a week to see the farmers and just 
to hold their hand a little bit, so quite a bit of that. The board have joined in 
that process since I established it because it’s just a great two way 
communication with, you know, 30 or 40, and not too many in one hit and that 
works really well. But there are issues that come up at those meetings such as 
the one we had yesterday, there will be things like the prices at the store and 
the tanker going too fast down the track all the way through to share value 
issues or milk policy issues or milk price issues and dividend issues and 
whether we put in a dividend or whether we put in a milk price and so very 
much crosses the board and crosses the barrier between management and the 
board areas. So it’s good to have them there and to cover that too. 
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I-2 Strategic-Involvement 
 
Document 'C3 Kevin Old',  10 passages, 7836 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 44, 599 characters. 
As you know [case C] has a series of strategic themes, that, they were put in 
place virtually at the outset of [case C]. We’ve since been through a refresh but 
that was pretty much tinkering at the margins.  Those strategic themes were 
essentially reinforced as a result of the strategic review.  There is a process 
therefore, at the very highest level, for revisiting every year or two the strategic 
framework and making sure that the themes and the goals are consistent with 
where the company needs to be going in a business sense and which are 
consistent with shareholder aspirations for the company. 
Section 0, Paragraph 46, 1037 characters. 
There is a lot of work goes on in any company, [case C] is a very good 
example, of issues which are strategic in nature, but they are not actually 
captured in the formal strategic planning process.  I’m talking typically about 
projects which, while they involve delivering on strategic themes or 
imperatives are more opportunistic because they arise at times unexpectedly.  
For example, a large company, perhaps a listed company may have its 
shareholding register destabilised. Maybe a large shareholder in that company 
says it wants to exit the register, wants to put a 40% shareholding on the block, 
and some investment bankers might turn up at [case C] saying well, here’s a 
chance to get a 40% interest in XYZ - cost a billion dollars.  So this is an 
example of something that wasn’t actually in the strategic plans specifically, 
but the actual positioning of this company, its business model, the particular 
market segment that it’s in is absolutely 100% consistent with [case C’s] 
strategic goals and one or more of the strategic themes. 
Section 0, Paragraph 48, 1713 characters. 
That kind of situation will then lead to a number of iterations inside of [case 
C].  First of all management will prepare a paper outlining the opportunity, it 
will be at quite a high level, it will come to the board for a preliminary, in 
principle agreement as to whether in fact management should commit 
significant resource to evaluating the opportunity to establish whether it should 
go forward or not.  Now the purpose of that paper of course will be to make 
sure that the board is satisfied that in fact is on strategy, that it is consistent 
with where [case C] should be heading.  There will be a very high level 
strategic discussion about it that will actually carry into a process discussion. 
What impact does it have on the balance sheet, can we finance it, what impact 
will it have short term on payout, what impact long term, all those sort of ...  
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I-3 Control 
 
Document 'C1 Kevin Old',  23 passages, 10434 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 7, 388 characters. 
Secondly also the hiring and the removal of the Chief Executive and thirdly, 
monitoring the business against the budget, and for [case C] also our three year 
business plan. And then the other responsibilities are in the areas of regulatory 
which I call Occupational, Health and Safety and those compliance sort issues. 
So it is compliance, it’s monitoring the business, it’s hiring, firing. 
Section 0, Paragraph 13, 184 characters. 
Strategy. And that's done in conjunction with management, so it is not the 
board doing it without management, and it is not management bringing a 
recommendation and the board stamping. 
Section 0, Paragraph 19, 52 characters. 
The management is actually accountable to the board. 
Section 0, Paragraph 21, 635 characters. 
Just as an example, all these things are public, we made a 100% takeover bid 
for National Foods in Australia which is part of our Australian strategy. We 
had a due diligence committee, that took a really deep dive into not only the 
process but the base assumptions, the model that drove the valuations, and the 
tactics. So management always had an interface with a subcommittee of the 
board, so they could still actually drive the day to day tactics.  We do structure 
[case C] in that sub committees are formed if there are fundamental issues 
around capital structure, around milk pricing, or any, what we consider risks to 
the business. 
Section 0, Paragraph 23, 541 characters. 
It is the big fundamentals, like if it’s a two billion dollar acquisition, if it is 
fundamentally changing the capital structure of the co-operative, if it is 
changing the control mechanism of the co-operative like the governance or if 
there is fundamental change at the interface with the shareholders, there are 
subcommittees set up to deal with those things. And it is that subcommittee, it 
cannot make decisions, but it recommends to the board and that gives the 
board the confidence that a lot of the details are actually thrashed out.  
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I-4 Serve 
 
Document 'C3 Kevin Old',  11 passages, 5104 characters. 
Section 0, Paragraph 6, 94 characters. 
In most respects, the monitoring and mentoring role is at the heart of what a 
board has to do. 
Section 0, Paragraph 6, 151 characters. 
In other words, the monitoring of performance and the mentoring of executives 
and the provision of oversight around strategic outcomes and imperatives.  
Section 0, Paragraphs 61-63, 580 characters. 
I think that is the way it goes, certainly in good companies.  I don't think the 
board is close enough to, in a very big complicated company, to superimpose a 
strategy on the basis of a day a week or whatever time the average director puts 
in.  So it has to be symbiotic and iterative. That said its pretty poor if a board 
can't actually from their lofty vantage point up there in a helicopter, not bogged 
down in the day to day issues, if they can't add some value and provide some 
constructive strategic thinking. It certainly is what I see at [case C], I do see 
that happening. 
Section 0, Paragraph 105, 533 characters. 
Yeah, well I mean it is just a bit of shorthand for me, I mean to say I think 
directors have to see themselves as both mentors and monitors.  We are a bit 
two-hatted because they can get into conflict. But if you only monitor all the 
time and you are continually pulling people up and growling and you say why 
haven’t you achieved this, and why are they into this, and why did we spend 
on that, and what happened to the budget this month, and why isn't the payout 
higher it is only a question of time before everything hits the fan.   
Section 0, Paragraph 107, 1141 characters. 
Mentoring I think is where directors add value to management. And I think 
there are two or three elements to this, one is managers are often under a lot of 
pressure and a lot of stress, managers work very hard, they do their best, but 
they are, whether we like it or not there is a lot of crisis fire fighting going on 
in everyday life for every manager.  And a director has the luxury of being in 
the helicopter, he doesn't have to deal with that, and can keep his or her head 
clear for the big picture. The chairman provides that role, with that perspective 
with the CEO ...  
